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p.  150, note  158.  Add to what  is  said of  the opinions of  Baldus 
the following :- 
'But in Rubr. C.  10, I, nr.  12,  he holds that the camera imjerii 
may in a secondary sense be said to belong to the Roman people; 
quia princeps repraesentat illum populum et ille populus imperium 
etiam, mortuo principa' 
HAD  what  is  here  translated, namely,  a brief  account  of  the 
political theories of  the Middle Ages, appeared as a whole book, it 
would  hardly have stood  in  need  of  that distorting medium, an 
English translation.  Englishmen who were approaching the study 
of medieval politics, either from the practical or from the theoretical 
side, would have known  that there was a  book  which  they would 
do well  to master, and many who  were  not professed  students or 
whose interests lay altogether in modern  times would  have heard 
of  it and have found it profitable.  The elaborate notes would have 
shewn that its writer had read widely and deeply; they would also 
have guided explorers into a  region where  sign-posts are too few. 
As to the text, the last charge which  could  be  made against  it 
would  be  that  of  insufficient  courage  in  generalization, unless 
indeed  it  were  that  of  aimless  tnedievalism.  The  outlines  are 
large, the strokes are firm, and medieval appears as an introduction 
to  modern  thought.  The ideas  that  are to possess  and  divide 
mankind  from  the  sixteenth  until  the  nineteenth  century- 
Sovereignty,  the  Sovereign  Ruler,  the  Sovereign  People,  the 
Representation  of  the  People,  the  Social  Contract, the Natural 
Rights of  Man, the Divine Rights of  Kings, the Positive Law that 
stands below  the State, the Natural  Law that stands above  the 
State-these  are the ideas whose  early history is to be detected, 
and they are set before us as thoughts which, under the influence of 
Classical Antiquity, necessarily shaped themselves in the course of 
medieval  debate.  And if  the thoughts are interesting, so too are 
the thinkers.  In Dr Gierke's list of  medieval publicists, beside the 
divines  and  schoolmen,  stand  great  popes,  great  lawyers,  great 
reformers, men  who  were  clothing  concrete  projects  in  abstract Viii  Political Theories of  the Middle  Age. 
men  who  fashioned  the facts  as well  as the theories  of 
their time. 
Moreover, Englishmen  should be especially grateful to a guide 
who  is  perhaps  at his strongest just  where  they must  needs  be 
weak:  that is, among the books  of  the legists and canonists.  An 
educated Englishman may read and enjoy what Dante or Marsiglio 
has written.  An English scholar may face Aquinas or Ockham or 
even the repellent Wyclif  But Baldus and Bartolus, Innocentius 
and Johannes Andreae, them he has never  been  taught to tackle, 
and they are not to be tackled by the untaught.  And yet they 
are important people, for political philosophy in its youth is apt to 
look like a sublimated jurisprudence, and, even when  it has grown 
in vigour and stature, is  often compelled  or content to work with 
tools-a  social contract for example-which  have been sharpened, 
if  not  forged, in the legal smithy.  In that smithy Dr Gierke is at 
home.  With perfect  modesty  he could say to a learned  German 
public 'It is not probable that for  some time to come anyone will 
tread exactly the same road  that I  have trodden in long years of 
fatiguing toil.' 
But then what  is  here translated is only a small, a twentieth, 
part of a large and as yet unfinished book bearing a title which can 
hardly  attract  many  readers  in  this  country  and  for  which  an 
English  equivalent  cannot  easily  be  found,  namely Das  deutsche 
Genossenschafts~ecclzt  Of  that work  the  third  volume  contains  a 
section entitled Die publicistischen Lehren des Mittelalters, and that 
is the section  which  is here done into English.  Now though this 
section can be detached and still bear a high value, and though the 
author's  permission  for  its detachment has been  graciously given, 
still it would be untrue to say that this amputating process does no 
harm.  The organism which  is  a whole with a life of  its own, but 
is  also  a  member  of  a  larger and higher  organism  whose  life  it 
shares, this, so Dr Gierke  will teach us, is  an idea which we must 
keep before our minds when we are studying the political  thought 
of the Middle Ages, and it is an idea which we  may apply to his 
and to every good book.  The section has a life of  its own, but it 
also  shares  the  life  of  the whole  treatise.  Nor  only  so; it  is 
membrum  de  menzbro.  It is a  section in  a  chapter entitled  'The 
Medieval  Doctrine of  State and  Corporation,'  which  stands in  a 
volume entitled '  The Antique and Medieval Doctrine of  State and 
Transd~t~r's  Introdztctio~z.  ix  - 
Corporation and its Reception in Germany';  and this again is part 
of  Das  deutsche  Genossenschaftsrec/zt.  Indeed  our  section  is  a 
member  of  a  highly  organized  system,  and  in  that  section  are 
sentences  and paragraphs  which  will  not yield  their full meaning 
except to those who know something of  the residue  of  the book 
and  something also  of  the controversial  atmosphere  in  which  a 
certain  Genosse?zsc/znftst/zeo~ie  has been unfolding itself.  This being 
so, the intervention  of  a translator who  has read the whole  book, 
who has read many parts of  it many times, who deeply admires it, 
may be of  service.  In a short introduction, even if his own steps 
are none too sure, he may be  able to conduct some of  his fellow- 
countrymen  towards  a  point  of  view  which  commands  a  wide 
prospect  of  history  and human  affairs. 
Staats-  und  Ko~po~ationslehre-the  Doctrine  of  State  and 
Corporation.  Such  a  title  may  be  to some  a  stumbling-block 
set  before  the  threshold.  A  theory  of  the  State, so  it  might 
be  said,  may  be  very  interesting  to  the  philosophic  few  and 
fairly interesting  to the intelligent  many, but a  doctrine of  Cor- 
porations,  which  probably  speaks  of  fictitious  personality  and 
similar  artifices, can  only  concern  some  juristic  speculators,  of 
whom  there are none or next to none in this country.  On second 
thoughts, however, we  may be  persuaded  to see here no  rock  of 
offence  but  rather  a  stepping-stone  which  our  thoughts  should 
sometimes traverse.  For, when  all  is  said, there seems to be a 
genus of  which  State and Corporation are species.  They seem to 
be permanently organized groups of  men ; they seem to be group- 
units ; we  seem to attribute acts and intents, rights and wrongs to 
these groups, to these units.  Let it be allowed  that the State is a 
highly  peculiar  group-unit ; still  it  may  be  asked  whether  we 
ourselves are not the slaves of  a jurist's  theory and a little behind 
the age of Darwin if  between the State and all other groups we fix 
an  immeasurable  gulf  and  ask  ourselves  no questions  about  the 
origin  of species.  Certain it is  that our medieval  history will go 
astray, our history of  Italy and Germany will go far astray, unless 
we  can  suffer communities  to acquire  and  lose  the character of 
States somewhat  easily, somewhat insensibly, or rather unless  we 
know  and feel that we must not thrust our modern 'State- 
as a German would call it, upon the reluctant material. 
Englishmen  in  particular  should  sometimes  give  themselves PoZiticaZ  Theories of  the MMe  Age. 
this  warning,  and  not  only  for  the  sake  of  the  Middle  Ages.- 
Fortunate in  littleness  and insularity, England could soon exhibit  ~ 
as a difference in kind  what elsewhere was a  difference in degree, 
namely,  to  use  medieval  terms,  the  difference  between  a  com- 
munity or  corporation  (universitas) which  does  and  one which 
1  does  not  'recognize  a  superior.'  There was  no  likelihood  that  ~ 
the England which  the Norman  duke had subdued and surveyed 
be  either Staatenbund  or Bundesstaat,  and  the aspiration 
~  of  Londoners  to  have  'no king  but  the  mayor'  was  fleeting. 
I  This, if  it diminished  our  expenditure  of  blood  and treasure- 
I  an expenditure that impoverishes-diminished  also our expendi-  ~ 
ture  of  thought-an  expenditure  that  enriches-and  facilitated 
(might  this  not  be said ?) a  certain  thoughtlessness  or  poverty 
of rideas.  The State  that  Englishmen  knew  was  a  singularly  ~  unicellular  State, and  at a  critical  time they were  not too well 
equipped with tried and traditional thoughts which would meet the 
case of Ireland or of some communities, commonwealths, corpora- 
tions in America which seemed to have wills-and  hardly fictitious 
I  wills-of  their own, and which  became States and United States'. 
The medieval  Empire  laboured  under  the  weight  of  an  incon- 
gruously simple theory so soon as lawyers were teaching that the 
Kaiser was  the Princeps  of  Justinian's  law-books.  The modern 
and multicellular British State-often  and perhaps harmlessly called  ~  an Empire-may  prosper without a  theory, but does not suggest 
~ 
and,  were  we  serious  in  our  talk  of  sovereignty,  would  hardly 
tolerate, a  theory that is simple enough and insular enough, and 
yet withal imperially Roman enough, to deny an essentially state- 
like  character  to  those  'self-governing  colonies,'  communities, 
commonwealths, which  are knit and welded into a larger sovereign 
whole.  The adventures of  an English joint-stock company which 
I  happed  into a  rulership  of  the Indies, the adventures of  another 
English company which  while its charter was  still very  new  had 
become  the puritan  commonwealth  of  Massachusett's  Bay should 
See the remarks  of  Sir C.  Ilbert, The Government  of  India,  p.  55:  'Both  the 
theory  and the experience were  lacking which  are requisite for adapting English insti- 
tutions  to new  and  foreign  circumstances.  For want  of  such experience England was 
destined to lose her colonies  in the Western  hemisphere.  For want of  it mistakes were 
committed  which  imperilled  the empire  she was  building  up in the East.'  The want 
of  a theory about  Ireland which would have mediated between  absolute dependence  and 
I 
absolute independence was the origin of  many evils. 
TransZator's Igtrod'uction.  xi 
be enough to shew that our popular English  Staatslehre if, instead 
of analyzing the contents of  a speculative jurist's  mind, it seriously 
grasped  the facts of  English history, would shew some inclination 
to become a Korporatio?zsZehre also. 
Even  as it is,  such a  tendency is plainly to be seen in  many 
zones.  Standing on  the  solid  ground  of  positive  law  and  legal 
we confess the king of  this country to be a '  corporation 
sole,' and, if  we  have  any curiosity,  ought to wonder  why  in  the 
sixteenth century the old idea that the king is the head  of  a 'cor- 
poration  aggregate of  many1'  gave way  before  a  thought which 
classed him along with the parish parson of  decadent ecclesiastical 
law  under  one  uncomfortable  rubric.  Deeply convinced  though 
our lawyers may be that individual  men  are the only '  real ' and 
'  natural' persons, they are compelled to find some phrase which 
places State and  Man  upon  one level.  'The greatest of  artificial 
persons, politically speaking, is  the State':  so we  may read  in  an 
excellent First Book of  Jurisprudencea.  Ascending from the legal 
plain, we are in a middle region where a sociology emulous of  the 
physical  sciences  discourses  of  organs  and organisms and social 
tissue, and cannot sever by sharp lines the natural history  of the 
state-group from the natural history of  other groups.  Finally, we 
are among the summits of  philosophy and observe how a doctrine, 
which makes some way in England, ascribes to the State, or, more 
vaguely, the Community, not only a  real will, but even 'the'  real 
will, and it must occur to us  to ask whether what is thus affirmed 
in the case of the State can be denied in the case of other organized 
groups : for example, that considerable group the Roman Catholic 
Church.  It seems possible  to one who can only guess, that even 
now-a-days  a  Jesuit  may think that the will  of  the Company to 
which he belongs  is no less real than the will of  any State, and, if 
the reality of  this will be granted by the philosopher, can he pause 
until  even  the so-called one-man-company has  a  real  will  really 
distinct from the several wills  of  the one man and his six humble 
associates?  If  we  pursue  that thought,  not  only will  our  philo- 
sophic  Staatslehre  be  merging itself  in  a  wider  doctrine, but we 
shall already  be deep in  the Ge7zossenschaftstheorie.  In any case, 
however,  the  law's  old  habit  of  co-ordinating  men  and '  bodies 
A late instance of  this old concept occurs in Plowden's Commentaries, 234. 
a  Pollock, First Book of Jurisprudence,  I r 3. xii  Political  Theories of the Middle Age. 
politic' as two kinds of Persons seems to deserve the close attention 
of the modern  philosopher, for, though  it be  an old habit, it has 
become vastly more important in  these last years than it ever was 
before.  In the second  half  of  the nineteenth  century  corporate 
groups  of  the most  various  sorts have  been  multiplying  all  the 
world  over  at a  rate  that far  outstrips  the increase  of  'natural 
persons,'  and a large share of  all our newest law is law concerning 
corporations1.  Something not unworthy of  philosophic discussion 
would seem to lie in this quarter: either some deep-set truth which 
is always bearing fresh fruit, or else a surprisingly stable product of 
mankind's  propensity to feign.-Howbeit,  this rare atmosphere we 
do not easily breathe and therefore will  for a while follow a lower 
road. 
A  large part in  the volume  that lies  before  the translator  is 
played  by 'the  Reception.'  When we  speak of  the Renaissance 
and the Reformation we  need  not be at pains to name what was 
reformed or what was born anew, and even  so a German historian 
will  speak  of  the  Reception  when  he  means  the  Reception  of 
Roman law.  Very often Renaissance, Reformation and Reception 
will  be  set before  us  as three  intimately  connected  and almost 
equally important  movements which  sever modern from  medieval 
history.  Modern  Germany  has  attained  such  a  pre-eminence 
in the study of  Roman law, that we in  England  may be pardoned 
for forgetting that of  Roman law medieval Germany was innocent 
and  ignorant, decidedly  more  innocent  and  more  ignorant  than 
was  the England  of  the thirteenth  century.  It is  true  that  in 
Germany the theoretical continuity  of  the Empire was providing 
a base for the argument that the law of  Justinian's  books  was  or 
ought to be  the law of  the land; it is also true that the Corpus 
Iuris was furnishing weapons useful to Emperors who were at strife 
with Popes ; but those weapons were fashioned and wielded chiefly 
by  Italian  hands,  and  the  practical  law  of  Germany  was  as 
German as it well could  be.  Also-and  here lay the possibility of 
In  1857  an American judge went the length of saying 'It is probably true that more 
corporations were  created by  the legislature  of  Illinois  at its last  session  than  existed 
in the whole  civilized  world  at the commencement  of  the present  century.'  Dillon, 
Municipal Corporations, § 37 a. 
Trazsdatov's 1ntroa'~ction.  xu1  .  .  . 
a catastrophe-it  was not learned law, it was not taught law, it was 
far from  being Juristenrecht.  Englishmen are wont to fancy that 
the law of  Germany must needs savour of  the school, the lecture 
room, the professor ;  but in truth it was just because German law 
savoured  of  nothing of  the kind, but rather of  the open air, oral 
tradition  and thoroughly unacademic  doomsmen  that the law of 
Germany ceased to be German and that German law has had to be 
disinterred by modern professors.  Of the geographical and histori- 
cal causes of  the difference we need not speak, but in England we 
see a very early concentration of justice and then the rapid growth 
of a legal profession.  The  Year Books follow and the Inns of  Court 
and lectures on English law and scholastic exercises and that 'call to 
the bar' of the Inn which is in fact an academically earned degree. 
Also long before Germany had universities, Roman law was  being 
taught  at  Oxford  and  Cambridge,  so that  it would  not  come 
hither with  the glamour of  the  Renaissance.  A  certain  modest 
place had been assigned to it in the English scheme of  life ;  some 
knowledge of  it was necessary to the students of  the lucrative law 
of  the  Church, and  a  few  civilians  were  required  for  what  we 
should call  the diplomatic service of  the realm.  But  already in 
the fourteenth  century Wyclif, the schoolman, had  urged  that if 
law was  to be taught in  the English  universities  it ought to be 
English  law.  In words which  seem  prophetic  of  modern  'Ger- 
manism'  he  protested  that English  was  as just,  as reasonable, as 
subtle, as was  Roman jurisprudence1. 
Thus when  the perilous  time came,  when  the New  Learning 
was in the air and the Modern State was emerging in the shape of 
the Tudor Monarchy, English law was and had long been lawyers' 
law, learned law, taught law,Juristenrecizt.  Disgracefully barbarous, 
so thought one enlightened apostle of the New Learning.  Reginald 
Pole-and  his  advice  was  brought to his  royal  cousin-was  for 
sweeping  it  away.  In so many  words  he  desired  that  England 
should  'receive' the civil law  of  the Romans :  a  law  so civil  that 
Nature's  self  might  have dictated  it and a  law that was being re- 
ceived in all well governed lands2.  We must not endeavour to tell 
Wyclif,  De Officio  Regis  (ed.  Pollard and  Sayle,  1887),  p.  193:  'Sed non  credo 
quod  plus  viget  in  Romana civilitate  subtilitas racionis  sive iusticia  quam in civilitate 
Anglicana.' 
2  Starkey's England (Early Eng. Text Soc.  1878),  192-5. xiv  Political  Theories of the Middle Age 
the  story of the danger that beset  English law when  the future 
Cardinal  Archbishop was  speaking thus: a  glance towards  Scot- 
land would shew us that the danger was serious enough and would 
have been far more serious but for the continuous existence of  the 
Inns of  Court, and that indoctissimam genus doctissimorunz komz- 
which was bred therein.  Then late in the sixteenth century 
began  the  wonderful  resuscitation  of  medieval  learning  which 
attains  its  completion  in  the books  and  acts of  Edward  Coke. 
The political  side  of  this  movement  is  the best  known.  Anti- 
quarian research appears for a while as the guardian and renovator 
of national liberties, and the men who lead the House of Commons 
are becoming always more deeply versed in long-forgotten records. 
However, be it noted  that even  in  England a  certain  amount of 
foreign  theory  was  received,  and  by  far  the  most  remarkable 
in4tance is the reception of  that Italian Theory of the Corporation 
of  which  Dr Gierke is the historian, and which  centres round  the 
phrase persona Pcta.  It  slowly stole from the ecclesiastical courts, 
which  had much to say about the affairs of religious corporations, 
into  our  temporal  courts,  which,  though  they  had  long  been 
dealing  with  English group-units,  had  no home-made  theory  to 
oppose  to the  subtle and  polished  invader.  This  instance  may 
help us  to understand  what  happened  in  Germany,  where  the 
native law had not reached  the doctrinal  stage of  growth, but was 
still rather 'folk  law' than lawyers' law and was  dissipating itself 
in countless local customs. 
Italian  doctrine  swept  like  a  deluge  over  Germany.  The 
learned doctors from the new universities whom the Princes called 
to their councils, could explain everything in a Roman or would-be 
Roman  sense.  Those  Princes  were  consolidating  their  powers 
into a  (by  Englishmen  untranslatable)  Landeshokeit:  something 
that was less than modern sovereignty, for it still would  have the 
Empire above it,  but  more  than  feudal  seignory  since  classical 
thoughts  about  'the  State'  were  coming  to  its  aid.  It is 
noticeable that, except in his  hereditary dominions, the Emperor 
profited  little  by  that  dogma  of  continuity which  served  as an 
apology for the Reception.  The disintegrating  process was  so far 
advanced  that  not  the  Kaiser  but the  Fiirst  appeared  as 'the 
Prince'  of  political  theory and the Princeps of  the Corpus  Iuris. 
The doctors  could  teach  such  a  prince  much  that  was  to  his 
- 
advantage.  Beginning late in the fifteenth century the movement 
accomplished  itself  in  the  sixteenth.  It is  catastrophic  when 
with the slow and silent process whereby the customary 
law of  northern  France was  partially  romanized.  No  legislator 
had  said  that  Roman  law  had  been  or was  to be  received  in 
Germany; the work  was  done not by lawgivers  but by lawyers, 
and from age to age there remained  some room  for controversy as 
to the exact position  that the Corpus Iuris occupied  among the 
various  sources of  law actual and potential.  Still the broad  fact 
remains that Germany had bowed her neck to the Roman yoke. 
In theory what was  received was the law of  Justinian's  books. 
In practice  what was  received  was  the system which  the Italian 
commentators had  long  been  elaborating.  Dr Gierke frequently 
insists  that this is an important difference.  In Italy the race of 
glossators  who  were  sincerely  endeavouring  to  discover  the 
meaning of classical texts had given way to a race of commentators 
whose work was more or less controlled by a desire for  ~ractically 
acceptable results, and who therefore were disposed  to accommo- 
date Roman law to medieval life.  Our author says that especially 
in  their  doctrine  of  corporations or  communities  there  is  much 
that is not Roman, and much that may be called Germanic.  This 
facilitated the Reception : Roman law  had  gone half-way to meet 
the facts that it was  to govern.  Then again, at a  later time the 
influence  of  what  we  may  call  the  'natural'  school  of  jurists 
smoothed  away some  of  the contrasts between  Roman  law  and 
German  habit.  If  in  the eyes of  an  English  lawyer systems of 
Natural  Law are apt  to  look  suspiciously  Roman, the modern 
Romanist will complain  that when  and where such systems were 
being  constructed  concrete  Rome  was  evaporating  in  abstract 
Reason, and some modern Germanists will  teach  us  that 'Nature 
Right'  often served  as the protective  disguise  of  repressible  but 
ineradicable Germanic ideas. 
With the decadence of  Nature Right and the advent  of  'the 
historical  school' a  new  chapter began.  Savigny's  teaching had 
sides.  We are accustomed to think of him, and rightly, as the 
herald  of  evolution,  the  man  who  substitutes  development  for 
manufacture,  organism  for  mechanism,  natural  laws  for  Natural 
Law,  the man who is nervously afraid  lest a  code should impede 
the beautiful processes of  gradual growth.  But then he was  also .  Podil'icnZ Theories of  the Middle Age. 
the great Romanist, the great dogmatist, the expounder of classical 
texts according to their true-which  must be their original-intent 
and meaning,  There was no good, he seemed to say, in playing at 
being Roman.  If the Common  Law of  Germany was Roman law, 
it ought to be the law of  the Digest, not the law of  glossators or 
commentators or 'natural'  speculators.  This teaching, so we are 
told,  bore  fruit  in  the  practical  work  of  German  courts.  They 
began  to take the  Corpus  Iuris  very  seriously and to withdraw 
concessions  that  had  been  made-some  will  say to national  life 
and modern  fact, others will say to slovenly thought and slipshod 
practice. 
But  that  famous  historical  school  was  not  only  a  school  of 
historically  minded  Romanists.  It was  also  the  cradle  of  Ger- 
manism.  Eichhorn  and  Grimm  stood  by Savigny's  side.  Every 
&rap  and  fragment  of  old  German law  was  to be lovingly and 
scientifically recovered and edited.  Whatever was  German was to 
be traced through all its fortunes to its fount.  The motive force in 
this prolonged  effort-one  of  the great efforts  of  the nineteenth 
century-was  not  antiquarian pedantry,  nor  was  it a  purely dis- 
interested curiosity.  If  there was  science there was also love.  At 
this point we ought to remember, and yet have some difficulty in 
remembering,  what  Germany,  burdened  with  the  curse  of  the 
translated  Imperium,  had  become  in  the  six  centuries  of  her 
agony.  The last shadow of  political  unity had vanished and had 
left behind  a '  geographical expression,' a  mere collective name for 
some allied states.  Many of  them were rather estates than states ; 
most  of  them  were  too small to live vigorous  lives ; all  of  them 
were  too small to be  the Fatherland.  Much  else  besides  blood, 
iron and song went to the remaking of  Germany.  The idea of  a 
Common  Law would  not die.  A common legislature there might 
not be, but a  Common Law there was, and a  hope that the law of 
Germany  might  someday  be  natively  German  was  awakened. 
Then  in  historical  retrospect  the  Reception  began  to look  like 
disgrace and disaster, bound  up as cause and effect with the forces 
that tore a nation into shreds.  The people that defied the tyranny 
of living  popes  had  fallen  under the tyranny  of  dead  emperors, 
unworthily reincarnate  in  petty  princelings.  The land  that  saw 
Luther  burn  one  'Welsh ' Corpus  Iuris  had  meekly  accepted 
another.  It seemed  shameful that Germans, not  unconscious  of 
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their  mastery  of jurisprudence,  should  see, not  only in  England, 
but  in  France  and  even  the  France  of  Napoleon's  Code  the 
survival of  principles that might certainly be called Germanic, but 
could not be called German without a sigh.  Was not 'a daughter 
of the Salica,'  or a  grand-daughter,  reigning over  the breadth of 
North America?  And then, as might be expected, all manner of 
causes  and  parties  sought  to suck  advantage out  of  a  patriotic 
aspiration.  The  socialist  could  denounce  the  stern  and  bitter 
individualism, the consecrated selfishness, of the alien slave-owners' 
law, and the Catholic zealot could  contrast the Christiano-German 
law of Germany's great days with the Pagano-Roman law in which 
disruptive Protestantism had found an unholy ally. 
In all soberness, however, it was  asserted that old German law, 
blighted  and  stunted though it had been, might yet be nursed and 
tended  into bearing  the  fruit  of  sound  doctrine  and  reformed 
practice.  The  great  men  were  neither  dreamers  nor  purists. 
Jacob  Grimm  once  said  that  to  root  out  Roman  ideas  from 
German  law would  be as impossible as to banish Romance words 
from  English  speech.  The technical  merits  of  Roman  law  were 
admitted,  admired  and  emulated.  Besides  Histories  of  German 
Law,  Systems  were  produced  and  'Iizstitutes.'  The  Germanist 
claimed for his science a parity of  doctrinal rank with the science 
of the Romanist.  He too had his theory  of  possession;  he too 
had  his  theory  of  corporations;  and  sometimes  he  could  boast 
that, willingly  or unwillingly,  the  courts were  adopting  his  con- 
clusions,  though  they  might  attain  the  Germanic  result  by  the 
troublesome  process  of  playing fast and loose with Ulpian and his 
fellows. 
Happier days came.  Germany was  to have a  Civil  Code,  or 
rather,  for  the  title  at least  would  be  German,  a  Biirgerliches 
Gesetzbuch.  Many years of  keen debate now lie behind the most 
carefully considered statement of a  nation's  law that the world has 
ever seen.  Enthusiastic Germanists are not content, but they have 
something and may win more as the work of interpretation pro- 
ceeds.  What, however, concerns us here is that the appearance of 
IGermanistic' doctrines led  to controversies of  a  new  and radical 
kind.  It became always plainer that what was in the field was not 
merel~l  a second set of rules but a second and a disparate set of ideas. 
Between  Romanist and Germanist, and again within each  school, 
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the  debate  toolc  a  turn  towards  what  we  might  call  an  ideal 
morphology.  The  forms  of  legal  thought,  the 'concepts'  with 
which the lawyer 'operates,'  were to be described, delimited, com- 
pared.  In this  work  there was  sometimes  shewn  a  delicacy  of 
touch  and  a  subtlety  of  historical  perception,  of  which  in  this 
country we,  having no pressing  need  for  comparisons, can know 
little,  especially  if  our  notion  of  an  analytical jurisprudence  is 
gathered from Austin's very '  natural ' exploits.  Of special interest 
to Englishmen  should  be  the  manner  in  which  out of the rude 
material  of  old  German  law the  Germanists will  sometimes  re- 
construct an idea which  in England  needs no reconstruction since 
it is in  all our heads,  but which  bears a wholly  new value for  us 
when we have seen it laboriously composed and tested. 
At an  early  moment  in  the  development  of  Germanism  a 
Theory  of  the  Corporation,  which  gave  itself  out  to  be  the 
orthodox Roman Theory  and  which  Savigny had  lately defined 
in  severe outline, was  assailed  by Georg  Beseler who  lived  to be 
a  father  among Germanistsl.  You will  never, he said  in  effect, 
force our German  fellowships,  our German  Genossenschafte?~,  into 
the Roman scheme:  we  Germans have had  and still have other 
thoughts  than  yours.  Since then  the  Roman  Corporation  (uni- 
versitas) has been in the crucible.  Romanists of  high repute have 
forsaken the Savignian path ; Ihering went one way, Brinz another, 
and now, though it might be untrue to say that there are as many 
doctrines as there are doctors, there seems to be no creed that is 
entitled  to give  itself  the airs of  orthodoxy.  It is  important  to 
remember  that the materials which  stand at the Romanist's  dis- 
posal are meagre.  The number of  texts in the Digest which, even 
by a  stretch  of  language,  could  be  said  to express a  theory  of 
Corporations is extremely small, and as to implied  theories  it is 
easy for different expositors to hold  different opinions, especially if 
they feel  more  or less  concerned  to deduce  a  result  that will  be 
tolerable in modern Germany.  The admission  must be made that 
there is no text which  directly calls the universitas  a pcrsona, and 
still less any that calls itpersonaficta2. 
Beseler, Volksrecht und Juristenrecht,  Leipzig,  1843,  pp.  158-194. 
''  It does not seem to be proved  that the Roman jurists went  beyond  the  'personae 
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According  to Dr Gierke, the first  man who  used this famous 
phrase was Sinibald Fieschi, who in 1243 became Pope Innocent IV? 
More than one generation of  investigators had passed away, indeed 
the whole school of glossators was passing away, before the Roman 
texts would  yield  a  theory to men  who lived  in  a Germanic  en- 
vironment,  and, when  a  theory  was  found, it was  found  by the 
canonists, who  had before  their eyes as the typical corporation, no 
medieval city, village or gild, but a  collegiate or cathedral church. 
In Dr Gierke's  view  Innocent, the father of  'the Fiction Theory,' 
appears as a truly great lawyer.  He really understood the texts ; 
the head of an absolute monarchy, such as the catholic Church was 
tending  to become,  was  the  very  man  to understand  them;  he 
found the phrase, the thought, for which  others had sought in vain. 
The corporation is a person ; but it is a person by fiction and only 
by fiction.  Thenceforward this was the doctrine professed alike by 
legists  and canonists, but, so our author contends, it  never  com- 
pletely  subdued  some  inconsistent  thoughts  of  Germanic  origin 
which  found  utterance  in  practical  conclusions.  In particular, to 
mention one rule which is a good touchstone for theories, Innocent, 
being in earnest about the mere fictitiousness of  the corporation's 
personality  and  having good  warrant  in  the Digest2, proclaimed 
that the corporation could commit neither sin nor delict.  As pope 
he might settle the question  of  sin, and at all events could prohibit 
the excommunication of an u~ziversitas~,  but as lawyer he could not 
convince his fellow lawyers that corporations must never be charged 
with crime or tort. 
Then Savigny is set before  us as recalling  courts and lawyers 
from  unprincipled  aberrations to the straight but narrow  Roman 
road.  Let  us  bring  to  mind  a  few  of  the  main  traits  of  his 
renowned  doctrine. 
vice fungitur' of  Dig. 46,  I, 22.  Any modern text-book of Pandektenrecht will introduce 
its reader to the controversy,  and give numerous references.  Here it may be enough to 
name  Ihering, Brinz,  Windscheid,  Pernice,  Dernburg  and  Regelsberger  as prominent 
expositors  of  various  versions  of  the Roman  theory.  Among  recent  discussions may 
be  mentioned, Kniep,  Societas  Publicanorum,  1896 ;  Kuhlenbeck,  Von den Pandekten 
biirgerlichen Gesetzbuch (18gS),  I.  169  ff. 
'  Gierke, Genossenschaftsrecht,  111.  279. 
'  Dig.  4,  3,  rj  §  1. 
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Besides  men or 'natural  persons,'  the law knows as 'subjects1' 
of proprietary rights certain  fictitious, artificial  or juristic  persons, 
and  as one  species of  this  class  it  knows  the corporation.  We 
must carefully sunder this ideal person from those natural persons 
who  are called  its members.  It is  capable of  proprietary rights; 
but  it  is  incapable  of  knowing,  intending, willing,  acting.  The 
relation  between  it and the corporators may best be compared to 
that between pupiZZus and tz~tor,  or that between  a  lunatic and the 
committee of  his  estate.  By  the  action  of  its  guardians  it can 
acquire property, and, if  it is to take the advantage of contracts, it 
must take the burden also.  To allow it possession  is difficult, for 
possession  is  matter  of  fact;  still  after  hesitation  the  Roman 
lawyers  made  this  concession.  An  action  based  upon  unjust 
enrichment  may lie against  it; but it must not be charged  with 
delict.  To attempt to punish it is both absurd and unjust, though 
the  State may dissolve a  noxious group in an administrative way. 
Being but a fiction  of  the law, its personality must have its com- 
mencement  in  some  authoritative  act,  some  declaration  of  the 
State's will.  Finally, it may continue to exist though it no longer 
has even one member. 
For the last three centuries  and more  Englishmen  have  been 
repeating  some of  the  canonical  phrases,  but  Dr Gierke  would 
probably say that we have never  taken them  much to heart.  We 
are likely  therefore  to  overlook  some  points  in  the  Savignian 
theory  which  seem  serious  to  those  who  have  not  raised  con- 
venient  inconsequence to the level  of  an  intellectual  virtue.  In 
particular, having  made 'the corporation  itself'  a  mindless  being 
that can  do no act, we  must not think of  the organized group of 
corporators  as an 'agent'  appointed  by a  somewhat inert 'prin- 
cipal.'  Were  the  corporation  'itself'  capable  of  appointing  an 
agent, there would  be  no apparent reason  why 'itself' should not 
do many  other  acts.  Savigny  is  far  more  skilful.  It is not  in 
agency but in guardianship of  the Roman kind that he finds the 
Germans distinguish between the Subject and the.Object of  a right.  If Styles owus 
a horse,  Styles is the Subject and the horse the Object of  the right.  Then if  we ascribe 
the ownership of  the horse  to the Crown, we make the  Crown  a Subject; and then we 
can  speak  of  the  Crown's  Subjectivity.  And  so  in  political  theory,  if  we  ascribe 
Sovereignty  to  the  Crown  or  the  Parliament  or  the  People,  we  make the Crown, 
Parliament  or People the Subject  of  Sovereignty.  The reader of  the following  pages 
may be asked to remember this not inconvenient usage. 
correct  analogy.  Those who wish  to make fun of  the theory say 
that it fills  the legal  world  with  hopeless  idiots  and their State- 
appointed  curators; but, if  we  mean  logic, we  must be careful  to 
see that our 'corporation  itself'-that  Dizg alz  sich which  some- 
how or another lies beyond  the phenomenal  group of  corporators1 
-does  no act,  speaks no word,  thinks  no thought,  appoints  no 
agent.  Also we may observe, and in history this is important, that 
this theory  might  play  into the hands of  a  Prince  or princeling 
inclined to paternal despotism.  Really and truly the property of a 
corporation-for  example a  city or university-belongs  to no real 
person  or persons, and over  the doings of  guardians and curators 
the State should exercise, no mere jurisdiction, but administrative 
control.  Of 'natural rights' there can here be no talk, for 'artificial 
persons'  can have no natural rights.  Furthermore, the strict con- 
finerrlent of  thepersona $eta within the sphere of Private Law may 
escape notice in a country where (to use foreign terms) '  publicistic' 
matter has been wont to assume 'private-rightly' form in a fashion 
that  some  would  call  shamefully  medieval  but  others  enviably 
Germanic.  The Savignian corporation is no 'subject' for 'liberties 
and  franchises'  or 'rights of  self-government.'  Really and 'pub- 
licistically'  it  can  hardly  be  other  than  a  wheel  in  the State's 
machinery, though for the purposes of  Property Law a  personifi- 
cation  of  this  wheel  is  found  to be  convenient.  Lastly,  some 
popular  thoughts  about  'body'  and  'members'  must  needs  go 
overboard.  The guardian  is  no '  member'  of his ward ;  and how 
even by way of  fiction could a figment be  composed of  real men? 
We had better leave body and members to the vulgar. 
Savigny wrote on the eve of  a  great upheaval.  A movement 
in  which  England  played  a  prominent  and honourable part was 
thrusting the joint-stock  company to the very  forefront  of  those 
facts  whence  a  theory  of  corporations  must  draw  its  sustenance. 
Whatever  may  be  said  of  municipal  and  other  communes,  of 
universities  and  colleges  and  churches,  the  modern  joint-stock 
colnpany plainly resents any endeavour to 'construe' it as a piece 
of the State's mechanism, though we may profitably remember that 
Pollock,  Contract,  ed. 6,  p.  108:  'If it is  allowable  to illustrate  one  fiction  by 
another,  we  may  say  that  the  artificial  person  is  a  fictitious  substance  conceived  as 
Supporting  legal  attributes.'  But  this  happy  phrase  is  not  by  itself  an  adequate 
expression of  Sir F.  Pollock's  view.  See the context. xxii  PoZiticaZ  Theovies of  the Middle Age. 
early and exemplary specimens, notably the Bank of  England and 
the East India Company, were closely related to the State.  More- 
over, the  modern  joint-stock  company, if  it is  an universitas,  is 
exceedingly  like a  societas, a  partnership,  a  GeseZZschaft,  and this 
resemblance seemed to threaten one of  the securest results of  legal 
science.  There were  a  few phrases in  the Digest  capable of  per- 
plexing  the first glossators, but in  clear  words  Innocent  IV. had 
apprehended  the  distinction : the  u?ziversitas  is  a  person ; the 
soczetas  is  only  another  name,  a  collective  name,  for  the socii'. 
Since then jurisprudence had kept or endeavoured to keep the two 
in very  different boxes, in  spite of the efforts of  Natural  Law to 
break  down  the  partition.  In  a  system  of  Pandektenrecht  the 
universitas  appeared  on an early page  under  the rubric 'Law of 
Persons,'  while  the  societas  was  far  away,  probably  in  another 
volume,  for  a  Partnership  is a  kind  of  Contract  and  Contract  is 
a  kind  of  Obligation.  Here, however,  was  a  being  whose very 
name of AktiengeseZLschaft  strongly suggested partnership, and yet 
the German  legislators  who  had  designed  its mould  had  almost 
certainly meant  that it should  exhibit  personality or  legal  'sub- 
jectivity,'  though they had not said this in so many words.  Was it 
z~niversitas,  or societas, or neither, or both ?  Could a mean term be 
found  between  unity  and  plurality?  What was,  what  could  be, 
the  'juristic  nature' of  a  shareholder's  'share,'  as  we  call  it  in 
England?  Was  it  any  conceivable  form  of  co-ownership,  any 
'  real ' right in  the company's lands and goods  ?  Could  it, on the 
other hand, be reduced to the mere benefit of  a  contract between 
the shareholder and the artificial person ?  Ideal walls were rocking 
and material interests were  at stake.  Was it, for example, decent 
of the Prussian government to tax first the income of the company 
and then  the dividends of  the shareholders and yet  disclaim  all 
thought of  double  taxation2? 
Pausing here for a moment, we may notice that an Englishman 
Gierke,  Genossenschnrtsrecht,  111.  285. 
a  Dernburg,  Pandekten, ed. 5,  I.  1~6.  The German lawyer  has  had a good many 
different types of association to consider, such as the Gesellschaft des bz2rgwlichen Rechtes, 
the oflene Natzdelsgesellschaf, the Kommanditgeelca, the  libnzrnanditgesellscha$  azq 
AKticlz, and the Aktiengeser'lschaft;  and, so I  understand, the legislature had not explicitly 
told him which, if any, of  these types were to display personalily.  So a large room was 
left for rival '  constructions.' 
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will miss a point in the history of  political  theory unless he knows 
that  in  a  strictly legal  context  the  Roman  societas, the French 
sociktk,  and the  German  GeseZZsclzaft  should  be  rendered  by  the 
English partncrshz)  and by no other word.  Also he should know 
that, just  as the English lawyer maintains that our English 'firm' 
is a mere collective name for the partners and displays no 'artificial 
personality,'  so also he will be taught in Germany that the Roman 
so~ietas  and  the  German  Gesellschaft  are  not  'juristic  persons.' 
Now-a-days  it will  perhaps be added that the German Gesellschft 
-and  the same would be said of the English partnership-shews  a 
tendency  to develop  towards  corporate organization, from  which 
tendency  the extremely 'individualistic'  societas of  the  Romans 
was wholly free1.  That is a small matter; but it is a great matter 
that  before  the  end  of  the  Middle  Ages  the  Roman  word  for 
partnership was assuming  a  vastly wide  meaning and,  under  the 
patronage  of Ciceronian comparisons2, was  entering  the  field  of 
politics.  '  Human Society' should be the partnership of  mankind ; 
'Civil Society' should be the partnership of  citizens ; 'the Origin 
of  Civil  Society' should be a  Social Contract or contract of  part- 
nership.  If  Rousseau writes  of  Ze  Contrat Social and  Pothier  of 
Ze  Contrat de  SociPtd, there should be, and there is, a  link between 
their  dissimilar books, and a  German  can say that both discussed 
the Gesellschafsvert~ag, the one with passion, the other with  erudi- 
tion.  Here  then  we  face  one  of  the  historical  problems  that 
Dr Gierke raises.  How came it about that political theory, which 
went to the lawyers for most of  its ideas, borrowed the contract of 
partnership rather than the apparently far more appropriate act of 
incorporation ?  In brief  the answer is that the current doctrine of 
corporations, the classical and Innocentian doctrine, stood beneath 
the level of  philosophic thought.  A  merely fictitious personality, 
created by the State and shut up within the limits of  Private Law, 
was  not  what  the  philosopher  wanted  when  he  went  about  to 
construct  the State itself. 
And then political philosophy reacted upon legal theory.  When 
the  State  itself  had  become  a  merely  collective  unit-a  sum of 
Presently existing  individuals bound  together by  the operation of 
their own wills-it  was not likely that any other group would seem 
capable of withstanding  similar  analysis.  Where philosophjr  and 
Dernburg, loc. cit.  See below,  p.  187. xxiv  PolitcicaZ  Theories of  the Middle Age.  Tra~sZator's  In trod~ction.  xxv 
jurisprudence met in such systems of Natural Law as were fashion- 
able in the eighteenth  century, the z/?ziversitas was  lowered to the 
rank of  the societns, or (but this was  the same process) the societns 
was raised to the rank of  the wziversitasl.  Both alike exhibited a 
certain  unity  in  plurality;  both  alike  might  be  called  'moral 
persons';  but  in the one case as in  the other this personality was 
to be thought of  as a  mere labour-saving device, like stenography 
or the mathematician's  symbols.  What we  may call the Bracket 
Theory or Expansible  Symbol Theory of  the Corporation  really 
in  sharp  contrast  with  the  Fiction  Theory  as  Savigny 
conceived it, though sometimes English writers seem to be speaking 
of the one and thinking of  the other.  The existing corporators, 
who  in  the  one  scheme  are  mere  guardians  for  a  somewhat 
that  the State has  instituted,  become  in  the other  scheme  the 
real  'subjects'  of  those  rights  and  duties  that  are  ascribed  to 
the corporation,  though  legal  art  usually  keeps  these  'subjects' 
enclosed  within  a  bracket.  However,  despite this  tendency  of  a 
'natural' jurisprudence--a  tendency  which  seems to have  left  an 
abiding mark in the legal terminology of  Scotland-the  Romanists 
of  Germany had been holding fast the doctrine that the ztniversitas 
is, while the societns is not, a person, when the joint-stock  company, 
a new  power  in the theoretic as in  the economic world, began  to 
give  trouble.  That the AKtiengeselZschnfi  was  a  corporation was 
generally admitted ; but  of  all corporations a joint-stock  company 
is that which seems to offer itself  most kindly to the individualistic 
analyst.  When all is said and done, and all  due praise has been 
awarded  to the inventors  of  a  beautiful  logarithm, are not  these 
shareholders,  these  men  of  flesh  and  blood,  the  real  and  only 
sustainers of the company's rights and duties?  So  great a Romanist 
as Ihering2  trod this 'individualistic '  or '  collectivistic '  path, and in 
America  where  law  schools  flourish,  where  supreme  courts  are 
many and the need for theory is more urgent than it is in England, 
highly interesting attempts have been  made to dispel the Fiction, 
or  rather  to  open  the  Bracket  and  find  thercin  nothing  but 
contract-bound men8.  Contract, that greediest of  legal categories, 
Gierke, Johannes  Althusius,  103. 
See especially Geist des rom. Rechts, vol.  III., p. 343. 
Dissatisfaction  with  the  Fiction--or,  as  Americans  sometimes  say,  with  'the 
Entity1-is  expressed  in  some  well-known  text-books,  e.g.,  Taylor,  Law  of  Private 
Corporations, B 60 ; Morawetz, Law of Private Corporations, ch. I. 
which once wanted  to devour the State, resents being told that it 
cannot  painlessly  digest  even  a  joint-stock  company.  Maine's 
famous sentence about Contract and Status might indeed be boldly 
questioned  by  anyone  who  remembered  that,  at least  for  the 
philologian,  the Roman  Status became  that modern  State, hat, 
Staat  which refused  to be explained by Contract into a mere '  Civil 
Society!  Few words  have had  histories  more  adventurous  than 
that of the word which is the State of  public and the estate of  our 
private law, and which  admirably illustrates  the interdependence 
that  exists  between  all  parts  of  a  healthily  growing  body  of 
jurisprudence.  Still, though  the analytic powers  of  Contract  are 
by no means what they once seemed to be, many will  think them 
equal to the task of  expanding what they might call the Corpora- 
tion  Symbol. 
It was in a Germany that was  full of  new ideas and new hopes 
that  a  theory  was  launched  which  styled  itself  'the  German 
Genossenschaftstheo~ie,' Even  the  hastiest  sketch  of  its  environ- 
ment,  if  it  notices  the  appearance  of  the  joint-stock  company, 
should  give  one word  to the persistence in Germany of  agrarian 
communities  with  world-old  histories,  to the  intricate  problems 
that their dissolution  presented, and to the current complaint that 
Roman  law had no equitable solution  for these questions and had 
done  scant justice  to the  peasant.  Nor  should the triumphs of 
biological science be forgotten.  A  name was wanted which would 
unite  many  groups  of  men,  simple  and  complex,  modern  and 
archaic; and  Genossenschaft  was  chosen.  The English translator 
must  carefully  avoid  Partnership;  perhaps in  our modern  usage 
Company has become  too specific  and technical; Society  also  is 
dangerous; Fellowship with  its slight  flavour  of  an old  England 
may  be  our  least  inadequate  word.  Beginning  with  Beseler's 
criticism of  Savigny, the theory gradually took shape, especially in 
Dr Gierke's hands, and a great deal of  thought, learning and con- 
troversy  collected  round  it.  Battles  had  to  be  fought in  many 
fields.  The new theory was to be philosophically true, scientifically 
sound, morally  righteous, legally  implicit in  codes and decisions, 
practically convenient, historically destined, genuinely German, and 
perhaps exclusively Germanistic'.  No, it seems to say, whatever 
However, some Romanists  of  repute have asserted their right  to adopt and have 
adopted  this  theory.  See in particular Regelsberger, Pandekten, vol.  I.  p.  289 ff.  See 
also Dernburg, Pandekten, 5 59. XXY~  Political  Theovies of  the Middle Age. 
the  Roman  unive~sitas  may have  been-and  Dr  Gierke  is  for 
pinning the Roman jurists  to Savignianism-our  German Fellow- 
ship is no fiction, no symbol, no piece  of  the State's machinery, no 
name for  individuals,  but a  living organism  and a  real 
person, with body and members and a will  of  its own.  Itself  can 
will, itself can act; it wills and acts by the men who are its organs 
as a  man  wills  and acts by brain, mouth  and hand.  It is  not a 
fictitious person; it is a Gesaw~mtperson,  and its will is a Gesammt- 
wiLZe;  it is a group-person, and its will is a group-will'. 
This theory, which we  might call Realism, may seem to carry 
its  head  among  the  clouds,  though  no  higher  perhaps than  the 
Fiction Theory; but a serious effort has been made to give it feet 
that walk  upon  the earth.  In one long book2 Dr Gierke  has in 
great  detail  argued  his  case  throughout  the  whole  domain  of 
practicable  modern  law,  contending, not  indeed  that all  German 
'authority'  (as an  English  lawyer  would  say) is  on his side, but 
that he has the support of  a  highly respectable body of  authority, 
express and implied,  and  that legislatures  and tribunals fall  into 
self-contradiction or plain  injustice when they allow themselves to 
be governed by other theories.  Nothing could be more concrete 
than the argument, and, though it will sometimes shew an affection 
for  'the German  middle age'  and  a  distrust of  ancient Rome, it 
claims distinctively modern virtues : for  instance, that of  giving of 
the shareholder's  'share'  the only lawyerly explanation that will 
stand severe  strain.  Then in  another  book  our author  has been 
telling the history of German Fellowship Law3. 
Let us try to imagine-we  are not  likely to see-a  book with 
some such title as English Fellowship Law, which in the first place 
The  works  of  Dr  Gierke  which  deal  with  this  matter  are  (I)  Das  deutsche 
Genossenschaftsrecht,  whereof  three volumes  were published in  1868,  1873,  and  1881  ; 
(2)  Die Genossenschaftstheorie und  die deutsche  Rechtsprechung,  1887 ;  (3)  The first 
volume of  Deutsches  Privatrecht,  1895,  which contains a more succinct and more recent 
statement ;  (4)  The monograph  on Johannes  Althusius,  1880,  which should  be  well 
known to all students of  political theory.  Those who would rather begin their study of 
the realistic theory in French than in German may be sent to A. Mestre,  Les Personnes 
Morales,  1899. French  lawyers  have  been  conservative,  and  Savignianism  was  in 
harmony with the spirit of  the Codes ; nevertheless the doctrine of  the real group-will is 
finding disciples.  The only English statement that I have seen of  this theory is by Ernst 
Freund, The Legal Nature of Corporations,  University Press,  Chicago, 1897. 
a  This is the Genossenschaftstheorie of  1887. 
a  This is the Genossenschaftsrecht of  1868-73-81. 
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described the structure of  the groups in which men of English race 
have stood  from  the days when  the revengeful  kindred was pur- 
suing the blood  feud  to the days when  the one-man-company  is 
issuing  debentures,  when  parliamentary  assemblies  stand  three 
deep above  Canadian  and Australian  soil  and 'Trusts  and  Cor- 
porations'  is  the  name  of  a  question  that  vexes  the  great 
Republic  of  the West.  Within  these  bounds  lie  churches,  and 
even  the  medieval  church,  one  and  catholic,  religious  houses, 
mendicant  orders, non-conforming  bodies,  a  presbyterian  system, 
universities old and new, the village community which Germanists 
revealed  to us,  the manor in its growth and decay, the township, 
the New  England  town, the counties and hundreds, the chartered 
boroughs, the gild  in  all its manifold  varieties,  the inns of  court, 
the  merchant  adventurers,  the  militant  'companies'  of  English 
condottieri who  returning home help to make the word 'company' 
popular  among  us,  the  trading  companies,  the companies  that 
become  colonies,  the  companies  that  make  war,  the  friendly 
societies,  the trade  unions,  the  clubs,  the  group  that  meets  at 
Lloyd's  Coffee-house, the group-that becomes the Stock Exchange, 
and so on even  to the one-man-company, the Standard Oil Trust 
and the South Australian  statutes for  communistic villages.  The 
English  historian  would  have  a  wealth  of  group-life  to  survey 
richer  even  than  that  which  has  come  under  Dr Gierke's  eye, 
though he would not have to tell of  the peculiarly interesting civic 
group which hardly knows whether it is a municipal corporation or 
a sovereign republic.  And then we  imagine our historian turning 
to inquire how Englishmen  have conceived  their groups : by what 
thoughts  they  have  striven  to  distinguish  and  to  reconcile  the 
manyness  of  the  members  and  the  oneness  of  the  body.  The 
borough  of  the  later  middle  ages  he  might  well  regard  with 
Dr Gierke  as a  central  node in  the long story.  Into it and out 
from it run most of the great threads of development, economic and 
theoretical.  The borough stretches one hand back  to the village 
community and the other forward  to freely  formed  companies of 
all sorts and kinds.  And this Dr Gierke sets before us as the point 
at which the unity of  the group is  first abstracted by thought and 
law  from  the plurality,  so that 'the borough'  can  stand out  in 
contrast  to the sum of  existing  burgesses  as another person,  but 
still as a person in whom they are organized and embodied. xxv;;;  political Theories of  the MiddGe  Age. 
T~ his  medieval  Germans  Dr Gierke  attributes  sound  and 
wholesome thoughts, and in particular a deep sense of  the organic 
character  of  all  permanent groups great and  small.  Not  that, 
according to him, their thoughts were  sharply defined:  indeed  he 
has  incurred  the  dissent  of  some  of  his  fellow  Germanists  by 
refusing to carry back to the remotest time the distinction between 
co-ownership  and  corporate  ownership.  In  deeply  interesting 
chapters he has described  the differentiating  process which  gives 
us  these  two ideas.  That process was  prospering  in the German 
towns  when  the  catastrophe occurred.  When  Gernlan  law  was 
called upon to meet the alien intruder, it had reached 'the stage of 
abstraction,'  but  not  'the stage of  reflection.'  It had its liiivper- 
schaftsJegrz.,  but  no  Korporationstheorie.  It could  co-ordinate 
Man  and Community as equally real  persons of  different kinds ; 
but  It  had  never  turned  round  to ask  itself  what  it was  doing. 
And  so down  it went before  the disciplined  enemy: before  the 
theory which Italian legists and decretists had been drilling. 
Then  in  another  volume  we  have  the history  of this theory. 
We should  misrepresent  our author  if,  without  qualification,  we 
spoke  of  Italian  science  as  the  enemy.  All  technical  merits 
were on its side ; it was  a  model for consequent  thinking.  Still, 
if  it did  good, it did  harm.  Its sacred  texts were the law of an 
unassociative  people.  Roman jurisprudence, starting with a strict 
severance of iuspztbl'icz~tn  from ius privatztm, had found its highest 
development in  'an  absolutistic  public law and  an individualistic 
private  law.'  Titius  and  the  State,  these  the  Roman  lawyers 
understood, and out of  them and a  little fiction the legal universe 
could  be  constructed.  The theory of  corporations which  derives 
from  this  source  may  run  (and  this  is  perhaps  its  straightest 
course)  into princely  absolutism, or it may take a  turn towards 
mere  collectivism  (which  in  this context is  another name for in- 
dividualism);  but for the thought of  the living group it can find 
no  place ; it  is  condemned  to  be  '  atomistic ' and  '  mechanical.' 
For the modern German  'Fellowship Theory' remained  the task 
of  recovering and revivifying  'the organic  idea'  and  giving to it 
a  scientific form. 
It is  not  easy for an Englishman  to throw his heart or even 
his  mind  into  such  matters  as these,  and  therefore  it  may not 
be  easy for some readers of  this book at once to catch the point of 
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all  Dr Gierke's  remarks  about the personality of  States and Cor- 
porations.  If we asked why this is so, the answer would be a long 
story which  has  never  yet  been  duly told.  However,  its  main 
theme  can  be  indicated  by  one short  phrase  which  is  at this 
moment a  focus of  American politics:  namely, 'Corporations and 
Trusts.'  That puts  the  tale  into  three  words.  For  the  last 
four  centuries  Englishmen  have been  able  to say, '  Allow us our 
Trusts, and  the law  and  theory  of  corporations may indeed  be 
important, but it will not prevent us from forming and maintaining 
permanent  groups of  the most various kinds:  groups that, behind 
a  screen  of  trustees, will live  happily  enough, even  from  century 
to century, glorying in their unincorporatedness.  If Pope Innocent 
and  Roman forces  guard  the front  stairs, we  shall walk  up  the 
back.'  From the  age when,  among  countless  other  unchartered 
fellowships, the Inns of  Court were  taking shape, to the age, when 
monopolizing trusts set America  ablaze,  our lam  of  corporations 
has only been  a part of  our Genossenschaftsrecht, and not perhaps 
the  most  important  part'.  We will  mention  but  one example. 
If  we  speak  the  speech  of  daily  life,  we  shall  say that in  this 
country  for  some time past  a  large  amount  of  wealth  has  'be- 
longed'  to religious '  bodies'  other  than  the established  church, 
and we  should have thought our religious  liberty shamefully  im- 
perfect  had  our law  prevented  this arrangement.  But until very 
lately our 'corporation  concept'  has not stood  at the disposal of 
Nonconformity,  and  even  now  little  use  is  made of  it  in  this 
quarter: for our 'trust  concept' has been  so serviceable.  Behind 
the screen  of  trustees  and concealed  from  the direct scrutiny of 
legal  theories,  all  manner of  groups  can  flourish:  Lincoln's  Inn 
or Lloyd's2  or the Stock  Exchange or the Jockey  Club, a whole 
presbyterian  system, or  even  the Church of  Rome with  the Pope 
at its head.  But, if  we  are to visit a land where Roman law has 
See the Stat. of (1531-2)  23 Hen. VIII., c. ro :  lands are already being held to the 
use  of  unincorporated  'guilds,  fraternities,  comminalities,  companies  or brotherheads,' 
and this  on so  large  a  scale  that  King Henry,  as supreme  landlord,  must  interfere. 
Happily  the lawyers  of  a  later  time  antedated  by a few  years  King Henry's  dislike 
of 'superstition,'  and therefore could give to this repressive statute a scope far narrower 
than that which its royal  author  assuredly  intended.  The important  case  is  Porter's 
Case,  I  Coke's Reports, 22 b. 
At length incorporated  in  1871: see F.  Martin,  History of  Lloyd's,  pp.  356-7,  a 
highly. interesting book. xx,  Political  Theories of the MMe  Age.  Translator's Iztrodz~t  ion.  xxxi 
been  'received,'  we  must  leave  this  great loose  'trust  concept' at 
the  Custom  House, and  must  not  for  a  moment suppose that a 
meagre $deicommissum  will  serve  in  its stead.  Then  we  shall 
understand how vitally important to a nation-socially,  politically, 
religiously  important-its  Theory of Corporations might be. 
If it be our task legally to construct and maintain comfortable 
homes wherein organic groups can live and enjoy whatever '  liberty 
of  association'  the  Prince will  concede to them, a little, but only 
a  little,  can  be  done  by  means  of  the Romanist's  co-ownership 
(condofeinium,  Miteigentutfz)  and  the  Romanist's  partnership 
(societas,  Gesellschnft).  They  are,  so  we  are  taught,  intensely 
individualistic categories: even  more individualistic than  are the 
parallel  categories  of  English  law,  for  there  is  no  'jointness' 
(Gesa~n~ntandscaf)  in  them.  If  then  our  Prince  keeps  the 
univ~~,sitas,  the corporate form, safe under lock  and key, our task 
is  that of  building  without mortar.  But to keep the universitas 
safe under lock and key was just what the received theory enabled 
the Prince to do.  His right to suppress collegia ilGiGita was supple- 
mented  by the metaphysical doctrine that, from the very nature of 
the  case,  'artificial  personality'  must  needs  be  the  creature  of 
sovereign  power.  At this  point  a  decisive  word  was  said  by 
Innocent  IV.  One outspoken  legist  reckoned  as the fifty-ninth 
of  the sixty-seven  prerogatives  of the Emperor that he, and only 
he, makes fictions : '  Solus princeps  fingit quod in rei veritate non 
estl.'  Thus 'the  Fiction  Theory'  leads us  into what  is  known 
to our neighbours  as 'the  Concession Theory.'  The corporation 
is,  and must  be,  the creature of  the State.  Into its nostrils the 
State must breathe the breath of  a  fictitious life, for otherwise it 
would be no animated body but individualistic dust. 
Long  ago  English  lawyers  received  the  Concession  Theory 
from  the canonists.  Bred  in  the free  fellowship  of  unchartered 
Inns,  they were  the  very men  to swallow  it whole.  Blackstone 
could  even  boast  that the law of  England went beyond 'the civil 
law ' in  its strict adhesion to this  theorya; and he was right, for 
the civilians of his day generally admitted that, though in principle 
the State's consent to the erection of  a  corporation was absolutely 
necessary,  still  there were  Roman  texts which  might be deemed 
Lucas de Penna, cited by Gierke, Genossenschaftsrecht,  111.  371. 
a  Comment.  I.  472. 
to have  given  that consent  in advance and  in  general  terms for 
the benefit  of  corporations of  certain innocuous kinds.  But then, 
what for  the civilians was  a  question  of  life and death was often 
in England  a  question  of  mere convenience and expense, so wide 
was  that  blessed  back  stair.  The trust deed might be long; the 
lawyer's bill might be longer; new trustees would be wanted from 
time  to time; and  now  and  again  an  awkward  obstacle  would 
require ingenious evasion ; but the organized group could live and 
prosper,  and  be  all  the more autonomous  because  it fell  under 
no solemn legal rubric.  Lawyers could even say that the common 
law reckoned  it a  crime for men  'to presume to act as a corpora- 
tion';  but as those  lawyers  were  members of  the Inns of  Court, 
we  should  hardly  need  other proof-there  is  plenty to be had- 
that the commission of  this crime (if  crime it were) was both very 
dificult  and  wholly  needless1.  Finally it became  apparent that, 
unless statute law stood in the way, even a large company trading 
with  a joint-stock, with vendible shares and a  handsome measure 
of  'limited  liability'  could  be  constructed  by  means  of  a  trust 
deed  without  any incorporatione. 
Nowhere  has  the  Concession  Theory been  proclaimed  more 
loudly,  more frequently,  more  absolutely,  than  in  America ; no- 
where  has  more  lip-service  been  done  to the  Fieschi.  Ignorant 
men  on board  the 'Mayflower'  may have  thought  that,  in  the 
presence  of  God  and of  one another, they  could  covenant  and 
combine  themselves  together  into  'a civil  body politics.'  Their 
descendants know  better.  A  classical  definition  has taught that 
'a  Corporation  is  a  Franchise,'  and  a  franchise  is  a  portion  of 
the State's power in the hands of  a subject4.  A Sovereign People 
Lindley,  Company Law, Bk.  I.,  ch.  5, sect.  I.  In the curious  case of Lloyd v. 
Leaving, 6  Ves.  773, Lord  Eldon  had  before  him  a lodge of  Freemasons  which  had 
made an imprudent display of  what  a  Realist would call its corporate character.  His 
lordship's  indignation  was  checked  by  the thought  that  'MI  Worseley's  silver  cup' 
belonged  to 'the  Middle Temple.' 
a  The directors are bound  to give notice to every one who gives credit that he has 
nothing to look to beyond  the subscribed  fund, and  that no person will  be personally 
liable to him.  As to  these  'attempts  to limit  liability,'  see Lindley,  Company Law, 
Bk.  II., ch. 6, sec. z. 
*  The Mayflower Compact can be found, among other places,  in Macdonald,  Select 
Charters,  p.  33. 
Kent, Comment. Lect. 33 :  'A corporation  is a franchise possessed by one or more 
individgals,  who subsist as a body politic under a special denomination, and are vested, rnXii  ~~&ticak  Theories of  the Middle  Age. 
has  loved  to deck itself  in  the  purple  of  the Byzantine Basileus 
and the  triple crown  of the Roman Pontiff.  But the picture has 
another  side.  Those  'Trusts'  that  convulsed  America  were 
assuredly  organized  bodies  which  acted as units,  and if  ever  a 
Gesammtwilh? was  displayed  in  this  world,  assuredly  they  dis- 
played  it: but  some of  them  were  not  corporations1.  A  reader 
of  American  trust  deeds  may  well  find  himself  asking  what, 
beyond  a  few  highly  technical  advantages,  an  incorporating 
act could bestow.  No doubt, if  the State mutters some mystical 
words there takes place in the insensible  substance of  the group, 
some change  of  which  lawyers  must  say  all  that a  Roman  or 
Romanesque  orthodoxy exacts; but  to the lay  eyes of  debtors 
and  creditors,  brokers  and  jobbers,  all  sensible  accidents  seem 
much what they were.  Already in  1694 in  the stock and share 
lists 'that John  Houghton  was  publishing  the  current  prices  of 
actions' in unincorporated bodies were placed alongside the prices 
of  the  stocks  of  chartered  corporationsa.  Certainly  it will  be 
curious,  but  it will  not  be  inexplicable,  if  when  the Concession 
Theory has  perished  in  other  lands it  still  lurks and lingers  in 
England or  among men  of  English race.  Probably our  foreign 
critics would  not suffer  us  to say that  it  does  us no harm; but 
they would  confess  that the harm  which  it does is neither  very 
grave nor very obvious.  A  certain half-heartedness in  our treat- 
ment  of  unincorporate  groups,  whose  personality  we  will  not 
frankly  recognize  while  we  make  fairly  adequate  provision  for 
their  continuous  life,  is  the  offence  against  jurisprudence  with 
which we  might most fairly be charged, and it is an offence which 
tends to disappear now  that groups of  many kinds, cricket clubs, 
religious Societies, scientific societies, and so forth, are slowly taking 
advantage of that offer of legal corporateness which has been open 
to them for nearly forty years3 and are discovering that it is well to 
be regarded as persons. 
We  can  therefore  imagine  a  German  Realist bringing to bear 
by  the policy  of  the law, with  the capacity  of  succession,  and of  acting in 
several respects,  however numerous the association may be, as a single individual.' 
Of late-so  we understand on this side of  the sea-some  of the largest combinations 
of capitalists have taken corporate form under the laws of  New Jersey. 
a  EIoughton, A Collection  for the Improvement of  Trade.  See especially No.  gS ff. 
where the author gives an account of joint-stock enterprise. 
a  Companies Act,  1862, sec.  6. 
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upon  English law  some such criticism  as the following :-'There 
is  much in  your history  that we  can envy, much in your free and 
easy formation  of  groups that we  can admire.  That great 'trust 
concept'  of  yours  stood  you  in  good  stead when  the days were 
evil:  when  your  Hobbes,  for  example,  was  instituting  an  un- 
savoury  comparison  between  corporations  and  ascaridesl,  when 
your Archbishop Laud (an absolutist if ever there was one) brought 
Corporation  Theory  to  smash a  Puritan  Trusta, and two years 
afterwards  his  friend  Bishop  Montague was  bold  enough to call 
the king's  attention to the shamelessly unincorporate character of 
Lincoln's  Inn3.  And your  thoroughly un-Roman '  trust concept ' 
is  interesting  to us.  We have  seen the like of  it in very ancient 
Lombard  charters4; and, by the way,  it was  Georg  Beseler  who 
suggested to the present Chief Justice of Massachusetts the quarter 
in  which  the  origin of  your  trusts  might  be  found6.  Also  the 
connexion  between  trust  and group takes  back our thoughts all 
the way to the Lex Salica where the trustis is a group of comrades. 
Then, again, we  can  well  understand  that English  lawyers were 
concerned to deny, at least in  words, the personality of  what you 
call  an '  unincorporate body '-a  term which  seems to us to make 
for  truth,  but  also  for  self-contradiction.  An open  breach  with 
Innocentian  orthodoxy and  cosmopolitan  enlightenment  seemed 
impossible, and so you  maintained  that  the unincorporate  body 
could,  as we  should  say,  be  'construed'  as a  mere sum  ~f  in- 
dividuals bound  only by co-ownership  and agreement.  But you 
must excuse us for doubting whether you have pressed this theory 
to  its  logical  conclusion.  For  example,  we  feel  bound  to  ask 
whether,  when  a  man  is  elected to one  of  your  clubs (and  you 
have been  great makers of  clubs), the existing members execute 
an assignment to  him of a share in the club-house and its furniture, 
Leviathan,  11.  29  (Works,  ed.  Molesworth,  vol.  nr.,  p.  321) : 'like worms  in 
the entrails of a natural man.' 
For this case of the Feoffees of Impropriations, see Gardiner,  Hist. of England, anu. 
1633, vol.  VII., 258. 
Black Book of Lincoln's Inn, vol. II., p.  333, ann.  1635. 
Schultze, Die Lombardische Treuhand, Bresiau,  1895. 
0. W. Holmes, Law Quart. Rev. I.  163 :  'The feoffee to uses of  the early English 
law  corresponds point  by  point  to the  Salman of  the early  German law as described 
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and whether, when  he  resigns,  he  executes a  release  to the con- 
tinuing  If that be not  SO,  and we  fancy that it is not, 
election  to,  and  resignation  of,  membership  in  'unincorporate 
bodies'  should  appear  somewhat  prominently  in  your  books 
among the modes in which rights are acquired and lost, and then 
it  would  be  plain  enough  that,  beside  a  Korporationstheorie  of 
Italian  origin,  you  have  a Kiirperschaftsbegrif  of  your  own : an 
idea  of a  'bodiliness'  which  is  not the effect  of  the State's fiat. 
Then  why,  we  should  like  to know,  did  your  legislature lately 
impose  a  tax on  the property of '  unincorporate  bodies ' as well 
as on that of corporate bodies ?  When the property of individuals 
and of corporations  was  already  taxed, was  there still  property 
that  escaped  taxation1?  And  what  can  your  legislature  mean 
when! it says that in  Acts  of  Parliament  (unless  a  contrary  in- 
tention  appears) the word '  person'  is to  include ' any  body  of 
persons  corporate or  unincorporate"?  If  once  we  are allowed 
to  see  personality  wherever  we  see  bodiliness,  the  victory  of 
Realism  is secure, though an old superstition  may die very hard. 
Some day the historian  may have  to  tell  you  that  the  really 
fictitious fiction  of  English  law was,  not that its corporation was 
a  person,  but  that its unincorporate  body was  no person,  or (as 
you  so  suggestively  say)  was  nobody.  There  are  many  other 
questions  that we should like to ask  of  you.  Why, for instance, 
are free-born and commercially-minded Englishmen prohibited by 
statute from trading in large partnerships3?  Is it not because your 
good sense and experience have taught you that, do what you will 
and  say  what  you  will,  the  large  trading  group  will  assuredly 
display, as it does  in  America,  the phenomena  of  corporateness 
and therefore ought to stand under the law for corporations ?  And 
do YOU  not think that some part at least of  the appalling mess- 
forgive  us-the  appalling  mess  that  you  made  of  your  local 
government was due to a bad  and foreign theory which, coupling 
corporateness with  princely  '  privilege,'  refused  to recognize  and 
foster  into  vigour  the  bodiliness  that  was  immanent  in  every 
Customs  and  Inland  Revenue  Act,  1885, sec.  11 :  'Whereas  certain property,  by 
reason  of  the same belonging to or being  vested  in  bodies corporate or unincorporate, 
escapes liability to probate, legacy,  or succession duty.' 
Interpretation Act,  1889, sec. 19. 
Companies Act,  1862, sec.  4. 
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English  township,  in  every  rural Gem~i~zde?  Even  our theory- 
ridden Romanists were  not guilty of  that fatal blunder which you 
are now  endeavouring tardily to repair by the invention of Parish 
Councils  and from which  some of  your less pedantic kinsmen in 
the colonies  kept  themselves  free  when  they  suffered  'the New 
England town' to develop its inherent corporateness'.' 
To say these few words of  our  own  law has seemed advisable 
in  order  that foreign  controversies  over  the nature and origin of 
a  corporation's  or a  State's  personality may be the better under- 
stood.  We may spend  one moment  more in  observing that the 
English Trust, nurtured though  it was  within the priviest recesses 
of  Private  Law,  and  educated,  if  we  may  so say,  in  a  private 
school, has  played  a  famous part  on  the public, the world-wide, 
and world-historic stage.  When by one title and another a ruler- 
ship  over  millions of  men  in  the  Indies had come to the hands 
of  an  English Fellowship,  this  corporation  aggregate was  (some- 
what  unwillingly)  compelled  by Acts of  Parliament to hold  this 
precious  thing,  this  'object  of  rights,'  this  rulership,  upon  trust 
for a  so-called  corporation  sole,  namely,  the British Crown2.  If 
at the present time our courts and lawgivers find it needless openly 
to  declare  that  the colonies  are,  to  use  the old  phrase,  'bodies 
corporate  and politic  in  deed, fact and name,' this is because our 
hard-worked Crown  is  supposed to hold  some property for or 'in 
right  of' the Dominion  of  Canada and other property for or 'in 
right of' the  Province of  Ontario, and a  court, after  hearing the 
attorneys-general  for  these  beneficiaries,  these  communities  or 
commonwealths, will  decide how  much is held  for one, and how 
much  for  another.  Certainly  we  work  our Trust hard  and  our 
Crown  harder, and it seems possible  that some new  thoughts or 
some  renovation  of  old  thoughts  about  the  personality  of  the 
organized  group might shew us  straighter ways to desirable and 
even  necessary ends. 
In the days when  Queen Elizabeth was  our  'Prince,'  she did 
A case of  1497  (Year Book,  Trin. rz Hen. bTII.,  f.  27,  pl.  7) marks the beginning 
of an  unhappy story.  See Toulmin Smith, The Parish, ed.  2,  p. 269. 
The theory finds  explicit statement  in  the Act  of  1833  (3 Sr  q  Will.  IV.,  c. 85), 
Preamble : '  And whereas it is expedient that the said  territories  now under  the govern- 
ment  of  :he  said Company be continued  under  such government,  but  in trust  for the 
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not forbid  her  secretary to write in Latin de Xepzrblica Anglorz~m, 
or  in English  of  the Co~zmonwealth  of  England:  Prince and Re- 
public were not  yet  incompatibles.  Events that happened in the 
next century outlawed some words that once were good and lawful, 
and  forced  us to make the  most that we could  of  the 'Subject' 
(or subjectifid Object) that lies in  the Jewel House at  the Tower. 
Much  we  could  make  of  it, but not  quite  all that was  needful. 
Not  having  always  been  a  punctual  payer,  the Crown  was  not 
always a  good  borrower,  and  so our  Statute Book  taught  us  to 
say that the National  Debt was  owed,  not  by the Crown, but by 
'  the Publick';  and this Public looks much like a Resp?~blica  which, 
to spare the feelings of '  a certain great personage,' has dropped its 
first  syllable1.  Those  who  rely  upon  'the  faith  of  the  Public' 
receive  their  annuities  in  due season,  even if  we  have  no  neat 
theory  about the relationship  between  that 'passive  subject,'  the 
Public,  which  owes  them  money,  and  that  'active  subject,'  the 
Crown, to which  they pay their  taxes.  Possibly the Crown and 
the Public  are reciprocally  trustees for  each other ; possibly there 
is  not  much  difference now-a-days  between the Public, the State, 
and the Crown2, for we have  not  appraised  the full work  of  the 
Trust until we  are quitting the province of  jurisprudence to enter 
that of political or constitutional theory. 
In  the  course  of the  eighteenth  century it  became  a  parlia- 
mentary  commonplace  that 'all  political  power  is  a  trust';  and 
this is now so common a commonplace that we seldom think over 
it.  But  it  was  useful3.  Applied  to the kingly power  it gently 
Already  in  1697  (8 &  g  Will.  III.,  c.  20,  sec.  20)  provision  is  made  for  'the 
better  restoring  of  the  credit  of  the  Nation.'  There  follow  a  good  many  financial 
transactions between  'the Publick' and the East India Company.  For example in 1786 
'the Publick  stands indebted'  to the Company in a sum of  four n~illions  and upwards. 
Stat. 26 Geo. III., c.  62. 
a  Pensions  (Colonial Service) Act,  1887, sec.  8: 'The expressions  'permanent  civil 
service  of  the  State,'  'permanent  civil  service  of  I-Ier  Majesty,'  and 'permanent  civil 
service of  the Crown '  are hereby declared to have the same meaning.' 
At the time when  these words were being  writter. one of  Her Majesty's Principal 
Secretaries of State upas 'operating'  on  a  magnificent  scale  with  our  'trust  concept.' 
Her Majesty's  Government, he was  repeatedly saying,  is (or are) a trustee (or trustees) 
for 'the whole Empire.'  Already in Locke's Essay on Civil Government (e.g. secs.  14% 
149) a good deal is said of trust and breach of trust.  As the beneficiary (cestui que trust) 
who  seeks  the  enforcement  of  a  trust  is  not  necessarily  or  even  normally  the trustor 
or creator of  the trust,  the introduction  of talk  about  trusts into such work as Locke's 
serves to conceal some of  the weak points in the contractual theory of Government. 
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relaxed  that  royal  chord  in  our  polity  which  had  been  racked 
to the snapping point  by Divine right and State religion.  Much 
easier  and  much more English was  it to make the king a trustee 
for his people than to call him  officer, official, functionary, or even 
first magistrate.  The suggestion of  a  duty, enforceable  indeed, 
but  rather  as a  matter  of  'good  conscience' than as a matter of 
'  strict law' was  still  possible ; the supposition that God  was the 
author of  the trust was  not  excluded, and  the idea of  trust was 
extremely  elastic.  For of trusts we  know  many,  ranging  from 
those which confer  the widest  discretionary powers to those which 
are  the  nudest  of  nude  rights  and  the  driest  of  legal  estates. 
Much has happened within  and behind  that thought of the king's 
trusteeship:  even  a  civil  death  of  'personal  government,'  an 
euthanasia of  monarchy.  And now in the year 1900  the banished 
Commonwealth,  purged  of  regicidal  guilt, comes back to us from 
Australia  and  is  inlawed  by  Act  of  Parliament.  Wonderful 
conjuring  tricks  with  a  crown  or  a  basket  (jscgs) may yet  be 
played  by  deft  lawyers,  especially  by such  as are familiar with 
trusts  for  '  unincorporate  bodies '  ; but  we  may  doubt  whether 
they will  much  longer  be able to suppress from legal records the 
thought  that was  in  Bracton's  mind  when  he spoke of  the uni- 
versitas  regnil.  '  The crown,'  said  Coke,  'is  an hieroglyphic  of 
the  laws2.'  Such  hieroglyphics,  personified  dignities,  abstract 
rulerships,  subjectified  crowns  and  baskets  are  (so  the  realistic 
historian  would  tell  us)  the  natural outcome of  a  theory which 
allows  a  real  personality  and  a  real  will  only  to Jameses  and 
Charleses  and  other specimens of  the zoological  genus homo  and 
Yet  is  compelled  to  find  some  expression,  however  clumsy, for 
the continuous life  of  the State.  Names,  he might  add, we  will 
not  quarrel  over.  Call  it Crown, if  you  please,  in  your Statute 
Book,  and  Empire in  your  newspapers;  only  do  not  think, or 
even  pretend  to think, of  this mighty being as hieroglyphic or as 
peysofza$cta  or as collective name. 
In Germany (for we  must  return) the Concession Theory has 
fallen  from  its  high  estate; the  Romanists  are deserting  it8; it 
is  yielding  before  the  influence  of  laws  similar  to,  though  less 
Bracton,  f.  171 b.  Valvin's  Case,  7 Rep. 11 b. 
a  Willdscheid,  Pandekten,  5 60; Dernbnrg,  Pandekten,  S  63;  Regelsberger,  Pan- 
dekten, § 78.  See also Mestre, Les Personnes Morales, 197 ff. ,,  political  Theories of  the Midde Age. 
splendid]y  courageous than, our Act of  1862, that '  Magna Carta 
of  co-operative  enterprise1' which  placed  corporate form and legal 
personality  within  easy  reach  of  'any  seven  or  more  persons 
associated  for  any  lawful  purpose.'  It has  become  difficult  to 
maintain  that  the State makes  corporations  in  any other sense 
than  that  in  which  the State makes marriages when  it declares 
that  people  who want  to marry can  do so by going, and cannot 
do so without going, to church or registry.  The  age of corporations 
created by way of 'privilege' is passing away.  The constitutions 
of  some  American  States prohibit  the  legislatures  from  calling 
corporations  into  being  except by  means  of  general  laws$, and 
among ourselves  the name 'Chartered'  has now-a-days  a highly 
specific sense.  What is more, many foreign lawyers are coming to 
the conclusion  that in  these  days of  free  association, if  a  group 
beha3es  as a  corporation,  the courts are well-nigh  compelled  to 
treat  it  as such, at least in  retrospect.  It has purposely,  let us 
say, or  negligently  omitted  the  act  of  registration  by  which  it 
would  have  obtained  an unquestionable legal personality.  Mean- 
while  it  has been  doing  business  in  the  guise of  a  corporation, 
and  others  have  done  business  with  it  under  the  belief  that it 
was what it seemed to be.  It is  strongly urged  that in such cases 
injustice will be done unless corporateness  is treated as matter of 
fact, and American courts have made large strides in this direction8. 
It seems seriously questionable whether a  permanently organized 
group, for example a trade union, which has property held for it by 
trustees,  should  be  suffered  to  escape  liability  for  what  would 
generally  be  called  'its'  unlawful  acts  and  commands  by the 
technical plea  that 'it' has no existence 'in the eye of  the law4.' 
Spectacles  are to be had in  Germany which, so it is said, enable 
the law to see personality wherever there is  bodiliness, and a time 
seems at hand  when  the idea  of  'particular  creation'  will  be  as 
antiquated  in Corporation  Law as it is  in Zoology.  Whether we 
like  it or no, the Concession Theory has notice  to quit, and may 
carry the whole Fiction Theory with it. 
Palmer,  Company Law, p.  I. 
"orawetz,  Private Corporations, § 9 ff.;  Dillon, Municipal Corporations, 5  45. 
For the treatment of these 'de facto corporations' see Taylor, Private Corporations, 
§  14  j  ff.  ;  Morawetz, 5 73  j  ff. 
'  This was written some months before Mr Justice Farwell issued an injunction against 
a Trade Union (Times,  6 Sept. rgoo).  Of this matter we are likely to hear more. 
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The delicts, or torts and crimes, of corporations have naturally 
been one burning point of the prolonged debate.  To  serious minds 
there  is  something  repulsive  in  the  attribution  of  fraud  or  the 
like  to  the  mindless  persona  jcta.  The  law  would  set  a  bad 
example  if  its fictions were  fraudulent.  But despite some fairly 
clear words  in  the Digest, and despite the high  authority of  the 
great  Innocentius,  the practice of  holding communities liable for 
delict  was,  so Dr Gierke says, far  too deeply  rooted in the Ger- 
manic  world  to  be  eradicated.  Even  Savigny could  not  per- 
manently  prevail  when  the  day of  railway  collisions had  come. 
And so in  England we  may see the speculative doubt obtruding 
itself  from  time  to time,  but  only  to be  smothered  under  the 
weight  of  accumulating precedents, while  out in America the old 
sword  of  Quo  warraeto,  forged  for  the recovery  of  royal  rights 
from  feudal barons,  is  descending  upon  the heads  of joint-stock 
companies  with  monopolizing  tendencies.  When  an  American 
judge  wields  that  sword  and  dissolves  a  corporation,  he  is 
performing  no  such  act  of  discretionary  administration  as 
Savigny would  have  permitted;  he  uses  the language  of  penal 
justice;  he  may even  say that he passes  sentence of  death, and 
will  expend  moral  indignation  on  the culprit that stands before 
him1. 
It is worthy of remark, however, that in this region Englishmen 
have  been  able to slur  a question which  elsewhere assumes great 
importance : namely, whether a corporation 'itself' can do unlawful, 
or  indeed  any acts.  We have  been  helped  over  a  difficulty by 
the  extremely  wide  rule  of  employers'  liability  which  prevails 
among  us  and  towards which  some of  our neighbours have cast 
wistful  eyes.  A  servant  of  Styles  acting  within  the  scope  of 
his employment  does  a  wrong; we  hold  Styles liable.  We sub- 
stitute a corporation for Styles, and then this corporation is liable. 
This being  so, we can say that '  of  course'  the corporation would 
be  liable  if  the wrongful  act  were  done or commanded  by its 
directorate  or by  its  members  in  general  meeting.  It matters 
little  whether we  affirm  or deny that  in  this  case the act would 
be that of  the corporation  'itself,' for if it were not this, it could 
still be represented as the act  of  an agent or servant done within 
Fcr example  see the solemn  words  of  Finch, J.  in  People  v.  North River Sugar 
RChzing Co.,  1890 ;  Jer. Smith, Select Cases on Private Corporations, 11. 944. x1  POl2i~aL7  Theories of the Middle Age. 
the  scope  of  his  employment.  Whether  that  picture  of  the 
assembled  or directors  as agents or servants of  an Un- 
knowable  Somewhat,  which  cannot  have  appointed  or selected 
them, is  a  life-like  picture we  need  hardly ask:  the conclusion  is 
foregone.  Such is  our happy state.  But where  Roman law has 
been  received  the primary rule is  that a master has not to answer 
for acts that he has not commanded, at all events if  he has shewn 
no negligence  in his choice  of  a  servant.  If then the directorate 
of  a  company has done wrong, for  example has published a libel, 
may depend  on  the manner in which the case is envisaged. 
If we  say that the corporation  itself  has acted  by its organs, as 
a man acts by brain  and hand, then the corporation is liable ; but 
the result  may be very different if  we  reduce the directors to the 
level  of  servants  or  agents.  Those  therefore  who  have  been 
striving for  the '  organic idea'  have not been fighting for a mere 
phrase ; and  now  the term  'Organ'  stands in  the Civil Code of 
Germany.  That is no small triumph of Realism1. 
That the theory of the Group Person and the Group Will has a 
long struggle before it if it is ever to dominate the jurisprudence of 
the world  would  be  admitted even  by its  champions.  We have 
just  been  touching  the  confines  of  a  region  in  which  lies  the 
stronghold  of  an  opposing  force.  That ancient saying-its  sub- 
stance is as old as Johannes Andreae-which  bids the body politic 
fear no pains in another world  represents profound beliefs.  Not- 
withstanding  all  that  we  may say  of  '  national  sins'  and  '  the 
national  conscience'  and the like, a  tacit inference  is drawn from 
immunity (real or supposed) to impeccability, and, until they are 
convinced that corporations and States can sin, many people will 
refuse to admit that a  corporation  or  State is  a  thoroughly  real 
person with a real will.  We cannot wait for eschatology to say its 
last word, but even in  quarters where jurisprudence  is  more at its 
ease there  are  many  contestable  points  of  which  we  must  not 
speak.  However, the general character of the debate is worthy of 
observation.  The Realist's cause would be described by those who 
are forwarding it as an endeavour to give scientific precision and 
legal  operation  to thoughts  which  are in  all  modern  minds and 
which  are always displaying themselves  especially in  the political 
'  Biirgerliches  Gesetzbuch,  §  32.  The term  has  for  some  time  past  been  used 
in German laws and by German courts.  Gierke, Genossenschaftstheorie,  p.  614. 
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field.  We  might  be told  to read  the leading article in  to-day's 
paper and observe the ideas with which the writer '  operates '  : the 
will of  the nation, the mind  of  the legislature, the settled policy of 
one State, the ambitious designs of  another:  the praise and blame 
that are awarded to group-units of all sorts and kinds.  We might 
be asked to count the lines that our journalist  can write without 
talking of  organization.  We might be asked to look at our age's 
criticism  of  the  political  theories  and  political  projects  of  its 
immediate predecessor and to weigh  those charges of  abstract in- 
dividualism, atomism and macadamization that are currently made. 
We might  be  asked  whether  the  British  Empire  has  not  yet 
revolted  against a  Sovereign  that was  merely Many (a  Sovereign 
Number as   us tin  said) and in no sense really One, and whether 
'the  People'  that  sues  and  prosecutes  in  American  courts  is  a 
collective  name for some living men  and a  name whose  meaning 
changes  at  every  minute.  We  might  be  referred  to  modern 
philosophers : to the  social  tissue  of  one and  the  general  will, 
which  is the real will, of  another.  Then perhaps we  might fairly 
be  charged  with  entertaining  a  deep  suspicion  that  all  this  is 
metaphor : apt perhaps and useful, but essentially like the personi- 
fication of the ocean and the ship, the storm and the stormy petrel. 
But  we,  the  Realist  would  say,  mean  business  with  our  Group 
Person, and severe legal logic.  We take him  into the law courts 
and markets and say that he stands the wear and tear of forensic 
and  commercial  life.  If  we  see him  as the State in  an  exalted 
sphere where his form might be mistaken for a cloud of rhetoric or 
mysticism, we see him  also in humble quarters, and there we can 
apprehend  and examine and even vivisect him.  For example, we 
are obliged to ask precise questions concerning the inferior limit of 
group-life.  Where does it disappear?  That is  no easy question, 
for the German Partnership goes near to disengaging a  group-will 
from the several wills of the several partners ;  but on the whole we 
hold, and can give detailed reasons for holding, that in this quarter 
the line falls between our partnership and our joint-stock company. 
By those who have neither leisure nor inclination to understand 
competing  theories  of  German  partnerships,  German  companies 
and  German  communes,  it  may none  the  less  be  allowed  that 
theories  of  the  State and  theories  of  the  Corporation  must  be 
closely  connected.  The individualism  which  dissolves  the  com- xlii  political  Theovies of  the Middle Age. 
pany into its component shareholders is not likely to stop at that 
exploit,  and the State's  possession  of  a  real  will  is insecure  if  no 
other groups may have wills of  their  own.  Hence the value of  a 
theory which at all events endeavours to cover the whole ground. 
T~ say more would be to say much more ;  and enough, it is hoped, 
has been  said  to enable a  reader  of  the following pages to under- 
stand  the  place  that  they  hold  in  an  historical  and  doctrinal 
exposition  of 'German  Fellowship Right.'  We have,  it must  be 
supposed, made a  brief  survey of  the history from  first to last of 
German groups ;  then we have turned back to explore the thoughts 
that were implicit in the Group Law of  medieval  Germany ; then, 
having reached the eve of  the Reception, we have investigated the 
genesis  and  adventures  of  that  learned  theory  of  Corporations 
which  is about  to cross the Alps;  we  have been  among Greek 
philo~ophers,  Roman lawyers, Christian fathers, and have spent a 
long time in  Italy with the canonists and legists.  We are now on 
the point of  returning to the Germany of  the sixteenth century to 
watch  the Reception  of  this  theory  and  the  good  and  ill  that 
follow, when Dr Gierke  interpolates  the following brief, but surely 
valuable, account of  the political  (or rather 'publicistic')  theories 
of  the Middle Age:  theories which, as he remarks, have numerous 
points of contact with the main theme of his book. 
The reader need not fear that he will here encounter much that 
he could call technical jurisprudence.  Indeed so much as has been 
said in  this  Introduction  touching  Corporation  Law and German 
Fellowships has been  intended  to explain rather the context than 
the text of an excerpted chapter.  It will be seen, however, that 
while Dr Gierke is careful of  those  matters to which any historian 
of  political  theory  would  attend-for  instance,  the  growth  of 
definitely  monarchical  and  definitely  democratic  doctrines-an 
acute  accent, which  some  English  readers  might  not  have  an- 
ticipated, falls upon the manner in which States, rulers and peoples 
were conceived or pictured when theorists made them the 'subjects' 
of powers, rights and duties.  The failure of  medieval theorists to 
grasp  the  personality  of  the  State  appears  as a  central  defect 
whence in later times evil conseqhences are likely to issue.  It will 
be seen that the stream of  political theory when it debouches from 
the defile of  the Middle  Age into the sun-lit plain is flowing in a 
direction which, albeit destined  and explicable, is not regarded by 
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our author as ultimate.  However much the river may be gaining 
in  strength and depth and lucidity as it sweeps onwards towards 
the Leviathan  and the Contrat  Social, its  fated  course  runs  for 
some  centuries  away  from  organization  and towards  mechanical 
construction, away from biology and towards dynamics, away from 
corporateness and towards contractual obligation, away (it may be 
added) from  Germanic  lands and towards  the  Eternal  City.  It 
will  be  gathered  also  that  the  set of  thoughts  about  Law  and 
Sovereignty into which  Englishmen were lectured by John Austin 
appears to Dr Gierke as a past stage.  For him Sovereignty is an 
attribute, not of some part of  the State, but of  the Gesa~nnz@erson, 
the whole organized  community.  For him  it is  as impossible to 
make  the State logically  prior  to Law (Recht)  as to make  Law 
logically  prior  to the State, since each  exists in,  for  and by the 
other.  Of these doctrines nothing must here be said, only let us 
remember that if the Rechtsstaatsidee, much discussed in Germany, 
seems to us unfamiliar  and obscure, that may be because we have 
no practical  experience of  a Polizeistaat or Beanzte7zstaat.  Some 
friendly critics would say that in the past we could afford to accept 
speciously logical  but brittle theories because we  knew  that they 
would never be subjected to serious strains.  Some would warn us 
that in  the future the less we  say about a  supralegal, suprajural 
plenitude of power concentrated in a single point at Westminster- 
concentrated  in  one  single  organ  of  an  increasingly  complex 
commonwealth-the  better  for  that  commonwealth  may  be  the 
days that are coming. 
The task  of  translating  into English the work  of  a  German 
lawyer can never be perfectly straightforward.  To take the most 
obvious instance,  his Recht is  never  quite our Right or quite our 
Law.  I  have  tried  to  avoid  terms  which  are  not  current  in 
England.  For this  reason  I  have  often  written political when  I 
would  gladly have written publicistic.  On the other hand I could 
not represent our author's theory without using the term SuFect in 
the manner in  which it is used  by German jurists and publicists1. 
For nature-right& an apology may be due, but there was a pressing 
See above p. xx.,  note I. xliv  Political  T/zeories  of  the Middle  Age. 
need  for some such adjective.  A  doctrine may be  natzrrrechtIich, 
though it is  not  a  doctrine  of  Natural  Law nor  even  a  doctrine 
about  Natural Law,  and  a  long periphrasis  would  probably  say 
more or less than Dr Gierke intended1.  It will  be seen that in his 
historical scheme a large part is played  by  the contrast between 
genuinely medieval  thought  and '  antique-modern ' ideas.  These 
are  ideas  which  proceeding  from  Classical  Antiquity  are  be- 
coming modern  in  their transit through the Middle Ages, but not 
without  entering  into  combination  with  medieval  elements.  I 
could  call  them by no other name than  that which Dr Gierke has 
given to them: they must be 'antique-modern.'  I would  not if  I 
could  induce the reader  to forget that he has before him the work 
not only of a German jurist but of a leader among Germanists. 
Some of  the treatises  to which  Dr Gierke refers  in  his  notes 
have been re-edited since his book was published (1881).  The main 
event of  this kind  is,  so I  believe,  the publication  in  the  Monu- 
menta Germaniae of  the numerous pamphlets  which were evoked 
by the struggle over the Investitures  and which  set before  us  the 
papal and imperial theories of Public Law in the first stage of their 
formation?  I have thought it best to repeat Dr Gierke's references 
as I found them and not to attempt the perilous task of substituting 
others.  Among the new  materials is the  highly  interesting  and 
astonishingly anti-papal treatise of  an anonymous canon of  York, 
apparently of  Norman birth, who about the year 1100  was warmly 
taking our king's  side in  the dispute about Investitures and was 
writing sentences that  Marsiglio and Wyclif  would  not  have dis- 
owned.  But of  him we  may read  in Bohmer's  valuable and easily 
accessible history of  Church and State in England and Normandy3. 
A  few  notes  about  some  English  publicists  I  might have  been 
tempted to add, had I not made  this translation  in  a land where 
'  When,  for example,  Dr Brunner  (v.  Holtzendorff,  EncyklopIdie, ed.  5, p.  347) 
mentioned  'die  naturrechtlichen  Theorien  Benthams  und  Austins  iiber  den radikalen 
Beruf  des Gesetzgebers'  he was not accusing Bentham and Austin of  believing in what 
they would have consented  to call Natural Law.  Austin's  projected science of  General 
Jurisprudence  which  was  to  bring  to  light  'necessary'  principles  (p.  1108)  would 
apparently have been very like a system of Na?urrecht. 
Libelli de lite imperatorum  et pontificum,  3 vols.,  1891-2-7.  See Fisher, The 
Medieval Empire,  11.  57. 
a  Bohmer,  Icirche  und  Staat  in  England  und  in der  Normandie,  Leipzig,  1899, 
P  '77  ff. 
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books of  any kind are very rare.  Some references to Richard Fitz 
Ralph,  to  the  Song of  Lewes,  to  Sir John  Fortescue  and  the 
English  law-books  might  have been  inserted.  But the works  of 
Mr  Poole1, Mr  Kingsfords and Mr  Plummer3 are likely to be  in 
the hands of every English student of medieval politics; to John of 
Salisbury  and  William  of  Ockham-who  belong  rather -to the 
World-State  than  to  England-Dr  Gierke  seems  to have  done 
ample justice;  I  know  of  little, if  anything, that would  tend  to 
impair the validity of  his generalizations4; and my endeavour has 
been  to obtain  for him  the hearing to which  he is justly entitled. 
I hope that I  may induce some students of  medieval and modern 
history, law  and  political  theory  to make themselves  acquainted 
with his books5. 
A large part of the treatise of Fitz Ralph (Armachanus) is to be found in Mr R. L. 
Poole's  edition  of  Joh.  Wycliffe,  De dominio divino,  IVyclif Society,  1890.  See also 
MI  Poole's Illustrations of  the History of  Medieval Thought, 1884. 
Kingsford,  The Song of Lewes,  1890. 
"lummer,  Fortescue's  Governance  of  England,  188  5.  An  English reader  will 
hardly need to be told that Dr Creighton's  History of the Papacy will  introduce him to 
the practical  aims  and  projects  of  some  of  the medieval  publicists.  hlr Jenks's  Law 
and Politics in the Middle Ages (1898) will also deserve his attention. 
In England the idea of  a  World-State which  is  governed  by the Emperor appears 
chiefly in the much  modified  form  of  a  notion  that  somehow or another  the king of 
England  either  is  an  Emperor  or  will  do  instead  of  an  Emperor.  Henry  I.  was 
Gloriosus  Caesar  Henricus:  Leg.  Hen.  Prim.  pref.  Bracton,  f.  5  b;  Bracton  and 
Azo (Seld. Soc.), p. 57.  Rishanger, Chron. et Ann.  (Rolls Ser.),  p. 255 : Speech of  the 
bishop of Byblos :  dominus Rex hic censetur imperator.  Rot. Parl. 111. 343 :  Richard 11. 
is 'entier  Emperour de son Roialme.'  On the other side stands that  strange book  the 
Mirror of Justices  (Seld. Soc.), pp. xxxiv.,  195. 
Dr Gierke's  notes are foot-notes.  I thought  that I should  consult  the  tastes  of 
English readers by placing them at the end of  the book.  The marginal catch-words are 
mine,  but  the summary of  the argument  is Dr Gierke's.  I owe my thanks for many 
valuable  suggestions  to Mr J.  N.  Figgis  whose  essays  on  the  Divine  Right  of Kings 
(1896) and on Politics  at the Council  of  Constance  (Trans. Roy.  Hist. Soc. N.  S. XIII. 
103) will be known to students.  Last year, being sent from  England, I was encouraged 
to undertake this translation by  Professor  Henry Sidgwick.  What encouragement  was 
like when it came from him his pupils are now sorrowfully reinembering. ANALYTICAL  SUMMARY. 
I.  The  Evolution  of  Politzcal  Theory. 
Developmeilt  of  a  Political  Theory (p.  I).  It becomes  a Philosophy 
of  State  and  Law (I).  Cooperation  of  the various  Sciences (I).  Unity 
and generality of the doctrine beneath all controversies (2).  Combination 
into a  system  of  elements which  came  from  various  quarters (2).  The 
various  methods  mutually  complete  each  other  (3).  Theologico-philo- 
sophical  Speculation,  political  pamphleteering,  and  professional  Juris- 
prudence  (3).  The Medieval  Theory  of  State and Society  is  a  stream 
which flows in a single bed (3).  Relation of  Medieval to Antique-Modern 
Thought (3).  The system  of  the hledieval  Spirit (4).  Reception of  the 
antique  ideas  of  State and Law (4).  Genesis of  the specifically modern 
ideas  (4).  Growth  of  an  antique-modern  kernel  in  the  shell  of  the 
medieval  system  (4).  Stages  in the work  of  dissolution and reconstruc- 
tion (5).  Relation  of  Political Theory to the Romano-Canonical Theory 
of  Corporations (6). 
I I.  Macrocos~n and  Microcosm. 
The Political  Thought  of  the Middle Age  starts from  the Whole but 
attributes  intrinsic value to every partial whole down to the individual (7). 
Hence  its  theocratic  and spiritualistic  traits  (7).  Idea of  the divinely- 
willed  Harmony  of  the  Universe (7).  The Universe  as Macrocosm  and 
every partial whole as Microcosm (8).  The first principles of  the Doctrine 
of Human  Society  must  be  borrowed  from  the  idea  of  the  divinely- 
organized Universe (8). 
111.  Unity  i7z  Church  and  State. 
The Principle  of  Unity (9).  It is  the  constitutive  principle  of  the 
Universe  (9).  Therefore  it  must  be  valid  in  every  Partial  Whole  (9). 
Unitv  as  the  source  and goal  of  Plurality  (9).  The Ordinatio ad anurn 
an all-pervading principle (9).  Application thereof  to Human Society (9). 
Wide1 .and narrower social units (10). xlv  political  Theories of  the Mdde Age. 
The  postulate  of an  external unity  of  All  Mankind  (10).  Mankind 
as a  n1  tical body,  EccZesia  universaiis,  Respl6Zica  gene~is  huinani (I  0). 
~l~~ divinely appointed  severance  of  this  body into two  Orders  of  Idife, 
the Spiritual and the Temporal  (10).  Each  of  these Orders a  separate 
external realm  (I I).  This dualism  cannot be final, but n1~1st  find  recon 
ciliation in some higher unity (1 1). 
The clerical party sees the solution in the Sovereignty of  the Spiritual 
Power (1  1).  The Principle  of  Unity is the philosophic foundation of  the 
hierarchical  theory  which  is  developed from  the time  of  Gregory  VII. 
(Ir).  The Church  is  the  true  Cosmopolis  (11).  The Pope is 
its  earthly  Head  (12).  The  divinely  appointed  separation  of  the two 
Powers  extends only to their  use (12).  The Temporal Power  possesses 
a divine sanction and mandate only through the mediation of  the Church 
(12).  Unholy  origin  of  the State (12).  It needs  hallowing  by  ecclesi- 
astical authority (13).  '  Institutio ' of  the Realm  by the Priesthood (13) 
The Tenlporal Order remains a subservient part of the Ecclesiastical Order 
and a means for ecclesiastical ends (13).  Leges and Canones (13).  Duty 
of  obeying the Church (13).  Worldly Rulership as ecclesiastical office (13). 
Papal claims to Overlordship  above the Emperor  and other independent 
wielders  of  worldly  power  (13).  The  Theory  of  the  Two  Swords (13) 
The Pope  has utruf?zqz~e  gZadiunz  but  demises  the  use  of  the  Temporal 
Sword (14).  Application  of  the feudal idea (14).  The Temporal Sword 
to be wielded in the service and at the instance  of  the Church (14).  The 
Pope's  right  of  supervision  by virtue  of  the Spiritual Sword (14).  Right 
and duty of the Pope in certain cases to make a direct use of the Temporal 
Sword  (14).  Translati0  iqberii  (14).  Institution  of  Emperors  and 
Kings (14).  Guardianship of  the Renlm when  it is vacant or the Ruler is 
neglectful  (15).  Jurisdiction  over  Emperors  and  Kings,  Protection  of 
Peoples against Tyranny, Deposition of  Rulers and Liberation of  Subjects 
(15).  All  these  claims  are  the  direct  outcome  of  ius  divinum  (15). 
Positive  Law  cannot  derogate  from  them  (15). 
The cllanlpions  of  the State but very rarely  deduce a  Sovereignty of 
State  over  Church from  the Principle  of  Unity (16).  Reminiscences of 
an older condition of  affairs (16).  Ockham (16).  Marsilius of  Padua(16). 
In general the doctrine  of  two  co-ordinate  Powers  each with  a  divinely 
appointed  spllere  is  maintained  (16).  Battle  for  the independence  of 
Temporal Law (16).  And for the maxim Imperiam inznzetlinte a Deo  (17). 
Particular  claims  of  the Church  Party  resisted  (17).  Concession  of  an 
equal Sovereignty and Independence to the Spiritual Sword (17).  Superior 
rank  allowed to the Church (17).  Twofold attempt to resolve the duality 
in  a  higher  unity (17).  Christ's  invisible  Headship a  sufficient present- 
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merit  of  Unity  (17).  An  internal  Unity  of  the  two  Orders  of  Life 
resulting  from  their  intimate  connexion  and  mutual  support  (17).  Re- 
ciprocal  completion  of  the  two  Powers  in  the production  of  a  single 
Life (17).  Curious theory of a law of necessity permitting one of the two 
powers to assume functions that are not its own (18). 
The Principle of Unity within Church and State respectively (18).  In 
the Church (18).  The Church as a  single visible  Polity (19).  Reaction 
against the  tendency to make a State of  the Church (19).  Unity in the 
Temporal Sphere (19).  Necessity and divine origin of the World-State (19). 
The imperium mundi of the Romano-German Emperor (20).  Controversy 
as  to  possible  exemptions  from  the  Empire (20).  Universality  of  the 
Empire denied  in principle (20). 
The  visible  Unity  postulated  in  Church  and  State does not  extend 
beyond  those  matters  which  lie within  the  purpose  that  is  common to 
All  Mankind (20).  Organically  Articulated Structure of  Human Society 
(21).  The units  that  mediate  between  the Community of  Mankind and 
the Individual (21).  Attempt  to establish general schemes of  these inter- 
mediate  units : village,  city,  kingdom  etc.  (21).  Appearance  of  a 
centralizing tendency in Church and State which is opposed to this federal- 
istic system (21). 
IV.  The  Idea  of  Organization. 
Comparison  of  Mankind and every smaller group to a body informed 
by  a  soul  (22).  Mankind  as a  Corpus Mysticam  (22).  Heads  of  this 
Body (22).  Church and State as soul  and body (22).  Inferences drawn 
from this picture resisted  (23).  Nicholas of Cues on the Body of Mankind 
(23).  The ecclesiastical  or  temporal  group  as  a  Corpus nysticum (24). 
The Corpus morale etpoZiticu;rit of Engelbert of Volkersdorf (24). 
The comparison  descending  to particulars  (24).  Anthropomorphic 
conceits  of  John  of  Salisbury (24).  Of  Aquinas  and others  in relation 
to  the Church  (25).  Ptolemy  of  Lucca  (25).  Aegidius  Colonna  (25). 
Engelbert  of  Volkersdorf (26).  Marsilius  of  Padua (26).  Ockham (27). 
Later writers (27).  Nicholas of Cues (27). 
Derivation  of  other  ideas  from  the  fundamental  idea  of  the Social 
Organism (27).  Idea of  Membership (27).  Differentiation and grouping 
of members (28).  Idea of  Mediate Articulation (28).  Idea of  Organiza- 
tion (28).  Idea of  Function (28).  Idea of  an Organ (28).  Idea of  the 
governing part as the Living Principle (28).  Idea of  the natural growth of 
social bodies is suppressed by  the idea of  Creation (29). 
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As in Antiquity, so in the Middle Age, the idea of Organization fails to 
issue in the legal  concept  of  the Personality of  the  unified  Whole  (29). 
Just  for  this  reason  it  can  conceal,  but  cannot  hinder,  the progress  of 
the atomistic and mechanical mode of constructing the State (30). 
V.  The  Idea  of Monarchy. 
~od  as  Monarch of  the Universe  and therefore  of  the  spiritual  and 
temporal  Colnmunity of  Mankind (30).  AS an  Institution,  all Rulership 
proceeds  from  God  (30).  But  from  Him  proceed  also  the  office  and 
mandate  of  every  particular  wielder  of  earthly  power  (31).  All  power 
immediately  or  mediately  demised  by  God  (31).  Since  every  Partial 
Whole should be like  the Universal Whole, a  monarchical constitution of 
Church  and  State  seems  self-evident  (31).  The  medieval  Publicist's 
preference for  Monarchy  (31).  Divine  institution  of  Monarchy  in  the 
~hurdh  (32).  Divine  institution  of  Monarchy  in  the  Empire  (32).  In 
every  smaller  body  Monarchy  is  normal  (32).  Dissolution  of  these 
thoughts  under  the influence  of  Antiquity (32).  Relative rightfulness of 
Republican Constitutions (32).  Attacks on the divine origin of Monarchy 
in Church and State (33).  Preference for Republics among the Humanists 
(33).  Rejection  of  inferences  favourable  to  Monarchy  that  are  drawn 
from the Principle of  Unity (33). 
The  Doctrine  of  the  Monarch's  position  (33).  The  genuinely 
Medieval Doctrine, in which  the Germanic idea  of  Lordship lives on but 
is deepened  by Christianity, sees  in every Lordship  an Office proceeding 
from  God  (33).  Exaltation  of  the  Ruler's  person  (33).  But  energetic 
development of the official character of  Rulership (34).  Reciprocal Rights 
and Duties  of  Ruler  and Community (34).  All  duty of  obedience  con- 
ditioned  by  the  rightfulness  of  the  command  (35).  The  Doctrine  of 
Active  Resistance  (35).  Development  of  the  idea  of  the  Ruler's 
Sovereignty beside that of the Ruler's Office (35).  The plenitude potestatis 
of  the  Pope  (36).  Struggle  between  this  notion  and  that  of  patestas 
limii'ata (36).  The plenitude  potestatis  of  the Emperor (36).  Opposition 
(36)-  Starting points of a doctrine limiting monarchical rights (37). 
VI.  The Idea  of Popular Sovertzgtzty. 
The  medieval  notion  of  the  active  and  aboriginal  Rights  of  the 
Community (37).  Conflict over the quality and scope of these Rights (37). 
Original influence of  the Germanic idea of  Fellowship (37).  Transmuta- 
tion under the influence of  antique elements (37).  Issue in the direction 
of popular Sovereignty (38).  Combinations of  People's Sovereignty with 
Ruler's Sovereignty (38). 
I.  In the Temporal  Sphere :  Rights  of  the Community (38).  The 
people's  Will  the  source  of  Lordship  (38).  Doctrine  of  the  State  of 
Nature (38).  Appeal to the Corpus Iuris Civilis to prove that the highest 
earthly power  proceeds from  the Will  of  the People (39).  Legal origin 
of all  subjection in the voluntary and contractual submission  of  the Com- 
munity (39).  Escheat  of  the Imperium  to the People (40).  Claims  of 
the  Roman  townsfolk  (41).  Rejection  of  those  claims  by  Leopold  of 
Bebenburg (41).  Cooperation of the People in the transfer of the Empire 
from the Greeks to the Germans (41).  Guardianship of the vacant Empire 
(42).  Right  of  the People to choose  its Head (42).  The pure Elective 
Principle preferable to the institution of  Hereditary Dignities (42).  Legal 
foundation  and  legal  nature  of  the  electoral  rights  of  the  Prince 
Electors  (42). 
Rights of  the Community as against a legitimately instituted Ruler (43). 
Controversy among the Glossators  as  to the significance of  the translatio 
impe~ii  by  the populus  to  the princefs (43).  Theory of  an out-and-out 
conveyance  (43).  Theory  of  a mere  concessio  (43).  Extension  of  this 
controversy to the general case of  Prince and People (43). 
The champions  of  Ruler's  Sovereignty  (43).  Derivation  of  Absolute 
Monarchy from an Abdication  of the Community (43).  But even on this 
side a continuing right of the People as against the Ruler is conceded (44). 
Contractual  relationship  between  Ruler  and  People  (44).  A  right  of 
active  participation  in  the life  of  the State conceded  to the People (44). 
Acts  prejudicial  to the  Community's  Rights  require  the  consent  of  the 
Community (44).  Cooperanon of  the People in Legislation and Govern- 
ment (44).  Deposition of the Ruler in a case of necessity (45). 
The champions of an intermediate theory (45).  Limited Monarchy (45). 
The Mixed Constitution (45). 
The champions of  the People's  Sovereignty (45).  They also maintain 
a  contractual relationship  between People  and Ruler and so concede an 
right  of  ruling  to  the  Ruler  (45).  But  they  declare  the 
People to be the true Sovereign : '  populus  maior  principe '  (45).  Conse- 
quences touching Legislative Power (45).  Deposition  and punish~nent  of 
the Ruler who  neglects  his  duties (46).  Popular Sovereignty in Leopold 
of Bebenburg (46).  The system of Marsilius of  Padua (46).  The system 
Nicholas of Cues (47).  Similar doctrines in cent, xv.  (48). 
2.  Development  of  analogous  thoughts  about  the Church and their 
significance in  ~olitical  theory  (49).  Survival  of  the  idea  of  a  right  of 
the  ecclesiastical  Community  even  within  the  Doctrine  of  an  Absolute 1;;  Po~&~Q~  Theories of  the Middle  Age. 
papal  Monarchy (49).  Superiority of  Council  over  Pope  in  matters  of 
faith (so).  Extension  of  this  Superiority  to other matters (50).  Bolder 
doctrines  after  the  beginning  of  cent.  xiv.  (5 I).  Transfer  to the eccle- 
siastical sphere of the idea of Popular Sovereignty (51).  John of  Paris (51). 
Marsilius (51).  Ockham (52).  The  writers  of  the  Conciliar Age  (52). 
The system of  Conciliar Sovereignty in d'Ailly, Gerson, Zabarella, Andreas 
Randuf, Dietrich of  Nienl  and their contemporaries (52).  The 'Subject' 
of  Ecclesiastical  Power (52).  Rights  of  the Council  over the Pope (53). 
Idea of  the Mixed  Constitution  in  the Church (53).  Its relation to the 
idea of Monarchy in the Church (54).  Nicholas of Cues and the principle 
of  the  Sovereignty of  the  Community (54).  Gregory of  Heimburg (57) 
The Canonists (57).  Antonius Rosellus (57).  Beginning of the scientific 
reaction  in  favour  of  the  Papacy  with  a  general  negation  of  Popular 
Sovereignty (5 7).  Torquemada (57). 
The Conciliar Movement d3es not  call  in question the exclusive right 
of  th"e1ergy  in  the Church (57).  At  the  most it admits a subordinate 
participation  on the part of  the Temporal Magistrate (57).  Even when 
the  Church  is  regarded  as  a  Fellowship  of  the  Faithful  this  does not 
concede  active rights  to  the  Laity (58).  Still  even  in the  Middle  Age 
there are precursors  of  the Reformers' ideas of  the Universal Priesthood 
and of the rights of  the Christian commune (58).  But even the medieval 
theories  of  this  tendency  are  apt  to  issue  in  an  introduction  of  the 
Temporal Magistrate into the Church (58).  Marsilius on the rights of  the 
Laity (58).  Ockham on the rights of the Laity (59). 
VII.  The Idea  of Represetztation. 
The  representative  character  of  the  Monarch  (61).  Pope  and 
Church (62).  Kaiser and Reich (62).  Perception and theoretical formu- 
lation  of  the  contrast  between  the private  and public  capacities of  the 
Monarch, between  his  private  property and State property, between acts 
of the Man and acts of  the Ruler (63).  Relation of the People as a whole 
to the Body of the  People (63).  Rights  of  the People  to be exercised 
by the People collectively, not distributively  (63).  Requirement of  a con- 
stitutional  Assembly  (63).  Application  of  the  Doctrine  of  Corporate 
Resolutions (64).  To the Council (64).  To Temporal Assemblies (64). 
Extension to Nations of  the Doctrine of  Corporate Delict (64).  Exercise 
of  the Rights  of  the People  by Representative Assemblies (64).  Repre- 
sentative  functions  of  the  Council  (64).  Their  scope  (65).  Their 
foundation  in  Election  (66).  Representation  of  the  People  in  the 
State  (66).  Parliamentary  system  of  Nicholas  of  Cues  (66).  Marsilius 
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reserves the exercise of  true rights of  Sovereignty for a primary Assembly 
(66).  Limited representative functions of collegiate bodies (66).  Leopold 
of  Bebenburg  on  the  Prince  Electors  (66).  The Cardinals  (66).  Be- 
ginnings of  the doctrine  that the Representatives of  the People act repre- 
sentatively when, and only when, they act as a Corporate Whole (67). 
VIII.  The Idea  of Personality. 
Personality  of  Church and State (67).  The idea  does not receive at 
the  hands  of  the Publicists  the  development  that  might  have  been  ex- 
pected (68).  The professional  Jurists  work  with  this  idea,  but  employ 
only a  'fictitious'  personality  developed  within  the province  of  Private 
Law (68).  Hence a  tendency  which  increasingly  prevails  until  our own 
day  (68).  Church  and State  as  juristic  persons  for  the  Jurists  (69). 
Baldus on the State's  Personality (69).  No  application  of  the notion of 
Personality  by  the  Publicists when  they  discuss the  'Subject'  in  which 
State-Power  resides  (70).  Disruption  of  the  State-Person  into  two 
'  Subjects ' embodied  respectively in Ruler and People (70).  The Ruler's 
Personality (7 I).  The Community as a '  Subject '  of rights and duties (71). 
The  concept  of  the  People  tends  to  take  the  'individual-collective' 
shape (72).  In the Church (72).  In the State (72).  Influence of  this 
on  the  theory  of  Representation  (72).  Germs  of  the  later  theories  of 
Natural Right (73). 
IX.  The Relation  of  the  State  to Law, 
The ancient Germanic conception of  a  Reign of  Law yields before the 
influence of  Antiquity (73).  The Idea of  the State becomes independent 
of the  Idea of  Law (73).  Howbeit,  genuinely Medieval  Thought holds 
fast the independence of  the Idea of  Law (74).  Solution  of  the problem 
by a distinction between Positive and Natural Law (74). 
The Medieval Doctrine of Natural Larv (74).  The lex naturalis before 
and above all earthly power (75).  The ius naturnle strictly so called (75). 
The  ius  divinum  (75).  The  ius  gentiz~m  (76).  Limitation  of  the 
principle  (76). 
The  Medieval  Doctrine  of  Positive  Law  (76).  The ius  civile  as 
product, instrument and sphere  of  human  power (77).  Exaltation of  the 
Ruler above the Law (77).  Resistance to this on the part of the advocates 
of the People's Sovereignty (78).  But they contend for a Popular Assembly 
which is similarly before and above all Positive Law (78). 
Application  of  these  principles to the Rights given respectively by  the liv  Political  Theories of the Midnle Age. 
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two kinds of  Law (78).  Rights  derived from  Positive Law are subjected 
to the free disposal of  the Sovereign (79).  The conflict between Martinus 
and Bulgarus (79).  The Right of  Expropriation as a right  of  Sovereignty 
(79).  Establishment  of  limitations  to this  Right (79).  Requirement  of 
justa  causa  (80).  Compensation  for  the  expropriated  (80).  Acquired 
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of London in  1382.-Compare  Lechner, Johann  v.  Wiclif,  Leipz. 
1873 (the Articles, I.  p. 669 ff.). ixx  Political  Theories of  the Middle  Age. 
Ubertus de Lampugnano.  Utrum omnes Christiani subsunt Romano 
Imperio; lecture delivered  in 1380;  in  Zeitschr. fiir geschichtliche 
~echtswissenschaft,  11.  246-256. 
Henricus de Langenstein dictus de Hassia (1325-1~~7).  Consilium 
de unione  ac reformatione  ecclesiae;  written  in  1381 ; in 
Joh.  Gerson,  Opera omnia, Antverp. 1706, 11.  p.  809 sq.-See  also 
0.  Hartwig,  Henricus  de Langenstein  dictus  de  Hassia,  Marb. 
1857. 
Konrad v.  Gelnhausen.  Tractatus  de congregando concilio tempore 
schismatis, in Martene, Thesaurus anecdot. II.,  pp.  1200-1226. 
Mathaeus  de Cracovia  (d.  1410).  De squaloribus Romanae curiae, 
in Walch, Monumenta medii aevi, I. I, pp. I-100.-Epistola  Univer- 
sitatis  Parisiensis ad Regem Francorum d. a.  1394.-Memorandum 
of  1396.-Resolution  of  the National  Synod  at  Paris  of  1398.- 
Speeches and writings of  Simon  Cramaud, Pierre Plaoul, Aegidius 
de Campis de Rothomago and Pierre  du Mont  de St Michel;  as 
given by  Hiibler, die Constanzer Reformation und  die Konkordate 
von  1418,  Leipz.  1867,  p.  360 ff.,  also  in  Schwab,  Joh.  Gerson, 
Wiirzburg, 1858.-Also  Consultatio  de recusanda  obedientia Petro 
de Luna,  circ.  1399,  in  Martene,  1.  C.  11.  1189  sq.-Appellatio 
interposita per Leodienses a  papa post subtractionem  obedientiae 
per eos sibi factam, a.  1400, ib.  1250 sq.-Letter  of  Simon Cramaud 
d. a.  1400, ib.  1230 sq. 
Tractatus de aetatibus ecclesiae;  from the time of  the Great Schism; 
in Goldast,  I.  30 sq. 
Century X  V. 
Franciscus de Zabarellis.  Tractatus de schismate ;  written circ. I 406 ; 
in Schard, pp.  688-7  11. 
Conclusiones  per  studium  Bononiense  a.  1409,  in  Martene,  Ampl. 
Collect.  VIII.  894. 
Octo  conclusiones  per  plures  doctores  in  Ital.  part.  approb.,  in 
Gerson,  Op.  11.  p.  IIO sq. 
Petrus de  Alliaco (1350-1425).  Treatises and Speeches in the matter 
of the Schism, in Gerson,  Op.  I.  p. 489 sq. and  11.  p. 867 sq., also 
Propositiones, ib.  11.  p.  112 ;  Tractatus de ecclesiastica  potestate, 
a.  1416, in  v.  d.  Hardt,  Conc.  Const.  VI.  6,  p.  15 sq.-See  also 
Tschackert, Peter von Ailli, Gotha, 1877. 
Johannes  Gerson  (1363-1429).  Opera  omnia,  Antverp.  1706.- 
Therein  the '  Schismatics' in  Tom.  11. ;  in  particular,  Protestatio 
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super statu ecclesiae, p.  2 ;  Sententia de mod0 habendi se tempore 
schismate, p.  3 ;  De schislllate tollendo, p.  76 ;  Trilogus in materia 
schismatis,  p.  83; Tractatus de unitate ecclesiastica,  p.  113; Pro- 
positio,  p.  123 ;  Sermones,  p~.  131  and  141 ; De  auferibilitate 
Papae ab ecclesia, p.  209 ;  De potestate ecclesiae  et origine iuris et 
legum (I~IS),  p.  225 ;  Propositio in Conc. Const. p.  271 ;  Quomodo 
et an liceat in causis fidei a Papa appellare, p.  303.-Also  some few 
matters in  Tom.  III.  (Opera moralia)  and  IV.  (Opera exegetica  et 
miscellanea).-See  also J.  B.  Schwab, Johannes Gerson,  Professor 
der Theologie und Icanzler der Universitat Paris, Wiirzburg, 1858. 
Johannes Hus (1373-1415).  Determinatio de ablatione temporalium 
a  clericis,  a.  1410;  in  Goldast,  I.  232  sq.-See  also  Lechner, 
Johann  v.  Wiclif,  vol.  11. 
Johannes Breviscoxa.  De fide et ecclesia, Romano pontifice  et con- 
cilio generali;  in Gerson, Op.  11.  p.  805 sq. 
Andreas of  Randuf.  De modis uniendi ac reformandi  ecclesiam  in 
concilio universali ;  written circ.  1410 ;  in Gerson, Op.  11.  161 sq. 
Theodoricus de Niem.  De  schismate; written  in the reign of Rupert; 
ed. Basil, 1~66.-Privilegia  et iura imperii  circa investituras episco- 
patuum  et abbatiarum ,  written 141o.-141g  ;  in Schard, pp.  785- 
859.-De  difficultate reformationis  ecclesiae;  in  von  der  Hardt, 
1.  c.  I.  6,  p.  255.-De  necessitate reformationis ecclesiae,  ib. I.  7, 
P* 277- 
Nilus  archiepiscopus  Thessalonicus.  De  primatu  Papae  Romani; 
written  in all likelihood about 1438 (not about 1360 as is supposed 
by  Riezler  and 0. Lorenz who  have  followed  in  this  a  mistake 
niade  by  Goldast  which  he  himself  corrected  in  the  Diss.  de 
autor.);  in  Goldast,  I.  30-39. 
Nicolaus  of  Cues  (1401-1464).  Opera omnia,  Basil.  1565.  The 
treatise  De  concordantia  catholica  (to which  our  references are 
made unless the contrary is stated), written  1431-3  and presented 
to the Council of Basel, is found ib.  692 sq. and in Schard, pp. 465 
-676.-A  treatise De auctoritate praesidendi in concilio generali, 
in Diix, Der deutsche Kardinal Nikolaus v.  Kusa,  Regensb.  1847, 
I.,  pp. 475--491.-See  also Stumpf, Die polit.  Ideen des Nicolaus 
V.  Cues,  Koln, 1865 ;  Scharpff, Nicolaus  v.  Cusa als Reformator 
in Kirche, Reich und Philosophie, Tiib. 1871. 
Laurentius Valla.  De falso  credita  et  ementita  Constantini  dona- 
tione;  written 1439; in Schard, pp. 734-780. 
Gregory  of  Ileimburg  (d.  1472).  Admonitio  de  iniustis  usurpa- 
tionibus paparum Romanorum ;  written about 1441 ;  in Goldast, I. 
557-563.-Controversial  writings concerning the affair of  Brixen, lxxii  PoZitiGaZ Theoyies of  the Midde Age. 
1460-~46~,  ib. 11.  1576--1595.-Apologia  contra detractiones et 
blasphemias  Theodori  Laelii,  ib.  11.  1604  sq.-Invectiva  in 
Nicolaum  Cusanum,  ib.  162 2-163  I .-See  also Clemens Brock- 
haus, Gregor v.  Heimburg, Leipz.  1861. 
Theodoricus  Laelius  episcopus Feltrensis.  Replica pro Pio Papa 11. 
et sede Romana;  in Goldast, 11.  1595-1604. 
Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini (1405-146~,  from 1458 Pope Pius 11.). 
De ortu et auctoritate imperii Romani ;  written in 1446 ;  in Schard, 
pp. 3~4-328.-See  also Voigt, Enea Silvio de' Piccolomini, 3 vols., 
Berlin, 1856 ff. 
Petrus  de Monte  (1442-1457  Bishop  of  Brixen).  De potestate 
Romani  pontificis  et generalis  concilii s.  de primatu, Tract. univ. 
iuris, XIII.  I, p.  144 sq. 
Johannes  a  Turrecremata (d.  1468).  Summa  de  ecclesia,  Venet. 
1561.-De  pontificis maximi conciliique auctoritate, Venet. I563 ; 
,under the title  De  potestate  papae et concilii generalis tractatus 
notabilis, ed. Friedrich, Oenoponti, 187 I. 
Antonius  de  Rosellis  (d.  1466).  Monarchia  s.  de potestate im- 
peratoris et papae ;  in Goldast, I.  252-556. 
Petrus de Andlo.  De imperio Romano-Germanico; written in 1460 ; 
ed. Marquardus Freher, Norimb. I 65 7. 
Franciscus  Patricius  Senensis  Pontifex  Cajetanus  (d.  1494).  De 
institutione  reipublicae  libri  IX.;  ed.  Arg.  1595.-De  regno  et 
regis institutione libri IX.;  addressed to King Alphonso of Aragon 
and Calabria ;  ed. Arg.  I 594. 
Klagspiegel;  ed.  Strasb.  1527; appeared  at Schwabisch-all near 
the beginning  of cent. xv., according to Stintzing, Geschichte der 
popularen  Litteratur des romisch-kanonischen  Rechts in Deutsch- 
land,  Leipz.  1867,  p.  353  ff,,  and  Geschichte  der  deutschen 
Rechtswissenschaft, Miinch. u.  Leipz., 1.  p. 43. 
Ulrich Tengler.  Laienspiegel ;  appeared in I 509 ;  ed. Strasb.  1527. 
Thomas  de Vio Cajetanus  (I  469-1534).  De auctoritate papae et 
concilii  utraque  invicem  comparata;  written  in  1511;  in  his 
OpuScula omnia,  Antv.  1612, I.  I. 
Jacobus  Almainus  (d.  1515).  Expositio  circa  decisiones  Magistri 
G.  Occam  super potestate  summi pontificis ;  written  in 1512 ; in 
Gerson,  Op.  II.,  p.  1013  sq.  and  (as  Expositio  de  suprema 
potestate  ecclesiastics  et  laica)  in  Goldast,  I.  588-647.-De 
dominio  naturali  civili  et  ecclesiastico;  in Gerson,  Op.  XI.,  p. 
961 sq.-De  auctoritate Ecclesiae et Conciliorum generalium, adv. 
Thomam de Vio Cajetanum ;  ib  10  13 sq. 
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105.  Glossa  Ordinaria,  compiled  by  Accursius  (1182-1258)  : in  the 
edition  of  the Corpus  Iuris  Civilis, Venetiis  apud Juntas 1606, 
compared  with  earlier  editions.  [Irnerius  (circ.  1100)  is  the 
founder of  the school;  Bulgarus,  Martinus,  Jacobus,  Hugo are 
the four doctors.'] 
106.  Placentinus  (d. I 192).  De varietate actionum  (before I 180), Mog. 
1530. 
107.  Jacobus  de Arena  (last  mentioned in  1296).  Commentarii in uni- 
versum ius civile, ed. Lugd.  1541. 
108.  Andreas  de Isernia  (Neapolitan,  b.  circ.  1220,  d.  1316).  Super 
usibus feudorum, ed. Lugd. 1561. 
109.  Oldradus  de  Ponte  (de  Laude)  (first  mentioned  1302,  d.  1335). 
Consilia, ed.  Francof.  I 576. 
110.  Jacobus  Buttrigarius (b. circ. 1274, d.  1348).  Lectura in Digestum 
Vetus, ed. Ron~ae,  1606. 
111.  Cinus  (Guittoncino Sinibaldi)  (b.  1270,  d.  1336).  Lectura  super 
Codicem, ed.  Francof.  1578.-Lectura  super Digestum  Vetus, in 
eadem editione. 
112.  Albericus  de Rosciate  (d.  1354).  Commentarii, ed.  Lugd. I 545.- 
Dictionarium, ed. Venet.  1573. 
113.  Bartolus  de Sassoferrato (b.  1314,  d.  1357).  Commentarii-Con- 
silia-Quaestiones-Tractatus.  All from the edition of  his works, 
Basil.  1562. 
114.  Baldus de Ubaldis (1327-1400).  Commentarii on the various parts 
of  the Corpus Iuris, ed. Venet.  1572-3.-Commentarius  in  usus 
feudorum,  written  in  I 39 I, ed.  Lugd.  1566.-Commentariolum 
super pace  Constantiae, in eadem editione.-Consilia,  ed. Venet. 
1575. 
115.  Bartholomaeus de Saliceto (d.  1412).  Commentarius super Codice; 
finished in 1400 ;  ed. Venet.  1503. 
116.  Christoforus de  Castellione  (1345-1425).  Consilia,  ed.  Venet. 
1560. 
117.  Raphael  Fulgosius  (1367-1427).  Consilia posthuma,  Ambergae, 
1607. 
On pp.  186, 238,  351 and  416 Dr Gierke gives long lists  of  legists and canonists. 
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Johannes  de Imola  (d.  1436).  Commentarius  on the  Infortiaturn 
and Digestum Novum,  ed. Lugd. 1549. 
Ludovicus  de  Ponte  Romanus  (1409-1439).  Commentarii, ed. 
Francof. I 5  77.-Consilia,  ed. Lugd.  1548. 
Paulus  de  Castro,  Castrensis  (d. 1441).  Commentarii  on Digests 
and  Code, ed. Lugd. 1585. 
Johannes Christophorus  Parcus (Portius, Porcius)  (from  1434 pro- 
fessor  at  Pavia).  Commentarius  in  Institutiones,  ed.  Basil. 
1548. 
Tartagnus, Alexander de Imola de Tartagnis (1424 or 1423-1477). 
Commentarii  on  the  three  Digests  and the  Code,  ed.  Francof. 
16 10.-Consilia,  ed.  Aug.  Taur.  15 75  (with  additions  by Marcus 
Antonius and Natta). 
Johannes  de Platea  (of  Bologna, cent. xv.).  Super Institutionibus, 
ed.  Lugd.  1539.-Super  tribus  ultimis  libris Codicis,  ed.  Lugd. 
'1528. 
Paris de Puteo (1413-1493).  Tractatus de Syndicatu, ed. Francof. 
1608 (also in Tr. U.  J.  VII.  127). 
Johannes Bertachinus (d. 1497).  Repertorium iuris, Lugd.  15 2 I. 
Jason de Mayno (1435-1519).  Commentarii on the three Digests 
and the Code, ed. Aug.  Taur.  1576.-Consilia,  ed.  Francof. 161 I. 
Paulus Picus a Monte Pico (pupil of  Jason, professor  at Pavia, end 
of  cent. xv.).  Opera, ed.  Francof. 1575. 
Johannes  Crottus (of  Casale, professor at Bologna, Pavia and Pisa, 
circ. 1500).  Consilia, ed. Venet.  1576. 
Franciscus Marcus (member of the  Parlement of  DauphinC).  De- 
cisiones Delphinenses, ed. Francof. 1624. 
Franciscus Curtius junior  (d.  1533).  Consilia, ed Spirae, 1604. 
Philippus Decius (1454-1536  or 1537).  Commentarii in Digestum 
vetus  et  Codicem,  ed.  Lugd.  1559.-De  regulis  iuris,  ed.  Col. 
1584.-Consilia,  ed.  Venet.  I 5 70. 
Martinus  de  Caratis  Laudensis.  Lectura  super  feudis,  ed.  Basil. 
1564.-De  fisco, Tr. U.  J.  XII.  2.-De  represaliis, ib. xrI. 279. 
133.  Glossa Ordinaria on the Decretum Gratiani :  compiled by Johannes 
Teutonicus  (d.  about  1220) :  editions  used  Lugd.  1512  and 
Argent.  p.  Henr.  Eggesteyn,  1471. 
134  Innocentius IV.,  Sinibaldus  Fliscus  (d.  1254).  Apparatus  (Corn- 
mentaria)  in  libros  quinque  decretalium,  ed.  Francof.  1570: 
finished soon  after  the Council  of  Lyons  (1245). 
Bernardus Compostellanus iunior.  Lectura on the Decretals (I  245- 
I 260,  unfinished), ed.  Paris,  15 I 6. 
Hostiensis, Henricus de Segusia Cardinalis Ostiensis (d. I 271).  Summa 
aurea super titulis decretalium, ed. Basil.  1573 ;  written after 1250. 
Glossa  ordinaria  on  the  Liber  Extra,  compiled  by  Bernhardus 
Parmensis de Botone (d. 1263);  finished shortly before his death; 
ed. Lugd. 1509 and Basil.  1482. 
Guilelmus Durantis, 'Speculator'  (I  237-1  296).  Speculum iudiciale; 
first finished in  1272,  revised  before  1287 ;  ed.  Basil.  1574 and 
Francof.  I 6  I 2. 
Glossa  ordinaria  on  the  Liber  Sextus  (1304  or  1305)  and  the 
Clementines  (1326)  by  Johannes  Andreae. 
Johannes Andreae Mugellanus (I  270-1348).  Novella in Decretales 
Gregorii IX.;  in  I.  et 11.  libr. ed. Venet. 1612 ;  super III. libr. ed. 
Venet.  1505;  super IV.  et v.  libr. ed. Venet.  1505. 
Idem.  Novella super Sexto, ed. Lugd.  1527 ;  written between  1334 
and  1342. 
Henricus  Bouhic (Bohic) (b. 1310, d. after 1350).  Distinctiones in 
libros  quinque  Decretalium,  Lugd.  1520; written  1348. 
Baldus de Ubaldis (1327-1400).  Commentarius super tribus prior- 
ibus libris decretalium, Lugd. 1585. 
Petrus de Ancharano (1330-141  6).  Lectura super sexto decretalium 
libro,  Lugd.  1543. 
Franciscus de Zabarellis Cardinalis (1335-141  7).  Commentaria in 
v.  libros  decretalium,  Venet.  1602.-Lectura  super  Clementinis, 
Venet.  1497 ;  written between  1391 and  1410.-Consilia,  Venet. 
1581. 
Antonius  de Butrio (1338-1408).  Commentaria in v.  libros decre 
talium, Venet.  1578.-Consilia,  Lugd. 1541. 
Dominicus  de Sancto  Geminiano (first  half  of  cent. xv.).  Lectura 
super  decreto,  Venet.  1504.-Lectura  super  libro  sexto,  Lugd. 
1535.-Consilia  et  Responsa,  Venet.  I 58 I. 
Johannes  ab Imola  (d.  1436).  Commentarius  super  Clementinis, 
Lugd.  1551. 
Prosdocimus  de Comitibus  (d.  1438).  De  differentiis  legum  et 
canonum,  Tr.  U.  J.  I.  190. 
Panormitanus,  Nicholaus  de  Tudeschis  (Abbas  Siculus,  Abbas 
modernus) (d. 1453).  Commentaria, Venet. 1605 (vols. I.-VII.).- 
Consilia et Quaestiones, in  eadem ed. vol. VIII.  ;  the Quaestiones 
also in Selectae Quaestiones, Col. 1570, p. 303. lxxvi  Political  Theories of  the  ~WiddZe  Age. 
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151.  Johannes  de Anania  (d.  1457).  Commentarius  super  Decretalibus 
and super  Sexto Decretalium,  Lugd.  1553. 
152.  Alexander Tartagnus ab Imola (1424-147  7).  Consilia, ed. Francof. 
1610. 
153.  Cardinalis  Alexandrinus,  Johannes  Antonius  de  S.  Gregorio  (d. 
1509).  Commentaria super Decreto, Venet. 1500  j written between 
1483 and 1493. 
154.  Philippus  Franchus  de  Franchis  (d.  1471).  Lectura  in  Sextum 
Decretalium,  Lugd.  1537. 
155.  Dominicus Jacobatius Cardinalis (d.  15 2 7).  Tractatus de concilio, in 
Tr.  U. J. XIII. I, pp.  190-398. 
156.  Hieronymus  Zanettinus  (d.  1493).  Contrarietates  seu  diversitates 
inter ius civile et canonicum, in Tr. U. J. I.  p.  197. 
157.  Benedictus Capra (d.  1470).  Regulae et Tractatus, Venet.  1568.- 
Consilia,  Lugd.  I 556. 
158.  Lddovicus Bologninus (1447-1508).  Consilia:  along with those of 
Benedictus Capra, Lugd.  155 6. 
159.  Felinus  Sandaeus  (1444-1503).  Opera,  Lugd.  1540  (Lectura  in 
decretales). 
160.  Philippus  Decius (1454-1  536 or I 537).  Super Decretalibus,  Lugd. 
155'. 
IV.  MODERN BOOKS. 
Forster,  Quid  de reipublicae vi ac natura  medio  aevo doctum  sit, 
Vratisl. I 847. 
Forster, Die  Staatslehre des Mittelalters,  Allg.  Monatschr. fur Wiss. 
u.  Litt.  1853, pp. 832 ff.  and 922 ff. 
Friedberg,  Die mittelalterlichen  Lehren  iiber  das  Verhaltniss  von 
Kirche und Staat, Zeitschr. fur Kirchenrecht, vol.  8, p.  69 ff. 
Friedberg,  Die  Grenzen  zwischen  Staat  und  Kirche,  Tiibingen, 
1872. 
Friedberg,  Die  mittelalterlichen  Lehren  iiber  das Verhaltniss von 
Staat und  Kirche,  Leipz.  1874. 
Hofler, Kaiserthuin und Papstthum, Prag, 1862. 
Dollinger, Die Papstfabeln des Mittelalters, Munchen, 1863. 
Hubler,  Die  Constanzer  Reformation  und  die  Konkordate  von 
1418,  Leipz.  1867. 
Schulte,  Die  Stellung  der  Koncilien,  Papste  und  Bischofe  vom 
historischen  und  kanonischen  Standpunkte, 1871. 
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Hergenrother,  Katholische Kirche  und  christlicher Staat,  Freiburg 
i. B.  1872. 
S. Riezler, Die literarischen Widersacher der Papste zur Zeit Ludwigs 
des Baiers, Leipz.  1874. 
F.  v.  Gezold,  Die  Lehre von  der Volkssouveranetat  ~vahrend  des 
Mittelalters,  Hist.  Zeitschr.  vol.  36 (1876),  p.  340 ff. 
W.  Molitor, Die Dekretale Per Venerabilem von Innocenz 111.  und 
ihre Stellung im ijffentlichen Recht der Kirche, Munster,  1876. 
0. Lorenz,  Deutschlands  Geschichtsquellen  im  Mittelalter  seit  der 
Mitte des dreizehnten Jahrhunderts, ed. 2,  Berl.  1876, 11.  p. 288 ff. 
W. v.  Giesebrecht,  Geschichte der deutschen Kaiserzeit, vol.  III. 
Raumer, Geschichte der Hohenstauffen und ihrer Zeit, vol.  VI. 
Wessenberg,  Die  grossen  Kirchenversammlungen  des  15  u.  16 
Jahrh.,  Iconstanz,  1845 ff. 
Hefele, Konciliengeschichte,  vols.  I.-IV.  in ed.  2. 
Ficker, Forschungen  zur Reichs- u.  Rechtsgeschichte  Italiens,  Inns- 
bruck,  1868-1874. Index  to List of  Authorities.  lxxix 
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This result was due to the co-operation of  various co-opera- 
tion of  sciences.  Theology and Scholastic Philosophy, Political various 
sciences.  History and practical arguments touching the questions 
of the  day,  here  encountered  both  each  other  and 
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POLITICAL  THEORIES  OF THE 
MIDDLE  AGE. 
I.  The  Evolution of  PoZiticaZ  Theory. 
THE  development  by  Legists and  Canonists of  aThe  beginning 
Theory  of  Corporations  came  into  contact  at many ofpolitical 
points with the efforts of the Medieval Spirit rationally Theory. 
to comprehend Church and State in their entirety, and 
therefore  scientifically  to  conceive  the nature  of  all 
Human  Society.  For  the  first  beginnings  of  this 
movement  we  may  look  as  far  back  as  the  great 
Quarrel  over  the  Right of  Investiture,  but  not  until 
the thirteenth  century did it issue in a definite Theory 
of Public Law.  From that time onwards the doctrines 
of  the Publicists,  doctrines which were being steadily 
elaborated  and unfolded,  became  no  mere  doctrines 
of  Public  Law,  but  were  also  the exponents  of  an 
independent  Philosophy  of  State  and  Law  such  as 
had not previously existed.  And just  because this was 
so, they  introduced a  quite new force into the history 
of legal  ideas. 2  PoZiticaG  Theories of the Middle Age. 
professional  Jurisprudence  in  one and the same field. 
Their  starting-points,  their  goals,  their  equipments 
might  be  different;  still  here  as elsewhere  Medieval 
Science preserved a high degree of unity and generality. 
In the first place, though a war of opinions over the great 
questions of  Public  Law might  be loudly raging, still 
all men shared one common concept of  the Universe, 
the  supreme  premisses  being  regarded  by  medieval 
minds  as no  discoveries  to be  made  by  man,  but  as 
the divinely revealed substratum of  all human science. 
Secondly, men  readily borrowed on all sides whatever 
they  needed, so that there  was  an  always increasing 
store of  intellectual treasure amassed  by  co-operative 
lab'our and common  to all. 
Diversity  In  this  manner  elements  that  derived  from  the 
of mate- 
iials.  most diverse sources were fused into a system.  Holy 
Writ and  the expositions  thereof,  Patristic  Lore and 
more  especially  the  Civitas Dei  of  Augustine,  these 
furnished  the  medieval  Doctrine  of  Society  with  its 
specifically Christian traits.  Genuinely Germanic ideas 
flowed into it from the tales of medieval historians and 
from  the popular  thought  which  those  tales  had  in- 
fluenced.  The  resuscitation of the Political Philosophy 
of the Antique World, and above all the exaltation of 
the Politics of Aristotle to the position of an irrefragable 
canon, had  from the first dictated at least the scientific 
form of  the whole doctrine.  And then to all that was 
obtained  from  these  various  sources  Jurisprudence 
added  the  enormous  mass  of  legal  matter  that  was 
enshrined in Roman and Canon Law, and, to a smaller 
degree, in  the ordinances of  the medieval  Emperors, 
for Jurisprudence regarded what these texts had to say 
of  Church  and State, as being not merely the positive 
statutes of  some one age, but rules of  eternal  validity 
flowing from the very nature of  things. 
The Cozt vse  of Deve  dojltze~  t  . 
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Then again, in the method of  handling this wealth methods.  Diverse 
of  material  the  tendencies  of  the  different  sciences 
supplemented  each  other.  The  deepest  speculative 
penetration  falls  to  the  share of  the theologian  and 
philosopher;  the  keenest  practical  appreciation  of 
newly-won  ideas  falls  to the share of  politicians with 
an eye on the question of the hour ; still Jurisprudence, 
albeit  with  some  hesitation,  yielded  to the impulses 
that were thus given.  Conversely, it was professional 
Jurisprudence  which  by  its assiduously detailed  work 
brought the aerial scheme of  thought into combination 
with the actual public life of  great and small societies, 
and  by  so doing  both  started a  science  of  Positive 
Public  Law1 and  provided  the  philosopher  and  the 
speculative  politician  with  a  series of  legal  concepts 
serviceable  for  the construction  of  a  system.  More- 
over, at this point  the other writers adhered as closely 
as was possible to the Legists, Canonists, and Feudists, 
and by so doing began to give to their abstractions and 
their postulates a stable formulated shape and a more 
solid basis among realities. 
Thus, notwithstanding  the diversity of  its  sources Unity of 
the move 
and its confluents, the Medieval Doctrine of  State and ment. 
Society flowed along one single bed.  Within that bed 
were commotions  that shook the world.  But  all this 
conflict between  opinions,  ecclesiastical  and  secular, 
absolutistic and democratic, only accelerated the speed 
of a  current which  as a whole  swept  onwards  in  but 
one direction. 
Beneath  this  movement,  however,  there  was  an Medieval 
and  internal contest, which  in  the history  of ideas  was of *"tique- 
Modern  more  importance than all  the external differences be- Thought. 
tween partizans : namely, the contest between  Properly 
Medieval and '  Antique-Modern ' Thought. 
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longer,  the outward  framework  of  all  Political  Doc- 
trine consisted  of  the grandiose but narrow system of 
thoughts that had been reared by the Medieval Spirit. 
It was a system of  thoughts which culminated in  the 
idea  of  a  Community  which  God  Himself  had  con- 
stituted  and which  comprised  All  Mankind.  This 
system  may be expounded, as it is by Dante, in all its 
prity and all its fulness, or it may become the shadow 
of  a shade ; but rudely to burst  its bars asunder is an 
exploit which is but now and again attempted by some 
bold innovator. 
None the less, this Political  Doctrine,  even when 
it  was  endeavouring  contentedly  to live  within  the 
wbrld of  medieval thoughts,  had from  the first borne 
into that world the seeds of dissolution.  To  the cradle 
of  Political  Theory the Ancient World brought gifts : 
an antique concept of  The State, an antique concept 
of  Law.  Of  necessity  these  would  work a  work  of 
destruction upon  the medieval mode of  thought.  As 
a matter of  fact  the old  system  began  internally  to 
dissolve.  The several  elements  that  were  thus  set 
free began to combine with the antique ideas, and from 
these combinations new  mental  products issued.  So 
much  of  Medieval Thought as was in  this wise com- 
pletely fused  with  the Antique  Tradition came down 
with  that  Tradition  into the  Modern World, and be- 
came the specifically  modern factor  in  the scheme of 
Natural Law.  All the more irreparable was the down- 
fall of  the Medieval  System. 
If  from the point  at which  we  have placed  our- 
selves we survey the Political Doctrine of  the Middle 
Age,  we  see within  the  medieval  husk  an  'antique- 
modern'  kernel.  Always waxing,  it  draws  away  all 
vital nutriment from the shell, and in the end that shell 
is broken.  Thus the history of  the Political Theories 
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of the  Middle  Age is  at one and the  same time  a 
history of  the theoretical formulation of the System of 
Medieval Society and  the  history  of  the erection of 
that newer  edifice which was built  upon a foundation 
of  Natural Law.  As might be expected, we may see 
great  differences  between  the  different  writers  and 
manifold  fluctuations.  Still, if  we  look at the whole 
movement,  there  is  a  steady  advance all  along the 
line.  We may  say that the first  forces  to tread the 
road  that leads  away from  the  Middle  Age are the 
champions of Papal Absolutism, though to a first glance 
they seem so genuinely medieval.  Then the study of 
Roman  Law and  the arguments for  Imperial  Abso- 
lutism with which it supplies the  Hohenstaufen really 
march in  the same direction.  New forces  were  mar- 
shalled by  the scholastic  students of  the Aristotelian 
Philosophy,  and  even  Thomas  of  Aquino  uncon- 
sciously laboured  in  a  work  of  destruction  and inno- 
vation.  A  new  and powerful  impulse  was  given  by 
the  literary  strife  that  broke  forth  in  France  and 
Germany  when  the  fourteenth  century  was  young: 
strife over the relation between  Church  and State, in 
the course whereof  many of the ideas of the Reforma- 
tion, and  even many  of the ideas of  the French  Re- 
volution  were  proclaimed,  though  in scholastic garb, 
by such  men  as  Marsilius  of  Padua and William  of 
Ockham.  Then along very various routes the writers 
of the Conciliar Age forwarded, whether they liked it 
or no, the victorious advance  of  the Antique-Modern 
forces.  Finally  in  the  fifteenth  century  Humanism 
broke with even the forms of  the Middle Age and, in 
its desire to restore the purely classical, seemed for a 
while  to be threatening those medieval elements with- 
out  the retention of  which  the  Modern World could 
not have been what it is.  The drift towards Antiquity 6  Political  Theo~ies  of the Middle Age.  Macrocosm  and Microcos?~.  7 
pure  and  undefiled,  whether  it  takes  with  Aeneas 
Sylvius the  turn  to  absolutism  or  with  Patricius  of 
Siena the turn  to republicanism, did as a  matter  of 
fact wholly repulse for  a season the Germanic notions 
of  State and  Law.  Yet  was  the medieval  tradition 
held by the many, and on the other hand the thoughts 
of  the  German  Reformation  were  being  prepared. 
Revolutionary  thoughts they were, but harmonious in 
their  innermost  characteristics with  the  work  of  the 
Germanic Spirit.  Isolated, it is true, and in the shape 
that he gave it fruitless, appears the effort of  Nicholas 
of Cues.  The  genius of his powerful mind endeavoured 
to unify two  ages, and, as it were,  to bring to a new 
biith  and to  modern  vigour  the  medieval  system of 
ideas.  But fundamental Germanic thoughts which lay 
in  that  system  lived on,  doing  a  mighty  work  both 
among the political ideas of  the  Reformation and also 
in the construction of  the 'nature-rightly'  Doctrine of 
the State. 
Influence  As  to  the  relation  between  the  development  of 
of Cor- 
poration  Political  Theory  and  that  Doctrine  of  Corporations 
Law upon 
~~li~i~~l  upon  which  Legists and Decretists had  laboured,  we 
shall  see  that  it  was  just  this  lore  of  Corporations 
which furnished  Political  Theory with genuinely legal 
elements.  Not  only  were  the  Jurists  themselves 
acquiring  a  Theory of  Church  and State which,  at 
least  in  part,  was  obtained by  a  direct  application  of 
the ideas and rules of  Corporation Law to the largest 
and  highest  Communities,  but  the  Philosophers  and 
Speculative  Politicians,  though  they  might  hold  that 
a  mere  corporation  was  unworthy  of  their  attention, 
borrowed from this quarter a wealth of  ideas and rules 
that could be employed in the scientific construction of 
Church and State. 
Conversely,  Political  Theory  necessarily  reacted 
upon  the Doctrine  of  Corporations.  For one  thing, Influence 
of Political 
the latter was  from the very first, and as a  matter of Theory 
course called upon to represent the fundamental thought trpra. 
of the world-embracing  Medieval  Spirit touching the 
highest  and widest  of  all Communities.  And, on the 
other hand,  every advance  of  the  '  antique-modern' 
idea of  The State was a preparation  for the negative 
and  destructive  influence  which  modern  modes  of 
thought  have brought to bear upon the medieval lore 
of  corporations. 
Having thus  indicated  the  main  tendencies  and 
combinations  that  will  deserve our attention, we  may 
now  more  closely  examine  those  leading  thoughts 
which  find  a  theoretical  formulation  in  the Political 
Doctrine  of  the  Middle  Age. 
I I.  Macrocosm  and  Microcosm. 
Political  Thought  when  it  is genuinely  medieval Medieval 
Thought 
starts from the Whole, but ascribes an intrinsic value andthe 
Uluverse  to  every  Partial  Whole down  to  and  including  the 
Individual.  If  it  holds  out  one  hand  to  Antique 
Thought  when  it  sets  the  Whole  before  the  Parts, 
and the other hand to the Modern Theories of Natural 
Law  when  it proclaims  the  intrinsic  and  aboriginal 
rights  of  the Individual,  its  peculiar  characteristic is 
that  it  sees  the  Universe  as one  articulated  Whole 
and every Being-whether  a Joint-Being (Community) 
or  a  Single-Being-as  both  a  Part and a  Whole:  a 
Part  determined  by  the final  cause  of  the  Universe, 
and a  Whole  with  a  final  cause  of  its own. 
This is the origin of  those theocratic and spiritual- 
istic  traits  which  are  manifested  by  the  Medieval C~~CY. 
Doctrine of Society.  On the one side, every ordering 
of a  human  community  must  appear as a component 8  Political  Theories of the Middle Age. 
part of that ordering of the world which exists because 
~od  exists, and every earthly group must appear as an 
member  of  that  Civitas Dei, that God-State, 
which comprehends the heavens and the earth.  Then, 
on  the other hand, the eternal and other-worldly  aim 
and object  of  every individual man must, in a directer 
or an indirecter fashion, determine the aim and  object 
of  every group into which he enters. 
The  But  as there  must  of  necessity  be connexion  be- 
Divine 
Harmany.  tween the various groups, and as all  of  them  must  be 
connected with the divinely ordered Universe, we come 
by the further notion of  a divinely instituted Harmony 
which  pervades  the  Universal  Whole and every part 
theieof.  To  every Being is assigned its place in that 
Whole, and to every link between  Beings corresponds 
a divine decree.  But since the World is One Organism, 
animated by One Spirit, fashioned by One Ordinance, 
the self-same principles that appear in  the structure of 
the World will appear once more in the structure of its 
every  Part.  Therefore  every particular  Being,  in  so 
far  as  it  is  a  Whole,  is  a  diminished  copy  of  the 
World;  it  is  a  lMicrocosmus  or  Mnor Mundus  in 
which  the Macrocosmus  is  mirrored.  In  the  fullest 
measure this is true of  every human individual ; but it 
holds  good  also  of  every  human  community  and of 
human society in general.  Thus the Theory of  Human 
Society must  accept the divinely created organization 
of the Universe as a prototype  of  the first  principles 
which govern the construction of human communitiesa. 
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I1  I.  Unity in ChurcA and  State. 
Now the Constitutive Principle of  the Universe is '?;?:- 
in the first  place  Unity.  God, the absolutely One, is Unity. 
before and above all the World's Plurality, and is the 
one  source  and  one  goal  of  every  Being.  Divine 
Reason as an Ordinance for the Universe (Ze,?: aeterna) 
permeates  all  apparent plurality.  Divine Will is ever 
and always  active in  the uniform  government  of  the 
World,  and is  directing all  that  is  manifold  to  one 
only  end. 
Therefore wherever there is to be a Particular or  The  Unity 
of Man- 
Partial  Whole  with  some  separate  aim  and  objectkind. 
subordinated to the aim  and object of  the Universe, 
the Principle of  Unity (princ@ium  unitatis) must once 
more hold  good.  Everywhere the One comes before 
the Many.  All  Manyness  has its origin  in  Oneness 
(omnis multitude derivatur ab uno) and to Oneness it 
returns  (aa!  unum  reducitur).  Therefore  all  Order 
consists  in  the  subordination  of  Plurality  to  Unity 
(ordinutio ad  unum), and never  and nowhere  can  a 
purpose  that is  common  to Many be effectual  unless 
the One rules over the Many and directs the Many to 
the goal.  So is it among the heavenly spheres ; so in 
the harmony of  the heavenly bodies, which  find their 
Unity in the primum mobile.  So is it in every living 
organism.  Here the Soul is the aboriginal principle, 
while  Reason  among the powers of  the Soul and the 
Heart among the bodily organs are the representatives 
of Unity.  So is it in  the Whole of inanimate nature, 
for  there  we  shall  find  no  compound  substance  in 
which there is not some one element which determines 
the nature of  the Whole.  Not otherwise can it be in 
the  Social  Order  of  Mankind'.  Here  also  every 10  PoZz'ficaZ  Theozyies  of the Middle  Age. 
Plurality which  has a  common  aim and object must in 
relation  to that aim and object find  source and norm 
and goal  in a ruling  Unity, while, on the other hand, 
every of those Parts which constitute the Whole, must, 
in  so far as that  Part itself  is a Whole with a final 
cause of  its  own,  itself  appear as a  self-determining 
Unit"  Unity  is  the  root  of  All,  and  therefore  of 
all social  existence9 
Mankind  Then in  the Middle  Age these thoughts  at once 
as one 
corn-  issue  in  the postulate  of  an  External,  Visible  Com- 
munity.  munity comprehending All Mankind.  In the Universal 
Whole,  Mankind  is  one  Partial  Whole with  a  final 
cause of its own, which is distinct from the final causes 
offlndividuals and from those of  other Communities6. 
Therefore in all centuries of the Middle Age Christen- 
dom, which in destiny is identical with Mankind, is set 
before  us as a  single,  universal  Community,  founded 
and  governed  by  God  Himself.  Mankind  is  one 
'mystical  body' ; it is one single  and internally con- 
nected  'peopleJ or  ' folk ' ; it  is  an  all  embracing 
corporation  (universitas), which  constitutes  that  Uni- 
versal  Realm,  spiritual  and  temporal,  which  may  be 
called  the Universal  Church (eccdesia  ~niversadis),  or, 
with equal propriety, the Commonwealth of the Human 
Race  (respubdica generis Aumani).  Therefore  that  it 
may attain its one purpose,  it  needs  One Law  (Zex) 
and One Government  (unicus princ$atus)'. 
Separation  Then however,  along  with  this  idea  of  a  single 
of Church 
and State.  Community comprehensive of  Mankind, the severance 
of  this  Community between  two organized  Orders of 
Life, the spiritual and the temporal, is accepted by the 
Middle Age as an eternal counsel of God.  In century 
after century an unchangeable decree of  Divine Law 
seems to have commanded  that, corresponding to the 
doubleness of  man's nature and destiny, there must be 
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two separate  Orders, one of  which  should fulfil man's 
temporal and worldly destiny, while  the other should ; 
make preparation  here on earth for the eternal here- 
after.  And each of  these  Orders necessarily appears 
as  an  externally  separated  Realm,  dominated by  its 
own  particular  Law, specially represented  by a  single 
Folk  or  People  and  governed  by  a  single  Govern- 
ment  s. 
The  conflict between this DupIicit~  and the requisite Duality 
Church 
Unity  becomes  the starting-point  for  speculative dis- and State 
reducible  cussions  of  the relation  between  Church  and  State. to  Unity. 
The  Medieval  Spirit  steadily refuses  to  accept  the 
Dualism as final.  In some higher Unity reconciliation 
must  be  found.  This was  indubitable ; but  over the 
nature  of  the reconciling process  the great parties  of 
the  Middle Age fell a-fighting. 
The ecclesiastical  party  found  a  solution  of  the The High 
Church  problem  in  the  Sovereignty  of  the Spiritual Power. Theory: 
Sovereign-  Always more plainly the Principle of  Unity begins to ty of the 
appear as the philosophical groundwork of  that theory Church. 
which,  from  the days of  Gregory  VII onwards, was 
demanding-now  with  more and now with  less rigour 
-that  all political arrangements should be regarded as 
part and parcel of the ecclesiastical organization.  The 
'argumentum  unitatis'  becomes  the key-stone  of  all 
those other arguments, biblical,  historical, legal, which 
support  the  papal  power  over  temporal  affairsB.  If 
Mankind  be only  one,  and  if  there  can  be  but  one 
State that  comprises all  Mankind,  that  State can  be 
no  other  than  the  Church  that  God  Himself  has 
founded, and all temporal  lordship  can be valid  only 
in  so far  as  it  is  part  and  parcel  of  the  Church. 
Therefore the Church,  being  the one true State,  has 
received  by a  mandate from  God the plenitude of  all 
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of One Mightlo.  The Head of this all-embracing State 
is  Christ.  But,  as  the  Unity  of  Mankind  is  to be 
realized  already  in  this  world,  His celestial  kingship 
must  have  a  terrestrial  presentment1'.  As  Christ's 
Vice-Regent, the earthly  Head of  the Church  is the 
one and only Head of  all  Mankind.  The Pope is the 
wielder of what is in principle an Empire (princ$atzcs) 
over the Community of  Mortals.  He is their  Priest 
and their King ;  their spiritual and temporal Monarch ; 
their Law-giver and Judge in all causes  upr re me'^. 
The  If  the  papal  party  none  the  less  held  fast  the 
Pope's 
temporal  doctrine that a  separation of  Ecclesiastical and Tem- 
power.    oral  Powers  was  commanded  by  God,  it  explained 
that the principle  of  separation was applicable  merely 
to the mode in which  those powers were  to be exer- 
cised13.  The bearer of the supreme plenitude of power 
in  Christendom is forbidden by divine law to wield the 
temporal sword with his own hand.  Only the worthier 
portion  of  Ecclesiastical  Might  is  reserved  for  the 
Priesthood, while  the worldly portion  is committed to 
less worthy  hands14.  It must  be confessed  therefore 
that  God  has  willed  the  separation  of  the Regnum 
from  the Sacerdotium,  and  therefore  has  willed  the 
existence of the Secular State :  the worldly magistrature 
is ordained of  God'"  Still it is only by the mediation 
of  the Church  that  the Temporal  Power possesses  a 
divine  sanction  and mandate.  The State in  its con- 
crete form  is  of  earthly and not,  like  the Church,  of 
heavenly origin.  In so far as the State existed before 
the  Church  and  exists  outside  the Church, it is the 
outcome of  a human  nature that was  impaired by the 
Fall of Man.  It was founded, under divine sufferance, 
by some act of violence, or else was extorted from God 
for some sinful purpose.  Of itself  it has no power to 
raise itself above the insufficiency of a piece of  human 
- 
handiwork'?  In order therefore  to purge away  the 
stain of its origin and to acquire the divine sanction as 
a legitimate  part of  that  Human Society which  God 
has  willed,  the  State  needs  to be  hallowed  by  the 
authority of  the Church.  In this sense therefore it is 
from the Church that the Temporal Power receives its 
true being, and it is from  the Church that Kaiser and 
Kings receive their right to rule1'.  And all along the 
Temporal  Government  when  it  has been  constituted 
remains a subservient part of  the Ecclesiastical Order. 
It is a mean  or instrument of  the single and  eternal 
purpose  of  the  Church.  In the  last  resort  it  is  an 
Ecclesiastical Institution1*.  For this reason all human 
laws (leges) find their boundaries set and their spheres 
of  competence assigned  to them  by the law  spiritual 
(canones)19.  For this  reason  the Temporal  Power is 
subject to and  should  obey the Spiritual".  For this 
reason  the offices  of  Kaiser,  King,  and  Prince  are 
ecclesiastical offices2'. 
From  these  fundamental  ~rinciples  flowed  with The  pope 
has both  logical  necessity  the claims  to  Over-Lordship  which swords 
the  Pope,  as  bearer  of  the sovereign  Sace~dotiwnt, 
urged against the Emperor as bearer of the lmperium, 
and also  against  all  other  independent  wielders  of 
worldly  might.  That the Emperor,  and likewise  all 
other Rulers,  derive their  offices but  mediately  from 
God,  and immediately from  the Church's  Head, who 
in this matter as in  other matters acts as God's Vice- 
Regent-this  became the general theory of the Church. 
It  was in this sense that the allegory of the Two Swords 
was  expounded  by  the  ecclesiastical  party.  Both 
Swords have been given by God to Peter and through 
him to the Popes, who are to retain the spiritual sword, 
while  the  temporal  they  deliver  to  others.  This 
delivery, however. will confer, not free ownership, but I4  Political  Theovies of  the Middle  Age. 
the  right  of an ecclesiastical  office-holder.  As before 
the  delivery,  so afterwards,  the  Pope  has  utrumgue 
gl&iZtn. He has  both  Powers  habit%, though  only 
the Spiritual Power adz.  The true ownership (domi- 
niufn)  of  both  swords is his, and what  he concedes in 
the temporal sword is merely some right of independent 
user,  which  is  characterized  as  usus  immediatus, or 
perhaps as domirtium utilez2. In the medium of feudal 
law  the papal  right  in  the Temporal  Power  appears 
as neither more nor less than a feudal lordship.  The 
Emperor assumes the place  of  the highest  of  papal 
vassals, and the oath  that at his coronation he swears 
to the Pope can be regarded as a true homagium".  In 
any case the Emperor and every other worldly Ruler 
are in  duty bound  to use in the service and under the 
direction  of  the Church  the sword  that has been  en- 
trusted  to them2'.  It is not  merely that the Pope by 
virtue  of  his  spiritual  sword  may by  spiritud means 
supervise,  direct  and  correct  all  acts  of  rulership2". 
Much rather must we hold that, though in the general 
course of  affairs he ought to refrain from any immediate 
intermeddling  with  temporal  matters,  and  to respect 
the legitimately acquired rights of  rulersm, he is none 
the less entitled and bound to exercise a direct  control 
of temporalities whenever there is occasion and reason- 
able cause  for his intervention  (casunditer ed  ex ratio- 
zabili  ~ausa)'~.  Therefore  for  good  cause  may  he 
withdraw  and  confer  the Irpzperium  from  and  upon 
peoples  and  individuals"  8:  and  indeed  it  was  by  his 
plenitude  of  power that the Imperizm was withdrawn 
from  the Greeks and  bestowed  upon  the  Germans 
(transdatio I~@erii)~@.  His is  it  to set  Kaisers  and 
Kings over the peoples, and the right so to do he uses 
whenever  no  other  mode  of  instituting  a  ruler  has 
been  established  or the established  mode  has shown 
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its  insufficiencyS0. In particular,  if  the  Emperor  is 
chosen by the Prince-Electors, this is a practice which 
rests  solely  upon  a  concession  which  the  Pope  has 
made  and  might  for  good  cause  revokes1.  It is  he 
that is and remains the true Imperial Elector.  There- 
fore  to him pertains the examination and confirmation 
of  every  election ;  upon  him  devolves  the election 
whenever, according to the rules of Canon Law, a case  - 
of  'lapse'  occurs ; and it is by his act of  unction and 
coronation that the Emperor  Elect  first  acquires im- 
perial  rights".  In case of  vacancy or if  the temporal 
Ruler neglects his duties, the immediate guardianship 
of the Empire falls to the Pope".  And lastly, it is for 
him  to  judge  and  punish  Emperors  and  Kings,  to 
receive complaints  against them, to shield  the nations 
from their tyranny, to depose rulers who are neglectful 
of their duties, and to discharge their subjects from the 
oath of fealty? 
All  these  claims  appeared as logical  consequences The Com- 
munity of  of  a  legal  principle  ordained  by  God  Himself.  The  Mankind 
subsidiary  arguments  touching  the  Pope's  right  and and  Sovereign-  the 
title, arguments derived from history and positive law, ,2h",ttk 
had  no  self-sufficient  validity,  but  were  regarded  as 
mere outward attestations and examples.  Conversely, 
no  title founded on Positive  Law could  derogate from 
the Divine Law of the Church.  For this reason what- 
ever  was  in  the first  instance  said  of the Emperor's 
subjection to the Pope could  be analogically extended 
to every other temporal Rulera5. And thus in fact was 
derived  immediately  from  the Ius Divinum  an ideal 
Constitution  comprehending  all  Mankind,  a  Consti- 
tution  which  by  the  universal  Sovereignty  of  the 
Church  thoroughly  satisfied  the  postulate  of  Unity 
above  Duality. 
Very rarely in  the Middle  Age were  the partizans 16  Podiiicad  Theories of the Mida'de Age. 
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Opposition Of  the  Secular  State bold  enough  to attempt a  con- 
to the 
High  of  this theory to the interest of  the Temporal 
Church  power,  or  to  deduce  from  the  Principle of  Unity a 
Sovereignty of  the State over the Church.  It is true 
that the earlier age in which  the Church was more or 
less  completely  subjected  to the  Empire was  never 
wholly  forgotten3'.  Yet  was  the  reminiscence  of  it 
seldom  used  except  as  a  purely  defensive  weapon. 
Even Ockham will go no further than the hypothetical 
assertion that if really and truly there must be just one 
single  State comprising  all  Mankind  with  just  one 
single Head upon Earth, then this  Head must be the 
Emperor, and the Church can be no more than a part 
oi'  his  Realm3?.  Lonely in the Middle Age was Mar- 
silius  of  Padua  when  he  taught  as  a  principle  the 
complete  absorption  of  Church  in  State.  He,  like 
others,  deduced  conclusions  from  the idea  of  Unity; 
but then with  him  this idea assumed a thoroughly un- 
medieval form.  Already it was transmuting itself into 
the '  antique-modern '  idea  of  an  all-comprehending 
internal  Unity  of  the State and was  proclaiming  in 
advance those  principles  of  the State's  Absoluteness 
which  would  only  attain  maturity  in  a  then  distant 
future.  To  this  we must  return hereafter. 
Thetheory  In general throughout the Middle Age the doctrine  of  two co- 
ord~nate  of the State's partizans remained content with the older 
powers.  teaching of the Church : namely, that Church and State 
were  two Co-ordinate  Powers, that the Two Swords 
were potestates  distinctae,  that Sacerdolium  and Im- 
$eriu;tn  were  two  independent  spheres  instituted  by 
God  Himself".  This doctrine  therefore  claimed  for 
the Temporal Power an inherent authority not derived 
from ecclesiastical  canonss9.  In century after century 
it  fought a  battle for the principle that the Iwerium, 
like the Sacerdotium, proceeds immediately from  God 
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(impen'um  a  Deo),  and therefore depends from  God 
and  not from  the Church  (imferiurn  non  defendet  ab 
eccZesia)40.  Now with more and now with less vigour 
this  doctrine  contested  the various  claims  that were 
urged  on the Church's side against the Emperor and 
Temporal Power".  Still it conceded a like sovereignty 
and independence to the Spiritual Sword, and merely 
demanded that the Ecclesiastical  Power should confine 
itself  within  the  limit  of  genuinely  spiritual  affairs, 
the Church  having  been  instituted  and ordained  by 
God as a  purely Spiritual Realm4'.  Nay, this theory 
was almost always willing frankly to admit that, when 
compared  with  the  State,  the  Church,  having  the 
sublimer aim,  might rightly claim,  not only  a  higher 
intrinsic value,  but also a  loftier  external rank". 
The writers, however, who took the State's side in Unity and 
the two 
the debate, they also were full  of  the idea of  the or- coordinate 
powers.  ganized Oneness of  all Mankind, and could see in the 
Spiritual and Temporal  Orders but two sides of  the 
one Christian  Commonwealth.  So in a two-fold wise 
they endeavoured to reduce  the contending principles 
to  Unity.  Sometimes  they  held  that  the  external 
Unity  of  the  Universal  Realm  finds  an  adequate 
presentment  in  that Celestial Head in which the Body 
of Mankind  attains completion-a  Head whence the 
two  Powers  flow  and  whither  they  return  in  con- 
fluence".  Sometimes they developed the thought that 
in the terrestrial  sphere an internal  Unity of  the two 
Orders  will  suffice:  such  a  Unity  as  results  from 
internal  connexion  and mutual  support.  The Sacer- 
dotiurn  and  the  Ir~zperiz~m,  each  of  these,  taken  by 
itself was but  one vital  Function of  the social  Body, 
and  the fulness  of  Life  was  only  attained  by  their 
'  harmonious  concord ' and  by  their  mutually  supple- 
menting  co-operation  in  the  task  that  is  set  before 









hfankind4'.  Hence were drawn, not only the conclu- 
sion  that the State must  be  subject to the Church in 
Spirituals, and the Church to the State in TemporalsA6, 
but  also  a  remarkable  and  further  reaching  theory 
by  virtue  whereof  each  of  the  two  powers  can  and 
must in case of  necessity (casuaditer  and per accidens) 
assume, for the weal of the whole body, functions which 
in themselves  are not its proper functions.  By such a 
'law  of  necessityJ an  explanation  could  be given  of 
those historical  occurrences which  seemed to stand in 
contradiction  to  a  system  which  severs  the  Two 
Swords, and from  such  a  'law  of  necessity'  political 
consequences  of  a  practical  kind  could  be  deduced. 
Since, when there is a vacancy in the office of supreme 
temporal Magistrate, it is for  the  Pope to judge even 
temporal  matters,  the tvansdatio  iwerii, the decision 
of  disputed  elections  to  the  Empire,  nay,  in  some 
circumstances even the deposition  of  a  Kaiser, might 
perhaps  have  fallen  within  the  Pope's  competence". 
But the same legal principle  required  that  in  case of 
necessity  the Temporal  Head of  Christendom should 
take  the  Church  under  his  care,  and  either  himself 
decide  ecclesiastical  controversies  or  else  summon  a 
General Council to heal the faults of the Church". 
Then when  each  of these  two  Orders is taken by 
itself  we  once  more  see  the  medieval  Principle  of 
Unity at work and constituting that Order as a  single 
whole. 
From it there arises within  the Church the idea of 
the divinely  instituted, visible  and external  Unity  of 
the Spiritual Realm.  Throughout the whole  Middle 
Age there reigned, almost without  condition or qualifi- 
cation, the notion  that the Oneness and Universality 
of  the Church  must  manifest itself  in  a unity of  law, 
constitution  and  supreme  government*,  and also  the 
notion that by rights the whole of  Mankind belongs to 
the  Ecclesiastical  Society  that  is  thus  constituted60. 
Therefore  it  is  quite  common  to  see  the  Church 
conceived as a '  State.'  That the Principle of Oneness 
demands of  necessity an external  Unity was but very 
rarely  doubted6'.  Very slowly was  ground won  by  a 
reaction  which  protested,  not  merely  against the in- 
creasing worldliness  of  the Church,  but  also  against 
the whole idea of  a '  Spiritual State.'  It was reserved 
for  Wyclif  and  Hus decisively  to  demand  that  the 
Church  should  be  conceived  in  a  more  inward,  less 
external, fashion, as the Community of  the Predestin- 
ated,  and  so  to  prepare  the  way  for  that  German 
Reformation which at this very point broke thoroughly 
away  from  the medieval  Idea of  Unity". 
Similarly  within  the mundane  sphere the  Middle 2;;: 
Age  deduced  from  the  Principle  of  Oneness  the temporal 
power.  divinely ordained necessity  of  a  one and only World- Imperial- 
State".  Theological, historical and juristic  arguments '"". 
were  adduced  to  prove  that  the world-wide  Roman 
Dominion  was  the  final  member  in  that  series  of 
Universal  Monarchies  which  was  foreordained  and 
foretold by  God, and that, despite many  appearances 
to the contrary, this Roman Dominion was legitimately 
acquired  and  legitimately  administered  even  in  the 
days  of  heathenry".  Then  this  Dominion  was  hal- 
lowed  and  confirmed  by  the birth,  life  and death  of 
Christ.  It was transferred  for a while  to the Greeks 
by  Constantine,  but  finally with  the approval  of  God 
was  conferred  upon  the  Germans".  Therefore  the 
Romano-German  Kaiser,  as  immediate  successor  in 
title  to  the  Caesars,  was  by  divine  and  human  law 
possessed  of  the I?njerium Mundi, by virtue whereof 
all  Peoples and  Kings of  the earth were subject unto 
himy  Like  the  Roman  Church,  the  Roman  Realm 
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was  indestructible  until  the time when  its  downfall 
would  usher in  the Judgment  Day".  Consistent  be- 
lievers in this Imperial Idea drew the further conclusion 
that de  iure,  as well  as  de facto,  this  Monarchy  of 
divine  right  was  indestructible.  Neither custom  nor 
privilege  could  effect  any deliverance  from  its  sway 
that  would  have any sort  of  legal  validity.  Every 
alienation,  every  partition,  every  other  human  act 
which  diminished  this  Empire,  even  though  the act 
were done by the Emperor's self, was de  iure  null  and 
void".  For a long while even doubters and opponents 
would not directly call  in question this  Imperial  Idea, 
but would  only  maintain  the legal validity  of  excep- 
tions that were based upon privilege or prescription  50, 
and  there  were  many  who  expressly  asserted  that 
exceptions of  this kind did not impugn the idea of  the 
Realm Universal". 
Imperial  Nevertheless,  as a  matter of  fact  the principle  of 
the0 y 
contested.  the  Universal  State was  assailed  while  as  yet  the 
principle of the Universal Church was not in jeopardy. 
Especially  in  France,  we  hear  the doctrine  that the 
Oneness of  all  Mankind need not find expression in a 
one and only State, but that on the contrary a Plurality 
of States best corresponds to the nature of  man and of 
temporal  power6'.  Thus at this point  also  medieval 
theory develops modern ideas, the process  of  develop- 
ment  being  in  harmony  with  the growth  of  National 
States in the world of fact. 
Theory of  If,  however,  medieval  thought,  whenever  it  was  partial 
groups.  purely medieval, postulated the visible  Unity of  Man- 
Federal- 
istic  kind  in  Church  and Empire, it regarded this Unity as 
Structure.  prevailing  only  up to those limits within which  Unity 
is demanded by  the Oneness of  the aim or object of 
Mankind.  Therefore the Unity was neither  absolute 
nor exclusive, but appeared as the vaulted dome of  an 
organically  articulated structure of human society.  In 
Church and Empire the Total Body is a manifold and 
graduated  system  of  Partial  Bodies,  each  of  which, 
though itself  a  Whole, necessarily demands connexion 
with  the larger  Whole".  It has  a  final  cause of  its 
own,  and  consists  of  Parts which  it  procreates  and 
dominates, and which in their turn are Wholes  68.  Be- 
tween  the  highest  Universality  or '  All-Community' 
and the absolute Unity of  the individual man, we find 
a  series  of  intermediating  units,  in  each  of  which 
lesser  and lower  units  are comprised  and  combined. 
Medieval  theory  endeavoured  to establish  a  definite 
scheme descriptive of  this articulation, and the gradu- 
ated hierarchy of  the Church served as a  model for a 
parallel system of temporal groups.  When it comes to 
particulars, there will  be differences between  different 
schemes ; but it is common to see five organic groups 
placed  above the individual and the family:  namely 
village, city, province, nation or kingdom, empire : but 
sometimes several of  these grades will be regarded as 
one  a. 
But as time goes on we see that just this federal- ~ederal- 
istic and 
istic  construction  of  the Social Whole was  more and central- 
izing ten-  more  exposed  to  attacks  which  proceeded  from  adencies. 
centralizing  tendency.  This we  may  see  happening 
first in  the  ecclesiastical  and  then  in  the  temporal 
sphere.  The '  antique-modern ' concept of  the State- 
Unit as an absolute and exclusive concentration  of  all 
group-life  gradually  took  shape inside  the  medieval 
doctrine, and then, at first unconsciously but afterwards 
consciously,  began  to burst  in  pieces  the  edifice  of 
medieval  thought.  Hereafter we shall return to this 
process  of  disintegration;  for  the  moment  we  will 
continue to pursue the leading ideas of  the medieval 
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IV.  The Idea  of Orgalzization. 
society as  Medieval  Thought  proceeded  from  the idea  of  a 
Organism. 
single  Whole.  Therefore  an  organic construction  of 
Human Society was as familiar  to it as a  mechanical 
and atomistic construction was originally alien.  Under 
the influence of biblical allegories and the models set 
by  Greek  and  Roman  writers,  the  comparison  of 
Mankind  at  large  and  every  smaller  group  to  an 
animate  body  was  universally  adopted  and  pressed. 
This led  at an  early  time  to  some  anthropomorphic 
conceits  and  fallacies  which  do  not  rise  above  the 
level  of  pictorial  presentment?  but  also  to  some 
fruitful  thinking  which  had  a  future before  it". 
Mankind  In  the  first  place,  Mankind  in  its  Totality  was  as one 
organism. conceived as an Organism.  According to the allegory 
that was found in the profound words of the Apostle- 
an allegory which dominated  all  spheres of thought- 
Mankind  constituted  a  Mystical  Body,  whereof  the 
Head  was  Christ".  It was  just  from  this  principle 
that  the  theorists  of  the  ecclesiasticaI party  deduced 
the  proposition  that  upon  earth  the  Vicar  of  Christ 
represents  the  one  and  only  Head  of  this  Mystical 
Body, for, were  the Emperor an additional  Head, we 
should have before us a two-headed monster, an aninznZ 
bicepsm.  Starting from the same pictorial concept, the 
theorists of the imperial party inferred  the necessity of 
a Temporal  Head of  ChristendomGg,  since there must 
needs  be  a  separate  Head  for  each  of  those  two 
Organisms which  together constitute  the one Bodyv0. 
The ultimate  Unity  of  this  Body,  they  argued,  was 
preserved by the existence  of its Heavenly Head, for, 
though it be true that the body mystical, like the body 
natural, cannot end in  two heads, still  there is exactly 
this difference  between  the two cases, namely, that in 
the mystical  body under  its one Supreme Head there 
may be parts  which  themselves  are complete  bodies, 
each with a head of its own". 
Moreover,  from  of  old,  behind  the conception  of 
Mankind  as  Organism, lay the desire that State and ~ody. 
Church  should  complete  each  other  and  unite  with 
each  other into a  one  and  only  life.  At this point 
ecclesiastical  theorists  could  make  profit  of  the  old 
comparison  which  likens the Realm  to the body and 
the  Priesthood  to  the soul.  A  basis  might  thus be 
easily  acquired  for  all  their  assertions  touching  the 
subjection  of  State  to  Churchva.  Their  opponents 
sometimes  tried to substitute one picture for another': 
but sometimes  were content with  resisting inferences. 
The latter course was taken, for example, by Nicholas 
of  Cues when he drew his magnificent portrait  of  Or- 
ganized Mankind.  For him the EccZesia is the Corpus 
Mysticurn.  Its  Spirit  is  God  and  His  Sacramental 
Dispensation.  Its Soul is the Priesthood, and All the 
Faithful are its Body.  But  the Ghostly Life and the 
Corporal  are, according to Nicholas, separately consti- 
tuted  and organized  under  the Unity of  the Spirit, so 
that there are two Orders of  Life with co-ordinate and 
equal rights.  But as each  Order is merely  a side of 
the  great  Organism,  they  must  unite  in  harmonious 
concord, and must permeate each other throughout the 
whole  and  in  every part.  As  the  soul,  despite  its 
unity, operates in every member as well  as in the total 
body (est tota in  toto et in puaZibet  parte), and has the 
body  for  its  necessary  correlate,  so there should  be 
between  the Spiritual and  Temporal  Hierarchies  an 
inseverable  connexion  and  an  unbroken  interaction 
which  must  display  itself  in  every  part  and  also 
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this  Body  of  Mankind  corresponds  some  spiritual 
office which  represents  the  Soul  in  this  member. 
["Thus  the  Papacy  will  be  Soul  in  the  brain;  the 
patriarchate  will  be  Soul in the ears and eyes;  the 
Archiepiscopate,  Soul  in  the  arms,  the  Episcopate, 
Soul in the fingers, the Curacy, Soul in the feet, while 
Kaiser, Kings and Dukes, Markgrafs, Grafs, 'Rectores' 
and the simple laity are the corresponding members of 
the '  corporal hierarchy 1'1 
Bodies  Like Mankind as a whole, so, not only the Univer- 
moral and 
pliti,  sal  Church and the Universal  Empire, but also every 
Particular Church and every Particular State, and indeed 
every permanent human group is compared to a natural 
body (coupus natu~ale  et organicurn).  It is thought of 
and  spoken  of  as a  Mystical  Body.  Contrasting  it 
with a Body Natural, Engelbert of Volkersdorf [I 250- 
I 3 I I]  already uses the term '  Body Moral and PoliticTs.' 
Anthropo-  At a still early time some men, anticipating modern 
morphism. errors,  spun  out this comparison  into superficial  and 
insipid  detail.  John  of  Salisbury  made  the first  at- 
tempt to find some member of  the natural body which 
would correspond to each portion of  the State7'.  He 
professedly  relied  upon  an otherwise unknown Epistle 
to Trajan, falsely attributed to Plutarch, but remarked 
that he had taken thence not  his phrases but only the 
general idean.  Later writers  followed him,  but with 
many variations in minor mattersB.  The most elabo- 
rate comparison comes from Nicholas of Cues, who for 
this purpose  brought into play  all  the medical  know- 
ledge of  his time7'. 
Deduc-  Still  even  in  the  Middle  Age  there  were  not 
tions from 
the idea of wanting  endeavours  to  employ  the  analogy  of  the 
,  Animated  Body  in  a  less  superficial manner,  and in 
such wise that the idea of Organization would be more 
In the original this passage stands in a footnote.-Trattsl. 
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or less liberated  from  its anthropomorphic trappings. 
Already John  of  Salisbury deduced thence the propo- 
sitions-indisputable  in themselves-that  a well ordered 
Constitution  consists in  the proper  apportionment  of 
functions to members and in the apt condition, strength 
and composition of  each and every member ;-that  all 
members  must in  their functions supplement and sup- 
port each other, never losing sight of  the weal of  the 
others, and feeling  pain  in  the harm  that  is done  to 
another;-that  the true unitas of the Body of the State 
rests  on  the just  cohaerentia  of  the members  among 
themselves and with  their  heads0.  Thomas Aquinas, 
Alvarius Pelagius and many others applied the doctrine 
in its traditional and mystical  vestments to the struc- 
ture and unity of  the Churchm.  Ptolomaeus of  Lucca 
pursued the thought that the life of  the State is based 
upon a harmony analogous to that harmony of  organic 
forces  (vires organicae)  which  obtains  in  the  Body 
Natural, and that in  the one case as in the other it is 
Reason,  which,  being  the ruler  of  all  inferior  forces, 
brings them into correlation  and perfects their unity". 
Aegidius Colonna, who constantly employs the picture 
of  the  Body  Natural,  leads  off  with  the  following 
statement:-'For  as  we  see  that  the  body  of  an 
animal  consists  of  connected  and  co-ordinated  mem- 
bers,  so  every  realm  and  every  group  (congyegatio) 
consists of  divers persons connected and co-ordinated 
for some one end.'  Consequently he distinguishes the 
'  commutative  justice ' which  regulates  the  relations 
between  the members  and  furthers  their  equipoise, 
their  reparation  and their  mutual  influence,  from  the 
'  distributive justice,' which  proceeding outwards from 
some  one  point,  such  as  is  the heart  in  the  body, 
distributes and communicates  in  due proportion  vital 
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bert of Volkersdorf  based  his whole exposition of  the 
external  and internal goods of  the well-ordered  State 
upon  the  supposition  of  a  thorough-going  analogy 
between  State and Individual; the Individual as Part 
and the State as Whole are governed by like laws and 
benefited by like virtues and qualities8".  In an original 
and spirited  fashion  Marsilius  of  Padua, who founded 
his doctrine of  the State upon the proposition 'civitas 
est velut animata seu animalis natura quaedam,' carried 
out  the  comparison  of  a  well-ordered  State  to  an 
'animal  bene  dispositum' : only  in  the  case  of  the 
animal the constitutive principle  is mere natural force, 
while in the case of  the State it is the force of  human 
reason,  and  therefore  the  life  of  the  organism  is 
governed  in  the one case by the Law of  Nature and 
in the other by the Law of  Reason.  So he compared 
even  in  detail  the  Reason  which  fashions  the State 
with  the  Nature  which  shapes  organisms.  In  both 
instances a  Plurality of  proportionately adjusted  Parts 
is  ordered  into  a  Whole  in  such  a  way  that  they 
communicate  to  each  other  and  to the  Whole  the 
results  of  their  operations (componitur  ex quibusdam 
proportionatis partibus invicem  ordinatis suaque opera 
sibi mutuo communicantibus et ad totum).  When the 
union  is at its best,  when  it  is  optima  dispositio,  the 
consequence in the Body Natural  is health, and in the 
State it is  tranpuiZZitas.  And,  as  in  a  healthy  body 
every part is perfectly fulfilling its own proper functions 
(perfecte facere operationes convenientes naturae suae), 
so the tranpuiZZitas of  the State results in the periect 
performance of all functions by those parts of the State 
to which, in accordance with Reason and constitutional 
allotment,  such  functions are respectively  appropriate 
(unaquaeque  suarum  partium  facere  perfecte  opera- 
tiones  convenientes  sibi  secundum rationem  et  suam 
The Idea  of Orga=i,ration.  27 
instituti~nem)~.  Ockham,  who  in  many  contexts 
treated  the  State  as  an  organism,  deduced,  in  a 
manner  that  was  his  own,  the principle  that  in  case 
of  need one organ can supply the place of another, and 
so the State may in some cases exercise ecclesiastical 
and the Church  temporal  functions ".  Manifold  em- 
ployment  was  found  for  this  analogy  between  State 
and  Body  Natural  by  Dante,  John  of  Paris, Gerson, 
d'Ailly,  Peter  of  Andlau  and  other  writers  of  the 
fourteenth  and  fifteenth  centuries.  This  mode  of 
thought, however, attained  its most  splendid develop- 
ment in Nicholas of Cusa's system of Cosmic Harmony. 
He  endeavours to present  to our  eyes a  harmonious 
equipoise between, on the one hand, the separate vital 
spheres of  all the particular social organisms-be  they 
large or small-and,  on the other hand, the higher and 
wider  spheres  of  combined  activity  proper  to  those 
superior  organisms  which  the  inferior  engender  by 
their  coalition. 
Then  from  the  fundamental  idea  of  the  Social Ideas of 
Member- 
Organism, the Middle Age deduced a  series of  other ship, 
Differen-  ideas.  In the first  place,  the notion  of  Membership tiation, 
was  developed  to portray  the  positions  filled  by  in- Function, 
and the 
dividual  men  in  the various ecclesiastical and political like- 
groups.  It  is  remarked,  on  the  one  side,  that  the 
Member  is  but  part  of  a  Whole,  that the Whole is 
independent of  the changes in its parts, that in case of 
collision the welfare  of  the Member must be sacrificed 
to that of  the  Body; and, on  the other side, that the 
Whole only lives and comes to light in  the Members, 
that every Member is of  value to the Whole, and that 
even a justifiable  amputation  of  a  Member, however 
insignificant,  is  always  a  regrettable  operation  which 
gives  pain  to  the  Whole".  Then  again,  from  the 
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of like with unlike, was derived the necessity of  differ- 
ences  in  rank,  profession  and  estate,  so  that  the 
individuals,  who  were  the  elements  in  ecclesiastical 
and  political  Bodies,  were  conceived,  not  as  arith- 
metically  equal  units,  but  as  socially  grouped  and 
differentiated from  each  otherm.  Moreover, from  thc 
picture  of  the human  body was obtained the notion of 
a  Mediate  Articulation,  by  virtue  whereof  smaller 
groups stood in graduated order between the supreme 
Unit and the IndividualBg. In particular, the necessity 
of this arrangement was upheld against the centralizing 
efforts of the Popes which tended to break through the 
organic structure  of  the Church ".  Furthermore,  the 
conititutional  order which  combined  the Parts into a 
Whole was regarded as an Organization which imitated 
the processes of  Nature.  The task therefore that was 
set before it was that of  so ordering the parts, that, as 
Marsilius of  Padua says, every of them might perfectly 
and undisturbedly act upon  all the rest  and so form a 
Whole,  or,  as  Ptolemy  of  Lucca  opines,  the  lower 
forces should  be set in  motion  and controlled by the 
higher, and all by the highest forceD1. Naturally there- 
fore the idea of a Function (operdtio, actus, oficium) of 
the Whole Bodya seemed appropriate to every case of 
social  activity,  and  the member  which  performs  the 
function  appeared  as an  Organg"  Lastly,  from  the 
nature  of  an  Organism  was  inferred  the  absolute 
necessity  of  some  Single  Force,  which  as szwzmum 
movens,  vivifies,  controls  and  regulates  all  inferior 
forces.  Thus we come to the proposition  that  every 
Social Body needs a Governing Part (pnrsprinc$ans) 
which  can be pictured  as its  Head or its Heart or its 
Soulw.  Often from the comparison  of  Ruler to Head 
the inference was at once drawn that Nature demanded 
Monarchy, since there could  be but one heads:  nay, 
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not  unfrequently  the  inference  that,  were  it  not  for 
connexion with  a  rightful  Head, the whole  Body and 
every member  thereof  would  be  altogether  lifeless ". 
Other  writers  however  expressly  rejected  these  fal- 
lacies,  urging that, despite all  resemblance,  there are 
differences between Natural Bodies and Mystical g7. 
The comparison appears once more when medieval Growth 
and 
theory  deals  with  the  Origin  of  ecclesiastical  and creation 
of Social  political  groups.  However,  in  accordance  with  its Organ. 
general  view  of  the  Universe,  it  could  not  find  the '"". 
constitutive principle of  the group in a natural process 
of  Growth, but in every case had recourse to the idea 
of  Creation.  Therefore,  on  the  one  hand,  a  divine 
act of  Creation appeared as the ultimate source of  all 
social grouping, in  such sort that the divine influence 
either (as was  beyond  doubt  the case of  the Church) 
directly fashioned and animated the Mystical Body, or 
else less directly effected the union  of  Parts in Whole 
by virtue of some natural and instinctive impulse.  On 
the other  hand,  a  creative  act performed  by  man  is 
supposed,  more  or  less  explicitly  by  most  of  the 
theorists, for to produce  the State in  conformity  with 
the type of  organization  which  Nature  supplies is  in 
their eyes the work  of  human  ReasonQs.  In elaborate 
detail Marsilius of  Padua endeavoured to explain how 
the  Reason  which  is  immanent  in  every  Community 
engenders the Social Organism by a conscious imitation 
of the life-making forces of  Naturegg. 
Howbeit,  though  at all these points  an  energetic Theory 
fails to 
expression  was  found  for  the  thought  that  human conceive 
Church  groups  are  organic,  nevertheless  medieval  doctrine and st,,, 
paused  here  without  attaining  that  ultimate  resting 
place where it would have been  able to formulate  this 
thought in the terms of jurisprudence.  As in Antiquity, 
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failed  to  issue  in  the  legal  idea of  Personality-the 
single  Personality  of  the  group-and  yet  it  is  only 
when  this  process  has taken  place that the idea which 
is  before  us  becomes  of  service  in  legal  science. 
Therefore it is that medieval  doctrine, despite all the 
analogies  that  it drew from organic life, might indeed 
occasionally conceal, but could not permanently hinder, 
the progress of a  mode of  thought which  regards the 
State as a  mechanism  constructed  of  atoms.  Indeed 
that mode of thought lay in the womb of  the medieval 
theory.  But of that, hereafter. 
V,  The Idea  of  MonarcAy. 
Medieval  We  must now turn to that idea of  Monarchy which 
preference 
for  a  governed all truly medieval theory and was  intimately 
Monarchy. connected  with  those  fundamental  notions  which  we 
have  been  portraying.  Through  all  the  work  of 
medieval publicists there runs a remarkably active drift 
towards  Monarchy ; and here we  see a sharp contrast 
between antique and medieval thinking. 
God  as 
Monarch.  The Middle  Age regards the Universe itself  as a 
single Realm and God as its Monarch.  God therefore 
is the true Monarch, the one  Head and motive prin- 
ciple  of  that  ecclesiastical  and political  society  which 
comprises  all  Mankind1".  All  earthly  Lordship is a 
limited  representation  of  the divine  Lordship  of  the 
World.  Human Lordship proceeds from, is controlled 
by,  and  issues  in,  divine  Lordship.  Therefore  as 
permanent  Institutions, the ecclesiastical and temporal 
' Powers  that  be'  are  ordained  of  God.  If  at one 
moment the champions of  the Church were inclined to 
contest the truth of  this principle when applied to the 
temporal  Power,  still, as time went on, even extreme 
partizans were once more willing to concede the divine 
origin-at  least  the  mediately  divine  origin-of  the 
State1", while on the immediately divine origin of  the 
State great stress was laid  by the advocates of  secular 
Government1".  Furthermore, the office and authority 
of every particular wielder of  Lordship flow from God. 
Immediately  or  mediately  He is  the  lender  of  all 
power, using  as His tools the Electors or other con- 
stituents of the Ruler.  Immediately from God derives 
the office of  His ecclesiastical  Vicar1".  The like,  so 
said  imperialists,  is true of  the  Kaiser who  is  God's 
temporal  Vicar1*,  while  their  opponents  here  intro- 
duced the mediating action of  the Church, but just for 
that reason expressly declared  that the imperial office 
and all other lordships were loans from God'".  And 
so too, not only the sovereign right of  the independent 
ruler, but every magisterial function  may be mediately 
traced to Him, for all powers that are sub-demised by 
superior  rulers  can  in  the  last  resort  be  regarded 
as emanations  from  the  divine  Government  of  the 
World l". 
But  since,  as  already  said,  every  Partial  Whole Divine 
Right of 
must be like unto the Universal Whole, the Monarchical Monarchs. 
Constitution of ecclesiastical and political groups needed 
no further proof.  Almost with one voice, the medieval 
publicists declared a monarchical to be the best form of 
Constitution.  They thought that they found, not only 
in  the  Universe at large, but  throughout animate and 
inanimate  Nature,  a  monarchical  order,  and  thence 
they  drew  the conclusion  that  this  order is  the  best 
also for Church  and  State.  Attempts were  made to 
strengthen this conclusion  by  historical  and  practical 
arguments ; but  in  the main  it  rests  on philosophical 
reasoning as to the essence of all human Communities. 
In this context all  arguments descend from  the prin- 
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Unity,  that  this  Unity  must  be  represented  in  a 
Governing  Part,  and  that  this  object  can  be  best 
attained  if  that  Governing Part be  in  itself  a  Unit 
(fey  se  mum)  and consequently a  single individual lm. 
Dante gave yet deeper import and sharper form to this 
thought  when he argued that the unifying  principle  of 
Bodies  Politic  is  Will,  and  that,  for  the purpose  of 
presenting  a  Unity  of  Wills  (unitas in voduntati6us) 
the governing  and  regulating Will of  some one man 
(voduntas  una  et  regudatrix)  is  plainly  the  aptest 
mean l". 
Monarchy  From  this  preferability  of  Monarchy  it  followed 
in Church 
and State. that  in  the  Church,  whose  constitution was  founded 
directly  by  God,  Monarchical  Government  existed 
iure divino, for  God  could  will  for  His Church none 
but  the  best  of  constitutions1".  In like  fashion  the 
doctrine which  taught that the Empire also was willed 
by God led  to the assertion of  a  divine institution of 
the Kaiser's universal Monarchy "4  Similarly in every 
Body which  is  a  Member of  the Church or  Empire, 
and consequently in every human group, a monarchical 
appeared  to the  Middle Age as the  normal  form  of 
government ll'.  The current legal doctrine of  corpora- 
tions  was  wont  either  tacitly  to  assume  that  every 
corporation  would  have,-or  even  expressly to assert 
that it must have,-a  monarchical head. 
Com- 
parison of  But  here once more a germ of  disintegration was 
forms of  introduced  into  Medieval  Theory  by  the  references 
govern- 
ment.  that it made to Antiquity.  Those who in their proof 
of  the excellence  of  Monarchy  appealed  to  Aristotle 
would also borrow from him the doctrine of Republican 
Constitutions,  their  forms,  conditions,  advantagesu2. 
But  the divine right of  Monarchy was threatened so 
soon as comparisons  of this kind were instituted.  In 
truth we  begin  often to hear  the opinion that no one 
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form of government is  more divine than another, that 
the advantages of  Monarchy are relative, not absolute, 
and  that  there  may  be  times  and  circumstances  in 
which Republican Constitutions would deserve prefer- 
ence"'.  In particular, whenever the Kaiser's imjerium 
mundi is disputed, an attack  is made upon the founda- 
tion  of  the medieval ideal of Monarchy, and utterance 
may be given even to the opinion that the State which 
comprehends all Mankind may perchance be conceived 
as an  Aristocracy :  an  Aristocracy  of  Sovereigns '14. 
Even  in  the  ecclesiastical  region  the  divinity  and  . 
necessity  of  Monarchy  did  not  escape  all  doubts115. 
And  then  in  the  books  of  the humanists  we  often 
encounter an outspoken preference for antique, repub- 
lican forms116.  Already in the fourteenth century there 
were decisive assertions that the argzmentum unitatis 
gives no unconditional judgment  for Monarchy, since 
the unitas principatz4s  is possible  and necessary  in  a 
Republic1".  In this context it became usual to repre- 
sent the ruling Assembly of a Republic as a composite 
Man,  and,  in  the  antique  manner,  it  could  be  con- 
trasted with the mass of  the ruled 118, so that the Mon- 
archical  State and the Republican  could  be  brought 
under one and the same rubric. 
So  again, as regards the Monarch's position in the The 
Monarch's 
State there was a  mixture of  and a  struggle between position. 
medieval and antique-modern thought. 
The genuinely medieval lore saw in every Lordship 
a personal office derived from God.  Despite all refer- 
ences to the Antique, what we have here is plainly the 
Germanic idea of  Lordship, but that idea had received 
a new profundity from Christianity. 
So there was, on the one hand, a tendency to exalt Apotheosis 
of  the  the person  of  the  Ruler.  In his  own  proper  person Monarch. 
he was thought of  as the wielder of an authority that 
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came to him  from without and from above.  He  was 
set over and against that body whereof the leadership 
had  been  entrusted  to  him.  He had  a  sphere of 
powers  which  was all his own.  He  was raised above 
and beyond the Comm~nity"~.  The Universal Whole 
being taken as type, the relation of Monarch to State 
was compared with that of  God to World.  Nay, even 
a  quasi-divinity  could  be ascribed  to him,  as to the 
Vice-Gerent  of  God'".  The lengths that  the Pope's 
supporters could go in this direction are well known1"; 
and their opponents lagged not  behind  when  Kaiser 
and Kings were to be extolled1*. 
Monarchy  None the less, however, the thought that Lordship 
as Office. 
is  Office  found  emphatic  utterance.  The relation- 
ship between  Monarch  and  Community  was  steadily 
conceived as a relationship which  involved  reciprocal 
Rights and  Duties.  Both  Monarch  and  Community 
were  'subjects'  of  political  rights  and duties,  and  it 
was  only  in  the  union  of  the two that the Organic 
Whole  consisted.  Moreover,  in  the Community  all 
the  individuals  stood  in  legal  relationships  to  the 
Monarch : relationships  which  properly  deserved  to 
be  called  legal  and  which  were  of  a  bilateral  kind. 
Lordship  therefore  was  never  mere  right ; primarily 
it was  duty ; it was a divine, but for that very reason 
an  all  the  more  onerous,  calling;  it  was  a  public 
office ; a service rendered to the whole body1".  Rulers 
are instituted for the sake of  Peoples, not Peoples for 
the sake of  Rulers'".  Therefore the power of a Ruler 
is,  not  absolute,  but  limited  by  appointed  bounds. 
His task  is  to further the common  weal,  peace  and 
justice,  the  utmost  freedom  for  all1%.  In  every 
breach of  these duties and every transgression of  the 
bounds that they set, legitimate Lordship degenerates 
into Tyranny1*.  Therefore the doctrine of the uncon- 
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ditioned  duty of obedience was wholly foreign  to the 
Middle Age.  Far rather every duty of obedience was 
conditioned by the rightfulness of the command.  That 
every  individual  must  obey  God  rather  than  any 
earthly superior appeared as an absolutely indisputable 
truthln.  If,  however,  already at an early  time, some 
writers went no further in limiting the obedience due 
from subjects than this point-a  point  to which Holy 
Scripture itself  would  carry them-and,  in  opposition 
to the claims of the Tyrant, allowed only the right and 
duty  of  a  martyr's  'passive  resistance1",'  still  the 
purely  medieval  doctrine  went  much  further.  For 
one  thing,  it taught  that every  command  which  ex- 
ceeded the limits  of  the Ruler's authority was  for  his 
subjects  a  mere  nullity  and  obliged  none  to  obedi- 
encem.  And  then  again,  it  proclaimed  the right  of 
resistance, and even armed resistance, against the com- 
pulsory enforcement of  any unrighteous and tyrannical 
measure-such  enforcement being regarded  as an act  . 
of  bare violence.  Nay more, it taught (though some 
men  with  an enlightened sense of  law  might  always 
deny  this)  that  tyrannicide  is  justifiable  or  at least 
excusable1". 
But alongside of  this medieval idea of  the Ruler's Theideaof 
Sovereign-  Office, there appeared  already in  the twelfth  century ty, 
the germ of  a  doctrine of  Sovereignty which  in  its 
monarchical form exalts the one and only Ruler to an 
absolute  plenitude  of  power.  The content  of  this 
plenitude  needed  no  explanation,  its  substance  was 
inalienable,  impartible and proof  against prescription, 
and all subordinate power was a mere delegation from 
it.  However,  during  the  Middle  Age  the  idea  of 
Monarchical Sovereignty remained, even for its boldest 
champions, bound up with the idea of Office.  Nor was 
this all, for its appearance soon awakened a  growi~lg 
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opposition,  which,  always  setting  a  stronger  accent 
on  the rights of  the Community, finally  issued  in  the 
doctrine  of  Popular  Sovereignty. 
It was within  the Church  that  the idea  of  Mon- 
ty of the 
pope  archical  Omnicompetence  first  began  to  appear.  It 
appeared in the shape of a pZenitado#otestatis  attributed 
to the  Pope1".  And yet just  at this  point  even  the 
extremest theories were unable utterly  to abolish the 
notion  of  an Office instituted  for  the  service  of  the 
Whole Body or to free the supreme power from every 
limitation1".  Moreover, in  antagonism to this explica- 
tion  of  ecclesiastical Monarchy, there set in a swelling 
movement  which  not  only  denied  to  the  Pope  any 
power  in  temporal  affairs, but would  allow  him, even 
in  spiritual  affairs,  no  more than  a yotestas  Zi?m2ata, 
and,  in  so doing,  laid  emphatic  stress on  the official 
character of Monarchy1"". Gradually also the doctrines 
of  Conditioned  Obedience,  of  a  right  of  resistance 
against Tyranny, of  a right of  revolution conferred by 
necessity were imported into the domain  of  ecclesias- 
tical polity'". 
Sovereign-  In the temporal sphere also the idea of  Monarchy 
ty of the 
Emperor.  tended to assume an absolute form when in the days of 
the  Hohenstaufen  the Jurists began to claim  for  the 
Kaiser  the plenitude  flotestatis  of  a  Roman  Caesar,  - 
and  soon  the  complete  power  of  an  Emperor  was 
treated as the very type of  all Monarchy.  Still in the 
Middle  Age absolutistic theory invariably  recognized 
that  the Monarchy which  it  extolled  to  Sovereignty 
was  subiect  to duties  and limitations'",  and (what  is  , 
more  important)  there steadily  survived  a11  opposite 
doctrine which, holding fast the notion that Monarchy 
is  Office,  would  concede  to  the  Emperor  and  other 
princes only a potestas  Zinzitata and a right conditioned 
by the fulfilment of  duty1". 
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The element of  Limitation which was  thus  imma- Limitation 
of Mon- 
nent in the medieval idea of  Monarchy began to receive archy. 
theoretical development in the doctrine of the rights of 
the Community.  To this we now must turn.  Here- 
after we shall have to observe that the Middle Age set 
legal boundaries to State-Power of every sort, and it is 
matter of course that the Monarch is restricted within 
these, even if  all the Powers of  the State are united in 
his person. 
VI.  The Idea  of Pofular Soverezknty. 
It is  a  distinctive trait of  medieval  doctrine that Develop- 
ment of  within  every human group it  decisively recognizes an the idea of 
aboriginal  and  active  Right  of  the group  taken  as gs, 
Whole.  As to the quality  and  extent of  this  Right, ty. 
there was strife among parties.  For all that, however, 
we may also see plainly enough the contrast  between 
the  once  prevalent  and  strictly  medieval  conception 
and that  antique-modern  manner  of  thought which 
was  steadily  developing  itself.  Clearly  in  the  first 
instance  what  lies before us is the Germanic idea of  a 
Fellows hip (die  germanische Genossenschafisidee).  J us  t 
as in  the actual  life  of  this age,  within  and  without 
the groups constituted  by lord  and men,  there might 
be found  what we may call '  fellowshiply' grouping, so 
also, along  with  the  Germanic  idea  of  Lordship, the 
Germanic  idea  of  Fellowship  forces  its way into the 
domain of learned theory.  But antique elements were 
at work in this quarter also.  In part their introduction 
was due to the Romano-Canonical  doctrine of Corpo- 
rations,  whence  the publicists  were  wont  to borrow, 
and in  part  to the influence of the Political Law and 
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they  transmuted  the  medieval  lore  of  the  Right  of 
communities  until  it  bore  the  form  of  the  modern 
doctrine of  Popular  Sovereignty.  As, however, even 
in the Middle Age the thought of Popular Sovereignty 
was  connected  in  manifold  wise  with  the thought  of 
the  Ruler's  Sovereignty, there was here a  foundation 
on which the most diverse constitutional systems of an 
abstract kind  could  be  erected :  systems which might 
range from  an Absolutism grounded on the alienation 
of power by  the people,  rhrough Constitutiollal  Mon- 
archy, to Popular Sovereignty of the Republican sort. 
Popular 
soverelgn-  I.  It was in the province of Temporal Power that 
ty in the  the Right of  the Community first assumed a  doctrinal 
State. 
form. 
The will  An  ancient  and  generally  entertained  opinion 
of the 
peopleand regarded  the  Will  of  the  People  as the  Source  of 
the State 
ofNature.  Temporal  Power.  A  friendly  meeting  took  place 
between  this  traditional  opinion  and  that  Patristic 
Doctrine of the State of  Nature which the Church was 
propagating.  That doctrine taught that  at one time 
under the Law of God and the Law of Nature com- 
munity of goods, liberty and equality prevailed among 
mankind.  It followed that Lordship made its first ap- 
pearance  as a  consequence of  the  Fall of  Man'".  It 
followed also that the authority of Rulers was grounded 
on  human  ordinance.  Then, during  the Strife over 
the Investitures, the  Church  could  draw  from  these 
premisses the conclusion  that this  humanly instituted 
Temporal Power must be subject to that Priesthood of 
which  God  Himself  was  the  direct  and  immediate 
Founder.  The defenders of  the State were content 
to resist this ecclesiastical reasoning without deserting 
the old ground.  In contrast  to theories which  would 
insist more or less emphatically on the usurpatory and 
illegitimate  origin  of  Temporal  Lordship,  there  was 
developed a doctrine  which  taught that the State had 
a  rightful  beginning  in  a  Contract  of  Subjection  to 
which  the  People  was  party'".  Many  reminiscences 
of events in the history of  Germanic  Law came to the 
help of this theory, as also the contractual form which 
agreements between  Princes and Estates had given to 
many of  those  rights and duties which  fell within the 
sphere of  Public Law.  Still it was also supposed that 
a successful appeal could be made both to Holy Writ, 
which  told  (11.  Reg.,  v.  3)  of  a  contract  made  at 
Hebron between  David and the People of  Israel, and 
also  to a  principle,  proclaimed  by  the Jurists,  which 
told  that,  according  to  the  ius genfium,  every  free 
People may set a Sztperior over itself13'.  Then, on the 
other hand, efforts  were made to demonstrate that the 
human  origin  thus  discovered  for  the State was  not 
incompatible with  the divine origin and divine right of 
Monarchy, since the People was  but an instrument in 
the  hands  of  God140, and  indeed  received  from  His 
influence the spiritual power of engendering the Ruler's 
officel4l. 
The victory of this manner of thinking was largely Contro-  versy over 
due to the decisive fact that just in relation to the very the L~Z 
Xcgia . 
highest  of all earthly Powers, the Jurists could find in 
the  Corpus IurG a  text  which  seemed  expressly  to 
indicate the Will of the People as the source of  Ruler- 
ship.  Ever  since  the  days  of  the  Glossators  [the 
twelfth  century] the universally accepted doctrine was 
that  an  act  of  alienation  performed  by  the  People 
in  the Lex Regia  was  tor  Positive  Law  the basis of 
the modern, as well as of  the ancient, Empire14'. 
For this  cause  it  was  all  the easier to generalize Voluntary  subjection 
this truth concerning the highest  of  all temporal Com- the  of  rightful  source 
munities, until  it appeared as a principle  grounded in 
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to  all  Rulership lies  in  the voluntary and contractual 
submission of the Ruled could therefore be propounded 
as a  philosophic  axiom1*.  True,  that concrete cases 
might  demand  the admission  that  the  Power  of  the 
State had its origin or extension in violent conquest or 
successful  usurpation.  Still  in  such  cases,  so  it  was 
said,  an  ex  post facto  legitimation  by  the express or 
tacit  consent  of  the  People  was  indispensable  if  the 
Ruler was to have a  good  title to Rulership.  It was 
in this wise that men  sought to explain the existence 
de  iure  of  the  Roman  Empire,  notwithstanding  the 
violence  which had  been  employed  in its making, for 
they  could  say that  the requisite subiectio voZuntaria 
could be found in  the  tacit  consent  of  the  Nations1". 
William of Ockham and Antonius Rosellus go even as 
far as an express constitution  of this World-Monarchy 
by the vote of  the majority  of  the Nations, and they 
refer to the doctrine of  Corporations  to prove that in 
such  a  case  the  vote  of  the majority  is  conclusive, 
since, on the one hand, the whole of Mankind, if regard 
be  had  to  that  original  community of  goods which is 
prescribed by the Law of  Nature, may be treated as a 
single  college  and  corporation  (unum  coZZegium  et 
corfus), and, on  the other hand,  the establishment  of 
the Universal Monarchy was, in the words of  Ockham, 
an act of necessity, or else  in  the words  of  Rosellus, 
an act which was done pro bono  communi1". 
Reversion  If  then the Zmperium proceeded from the People,  of power 
to the  the inference might  be  drawn  that it would escheat or 
People.  revert to the  People  whenever  no  rightful  Emperor 
existed.  The Church, it is true, avoided  this  conclu- 
sion by the supposition that, since the advent of  Christ, 
the rights of the People  had passed to Him and from 
Him  to Peter  and  Peter's successors.  On the other 
hand,  the opponents  of  papal  claims  made  manifold 
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use of the idea of  Escheat or Reversion.  The older 
Jurists were indeed so much  entangled  in the network 
of  the ancient  texts that in their eyes the '  subject ' of 
those rights which they ascribed to thepopulus Roma- 
nus in relation to the Imferium was the population of 
the  town  of  Rome  as  it  existed  in  their  own  day. 
About  the middle of  the twelfth century the followers 
of  Arnold  of  Brescia  made a serious attempt to claim 
for  the city a  right  to bestow  the vacated  Empire1&. 
Leopold von Babenberg was the first forcibly to protest 
against this identification of the Roman townsfolk with 
the sovereignpopuZus Romanzls.  The Roman burghers, 
he says, have nowadays  no more right than has pui- 
cunpue aZiuspopuZus  Romano iwzjerio subiectus; and when 
rights of  sovereignty in the Empire are in question, the 
termfopzdus Romanus must be understood to mean the 
whole People that is subject to the Roman I~eriz~m'~'. 
A first application of this idea of the Escheat to the T~F  trans- 
lation of 
People  of  a  forfeited  or otherwise  vacant  Rulership the Em- 
was  made when  the opponents of  the  Popes  had  to pire* 
explain  the so-called  transZatio  iqberii:  that  is,  the 
transfer  of  the  Empire  from  the  Greeks  to  the 
Germans.  The Greek  Emperor,  so it  was  said, for- 
feited his right, and thereupon  the Roman people once 
more acquired power to dispose of the Empire.  There- 
fore the consensus popudi,  which  is  mentioned  on  the 
occasion of Charles the Great's coronation, was the true 
act  of  transfer,  and  the  Pope  merely  declared  and 
executed  the  Will  of  the  People1".  Leopold  von 
Babenberg,  however,  refuses  to recognize this  power 
of  the  Roman citizens, who  at that time, so he says, 
neither possessed the Lordship of the World nor repre- 
sented the People of  the World.  So at this point  he 
has  recourse  to  the authority  of  the  Pope,  who  by 
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law--had  to occupy the vacant  seat of the highest  of 
temporal judges1@. 
G~~~~~~~-  In like manner many writers claimed for the People 
ship of the 
vacant  a  guardianship over the Empire or the State, pending 
Empire.  a vacancy of the throne'". 
Electionof  In  particular,  however,  from  this  same  way  of 
the Ruler. thinking  was  deduced  the  right  of  every  People  to 
choose  a  new  Head in a  case of  necessity : provided 
that  no  mode  of  appointment  by  a  superior  and  no 
strict right of succession had been established.  For all 
power  was  originally based  upon  Choice, and Divine 
and Natural Law declared that, as a matter of principle, 
it was for the Whole Body of the ruled  to institute  its 
Head1''.  True, that by a grant of Lordship to a whole 
family, or, it may be, by  other means,  an  Hereditary 
Monarchy might be validly created""  None  the less, 
the Elective  Principle was  preferable,  being  in  fuller 
accord with Divine and Natural  LawE3.  Therefore  it 
is  that the Elective Principle prevails  in the Empire, 
which needs must have the best of constitutions, and in 
the  Empire this principle  has always  been  observed, 
albeit under different forms'?  The People  may itself 
exercise the  right  of  Election, or may  delegate that 
right  to  others.  To such  an  act  of  delegation  the 
opponents  of  the papal  claims were wont  to trace the 
rights of the princely Electors of  Germanyl5; while the 
Pope, so they said, had  acted in this matter as one of 
the People, or, at the most, as the People's mandatory'". 
Also  it was  argued that, as the electing  Princes per- 
formed  the  election  as  representatives  of  the whole 
People of  the Realm, their act had all the effect of  an 
election directly made by the People, and, without  any 
co-operation on the part of  the Pope, immediately con- 
ferred upon the Elect the full rights of  an Emperorlm. 
Then as to the rights  that  the Community could 
assert against its Ruler when once he had  been  legiti- Relationof 
Ruler to  mately instituted, there were wide differences of opinion. People. 
The conflict of theories appears already in all its sharp- 
ness so soon as the Glossators have begun to controvert 
each other over that translatio imjerii frompojulus to 
pritzcqbs,  which  was  mentioned  in  the classical  text. 
Some of them declared that there had been a definitive 
alienation, whereby the People renounced its power for 
good and all, and that therefore the People, when once 
subjected to the Emperor, had no legislative power and 
could  never  resume what  it  had  alienated'".  Others 
saw the translatio as a mere concessio, whereby an office 
and a  usus  (right of  user)  were  conveyed,  while  the 
substance of the Imjerium still remained in the Roman 
People.  Thence they argued that the People is above 
the Emperor  (fojulas maior iwi$eratore),  can at the 
present  day make laws, and is entitled  to resume the 
imperial power169. The  controversy that was thus begun 
within the field of  Roman law, extended itself, until in a 
more general fashion the relation  between  Prince and 
People was  brought  into  debate.  Out of  the debate 
there issued diametrically opposite systems. 
For those who adopted the first  of  these  explana- The 
system of  tions of  the transZatio [that, namely, which told of  ' an Ruler's 
out and out conveyance '1 it was easy to erect a system SOve"ign. 
of  Absolute  Monarchy upon  the original  Sovereignty 
of  the People.  In this sense even the Hohenstaufen 
could acknowledge the derivation of  Lordship from the 
Popular  and in fact many lawyers were at pains 
to deduce  from  that Abdication  of  the  People which 
was  implied  in  the  Institution  of  a  Ruler, a  Right of 
the Monarch which should be as absolute as they could 
make it. 
Still  even  the advocates of  '  Ruler's-Sovereignty,' ::&reb 
when once they had grounded this upon  a  Contract of Ruler and 
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subjection, were  unable  to avoid  the  recognition  of 
a  right  against  the  Ruler which  still  perdured  in  the 
~~dy  of  the  People.  Even  they  were  compelled  to 
regard  the legal relationship between  Ruler and Ruled 
as  being  in  all  respects  a  contractual  relationship 
between  the  Body  of  the  People-which  Body could 
be treated as a corporation (universitas)-and  its Head, 
so that the People had  a strict right corresponding to 
the duty incumbent upon the Sovereign.  Furthermore, 
throughout  the  Middle  Age  even  the  partizans  of 
Monarchy were wont to concede to the Community an 
active  right  of  participation  in  the life  of  the State. 
Political  Institutions being what they everywhere were, 
some such concession was almost unavoidable.  There 
was unanimity in  the doctrine that the consent of  the 
Whole Community was  requisite  for  the validation  of 
any  acts of  the  Ruler  which  were  prejudicial  to  the 
rights  of  the  Whole,  and  among  such  acts  were 
reckoned  submission  to  another  lord,  alienation  or 
partition  of  the lordship, and indeed any renunciation 
of the essential  rights  of  a  lordu1.  It was just  from 
this uncontested principle that J,eopold  von Babenberg 
concluded  that  any  act  done  by  an Emperor which 
could be deemed to imply the recognition of the Pope's 
claim  to examine  and  confirm  imperial  elections,  or 
which  could  be  deemed  to have effected  any sort of 
subjection of the Empire to the Church, was powerless 
to alienate the rights of the Empire and its Princes and 
Peoples  without  their  con~urrence'~~.  Also  men  ex- 
plained  that,  though  as matter  of  pure  law  this was 
not necessary, still a general custom required that the 
Monarch should of  his own  free will  bind  himself  not 
to make laws or  do other important  acts of  rulership 
without  the consent  of  the Whole  Body or its  repre- 
sentative~'~. Not  unfrequently  the  opinion  was 
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expressed that even the right of  deposing the Ruler in 
a case of  necessity could  be  conceded  to the  People 
without any surrender of  the maxim  'Princefs  maior 
popuzo  164.' 
Then there was a mediating tendency which sought  of 
to combine the idea  of  the Ruler's  Sovereignty  with Divided 
Sovereign- 
that  of  the  People's  Sovereignty.  It  co-ordinated ty. 
Ruler and Community and ascribed the supreme power 
to both  of  them  in  union.  Those who  occupied this 
position rejected Pure Monarchy and held that Limited 
Kingship or a  mixture  of  Monarchy, Aristocracy and 
Democracy was the best of Constitutions'". 
On the other  hand, the second of  the two  expla- The 
system of 
nations  proposed  by  the Glossators [for  the classical Popular 
Sovereign- 
text  touching  the LRX  Regial-namely  the  doctrine ty. 
that the People  granted to the  Monarch  merely 'the 
use'  of  supreme  power-issued,  when  it  was  con- 
sistently  developed,  in  the  system  of  pure  Popular 
Sovereignty:  a  Sovereignty  that  remained  in  the 
People  despite the institution  of  a  Monarch.  True, 
that even the advocates  of  this system held  fast the 
thought-and  the idea  of  a  Contract with  the Ruler 
favoured  it-that  the  relation  between  People  and 
Ruler was a bilateral legal relationship, which conferred 
upon the  Ruler  an independent  right  of  Lordship, of 
which he could not be deprived so long as he was true 
to his  pact.  However,  no  matter  what  the form  of 
government, the People was always the true Sovereign, 
and this was  expressly stated  by the maxim '  Pofuhs 
nzaior  $rincipe.'  Hence  was  generally  drawn  the 
inference that the Community still retained a legislative 
power  over the  Prince and a permanent control over 
the  exercise  of  the  rights  of  Rulership'".  But,  in 
particular, the further inference was  drawn  that, if  the 
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judgment  upon  him  and  depose him  by  right  and 
doom1*.  Just this last consequence was very generally 
drawn, and a peculiar  importance was  attributed to it. 
Here might  be found  an explanation of those cases in 
which the Pope had, or might  seem  to have, deposed 
Emperors and  Kings and absolved  Nations from  the 
duty of  subjection.  Such cases might be regarded  as 
legal precedents without any acknowledgment of  papal 
power.  The Pope's part in them had been not ' consti- 
tutive' but merely 'declaratory.'  The  authority had in all 
cases proceeded from the Folk or its representativeslB8. 
Monarchy  When the matter was  regarded from  this point  of 
and Re- 
*ublic.  view,  there  could  be  no  deep-set  difference  between 
a  Monarch  and a  Republican  Magistrate. 
This, it  is  true,  was  not  always  consciously  per- 
ceived.  We  can hardly, for instance, assert that Leopold 
of Babenberg's mode of thought is republican.  Yet he 
expressly  teaches  that the  People  of  the  Empire  is 
maior $so  principe, can make laws, especially if  there 
be no  Kaiser  or if  the  Kaiser  neglect his  duty, and 
can for  sufficient  cause transfer  the Empire from  one 
Folk  to  another  or  depose  the  Emperor.  He also 
teaches that every particular People has just  the same 
rights against its King  16'. 
Republic-  Decisively  republican,  on  the other  hand,  is  the 
anism of 
Marsilius.  system of  Marsilius  of  Padua.  With  all  the consist- 
ency  of  democratic  Radicalism  it  erects  an  abstract 
scheme dividing power  between  the universitas civium 
and the jars princzpans:  a scheme which remains the 
same,  whatever  be  the  form  of  government.  With 
him  the ' Legislator' must  be the Sovereign ; but  the 
People is  always  and necessarily the '  Legislator,' by 
the People being meant the Whole Body or a majority 
of those citizens who are entitled to vote.  This inalien- 
able  right  is  to  be  exercised  either  in  a  primary 
The Idea  of  Po$uZar  Soveye@ty.  47 
assembly of the People or by its elected representatives. 
Therefore the Will of  the People is the efficient cause 
of the State.  By legislation it gives an articulate form 
to the State, distributes offices, and binds  the various 
parts  into  a  whole.  In the  first  place  it  erects  the 
office of  Ruler for  the discharge of  such  business as 
the universa communitas cannot itself undertake.  But 
more: the matter, as well  as the form, of  the Ruler's 
office proceeds from  this  Sovereign  Legislator.  The 
wielder  of  Government  is  to be appointed, corrected, 
deposed by the Legislator ad commune conferens.  The 
Ruler  himself  is only a  part (pars  princz$ans)  of  the 
Whole and always remains inferior  to the Whole.  By 
authority granted to him by the Legislator (per  aucto- 
ritatem  a  Zegisdatore  sibi concessam) he is  the State's 
secondary and, as it were, instrumental or executive part 
(scczrndaria quasi  insfrz~mentaZis  seu  executiva  jars). 
Therefore  in  all  things he  is bound  by the laws, and 
finally, since  the incorporate body  (universitas) is  to 
act by his  agency, his  government will  be  at its best 
when  it  conforms  most  closely  to  the  Will  of  the 
Whole  (ida  subditorum suorum  voduntatem  et  con- 
sensunz '''). 
An essentially different  system  was  developed  by 2;r;;;u. 
Nicolas  of  Cues  in  his  Cathodic  Concordance;  but lar sove- 
reignty. 
none  the less  decisively  was  it  a  system of  Popular 
Sovereignty.  In his eyes, all earthly power proceeded, 
like man  himself, primarily from  God (principaditer a 
Deo); but a God-inspired Will  of  the Community was 
the organ of  this divine manifestation.  It is just in the 
voluntary consent of  the Governed that a Government 
displays its divine origin : tunc divina censetur, quando 
per  concordantiam  cowzmunem  a  subiectis  exoritur. 
Therefore all iurisdictio and administratio  are  based 
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made by the Community or its majority or representa- 
tives.  There is no rightful and holy species  dominandi 
that is not founded per viam voluntariae subiecltionis et 
consensus in  praesidentium f  raeZationes concordantiades. 
Only a Ruler who has been thus appointed is, as bearer 
of  the Common  Will, a  public and 'common  Person 
(at  sic  constihtus,  quasi  in  se  omnium  voduntatem 
gestans  in frinc@ando, p~bZica et  communis persona 
ac  pater  singuZorum  vocetur), and only by recognizing 
himself  to be the creature of  the Whole does he be- 
come the father of  its several  members (dam se  quasi 
omnium coZZective  subiectorum sibi creaturanz cognoscat, 
singudova~m  patw  existat).  The function  of  making 
laws  is  by its very nature  necessarily reserved for the 
Community,  since  all  the  obligatory  force  of  laws 
proceeds from the express or silent consensus of  those 
who are to be  bound.  Therefore the Ruler  also  is 
bound by the laws.  He  only receives  iurisdictio and 
ad~ninistratio  within the scope of  his mandate.  Even 
in  his jurisdiction  and administration  he is subject to 
constant supervision,  and, in  case he transgresses  the 
limits  of  his  power,  he may be judged  and deposed 
by  the  People.  And  all  this  is  imprescriptible  and 
inalienable  Right bestowed  by  the law  of  God  and 
Nature1". 
Popular  In similar fashion throughout the fifteenth  century 
appeals to 
the prin-  in aU  the theoretical  arguments by which  men  strove 
ciple of 
~o,,~ar  to defend the rights of  'the Estates  against the grow- 
Sovereign- ing might of  Monarchy, frequent recourse was  had  to  tY. 
the People's Sovereignty as to a first  principle '",  until 
that  principle,  assuming  a  popular  form,  penetrated 
more  and more deeply the masses  of  the folk, and at 
length  took  flesh  and blood  in  the revolutions which 
were accomplished or projected during the Age of  the 
Reformation. 
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2.  Meanwhile thoughts similar to those which had Popular 
Sovereign-  been  developed  in  relation  to the State had exercised tyinthe 
a  decisive  influence  within  the  Church.  More  and 
Church. 
more distinctly and sharply men  were  conceiving the 
Church  as 'a Polity,' and it was natural therefore that 
in  the construction of  this  Polity  they should employ 
the scheme of categories which had in the first instance 
been applied to the temporal State.  Indeed in the end 
the Church was  regarded as charged with the mission 
of realizing the ideal of  a perfect political Constitution. 
Thus,  besides  the  transmutation  of  the  specifically 
ecclesiastical  ideals,  we  may see, in  this  quarter also, 
the well-marked evolution of a 'nature-rightly  Doctrine 
of the State. 
A  definition  which  declared  the  Church  to  be ~ight  of 
the eccle-  '  the Congregation of the Faithful '  was not to be eradi- siastical 
cated, and therefore the doctrine of absolute monarchy, EZfty. 
even  when  at  its  zenith,  was  powerless  utterly  to 
eliminate the idea of  a right vested in the ecclesiastical 
Community taken as a Whole.  However loud  rnight 
be the tone in which men asserted that the Pope stood 
above the rest of  the Church, had no  'Superior,' and 
therefore could judge all and be judged  of  none (sedes 
afostoZica  omnes  iudicat  et  a nemine iudicatur) : that 
the Senate of Cardinals, which was always more  com- 
pletely  supplanting  the  Assembly  of  Bishops,  had 
acquired  all  its  powers  merely  from  the  Pope  and 
not  from  the Church : that  even  a  General Council 
stood below the Pope, obtained from  him  authority to 
assemble  and decide, and could  neither bind him  nor 
confer authority upon him''3 : none the less, there were 
two points at which a breach  of  these principles could 
not be  avoided  or could with  difficulty be excused as 
a merely apparent breach.  For one thing, the election 
of a Pope was always recalling the idea that when the 
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see was vacant the power of  the Pope reverted  to the 
Community, and that therefore the Cardinals, as repre- 
sentatives of  the Community, chose a new Monarch 
Secondly, the doctrine, hardly  doubted  in  the Middle 
Age,  that  in  matters  of  faith  only  the  Church  is 
infallible, and that  the Pope  can  err and be deposed 
for heresy1",  led  to  the  opinion  expressed  by  many 
canonists that in this exceptional case the Pope is sub- 
jected to the judgment of the Whole Church (iudicatur 
a  tota  ecclesia,  condemnatur  a  concidio generadi,  iudi- 
catur a subditis, ab inferoribus accusari et condemnari 
potest)":  It makes no  practical difference if, in order 
to conceal  this breach with the principle  of  Absolute 
Monarchy,  men  invent the  fiction  that  an  heretical 
Pope, being spiritually dead, has $so  fact0  ceased to be 
Pope,  and  that  the  General  Council  has  merely  to 
declare  this  accomplished  fact  in  the  name  of  the 
Church,  of  which  it  has become  the sole  representa- 
tive"". 
Supre-  If  then  in  this  manner  a  certain  Supremacy  of 
macyofthe 
<:ouncil.  Council over  Pope was still incidentally recognized by 
the existing Law of  Church, a  theoretical  explanation 
and justification  of this Supremacy would soon be forth- 
coming.  The doctrine that as a general rule the Pope 
is above the Universal Church, but in matters of  faith 
is  subject  to it  and  to the Council that represents  it, 
had hardly ever died  But if  the divine character 
of  the Pope's  right  to rule  was  compatible with  his 
subjection, even at a single point, to the Church, then 
it appeared possible that, without  abandonment of  the 
old  and general  principle  of  Papal Supremacy, other 
points might be found at which, by way of exception, a 
right of the Whole Body might be made good  against 
its  Head.  As a matter of  fact, there soon were some 
who  taught  that the  Conciliar  Jurisdiction  over  the 
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Pope extended to cases  of  notorious  crime, of  schism 
and of  other evils which threatened the welfare of  the 
Whole Ch~rch''~. Moreover, the legal doctrine of acts 
dictated  by necessity was developed in such a manner 
as to justify  in urgent cases an extraordinary procedure 
on the part of the Whole Church without the Pope and 
against the Pope'". 
Howbeit,  from  the  beginning  of  the  fourteenth F'''yp 
century  an  ever  more  triumphant  doctrine  pressedecclesiasti- 
cal com-  forward towards a bolder  statement of  the case.  Re-  munity. 
lying now on those speculative constructions of Society 
which were supposed to have the warrant of  Natural 
Law, and now upon the Positive Law touching Corpo- 
rations,  it transferred  to  the  Church  that  theory  of 
Popular  Sovereignty  which  had  been  elaborated  for 
the State, and in the end  it declared  in  favour  of the 
full  Sovereignty  of  the  Universal  Church  as  repre- 
sented by  a  Council. 
Already  John of  Paris saw in  the  Pope  only the council 
and Pope.  corporative  Head  of  the  Community,  related  to  it 
merely as every prelate was related to his own ecclesi- 
astical corporation, having only such powers of govern- 
ment as were necessary for  the preservation  of  unity, 
and, if he transgressed against the common weal, liable 
to  be  admonished  by  the Cardinals and deposed  by 
a CouncillQ.  But, at this point also, Marsilius of Padua 
outstripped  all  his  contemporaries.  Contesting  the 
divine origin of  the Primacy, he saw the Unity of  the 
Visible  Church  under  its  Invisible  Head represented 
only by  a  Council, while  to  the  Roman  Bishop, who 
was to be  elected, corrected, deposed  by the Council, 
he allowed no other functions  than  that  of  requesting 
the Temporal Power to summon a Council, that of pre- 
siding  in  it  and  laying  proposals  before  it,  that  of 
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threatening  transgressors  with  purely  spiritual  cen- 
sures's"  And then  all the propositions  which  flowed 
from the Sovereignty of  the 'Nhole  were deduced and 
stated in elaborate detail by William of Ockham.  They 
were  propositions  which  theretofore  had  only  been 
maintained in isolation from each other, ar 1 it was left 
for the extremest champions of  Councils against Popes 
to raise  them  to the level  of  a  practical  programme. 
Ockham  marshalled  all  the  doubts  concerning  the 
divine  origin  of  the  Papal  Primacy : doubts  which 
thenceforth  grew  always  10uder"~.  He discussed  the 
question whether the Church can  not freely determine 
its own  Constitution  and  perhaps  wholly  abolish  the 
monarchical  form18'.  He explained  the  Election  of 
Popes  as  the  exercise  of  a  right  delegated  to  the 
Cardinals  by the Community1".  In no  circumstances 
would  he  concede  to the  Pope  more  than  a  limited 
powerls',  while  to a  General  Council  he  ascribed  the 
power  of binding  him  by its resolutions, of  sitting in 
judgment  upon  him,  of  deposing  him,  and  of  relin- 
quishing  him  to the temporal  arm  for  punishment1@. 
Lastly,  he  maintained  that  in  case  of  necessity  a 
Council  might  assemble without  papal  summons and 
by virtue of its own inherent power1". 
This doctrine of  the Sovereignty of  the Ecclesias- 
tical  Community  had  already  been  fully  developed 
when the writers of the great Conciliar Age, though at 
some points they tempered  it,  erected  it  as a  system 
and made it an official  programme at Pisa and  Con- 
stance  and  Basel.  For  d'Ailly,  Gerson,  Zabarella, 
Andreas Randuf, Dietrich  of Niem  and  sqme of their 
contemporaries, the whole  Constitution  of  the Church 
was based  on the thought that the plenitude of eccle- 
siastical power was in substance indivisible and inalien- 
able, and was  vested  in the Universal  Church  repre- 
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sented by the Council, while the exercise of that power 
belonged  to the  Pope  and the Council  in ~ommon'~. 
When the various writers attempted more precisely to 
define the relationship of Pope to Council, there were 
many variances between  them ; but on the whole they 
are agreed in ascribing to the Pope the ordinary exer- 
cise  of  a  supreme and monarchical  power  of  govern- 
ment, and to the Council a more aboriginal and a fuller 
power which  is to be employed  in regulating, correct- 
ing,  and,  if  need  be,  overruling  the  papal  govern- 
ment''"  Therefore  in  the  most  important  acts  of 
Rulership the co-operation  of the Council  was  requi- 
site.  The Council should rectify abuses of  the Pope's 
power  and might  have to judge him, depose him and 
even inflict corporal punishment upon himlQ1. In order 
to exercise these powers, it might  assemble itself and 
constitute  itself  without  the  Pope's  permission  and 
against his will, though  in  the normal course it should 
be summoned by him'".  During a vacancy of the see, 
its suppletive power (potestas su@ZeLiva)  put  it  in  the 
place of the missing Monarch, and then by itself or its 
vicars  (per se  $sum  ved  per  orgagzztm  ali'puod  vice 
omniunz)  it could  exercise his rights of government'". 
In ~rinciple  the election  of  a  Pope belonged  to  the 
Council  as representing the Whole Church, and when 
the Cardinals, as was  the regular  practice, performed 
this  function,  they  were  but  representatives  of  the 
Council1".  Attempts,  however,  were  often  made to 
give to the College of  Cardinals an independent posi- 
tion  as a third organ  of  the Church, intermediate be- 
tween  Pope  and  Council'".  Gerson and d'Ailly even 
believed  that  in  this  fashion  the  ideal  of  a  Mixed 
Constitution, cornpounded of  the three '  good polities ' 
of Aristotle, could  be realized in the Church, since the 
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for Aristocracy, and the Council for Democra~y'~~.  In 
truth,  however,  notwithstanding  apparent  variations, 
we  see in  the works  of  all  these  writers a full  Sove- 
reignty  of  the  Council  as the  representative  of  the 
Whole Community.  In the last resort all other eccle- 
siastical powers appeared as mere delegations from the 
Sovereign  Assembly : an Assembly whose  resolutions 
\vere unconditionally  binding on the other organs  of 
the Church : an  Assembly which,  in case of  collision, 
was the sole representative  of  the Church and indeed 
stood  'above ' the Pope1".  The Law of  God, which 
set bounds  to  every  power,  was,  it  is  true,  a  limit, 
though  it was  the only generally recognized  limit  of 
the Council's  omnipotence.  Gerson, who accepted the 
divine  origin  of  the  Monarchical  Constitution  of  the 
Church, held therefore that the Papacy, when regarded 
as an  Institution, was unassailable  even by the Coun- 
cil''"  while  other writers, who suppose a merely histo- 
rical origin  for the Primacy, would  allow the Council 
to modify the monarchical regimen  or even to abolish 
it1''. 
Theory of  It is,  however, Nicolas  of  Cues  who  in  the most 
Cusanus. 
many-sided fashion carries out the principle of  Popular 
Sovereignty in the Churchzo0. For him  that  principle 
was  an  imprescriptible  rule  of  Divine  and  Natural 
Law and he maintained a complete parallelism between 
Church  and  State.  The 'subject'  of  Church-Right 
was  in  his  eyes  the  Whole  Body  which  alone  had 
received a mandate from God (I. c. I 2-1  7).  Th'  is was 
true of the Universal Church as well as of the Particu- 
lar  Churches.  In  the  Church  therefore,  as  in  the 
State,  all  superiority  was  founded on  consent  and 
voluntary  submission  (11.  c.  13-14).  True it  was, 
that  God co-operated  with  man  in  the institution  of 
Ecclesiastical Powers and that all Ecclesiastical Power 
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was  from  God  (11.  c.  19) ; but  it was only the Grace 
that was bestowed  immediately by  God ; the Coercive 
Force was bestowed by means of a  human and volun- 
tary act of conveyance (11.  c.  34), and the divine right 
of  every office,  even  of  the  Primacy,  had  no  other 
character than that borne by every Temporal  Magis- 
tracy  (I.  c.  I 6 ; 11.  c.  I 3, 34).  The medium whereby 
definite  form  was  given  to  that  expression  of  the 
General  Will,  that communis consensus,  which  in  all 
the various zones of government was necessary for the 
conveyance of  power, was Election (11.  c.  14, 18-19). 
By  Election  were  ordained  the  overseers  of  the 
smaller  and  larger  governmental  districts,  parsons, 
bishops,  metropolitans,  patriarchs,  who  thenceforth 
represented  the Communities of  their  respective  dis- 
tricts, and who  when  they assembled in Council stood 
as a  visible  presentment of  their  particular  churches 
and moreover of  the Universal  Church  (11.  c.  I, 16- 
19).  Therefore  the authority  of  Councils,  whatever 
their degree, proceeded, not from their Heads, but from 
'  the common  consent of  all ' (11.  c.  8,  I 3).  For this 
reason  the  General  Council,  since  it  stood  for  the 
infallible  Church  (11.  c.  3-7),  was  above  the  Pope 
(11.  c.  17-34)  and was not dependent on his authority 
(11.  c.  25)) could  in  case  of  necessity  assemble of  its 
own motion, and could  transact  business  without  him 
(I.  c  2,  8).  By virtue of the representative character 
given by  Election, Councils could  exercise the power 
of legislation, for, since all  the binding force of laws is 
based  upon  the concordantia subiecdionaGis eorunz  pgi 
per  earn  Zegzrn  Zzgantur,  and  since  therefore  Papal 
Decretals as well as Provincial Statutes had no source 
save this  ' common  consent,' it followed that canonical 
ordinances of all sorts acquired their validity either by 
the tacit acceptance that is  implied  in usage or by the 56  Politicnl  Theories of the Middle  Age.  The Mea  of Pop~Zar  Save~e&nty.  57 
- 
express consent of the Community (11.  c.  8-12).  But 
further, on  the  Mandate that  is  implicit  in  Election 
rested  all  the jurisdictional  and administrative powers 
of  the several  Prelates.  By  virtue  of  those  powers 
the  Prelates  were  the  Heads  of  the  Communities 
and the presidents  of  the  communal  assemblies,  but 
they were bound by the resolutions of those assemblies 
and  were responsible  to those assemblies  for the due 
exercise of entrusted offices (11.  c.  2,  13-15).  And no 
other was the case of the Supreme Head of the Church 
Universal.  He too  held  his  place  by  Election,  an 
Election  performed  by  the  Cardinals  nomine  totius 
eccdesiae.  And, albeit the Power  of  God entered into 
the act, authorizing and confirming it, still  the  Pope 
owed  his  position  to the voluntary submission of  the 
Church Universal.  Therefore his only power consisted 
of the 'administration and jurisdiction'  which had been 
conveyed to him (11.  c.  13-14,  34).  SO  the Pope was 
bound and confined by laws (11.  c. 9-10,  20).  Like the 
King, he was higher than any one of  the People, but 
of  the whole  People  he was  the  servant  (11.  c.  34). 
His relation  to the General  Assembly  was  that  of  a 
Metropolitan  Bishop  to the Provincial  Council  (11.  c. 
I 2) : by it he could be judged  and deposed (11.  c.  I 7- 
18).  For  all  this,  however,  Nicholas  of  Cues,  like 
Gerson, regarded this monarchical culminating-point as 
an essential  and divinely decreed part of the Church's 
Constitution  (I.  c.  14).  Also he endeavoured, as did 
some  others,  to  interpolate  between  the  democratic 
groundwork  and the monarchical  head  an aristocratic 
element,  which  in  the case of  the  Universnl  Church 
consisted  of  the  Cardinals  regarded  as  provincial 
dei~~ates,  and in  the case of the Particular  Churches 
consisted of  the Chapters (11.  c.  15).  Then he strove 
to institute a  constitutional  link between  this Ecclesi- 
astical Constitution and the parallel Constitution of the 
Empire.  On the  one  hand,  the  temporal  rulers  in 
their several provinces and the Emperor in the Whole 
Church  were to manifest  their care for the Church by 
summoning .Councils and  voting in  them  (111.  c.  8- 
I I,  13-4)  while,  on the other hand, the clergy were 
to take part  in  the Assemblies  of  the  Empire and of 
its component  territories.  To these '  mixed ' assem- 
blies-partly  ecclesiastical and partly temporal-power 
to deal  with '  mixed ' affairs was to be ascribed (111.  c. 
12, 25, 35). 
Upon this  same notion  of  a  Sovereignty given by Reaction 
against  Natural  Law to  the Community,  Gregory  of  Heim- Popular 
burg, Almain, Aeneas Sylvius in his earlier days, and pip 
some later writers constructed their doctrine of  Eccle- 
siastical Law2".  Those Canonists also who were friendly 
to the  Councils  advocated  the less  extreme proposi- 
tions of  this system and at the same time paid  heed 
to the Law of Corporations'".  Even the constitutional 
theory of  Antonius Rosellus, albeit strongly monarchi- 
cal and based  on Positive  Law, was permeated by the 
thought of  a Popular Sovereignty within the Church2". 
Therefore the earliest scientific reaction in favour of the 
Papacy, a reaction in which Torquemada was a leader, 
began  with  the negation  of  the principle  of  Popular 
Sovereignty,  and indeed  denounced  that principle  as 
radically  false and impossible". 
The constitutional  doctrine  of  the  Church  thus Rigl1ts.of 
the La~ty 
underwent  violent  disturbances.  Nevertheless  one  in the 
Chur~h.  important  consequence  of  the  principle  of  Popular 
Sovereignty remained undrawn  or but partially drawn. 
The Conciliar Movement did not bestow any active part 
in the affairs of  the Church  upon  the Laity.  At the 
utmost the theorists would  allow  a  secondary or sub- 
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exclusive  right  of  the  Clergy  was  not  attackedm5. 
Indeed  Gerson  held  fast  an  extremely  'institutional' 
idea  of  the  Church  [i.e.  an  idea  that  the Church  is 
rather an Institution than a Fellowship],  for he defined 
the Church Universal in its active potency as the sum 
total of those essential offices which have been founded 
by God2".  And,  if  upon  the other  side the Consti- 
tution  of  the  Church  as  a  Fellowship  was  loudly 
proclaimed and all ecclesiastical  power was  reposed  in 
the  Congregation  of  the  Faithful, all  inferences  in 
favour of  any active rights of  the Laity were excluded 
by the supposition that  every Congregation  was  per- 
fectly  and  absolutely  represented  by  the  Clerical 
Council  'Or. 
The  Still even at this  point  the  Reformation was  not 
Temporal 
Magistrate wholly without medieval precursors.  The idea  of  the 
as repre- 
sentative  general Priesthood of  all the Faithful was never quite 
ofthe  Laily.  unrepresented,  and also  there  were  some  who  made 
the communal  principle a foundation for  the theoretic 
construction  of  the  Church's  constitution.  What is 
most  remarkable  in  this  context  is  that  the theories 
which went furthest  in  this  direction  finally issued in 
the introduction  of  the  Temporal  Magistrature  into 
the Church, for instead of  postulating an independent 
organization of  the Ecclesiastical Communes [parishes  . 
and the like],  men were content to suppose that these 
were represented by the constituted political powers. 
Marsilius  Above all  others  it is  Marsilius  in  his  Defensor  and the 
Laity.  Pacis who pictures the Church as a  Corporation of  the 
Faithful (universitas jdelium) wherein the Laity,-for 
in  truth  they  are Churchmen  (virz' eccZesicstici),-are 
active members.  Between Spiritual and Temporal the 
diflerence was not ' personal' but 'real' (11.  c.  2).  The 
Clergy  were  distinguished  from  the  Laity  by  the 
Priesthood.  This,  however,  was  merely  a  peculiar 
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faculty  of  a  spiritual  kind, and bestowed  no  external 
coercive power and no exceptional right of  an admini- 
strative or jurisdictional  sort (11. c.  3-10;  III.  c.  3, 5, 
13-14),  Therefore the full powers entrusted by God 
to the Community of the Faithful were to be exercised 
by a General Council (11.  c. 7, 18, 20,  22), which was to 
be constituted by all the Faithful, including the Laity, or 
their Deputies (11. c.  20 ;  111. c.  2).  However, as repre- 
sentatives of  the  Body  of the Faithful,  the ZegisZator 
humanus and theprinc$ans  were to act :  in other words, 
the Assembly of  the People and the Temporal Ruler. 
Upon them, therefore, lay the duty of  summoning the 
Council, deciding who were its members, controlling and 
closing its deliberations,  and executing its resolutions 
by force and punishment (11.  c.  28,  2 I ;  III. c.  33). 
Yet more extensive rights were challenged for the Ockham 
and the 
Laity by Ockham.  He  starts from the principle  that, Laity. 
albeit the Canon  Law would  narrow  the idea  of  the 
Church  until  it  comprised only the Clergy, none  the 
less the Church  Universal, being the Congregation of 
the Faithful,  must,  according to  Holy Writ, embrace 
the  Laity  also  (Dial I.  5,  c.  29-31).  Thence  he 
argued in detail that, since Infallibility was guaranteed 
only  to the  Church  Universal,  the true  faith  might 
perish  in  Pope,  Cardinals,  Roman Church, the whole 
Clergy, all male and indeed all reasonable members of 
the Church-for  one and all they were but parts of the 
Church-and  yet  might  survive  in  the  rest  of  the 
Church, perhaps in women and babes  '08.  Therefore even 
the Laity might accuse an heretical  Pope, and if  they 
had  power  enough,  might  punish  him  (Dial. I.  5, 
c.  30-35).  So they could summon a General Council 
and  themselves  take part  in  it; indeed  (though  the 
Scholar  in  Ockham's  Dialogue  thought  this  a  plain 
absurdity) even women should be admitted, were there 60  Political  Theories of the Middle Age. - 
need  of  them (Dial. I.  6, c.  85).  In Ockham's eye a 
General  Assembly  of  this  sort  was  by  no  means 
impossible.  It might, for  example, be constructed in 
such  wise  that  within  some limited  time  every Com- 
mune should elect certain delegates, from among whom 
deputies for  the  Council  should  be  chosen  by  the 
episcopal Synods or temporal Parliaments.  In such a 
Council  the  Universitas  FirGdium  would  in  fact  be 
present in the persons  of  its representatives, and such 
a  Council,  like  the General  Assembly  of  any  other 
Community or Corporation, would concentrate in itself 
the  power  of  the  Whole  Body  (Diad.  I.  6,  c.  57, 
84, 91-100  ;  OC~O  qu.  III.  C.  8).  The only  spiritual 
rights and powers (iura sjirituadia)  from which Ockham 
would exclude the Laity are such as have  their origin 
in Ordo or Oficium Divinum; on the other hand, laymen 
are capable of  all iura s$irituadia  which are concerned 
with  care for  the weal  of  the Church  (propter com- 
munem  utiditatem  ecclesiae).  In  particular,  according 
to the ius naturade, according to the ius gentium, and 
perhaps  according  to  the  ius  divinum,  laymen  are 
entitled  to take  part  in  the  election  of  bishops  and 
popes,  and  are excluded  merely  by  temporary  ordi- 
nances of human origin.  Their ancient right becomes 
valid  once more  if  there be any defect  in  the agency 
which  positive  law has  put  in  their  place.  Thus in 
case of  the heresy, the schism or the culpable delay of 
the Cardinals, the right to elect  a  Roman bishop  lies, 
as a  matter  of  principle, in  the Romans, without dis- 
tinction between  Clergy and  People, or else it  lies  in 
all Catholicsmg. However, the actual use of  this right, 
as of other rights pertaining to the Whole Community, 
Ockham  made  over  to  the  Emperor  'Roman  and 
Catholic,'  who,  as  the  Community's  Christian  Head, 
might  act  vice  omnium,  in  the  name  of  and under 
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a  commission  from  All,  and  more  especially  the 
Romans"'.  And thus Ockham, like others, introduces 
the Temporal Magistrate into the Church as the repre- 
sentative of the Laity2l1. 
V I I.  The Idea of  Representation. 
To this  lively  controversy  concerning  the  rights The 
Repre- 
of  Rulers  and  the  rights  of  Communities,  medieval sentative 
Consti-  doctrine owes the idea  of  a  State with  Representative tution. 
Institutions.  It was  admitted  on  all  sides  that  the 
main object of  Public Law must be to decide upon the 
Apportionment  of  Power,  and,  this  being  so,  every 
power of  a political kind appeared always more clearly 
to bear the character of  the constitutional  competence 
of  some  part  of  the  Body  Politic  to 'represent'  the 
Whole.  It became evident therefore that a theoretical 
severance  must  be maintained between  the individual 
personality and  the social  personality of  every human 
wielder  of  power,  between  his  own  right  and  his 
public  right,  between  the private  act which  affected 
only  the  individual  and  the  official  act  which  by 
virtue  of  the Constitution  bound  the Whole  Body*. 
At  all  these  points  the  Doctrine  of  the  State co- 
incided  with  the  Doctrine  of  the  Corporation,  and 
therefore in  this  quarter  the  Publicist  had  often  no 
more  to do than  simply to borrow  the notions which 
had been elaborated  by the Jurists  in  their  theory of 
Corporations. 
In the first place,  medieval  doctrine  gave to the Repre- 
sentative  Monarch a representative character.  However highly character 
of Mon-  his  powers  might  be extolled, the thought that Lord- archy. 
* In other, and  to  Englishmen more familiar, words, 'private  capacity'  and 
'politic capacity ' were to be distinguished.-TransL. 62  Political  Theorzes of  the Middle Age. 
is  Office  had,  as we  have  already  seen, always 
remained a living thought.  Pope and Emperor stood 
for  this  purpose  on  a  level  with  any  president  of  a 
corporation.  Therefore, though it was conceded on all 
hands that the Ruler might  have a vested right, and a 
right  that was  all  his own, in  his  Lordship, still with 
equal unanimity men  saw as the content  of  this  right 
merely a  call  to the temporary assumption of  an im- 
mortal dzgqnitas, and in the concept of  that dzgnitas the 
function  of  the Ruler was objectified as a constitution- 
ally defined sphere of power *'la. 
Politic  So it was  as the bearer  for the time  being  of  a 
capacity.  permanent  dignity, and  not  as this or that individual, 
that the Monarch was  to exercise the rights  and dis- 
charge the duties of  Lordship.  And within  the scope 
of  the powers  constitutionally assigned to him, he, as 
Head, represented the Whole Body.  Therefore it was 
generally agreed in the Church that, as the  Prelate is 
not  the  Particular  Church,  so  the  Pope  is  not  the 
Universal  Church, but  merely  represents it  by virtue 
of his  rank  (intuitu dzgnitntis)""  The only question 
for  dispute  was  whether,  as a  general  rule,  he  by 
himself represented  the Whole Body"',  or whether (as 
was the case of  the president of  a  Particular  Church) 
his  representative  power  was  confined  within  certain 
limits,  while  for  a  complete representation  men  must 
look  to a  Council216. So again,  notwithstanding  all 
disputes touching the extent of  a Monarch's  power, all 
were  agreed that the  Emperor  was  not the Empire, 
but only, by virtue of his rank, represented the Empire 
and the Community that  was  subject to him"'.  The 
Thus, for example, in our English legal doctrine, lordships, dignities, offices, 
were 'objectified' as '  incorporeal things,'  or incorporeal ' objects' of  rights, and 
these things were supposed  to endure while their  possessors came and went.  In 
such 'things'  men might have  vested  rights, but the things themselves were con. 
ceived as constitutionally allotted portions of public power.-Transl. 
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like was  the case of  every Ruler, whether elective or 
hereditary"'.  This being  so,  endeavours  were  made 
with  increasing  success  to formulate  in  theory  and 
effect in practice a  distinction  between  the public and 
private capacities of the Monarch2", between his private 
property and the State's property which was under his 
care2lg,  between those private  acts  of  his  which  only 
affected him as an individual and those acts of govern- 
ment  which  would  bind  his  successorsM0.  In  this 
instance the Church  might serve as a  model  for the 
Empire and the State, for  within  the Church distinc- 
tions  of  this  kind  had  long been  observed. 
Then, on the other hand, it became apparent  that Represen- 
tation in  the powers ascribed  to the Community of the People Assem- 
were not the private rights of a sum of individuals, but blies 
the  public  right  of  a  constitutionally  compounded 
Assembly.  Even  the  advocates  of  an  inalienable 
Sovereignty of  the People did not  identify the Whole 
with the mere Body of  the State, for beside the Body 
there  was  a  Head  with  rights  of  its  own.  They 
declared at the outset that in  all  cases  it  was 'collec- 
tively' and not 'distributively' that the Community was 
entitled to exercise supreme powerB1.  Therefore a line 
was to be drawn between the individual and the social 
capacities of  men".  It was not the individual man as 
such, but the fully qualified citizen, the 'active burgher,' 
as  distinguished  from  mere  'passive  burghers,'  who 
was  entitled  to participate  in  the powers  that  were 
ascribed  to  the  Communitym3.  Even  those  citizens 
who could vote were thought of, not as an undifferenti- 
ated mass, but  as an  articulated whole, whose compo- 
sition was  affected by differences of rank, of profession 
and  of  office".  The exercise  of  the  Popular  Sove- 
reignty or of  any other right  of  the  Community was 
possible  only in  a  properly constituted Assembly, and 64  Political  Theories of the Middle Age. - 
if and when  all formalities had  been  duly observedm. 
In this context the rules of the Common Law touching 
the resolutions of  Corporations were bodily transferred 
to  Ecclesiastical  and  Political  Assemblies.  In par- 
ticular,  during the  Conciliar  Age when  questions  of 
ecclesiastical  polity  were under  discussion-questions 
about the summons to coun~ils~~q  their power of passing 
resolutions",  the rights of  majorities",  the mode  of 
reckoning a majorityBg-the  rules of  Corporation  Law 
were called into play.  So  also its rules concerning the 
prevalence  of  the  majority  were  applied  to  acts  of 
Political  Bodies, and it was  in  the very words of  the 
Jurists  that  the  majority's  power  to  represent  the 
Whole was statedB0.  Ockham even went  so far as to 
transfer the lore of corporate delict [the torts of  corpo- 
rations] to the relation between  Political  Communities 
and that State which  comprises  all  Mankind, in  such 
wise  that by a formal  sentence  of  the Corporation  of 
All  Mortal  Men  (universitas  mortadium)  a  guilty 
Nation  might be deprived  of  any preeminence  that  it 
had enjoyed and indeed of all part and lot in the ruler- 
ship of the World-Community"'. 
Repre-  But, more particularly, to the Law of  Corporations 
senting 
and repre- we may trace the endeavour to give definite legal shape 
sented 
Assem-  to that idea of  the exercise of  the rights of  the People 
b'ies.  by  a  Representative  Assembly  which  had  long  been 
current  in  the  Middle  Age,  though  unknown  to 
Antiquity.  Whenever to the right of the Ruler there 
was  opposed  a  right  oi the  Community-were  this 
right superior to his or were it subordinate-the  possi- 
bility  that  the  right  of  the  Community  would  be 
exercised by means of an Assembly of  Representatives 
was  admitted.  Indeed  in  all  cases  in  which  either 
a  gathering of  the whole  people was  out of  the ques- 
tion,  owing  to  the  size  of  the  Community,  or  the 
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business in hand was not suited to a General Assembly, 
representative action appeared not only as a possibility 
but as a necessity.  When put into a  precise form, the 
idea was  that the Representative Assembly  stood  in 
the stead of  a  Represented  Assembly  of  All, so that 
the acts of the Representing had exactly the same legal 
effect as the same acts of  the Represented  Assembly 
would  have had.  Within the ecclesiastical  sphere it 
was  on  this  principle  that  men  based  the  action  of 
Councils, and especially it was from  this principle that 
were deduced the claims which were asserted on behalf 
of  a  General  Council.  Such  a  Council, it  was  said, 
represented  in  a  perfect  and all-sufficing manner  the 
Community of all the members of the Church, in which 
Community were vested  those rights that the Council 
exercisedB2.  A  prevailing  opinion  attributed  to  this 
representation a character so perfect that we might call 
it 'absorptive,'  so that, though there might be a distinc- 
tion in idea, there was no distinction in power  between 
the Council and the Universal Church or Congregation 
of  the Faithful.  On the other hand, an opinion which 
Ockham  stated  argued  conversely  that  because  the 
Council's position was purely representative, some limit 
must be set to its power  in relation  to the congregatio 
fidelium".  Then when the representative character of 
the Council was to be explained, it was  usual  to refer 
to the fact  that  it  was  composed  out  of the  elected 
Heads of the various ecclesiastical Communities.  Each 
of these prelates might be supposed to have received at 
his  election  a  mandate to  represent  the  Community 
that was subject to him234. In Ockham's works we may 
see even the idea of a  General Assembly of  Deputies 
elected,  not  without  the  participation  of  the  Laity, 
to  represent  all  and singular  the  ecclesiastical  com- 
mune~~~~. 
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Repre-  In exactly the same fashion  the various Assemblies 
sentation  Elec-  Of  Estates of larger or smaller territories were regarded 
tion.  as Representations of the  People empowered to exer- 
cise  the  People's  Rights"!  In  this  case  also  the 
character  was  supposed  to be  derived 
from  the  mandate  given  by  Election : an  Election 
which  every  section  of  the  People  had  made of  its 
own  Rulers, but an  Election which  perhaps  had  con- 
ferred  an  hereditary  right  upon  some  race  or  some 
housem7.  On  such  foundations  as  these  Nicholas  of 
Cues erected a formal system of Representative Parlia- 
mentarism.  It is  true that  in  this  early specimen  of 
that system we see no  mechanically  planned  electoral 
districts, and the constituencies are organic and corpora- 
tively constructed limbs of  an articulated  People ; still 
the  Assembly  stands  for  the  Whole  People  in  uno 
comjendio ~epraesentativo'~. In a similar sense, at an 
yet  earlier  time,  Marsilius  of  Padua  had  declared 
in  favour of  an elective representation of  the People, 
but, in his consistent Radicalism,  reserved  the exercise 
of  the rights of  Sovereignty, properly so called, for  a 
primary or immediate A~sernbly'~~. 
Kepre- 
sentative  Then a  representative  function  of  a  more limited 
character  kind was ascribed to the small collegiate bodies which, 
of  Car- 
dinals and with  certain  powers  of  their  own,  stood  beside  the 
Electors.  Monarchical  Head : for instance,  the  Electors  in  the 
Empire  and  the  Cardinals  in  the  Church.  Leopold 
von Babenberg was the first to ascribe-but  in this he 
had many followers-tht  peculiar rights of the Electors, 
and  more  especially  that  of  choosing  a  Kaiser, to a 
representation  by  them  of  the  whole  Folk  of  the 
Empire : a right belonging to the People was exercised 
by  its   representative^^^.  So lilcewise  the  Cardinals, 
when they chose a Pope or participated in other acts of 
Sovereignty,  were  looked  upon  as representatives of 
the ecclesiastical  C~mmunity~l.  It is in just this con- 
text that we see the first development of  the principle 
that every set of  men which  is a representation  of  an 
universitas (corporation)  must  itself  be treated  as an 
universitas.  The  surrogate  or  substitute,  so  men 
argued, takes the nature of  that  for  which  it  stands. 
Therefore  Representatives,  who  in  the  first  instance 
are  charged  with  the  representation  of  the  several 
particular communities which compose a People, must, if 
they are to represent  the People as a  Whole, act  as 
one  single  Assembly  which  resolves  and decides  in 
a corporate fashion, and, in the absence of  any special 
provisions for its procedure, ought to observe the rules 
of  the Common  Law of  Corporations.  It was on this 
ground  that  Imperialistic  Publicists, from  the days of 
Leopold von  Babenberg onward, defended, against the 
contrary opinion of  some Canonists, the thesis that the 
rules of  Corporation  Law were applicable to the form 
and  the  effect  of  the  choice  of  an  Emperor by  the 
princely Electorsw2.  That those rules were  applicable 
to the choice of a Pope and to all other joint acts of the 
Cardinals was indubitable". 
V I I.  The Idea  of Personaliby. 
After  all  that  has heretofore  been  said, we  might Person- 
ality of  well expect that the Political  Theories of  the  Middle Church 
Age would have laid great stress on  the application to and State  not theo- 
Church and State of the idea of Personality, and by so  ;E:~!Y 
doing would have both enriched that idea and deepened lated. 
it.  The notion  of  the merely representative function 
of  all  the  visible  wielders  of  public  power  would 
naturally lead  onwards to the notion  of  a represented 
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Doctrine of  Corporations, which was  so often  cited in 
this context was ready to supply the idea of  a  Juristic 
Person, and a due consideration of the nature of Church 
and State might have induced a transmutative process 
which  would  have  turned  the Pevsona Ficta  of  pro- 
fessional  jurisprudence  into  the  concept  of  a  really 
existing  Group-Personality  (Gesa.rlzmtpe~siinlichkeit). 
Already the Church  was  conceived,  and  so was  the 
State, as an organic Whole which, despite its compo- 
site  character, was  a  single  Being,  and  the thought 
might have occurred  that the Personality of  the  Indi- 
vidual consists in a similar permanent Substance within 
an Organism. 
Failure of  Nothing of  this sort happened.  The professional 
political 
thee,,,.  lawyers  of  the  Middle  Age,  it  is  true,  were already 
operating with the ideal '  Right-Subjectivity ' of Church 
and State, and sometimes  their operations were  by no 
means wanting  in  precision; but the  instrument  that 
they were  using was  merely their '  Fictitious  Person,' 
an instrument forged in the laboratory of  Private Law. 
On the other hand, the Publicists, properly so called, 
of  the  Middle  Age  hardly  ever-and  this  is  highly 
remarkable-make  any  direct  use  of  the  idea  of 
Personality  in  their  theoretical  construction  of  the 
Body Social, and, when  they make  an  indirect  use  of 
it by accepting its results, they become  the dependent 
followers of  Legists and  Canonists.  At this point we 
may see the beginning of  a  stream of  tendency which 
has not ceased to flow tlren in our own  day.  On the 
one part, the concept of Legal Personality was confined 
always more definitely within  the boundary of  Private 
Law  and became  always  more  arid  and  sterile.  On 
the other part, the Theory of  the State had at its com- 
mand no instrument which would  enable it  to put into 
legal terms the organic nature of  the State, and thus 
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was driven to mechanical  construction  on  a basis  pro- 
vided by the Law of Nature. 
We have seen above that the Canonists regarded!;;$;;;; 
not  only  each  Particular  Church but also the Church Person- 
Universal as a corporate Subject of Rights?  and that """' 
the Civilians simply subsumed Empire and State under 
the  concept  of  Corporations".  Baldus, in  particular, 
formulated  with  much  precision  the  thought  of  the 
State's  personality.  Thus he explained that the acts 
of a Government are binding on its successors because 
the real  Subject of  the duty is the State's Personality. 
The Commonwealth, he said, can  do no  act  by itself, 
but he who rules the Commonwealth acts in virtue of 
the Commonwealth and of  the office which it has con- 
ferred  upon  him.  Therefore  in  the  King  we  must 
distinguish the private person  and the public  person. 
The person  of  the King is the organ  and instrument 
of  an  'intellectual  and  public  person' ; and  it  is  this 
intellectual and public person that must be regarded as 
the principal,  for  the  law  pays  more  regard  to the 
power of  the principal than to the power of  the organ. 
So the true  subject  of  the duty created by an  act  of 
the  Government  is  the  represented  Commonwealth 
($sa  ~e@ubZicn  re$raesentata)  which  never  dies,  and 
a subsequent Ruler is liable in its name  24!  However, 
Baldus  is  the very man  who  lets  us  see clearly  that 
he regards the State's Personality merely  in the light 
of  the prevalent  ' Fiction  Theory ' of the Corporation. 
This appears plainly from his  refusal to attribute Will 
to the State.  For this reason he holds that jurisdiction 
delegated  by  the  Prince  ceases  at the  death  of  the 
delegator.  If Gulielmus de Cuneo has argued to the 
contrary,  urging  that  the  Empire continues to  exist 
and therefore that the delegator  is  not  dead,  he  has 














to do, not  with  the Empire, but  with  the  Emperor; 
for, be it granted that the Empire remains unchanged, 
still the Will which is expressed in the act of delegation 
is the Emperor's, not the Empire's, for the Empire has 
no  Mind  and therefore no Will, since Will is mental. 
(Jmjerium  non  habet animum, ergo non habet veZGe  ncc 
noZZg, pis  animisztnt.)  Will is matter of fact; and mere 
matter  of  fact,  as distinguished  from  matter  of  law, 
we cannot thus transfer from Emperor to Empirez4'. 
If therefore the Publicists  when they had occasion 
to employ the concept of  an ideal  Person  had only at 
their disposal  this ' Fictitious'  Person that the Jurists 
had  fashioned, we may easily understand  that, at the 
critically decisive  points  in  the discussion of questions 
touching the  whereabouts  of  the  State's  Power,  the 
Publicists  altogether  refrained  from  speaking  of  the 
State's  Personality.  The rights  that  lay  debatable 
between  Ruler and Community were being ever more 
definitely brought  within  the growing  idea  of  Sove- 
reignty,  and,  this  being  so,  a  merely  Artificial  and 
Fictitious Person became an ever less competent 'Sub- 
ject ' for  such rights.  Moreover, in  the controversies 
about  the partition  and  limitations  of  Public  Power 
men  felt  little  need  to penetrate  beyond  the visible 
wielders of  that Power.  And above all, the Doctrine 
of  the  State which  prevailed  in  Classical  Antiquity 
identified  the State, when  considered  as a  Subject of 
Rights and Duties, with its visible Sovereign, and this 
antique Doctrine was becoming the starting-point for 
theorists. 
And so it  fell  out that even in mediev-I  theory we 
may  already  see that  the  single  Personality  of  the 
State is torn asunder into two 'Subjects' corresponding 
respectively  to  the  Ruler  and  the  Assembly  of  the 
People.  Between them there is a conflict as to which 
has  the  higher  and  completer  right ;  but  they  are 
thought of  as two distinct Subjects each with rights of 
a  contractual  kind  valid  against  the other and with 
duties of a contractual kind owed to the other ; and in 
their connexion consists the Body Politic. 
In so far as the  Ruler  was  the  'Subject' of  the The 
Ruler's 
State's  power,  the  notion  of  a  personified  Dzgnitas person- 
enabled men to separate, both in the ecclesiastical and '"" 
in the temporal  groups, the rights which  belonged to 
the Ruler as Ruler from  those which belonged to him 
as an individual manM.  But thereby an expression for 
the Personality of  the State as a Whole had not been 
gained, for in  the State there was a place also for the 
Community as distinguished from  the Ruler.  Rather 
we must say that  within  the State a  separate Ruler- 
Personality [such  as the English  '  Crown '] was  con- 
structed.  This  Ruler-Personality  would  outlive  the 
various Rulers who from  time to time  were  invested 
with it;  it endured in the shape of a personified Office. 
However, in  a  Monarchy, so long as the throne  was 
occupied, this  Personality was absorbed  by the visible 
occupant2",  and  in  a  Republic  it  took  body  in  the 
Assembly which exercised the rights of  Sovereignty : 
an  Assembly  which  was  pictured  in  visible  form  as 
a living Collective Ruler2". 
And then on the other hand, in so iar as the Com- The 
People's 
munity was a ' Subject ' of rights, and stood apart from Person- 
and either above or below  the Ruler,  this  'Subject ,  ality. 
could  not be identified with  the Whole organized and 
unified  Body,  since  the  Head was  being left  out of 
account.  Rather a  separate  'Subject'  was  made  of 
'the  People' : a  'Subject'  that  could  be  contrasted 
with  'the  Government*.'  Then it  is  true  that  the 
Thus at a later day King James 11. was conceived to have broken a contract 
made with, not the State, but 'the People.'-Transl. 72  Political  Theories of the Middle Age. 
People  when  thus  conceived  was  personified  in  the 
guise of an universitas and could be distinguished from 
the individuals  that  were  comprised  within  itz1 ; but, 
the  impulse  towards  an  organic  construction  having 
been repressed,  men were steadily driven onwards to a 
mode of  thought which  explained  the right-possessing 
universitas  to  be  in  the last  resort  merely  a  sum  of 
individuals,  bound  into  unity  by  Jurisprudence,  and 
differing only from the plurality of  its members for the 
time being in  that those members were 'to be taken 
collectively'  and  not  'distributively.'  This  mode  of 
thought  appears  in  a  pregnant  fashion  among  the 
champions of  the rights of  the Ecclesiastical Commu- 
nity,  They  simply  identify  the  Universal  Church, 
(which is by definition the Universitas Fidedium,) with 
a '  collective ' sum of all faithful people252.  Torquemada 
therefore  could  attack  the  Conciliar  Theory at this 
very point.  He  undertook to prove that the Universal 
Church  as defined  by his  opponents was  not  even  a 
possibly competent wielder  of  the ecclesiastical power 
that was ascribed to it.  For, he argued, a Community 
taken as ViThole  cannot have rights of which the major 
part of  its members are incapable, and of the Faithful 
the  major  part  will  consist  of  women  and  laymen ; 
besides  it  would  follow  that  all  the  members  of  the 
Church would have equal  rights and the consent of all 
would  be  necessary  for  every  act  of  Sovereignty2". 
Similarly  in  temporal  affairs just  the  most  energetic 
champions of Popular SL ~ereignty  regard the Sovereign 
People as the merely collective sum of all individuals". 
The influence of  this '  individual-collective ' explication 
of the idea of the People becomes always more evident 
in  the theories that men  hold  touching  the base  and 
limits  of  the  representation  of  the  Whole  by  the 
Majority or by Conciliar  Bodies or by the Rulerz5. 
- 
Thus the path to the idea of  '  State-Sovereignty '  The idea 
of  the 
was barred for medieval theory, and already there were state's 
planted in that theory the germs of  those later systems :::&is 
of  '  Nature-Right '-the  system  of  Ruler-Sovereignty, mi"ed. 
the system of  Popular  Sovereignty and the system of 
Divided Sovereignty-which  endeavoured  to construe 
the '  Right-Subjectivity ' of the State now in a central- 
istic,  now  in  an  atomistic,  but  always  in  a  purely 
mechanical  fashion. 
Before,  however,  we  turn  our  attention  to these 
modern elements in the medieval doctrine, we must, in 
order  to  complete  our  picture,  cast  a  glance  at the 
relation  and interaction  between  the idea of the State 
and the idea of Right (Law). 
I X.  The State and Law. 
When the Middle Age began  to theorize over the The State 
freeing 
relation  of  the State to Law, the old Germanic idea of itselffrom 
a '  Right-State' [Reign of  Law]  had already shown its the Law' 
insufficiency.  It  was the idea of a State which existed 
only in  the  Law and  for  the  Law,  and whose  whole 
life was bound by a legal order that regulated  alike  all 
public  and  all  private  relationships.  In  the  Church 
there had been from all time a Power established which 
found its origin and its goal outside and beyond a mere 
scheme of  Law and which might be contrasted with that 
scheme.  So also  State-Power, so soon  as it  became 
conscious of  its own  existence,  began to strive  for a 
similar  emancipation  from  the  fetters  of  the  Law. 
Jurisprudence  and  Philosophy,  so  soon  as they  felt 
the first  rustle  of  the  breath  of  Classical  Antiquity, 
began  to vie  with  each  other in  finding  a theoretical 
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be independent  of  the idea  of  Law.  Almost  unani- 
mously medieval  Publicists are agreed  that  the State 
is based on no foundation of mere Law, but upon moral 
or natural  necessity:  that  it has  for  its  aim  the pro- 
motion of  we1fai.e : that  the realization of  Law  is  but 
one of  the appropriate  means  to  this  end: and that 
the State's relation  to  Law is  not  merely subservient 
and receptive, but is creative and dominant. 
Lawabove  But, notwithstanding  these acquisitions from  Clas- 
State and 
state  sical Antiquity,-for  such in their essence they were- 
above 
Law.  Medieval Doctrine, while  it was  truly medieval, never 
surrendered  the  thought  that  Law  is  by  its  origin 
of equal rank with the State and does not depend upon 
the State  for its existence.  To  base the State upon some 
ground  of  Law, to make it the outcome of  a legal act, 
the  medieval  Publicist  felt  himself  absolutely  bound. 
Also  his  doctrine  was  permeated  by  the conviction 
that the State stood charged with  a mission  to realize 
the idea of  Law:  an  idea  which  was  given  to  man 
before  the  establishment  of  any earthly  Power,  and 
which  no  such  Power  could  destroy.  It was  never 
doubtful  that  the highest  Might,  were  it  spiritual  or 
were  it temporal,  was  confined  by  truly  legal  limita- 
tions. 
Natural 
Law and  How  then  was  it  thinkable  that,  on  the  one 
Positive  hand,  Law  ought  to  exist  by,  for  and  under  the 
Law. 
State, and  that,  on  the other hand,  the State ought 
to exist  by,  for  and  under  the  Law?  The thought 
that  State  and  Law  exist  by,  for  and  under  each 
other  was  fore;:n  to  the  Middle  Age.  It  solved 
the problem  by  opposing to Positive  Law  the  idea 
of  Natural  Law.  This idea,  which  came to it  from 
Classical  Antiquity,  it  proceeded  to elaborate. 
Theideaof  This is not  the  place  in  which  to  expound  the 
Natural 
L~W.  medieval  doctrine  of  Nature-Right or  Natural  Law 
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or to pursue  its  evolution  through  the  innumerable 
learned  controversies that beset it.  The work of  de- 
velopn~ent  was done partly by Legists  and  Decretists 
on the ground provided  by  the texts of  Roman  and 
Canon Law, and partly  by  Divines  and  Philosophers 
on the ground  of  Patristic  and Classical  Philosophy. 
Thomas Aquinas drew the great outlines for  the fol- 
lowing centuries.  To  say more would be needless, for, 
however  many  disputes  there might  be  touching the 
origin of  Natural Law and the ground of its obligatory 
force,  all  were  agreed  that  there  was  Natural  Law, 
which,  on  the  one  hand,  radiated  from  a  principle 
transcending  earthly power,  and,  on  the other hand, 
was true and perfectly binding Law"'.  Men supposed 
therefore that before  the State existed  the Lex Natu- 
raZis  already  prevailed  as an  obligatory  statute,  and 
that  immediately or mediately from  this flowed  those 
rules of  right to which  the State owed even the possi- 
bility of  its own rightful origin.  And men also taught 
that the highest  power  on  earth was  subject  to  the 
rules  of  Natural  Law.  They stood  above the Pope 
and above the Kaiser, above the Ruler and above  the 
Sovereign People, nay, above the whole Community of 
Mortals.  Neither  statute  nor  act  of  government, 
neither  resolution  of  the  People  nor  custom  could 
break  the bounds  that thus were set.  Whatever con- 
tradicted  the  eternal  and  immutable  principles  of 
Natural  Law  was  utterly  void  and would  bind  no 
one  167. 
This force  was  ascribed,  not  merely  to  the IZS  T~~L~W 
of God, of  Nalurale in the strictest  sense  of  that  term, but  also Nature, 
to the revealed  lus  Divinzcm and to the lus  Commane ;,4i~i,. 
Genlium  which  were  placed  alongside  of  it.  The 
revealed  Law  of  God  stood  to  the  Law  of  Nature 









the latter was  implanted  by  God in  Natural  Reason 
for  the  attainment  of  earthly  ends,  the  former was 
communicated by God to man in a supernatural way and 
for a supramu~dane  purpose ".  Then the Ius Gentium 
(thereby being meant such Law as all  Nations  agreed 
in recognizing) was regarded as the sum of  those rules 
which  flowed  from  the  pure  Law  of  Nature  when 
account  was  taken  of  the relationships  which  were 
introduced by that deterioration of human nature which 
was caused by the Fall of Man.  Since the constituted 
Power in Church and State had  not created  this  Law 
of  Nations  but  had  received  it, it was  therefore  held 
to partake of  the immutability and sanctity of  Natural 
Law *=. 
The deeper were the inroads that were made into 
the  domain  of  ecclesiastical  and temporal  legislation 
by  this  idea  of  a  Law of  Nature which  even  legis- 
lators  might  not  infringe, the more  urgent  was  the 
need for a  definition  of  the principle which  set limits 
to a law-giver's power.  As to the breadth  and import 
of  the  principle  there  were  abundant  controversies. 
But  the very  elasticity  of  the limiting idea could  in 
all circumstances save the principle.  Men agreed that 
the  rules  of  Natural  Law  could  not  be  altogether 
abrogated  by  Positive  Law,  but  still  those  rules 
might be,  and ought to be,  modified  and developed, 
amplified  and restricted, regard  being  had  to special 
cases.  In this  sense a  distinction  was  often  drawn 
between the immutable first principles and the mutable 
secondary  rules  which  might  even  be  regarded  as 
bearing  an  hypothetical  character.  This distinction 
was  applied  to the true Ius N~turaZe"~,  as well  as to 
the Ius Divinumaa  and the lus Geetiurn"'. 
The reverse side of this exaltation of  Natural Law 
we may see in  the doctrine of the absolute  subjection 
of  Positive  Law (ius civide) to the Sovereign Power. 
This doctrine, which worked a  revolution in  the world 
of  archaic  German  ideas,  taught that the lus CiviZe 
was the freely created product of the Power of  a Com- 
munity,  an  instrument  mutable  in  accordance  with 
estimates  of  utility, a  set of  rules  that had no force of 
their own".  It followed that in every Community the 
wielder  of  Sovereignty stood  above the Positive Law 
that prevailed  therein.  Nay, always more  decisively, 
men  found  the  distinguishing  note  of  Sovereignty, 
ecclesiastical or temporal, in the fact that the Sovereign 
was not bound by any human law. 
The advocates  of  Ruler's-Sovereignty  identified The 
Prince not 
Positive  Law  with  the  expressly  or  tacitly  declared bound by 
Will of  the Ruler.  They placed the Ruler before and Law. 
above  the statutes made  by him  or his  predecessors. 
They taught that he for  his  part was  not  bound  by 
a statute, but might in every single case apply or break 
it as need might be.  Even from  the twelfth  century 
onwards,  Jurisprudence  laid  stress  on  those  Roman 
texts that made for this result.  Thence it might take 
the comparison of  the Ruler to a Zex ani~ata  : thence 
the assertion Quod Princzjijdacuit Zegis habet vzgove?n : 
and thence above all a  sentence destined  to be, from 
century to century, a  focus  of  controversial  literature, 
namely,  Pri~zcejs  legidus solutus  est.  Furnished with 
these, the lawyers could thereout fashion other maxims, 
in  particular  that which  the  Popes applied  to them- 
selves : Omnh iura  badd  P1.inceps  in jectore  suo. 
Philosophical  theory  assented.  It found  the specific 
difference between the true Monarch  and the Republi- 
can  Magistrate exactly at this point.  The latter was 
bound by the laws made by the People or by him and 
the  People.  The former  wandered  around  as a  Zex 
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previously  existing  law  by virtue  of  a  word  that was 
drawn from him by the concrete needs of the moment264. 
Nor were  there wanting  men  who  from  this potestas 
hgibus soZuta would  draw absolutistic  consequences, of 
which  the  Pope  in  the Church  and  the  Kaiser, or 
a  little later every Sovereign, in  the State would reap 
the profit". 
Positive  Against  this  doctrine  a  protest  was  made  by  all 
Law and  those writers who ascribed Sovereignty or even a share 
munity.  of  Sovereignty to  the  People; and their  protest was 
sharply  formulated.  Whereas  the  maintainers  of 
Ruler's-Sovereignty ' declared  that only in  Republics 
were the laws founded on the Will of  the People  and 
therefore superior to the Magistrate",  the champions 
of  the theory which  accepted  Popular  Sovereignty as 
a  first  principle  proclaimed  that, no  matter what was 
the form of  government, the binding force  of  Statute 
always had its source in the consent of the Community. 
Therefore they would hear nothing of  any Ruler who 
was above the laws : no, not though  he were Pope or 
Kaiser"'.  A  separation  of  the  legislative  from  the 
executive power  begins to be  suggested at this point, 
and it afterwards becomes of the highest importance in 
the  development  of  the idea  of  the  Reign  of  Law 
(Rechtsstaat)".  However,  what  was  at  issue  in  the 
first instance was only the whereabouts of Sovereignty, 
and  not  the relation  between  Sovereign  Power  and 
Law,  for  the  one  party  claimed  for  the  Sovereign 
Assembly, (in Church  or State as the case might be,) 
exactly the same superiority to Positive Law which the 
other party granted to the Monarch". 
Natural 
Rights and  Medieval theory therefore was unanimous that the 
Positive  power  of  the State stood  below the rules  of  Natural 
Rights. 
and above the rules of  Positive  Law.  That being so, 
an analogous distinction had to be drawn in the matter 
of  the  State's  relation  to  two  classes  of  Rights  and 
Duties. 
A Right that was conceived to fall within  Positive 
Law  was  regarded  as being,  like the rule  whence  it 
flowed, the outcome of a concession made by the State, 
and was subject to the Sovereign's  disposal.  Men did 
not  allow  that  a  vested  right,  if  acquired  by  a  title 
derived  from  Positive  Law,  could  as  a  matter  of 
principle be valid as against the Power of  the State. 
Already,  as  is  well  known,  the  jurist  Martinus Eminent 
domain. 
[circ.  I 1501 ascribed to the Emperor a true ownership 
of  all  things, and therefore  a  free power  of  disposal 
over  the  rights  of  private  persons.  He  relied  in 
particular on  some words  in  the Code (c. 7,  37, 1.  3): 
quum  onznia  Principis  esse  intellzgantz~r.  On  the 
ecclesiastical  side  a  similar  doctrine  was  asserted  in 
favour of the  Popes0.  For all  this,  however,  a  con- 
trary  doctrine,  which  was  already  maintained  by 
Bulgarus  [circ.  I I 501, was  constantly  gaining ground. 
It taught  that  above private  ownership  there stood 
only a Superiority on the part of  the State, which was 
sometimes  expressly called  a  mere  iurisdictio et pro- 
tectio,  and  which,  even when  it  was  supposed  to be 
a sort of dominium, a sort of  over-ownership, was still 
treated in a purely  '  publicistic ' mannerm.  However, 
it was just  out of  this Superiority that  men  developed 
the theory-a  theory strange to archaic German law- 
of  a  Right  of  Expropriation, by  virtue  whereof  the 
State, whenever Reason of  State demanded this, might 
modify private rights or abrogate thema2. 
Thus the history  of  the Theory of  Expropriation Thetheory 
of Expro- 
takes,  in  the  main,  the form  of  a  process  whereby priation. 
definite bounds  are set to an  expropriatory right.  It 
was  generally  agreed  that  the  Supreme  Power  may 
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arbitrarily.  For some this was an absolute principle of 
lawn3,  and even those who would  allow the Sovereign, 
either in all cases or at least  in  certain  cases, to trans- 
gress it,  still  regarded  it  as  a  general  rulen'.  As a 
sufficient cause,' besides forfeiture for crime and many 
other multifarious matters, we see Public  Necessity, to 
which  Private  Right  must  yield  in  case  of  collision. 
However,  we  may  hear  with  increasing  stress  the 
assertion that, when there is expropriation for the good 
of  the public, compensation  should be made at public 
expenseg5; but from this rule  exceptions will  be made, 
sometimes for the case of general Statutes which affect 
all  individuals  alike*',  and  sometimes  for  cases  of 
necessity? 
Natural  Now it is, however, highly characteristic of  Medi- 
Law, 
Property  eval Doctrine that the ground of  Positive Law did not 
and  seem  to  it  capable  of  supporting  this  protection  of 
acquired  rights.  On  the  contrary,  the  sanctity  as 
against the Sovereign of any such right was only to be 
maintained  if  and  in  so far  as the right  in  question 
could be based  outside  Positive Law on some ground 
of  Natural  Law.  In  this  context  two  propositions 
became the foundation  of  the whole doctrine.  First: 
the institution of property had its roots in the Ius Gen- 
tium : in  Law therefore which  flowed out of the pure 
Law  of  Nature without  the aid  of  the State, and  in 
Law which was when as yet the State was not.  Thence 
it followed that  particular rights which  had  been  ac- 
quired  by  virtue  of  this  Institution  in  no  wise  owed 
their existence ~xclusively  to the States8.  Secondly : 
the binding  force of  Contracts descended from the Law 
Natural, so that  the Sovereign, though  he could  not 
bind  himself  or his  successors by Statute, could  bind 
himself and his successors to his subjects by Contract. 
Thence it  followed that  every right  which  the State 
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had  conferred  by way of  Contract  was unassailable by 
the State, though  here  again  an  exception  was  made 
in  favour of interferences proceeding ex  iusta causn? 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  a  private  right  could  vouch 
for its existence no title of  Natural Law, then doctrinal 
consistency denied a similar protection to this '  merely 
positive  rightJz8'.  This  struck  in    articular  at those 
rights  which  were  held  to  fall  under  the rubric  of 
'privileges'  unilaterally  conceded  by  the  State  and 
sanctioned only by Positive  Law.  An ever growing 
opinion deemed  that rights of this class  were  always 
freely revocable at the instance of the public wealz8'. 
Thus as regards acquired rights, the relative degree Innate 
Rights and  of  protection  which  was  due  to  any  such  right  was Acquired 
held to be derived from  and measured  by the founda- Rights. 
tion  in  Natural  Law of  the 'title'  by  which  in  the 
given case that right had been acquired.  On the other 
hand,  absolute  protection  against  Positive  Law  was 
due to those  rights  which  were  directly conferred by 
pure  Natural  Law without  the intermediation  of  any 
entitling act [e.g. the right to life], and which therefore 
were  not  conditioned  by  any  title  and  could  not  be 
displaced by a title that was adverse. 
In this sense Medieval  Doctrine  was already filled ights 
with the thought of the inborn and indestructible rights of Man. 
of the Individual.  The formulation  and classification 
of  such  rights  belonged  to a later stage in the growth 
of  the theory  of  Natural  Law.  Still, as a  matter  of 
principle, a recognition of their existence may be found 
already  in the medieval  Philosophy  of  Right when  it 
attributes  an  absolute  and  objective  validity  to  the 
highest maxims  of  Natural and  Divine Law.  More- 
over, a  fugitive glance at Medieval  Doctrine  suffices 
to perceive  how  throughout it all,  in  sharp  contrast 
to the theories of Antiquity, runs  the thought of  the 
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absolute and imperishable value of  the Individual : a 
thought revealed by Christianity and grasped in  all  its 
p-ofundity by the  Germanic Spirit.  That every indi- 
vidual by virtue of his eternal destination is at the core 
somewhat holy  and indestructible  even  in  relation  to 
the Highest Power : that the smallest part has a value 
of its own, and not merely because it is part of a whole : 
that every man is to be regarded by the Community, 
never as a  mere instrument, but also as an end :-all 
this is not merely suggested, but is more or less clearly 
Rights of  On the other hand occurred the thought of the origi- 
the Com- 
munity.  nal and essential rights of  Superiority which belonged 
to  the  Whole  Body.  Here, once more,  the Church 
had set up a model : a model of a Power in  the Com- 
munity which, by virtue of Divine Law, was necessarily 
implicated in the Community's existence and therefore 
was  absolutely  one  and  indivisible  and  inalienable. 
The  same necessity, the same oneness, indivisibility and 
inalienability were  soon  claimed  for the plenitude  of 
the Imperial  Power by Legists and Publicists.  Thus 
could they demonstrate against the Church the nullity 
of  the Donation of  Constantinern, and thus could they 
demonstrate against other temporal rulers the impossi- 
bility  of  any complete liberation  by privilege  or pre- 
scription  from  the power  of  the  Empire".  What in 
this context was said of the Empire became in the end 
bare theory; but,  soon  afterwards it gained  practical 
value  by  being  transferred  from  the  Empire  to the 
State.  It was  from this point outwards that, with the 
aid  of  legal  and philosophic  argument,  was  laid  the 
doctrinal foundation upon  which  in course of time the 
towering Modern State, (absorbing meanwhile into itself 
the feudal and patrimonial rights of the Middle Age,) 
could  take, and actually took, its stand.  There arose 
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the doctrine of  a  State Power, precedent and superior 
to  all  Positive  Law,  founded  by  the  very  Law  of 
Nature, possessing an immutable sphere of  action :  of 
a State Power which, being an aboriginal and essential 
attribute of the Community, was the correlate  of  the 
inborn rights of individual men.  Thenceforward, with 
ever-increasing  distinctness,  were  formulated  those 
indestructible  rights  of  Superiority which  are implicit 
in  the idea of  the State : rights which needed no title 
in  Positive  Law and could  not be diminished by any 
title  which  that  Law could  bestow""  And then the 
notion of Sovereignty received its culminating attribute, 
when  (however highly  the Supreme Power  might  be 
extolled) men asserted that even itself could not destroy 
itself.  If,  on  the  one  hand,  the prevailing  doctrine 
hence deduced  the inalienable  rights  of  the Crown"', 
there were, even in  the Middle Age, those who would 
establish by similar reasoning the inalienable  rights of 
the People.  Indeed, the attribute of  indestructibility 
was applied to that original Sovereignty, which a com- 
mon opinion attributed to the Community, and we may 
already see assertions of  the logically reasoned conclu- 
sion  that, by  virtue  of  Divine and  Natural  Law, the 
Sovereignty of the People is absolutely indestructible9 
Hand  in  hand  with  this  went  a  theoretical  process 
which  distinguished  those rights of  Superiority which 
belonged to the very essence of  the State from  fiscal 
rights casually acquired  by the State and held by it in 
the same manner as that in which a private man might 
hold them".  And thus it fell out that, as the doctrine 
of  Nature  Right  became  victorious,  men  began  to 
grasp, as a  matter of  principle, that separation of lus 
Publicurn from  lus Privafum which  they had learned 
from  the  Romans.  That contrast  had  at one  time 
seemed to them  hardly more than a matter of  words ; 
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soon,  however, it was  becoming ever more  decisively 
a  main  outline in  the ground-plan  of  all  constructive 
J~ris~rudence~~~. 
Transgres-  In the course of  these discussions of  the relation- 
sion  limits  of  by  ship of  the State to Law, a deep difference of opinion 
the State  began  to  reveal  itself,  and  to  cleave  the  Medieval 
doctrine in twain, so soon as questions were raised as 
to the effects of  a transgression by the State Power of 
the limits that Law set to its action. 
voidacts  The  properly  Medieval  and  never  completely 
of State.  obsolete theory declared that  every act of  the Sove- 
reign  which  broke the bounds drawn by Natural Law 
was formally null and void.  As null and void therefore 
every judge  and every other magistrate  who  had  to 
apply  the law  was  to treat,  not  only  every unlawful 
executive act, but every unlawful  statute, even though 
it  were  published  by  Pope  or Emperorm0.  Further- 
more, the unlawful  order or unlawful act was null and 
void  for the individual subjects of  the State.  It  was 
just  for  this cause  that  their  duty  of  obedience was 
conceived as a conditional  duty, and that the right of 
actively resisting tyrannical measures was conceded to 
themzg1. 
Formal  This truly  Medieval mode of  thought was in har- 
omnlpo- 
tence of  mony with  the actual  practice of  the age of  feudalism 
the State.  and  the age  in  which  the  Community appeared  as 
a  legal  system  of  'Estates.'  But,  as  the  idea  of 
Sovereignty  took  a  sharper  outline,  theorists  began 
to hold  that  in  the  legal  sphere  the Sovereign  was 
formally  omni~rent. Then  the  prevalent  opinion 
found  itself  once  more  compelled  to  declare  that 
in a  Monarchy both  the legislative and the executive 
acts  of  the  Monarch  are equipped  with  this  formal 
omnipotence.  On  the  other  hand,  the  doctrine  of 
Popular  Sovereignty  made  exactly  at  this  point  a 
fruitful  application  of  its  principle  of  a  Separation of 
Powers, since it would  allow  this  formal omnipotence 
only  to  acts  of  legislation.  When  this  point  of 
view  had  been  attained,  all  limitations  of  the  State 
Power began  to look  like  no  more  than  the  claims 
which  Righteousness makes  upon  a  Sovereign  Will. 
If  that  Will  knowingly  and  unambiguously  rejected 
such  claims, it none  the less  made a  law  which  was 
formally binding : a  law  which  was externally binding 
on individual men, and on the Courts also29a. 
None the less, there still was life in the notion that The State 
a duty of  the State which was deducible from Natural E:ural 
Law was  a  legal  duty.  Although there was no sharp  Law' 
severance of  Natural  Law from  Morality,  the  limits 
drawn round  the legitimate sphere of Supreme Power 
were  not  regarded  as merely ethical  precepts.  They 
were regarded and elaborated as rules which controlled 
external  action,  and  so were  contrasted with  purely 
ethical claims made upon  internal freedomzg3. No one 
doubted that the maxims of  Divine and Natural Law 
bore the character of true rules of true Law, even when 
they were not to be enforced by compulsory processes. 
No one doubted that a true and genuine Law existed 
which preceded the State and stood outside and above 
the  State.  No one  doubted  that  formal  Right  [or 
Law] might  be material Unright [or  Unlaw],  and that 
formal  Unright  might be material  Right"'.  No one 
doubted that the formally unconditional duty of obedi- 
ence  that  is  incumbent  on  subjects  was  materially 
limited  by  the  Law  of  God  and  Nature.  No one 
doubted that the words of  Holy Writ 'We must obey 
God rather than man ' contained a  rule of Law for all 
places  and  all  ages,  or that the  meanest  of  subjects 
would  be doing Right [Law]  if in conformity with the 
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Sovereign Power and steadfastly bore the consequence, 
or, again, that such  a sub-iect  if  he took  the opposite 
course would be doing not  Right [Law]  but  Unright 
[Unlaw]".  And we should go far wrong  if  we sup- 
posed  that the distinction  between  formal  Right [or 
Law]  and  material  Right  [or  Law],  a  distinction 
immanent  in  the idea of  a  Law  of  Nature,  was  but 
mere  inactive  theory.  To  say  nothing  of  indirect 
consequences, it  produced  a  direct result of  far-reach- 
ing  practical  importance.  All  tribunals,  all  officials 
charged  with  the application  of  law,  were  conceived 
to be in duty bound to bring the acts of the Sovereign 
into the closest  possible  conformity  with  the dictates 
of  material  Right  [or  substantial  Justice].  For  this 
purpose  they  were  to  employ that  exceedingly wide 
power  of  '  interpretation ' with  which  they were  sup- 
posed to be entrustedzg6. 
The State  During the Middle Age we can hardly detect even 
and 
Morality.  the beginnings  of  that opinion  which  would free the 
Sovereign (whenever he is acting in the interest of the 
public  weal)  from  the  bonds  of  the  Moral  Law  in 
general, and therefore from  the bonds  of  the  Law of 
Nature"'.  Therefore  when  Machiavelli  based  his 
lesson  for  Princes  upon  this  freedom  from  restraint, 
this  seemed  to the  men  of  his  time  an  unheard  of 
innovation and also a monstrous crime.  Thus was laid 
the foundation  for  a  purely  'political'  theory  of  the 
State, and thenceforward  this  theory  appeared  as a 
rival of the '  nature-rightly ' doctrine.  But just because 
there was a corrlpetitor  and assailant in  the field, this 
old doctrine evolved  itself  into an ampler form in the 
course of the next century.  More and more the germs 
which were present in the medieval lore unfolded them- 
selves, and new thoughts about the nature of  Human 
Society  were  brought  to light  as  the  old  elements 
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were  systematized  and  combined.  Irresistibly  and 
incessantly waxed the System of  Natural Law, intern- 
ally growing towards completion, externally extending 
the boundaries  of  its domination  over the minds  of 
men, plunging deeper into the positive doctrines of Law 
and Polity, subjecting them to its transmutative power. 
X.  The Beginnings  of the Modern  State. 
At all  these points the Doctrine  of  the Medieval tation  Transmu-  cf 
Publicists has shown us a double aspect.  Everywhere Medieval 
Doctrine 
beside  the formulation  of  thoughts that were properly byAntique 
influence.  medieval  we  have  detected  the genesis of  'antique- 
modern' ideas, the growth of  which coincides with the 
destruction of the social system of the Middle Age and 
with  the  construction  of  'nature-rightly'  theories  of 
the State.  It remains for  us to set forth by way  of 
summary this  tendency  of  medieval  doctrine to give 
birth to the modern idea of  the State and to transform 
the previously  accepted theory of  Communities.  We 
must attend separately to the more  important of those 
points at which this tendency exhibits itselP9'. 
The fundamental  fact  which  chiefly  concerns  us state and 
Individual 
when we contemplate this process of  evolution is that obliterate 
Inter- 
in  medieval  theory  itself  we  may  see a  drift which mediate 
makes  for  a  theoretical  concentration  of  right  and 
power  in  the highest  and widest  group  on  the  one 
hand and the individual  man on the other, at the cost 
of  all  intermediate groups.  The Sovereignty  of  the 
State  and  the  Sovereignty  of  the  Individual  were 
steadily on their way towards becoming the two central 
axioms  from  which  all  theories  of  social  structure 
would  proceed, and whose  relationship  to each other 
would be the focus of all theoretical controversy.  And 
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teristic of the '  nature-rightly '  doctrines of a later time : 
namely, a  combination of the Absolutism which is due 
to the renaissance of  the antique idea of  the State, 
with  the  modern  Individualism  which  unfolds  itself 
from out the Christiano-Germanic thought of  Liberty. 
origin of  As regards the question touching the Originaof  the 
the State in State-its  origin  in  time  and  its  origin  in  law-the 
Theory of  the Social  Contract slowly  grew.  It was 
generally  agreed  that  in  the beginning  there  was  a 
State of Nature.  At that time '  States ' were not, and 
pure  Natural  Law  prevailed,  by  virtue  whereof  all 
persons  were  free  and  equal  and all  goods  were  in 
common.  Thus it was  universally admitted  that the 
Politic or Civil State was the product of acts done at a 
later time,  and the only  moot  question  was  whether 
this  was a mere  consequence  of  the Fall of  Man, or 
whether the State would have come into being, though 
in some freer and purer form, if mankind had increased 
in  numbers while yet they were innocentzgB. By way 
of investigating the origin of  Political Society, men at 
first contented themselves with a general discussion of 
the manner in  which  dorninium  had made its appear- 
ance  in  the  world  and  the legitimacy  of  its  origin ; 
and  in  their  concept  of  dominiurn,  Rulership  and 
Ownership  were  blent.  Then,  when  the  question 
about  Ownership  had  been  severed  from  that  about 
Rulership, we may see coming to the front always more 
plainly the supposition of  the State's origin  in a Con- 
tract of  Subjection  made between  People and Ruler304 
Even the part:,ans  of  the Church adopt  this  opinion 
when they have surrendered the notior, that the State 
originated in mere wrong.  But then arose this further 
question :-How  did it happen  that  this  Community 
itself, whose Will, expressed in an act of  transfer, was 
the origin  of  the  State, came to  be  a  Single  Body 
competent  to  perform  a  legal  act  and  possessing  a 
transferable  power over its members?  At this  point 
the idea  of  a  Divine Creation  of  the State began to 
fail, for however certain men might be that the Will 
of  God was the ultimate cause of Politic Society, still 
this cause fell back  into the position of a causa remota 
working through human  agency3".  As a more proxi- 
mate  cause the  'politic  nature'  which  God  has  im- 
planted in mankind could be introduced ; and Aristotle 
might be vouched.  We can not  say that there were 
absolutely  no  representatives of  a  theory of  organic 
development,  which  would  teach  that the State had 
grown out of that aboriginal  Community, the Family, 
in a purely natural, direct and necessary fashiona0". Still 
the weightier opinion was that Nature (like God) had 
worked only as cazdsa  j~ernota  or causa  imjudsiva :  that 
is,  as the source  of  a  need  for  and  of  an  impulse 
towards  the social life, or, in short, as a  more or less 
compulsory  motive  for  the  foundation  of  the  State. 
More and more decisively was expressed the opinion 
that the very union  of  men in a political bond was an 
act of rational, human Willm3.  Occasionally there may 
appear  the notion  that the State was  an Institution 
which  was founded, as other human  institutions  [e.g. 
monasteries  or  colleges]  were  founded,  by  certain 
definite  Founders, either in  peaceful  wise or by some 
act of violence"""  but, in the main, there was a general 
inclination  towards  the  hypothesis  of  some  original, 
creative, act of  Will of  the whole uniting Community. 
This joint  act was compared to the self-constitution of 
a  corp~ration~~f  But  men  did not construct  for  this 
purpose  any legal  concept  that  was  specially adapted 
to the case.  The learning of Corporations  developed 
by the lawyers had  no such concept to offer, for  they 
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societas, [between  Corporation and Partnership,] con- 
fused  the  single  act  whereby  a  Community  unifies 
itself,  witn  a  mere  obligatory  contract  made  among 
individuals, and they regarded the peculiar unity of the 
Corporation as something that came to it from yithout 
by virtue of a concession made by the State.  Thus in 
the  end  the  Medieval  Doctrine  already  brings  the 
hypothetical  act of  political  union  under the category 
of  a  Contract  of  Partnership  or  'Social'  Contract". 
On the one hand,  therefore,  proclamation  was  made 
of the original  Sovereignty  of  the  Individual  as the 
source  of  all  political  obligation307.  In this  manner a 
base  was  won  for  the construction of  Natural Rights 
of Man, which, since they were  not  comprised  in  the 
Contract,  were  unaffected  by  it  and  could  not  be 
impaired  by the State.  On the other hand, since the 
Sovereignty  of  the  State,  when  once  it  was erected, 
rested on the indestructible  foundation of  a  Contract 
sanctioned  by the  Law  of  Nature,  conclusions  which 
reached  far in  the direction of  the State's Absolutism 
could be drawn by those who formulated the terms of 
the Contract308. 
The Final  If Philosophy was to find the terms of that fictitious 
Cause of 
the State.  Contract  which  provided  a  basis of  Natural  Law  for 
the State and  the State's  power, it could  not  but  be 
that  the  decisive  word  about  this  matter  would  be 
sought in  the purpose which  the State and its power 
are designed  to fulfil.  If, on  the one part, the idea 
was retained that every individual had a final cause of 
his own, which  mas  independent of  and stood  outside 
and above all  political  and communal lil'esW-and  here 
was a divergence from  Classical  Antiquity-so,  on the 
other  part,  the  final  cause  of  the State was  always 
being  enlarged-and  here  was a  departure from  the 
earlier  Middle Age, though at times we may still hear 
echoes of  the old  Germanic idea that the State's one 
function is the maintenance of peace and law"'".  In  imita- 
tion of classical thought, men defined the State's purpose 
to be a happy and virtuous life : the realization  of  the 
public weal and civic morality.  True, that, according to 
the prevailing doctrine, the function of the State had a 
limit, and a  necessary complement, in  the function  of 
the Church: a function making for a  higher aim  than 
that of the State, namely, for inward virtue and supra- 
mundane blisss".  But  an always stronger assault  was 
being  made upon  the Church's  monopoly  of  culture. 
An  independent  spiritual  and  moral  mission  was 
claimed  for  the  State",  until  at  length  there were 
some who would  ascribe to the State the care for all 
the interests of the Community, whether those interests 
were material or whether they were spiritua1313. 
If, however, the contents of  the  Institutes  of  Na- Natural 
Rights and  tural  Law  were  to be  discovered  by a  consideration the Final 
of  their  final  cause,  this  same final  cause would  also Cause of  the State. 
be the measure of  those indestructible rights that per- 
tained  to the '  Subjects ' of  Natural  Law.  From the 
final  cause  of  the  Individual  flow  the innate and  in- 
alienable  rights of  liberty, and so from the final cause 
of  the Politic  Community  flow-and  from  of  old  the 
Church  might  here  serve  as  a  model-the  State's 
innate and inalienable rights of  superiority.  From the 
rights thus bestowed  Positive  Law could take, and to 
them it could  add, nothing.  If, as a  matter of  fact, it 
contravenes them, it must admit itself over-ruled.  The 
maxim  SaGus jubZica su$rema  Zex  entered on its reign, 
and a  good legal title had been found on which Revo- 
lution,  whether  it came  from  above  or  from  below, 
could  support itself  when  it endeavoured to bring the 
traditional  law  into conformity with  the postulates  of 
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In truth  Medieval  Doctrine prepared  the way  for 
the great revolutions in  Church and State, and this it 
did  by attributing  a  real  working  validity as rules  of 
Natural  Law to a system  constructed of abstract pre- 
misses  and planned  in  accordance  with the di~tates  of 
expediency.  The whole internal structure of the State 
was  subjected  ever more  and more  to criticism  pro- 
ceeding  from  the  Rationalist's  stand-point.  The 
value  of  the structure  was  tested  by reference  to its 
power of accomplishing a purpose and was measured by 
reference to an ideal  and '  nature-rightly ' State.  The 
steering of public affairs was likened to the steering of 
a ship ;  it is a free activity consciously directed towards 
the attainment of a goal"'".  Thus there arose the idea 
of  an  Art of  Government, and people  undertook  to 
teach it  in  detaila5.  There was disputation about the 
best  form of  government and the most  suitable laws, 
and out of this grew a demand for such a transformation 
of  Public Law as would bring it into accord with theo- 
retical  principles.  Through  the last  centuries  of  the 
Middle  Age,  alike  in  Church  and  Empire, unbroken 
and always louder, rings the cry for ' Reformation '  ! 
Turning now to the fundamental concepts of  Public 
Law, the resuscitation and further development of  the 
classical idea of  Sovereignty will  appear to us as the 
main  exploit achieved in this department by the pre- 
valent endeavour to construct constitutions which shall 
conform to Natural Law.  Men  found  the essence of 
all political  organization  in  a separation of  Rulers and 
Ruled.  Also  +4ey  took  over from  the antique  world 
the doctrine of  the Forms of  Governrr'ent  and of  the 
distinctions  that  exist  between  them.  And  so they 
came to the opinion that in every State some one visible 
Ruler, a man or a  ruling assembly, is the 'Subject' of 
a Sovereign Power over the Ruled":  And then, when, 
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in contrast to the theory of  '  Ruler's Sovereignty,' men 
developed the theory of a Popular Sovereignty, existing 
everywhere  and always, the partizans of this doctrine 
did not once more call  in question the newly acquired 
idea of Sovereignty, but transferred  it to an Assembly 
which  represents the Peoplen7.  The Medieval  notion 
of  Sovereignty, it is true, always differed  in principle 
from that exalted notion which prevailed in after times. 
For one thing,  there was  unanimous  agreement that 
the Sovereign Power, though raised above all Positive, 
is  limited  by  Natural  Law3''.  Secondly,  it  was  as 
unanimously agreed  that the idea of  the Sovereign by 
no means excludes an independent legal claim of  non- 
sovereign  subjects to participate in  the power  of  the 
State.  On the contrary, advocates of  '  Ruler's  Sove- 
reignty'  expressly maintained  a  political  right  of  the 
People,  and  advocates  of  the  People's  Sovereignty 
expressly maintained  a  political  right of  the Ruler, so 
that  even  the  extremest  theories  gave to the  State 
somewhat  of  a '  constitutional ' character.  Therefore 
it was thought possible  to combine the Sovereignty of 
the  Monarch  with  what  was  in  principle  a  Limited 
Monarchyas.  Therefore  also  the  idea  of  a  Mixed 
Constitution could  be developed  without  facing awk- 
ward questions""0  Therefore again the beginnings of a 
doctrine which teaches the Separation of  Powers could 
be reared  on a  basis  of  Popular Sovereignty"'.  And 
therefore  also  the  Representative  System  could  be 
theoretically elaborated3".  None the less, the idea  of 
Sovereignty,  when  once it had  been  formulated,  irre- 
sistibly pressed  forwards towards  the conclusion  that 
in the last resort some one Ruler  or some one Assem- 
bly must be the ' Subject ' of  the Supreme Power, and 
that in case of conflict the State is incorporate only in 
this one man or this one Assembly. 94  Political  Theoyies of the Middle  Age. 
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Stateand  The State Power, thus fccussed  at a  single point, 
Individual 
in im-  made, ot.er all members of  the State, ever fresh claims 
mediate  contact.  to all  such  rights  of  Superiority  as were  comprised 
within  the idea and measure of the State's final cause 
and were  compatible with  those  rights  of  L4berty of 
which  the  Individual  could  not  be  depriveds3.  And 
just  because the rights of  Superiority flowed from the 
very idea of  State Power, that Power, with increasing 
insistance, claimed to exercise them over all individuals 
equally and with equal directness and immediacys".  If 
then, on the one hand, the Individual just in so far as 
he  belongs  to  the  Community  is  fully  and  wholly 
absorbed  into the State3", so, on the other hand, there 
is a strong tendency to emancipate the Individual from 
all bonds that are not of the State's making.  - 
Thestate  There was,  moreover,  a  steady  advance  of  the 
an exclu- 
sivegroup. notion  that the State is an exclusive Community.  In 
-. 
phrases which tell of the Antique World men spoke of 
the State simply as '  Human Society.'  The State is 
the all-comprehensive, and therefore the one and only, 
expression of that common life which stands above the 
life of the individual. 
State and  This thought, it is true, came at once into conflict 
Church. 
with  the  ascription  of  a  higher,  or  even  an  equal, 
right to the Church.  And it  was  only with  a  great 
saving-clause  for  the  rights  of  the  Church  that  the 
prevalent  doctrine  of  the  Middle  Age  received  the 
antique idea of  the State.  Still in the fourteenth and 
fifteenth  centuries  theory  was preparing  the way  for 
the subsequeilt  absorption  of  Church in  State.  One 
medieval  publicist  there was  who  dared  to project  a 
system, logically  elaborated  even into details, wherein 
the church was  a  State Institution,  Church  property 
was  State  property,  spiritual  offices  were  offices  of 
State, the government of the Church was  part of the 
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government  of  the  State, and  the sovereign  Eccle- 
siastical  Community was  identical with  the Political 
Assembly  of  the  Citizens.  He was  Marsilius  of 
PaduaS*.  No one followed him the whole way.  How- 
beit, isolated  consequences of  the same principle were 
drawn  even  in  the  Middle Age by  other opponents 
of  the  Hierarchy.  Already  an  unlimited  power  of 
suppressing abuses of  ecclesiastical office  was  claimed 
for  the  State3*.  Already,  with  more  or  less  dis- 
tinctness,  Church property was treated  as public pro- 
perty and placed,  should the salus publics  require  it, 
at  the  disposal  of  the  State".  Already  powers  of 
the State which  reach  far down even into the internal 
affairs  of  the  Church  were  being  deduced  from  the 
demand  that in  temporal matters the Church  should 
be subject to the temporal  Magistrate3".  Already the 
classical sentence which  told  how  the ius sacrum was 
a  part of  the ius publicztm  was once more beginning 
to reveal its original meanings3". 
If, however, we leave out of sight the State's rela- state and 
Empire. 
tion  to  the  Church,  we  see  that,  when  Medieval 
Doctrine first takes shape, the idea of the State, which 
had  been  derived from  the Antique  World,  was  en- 
feebled  and well-nigh  suffocated  by the consequences 
that were flowing from the medieval idea of the Empire : 
an idea  which  itself  was  being formulated by theory. 
The  thought of a concentration at a single point of the 
whole life of the Community not  only stood  in  sharp 
contradiction to actual facts and popular opinions, but 
also  was  opposed  in  theory  to what  might  seem  an 
insurmountable  bulwark,  namely  to  the  medieval 
thought of an harmoniously articulated Universal Com- 
munity whose structure from  top to bottom was of the 
federalistic kind"'.  Nevertheless that antique concept 
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and  workel  unceasingly  and  with  deadly  certainty 
until it :lad  completely shattered this  proud  edifice of 
thought.  We  may see theory trying to hold 
fast  the mere  shadow of  this stately idea, even when 
what should  have corresponded to it in  the world  of 
fact,  the  Medieval  Empire,  had  long  lain  in  ruins. 
And so also  we may see in  theory the new edifice of 
the Modern State being roofed  and tiled when in the 
world  of  fact  just  the  first  courses  of  this  new 
edifice are beginning to arise amidst the ruins of  the 
old. 
Definition  When Aristotle's Politzcs had begun their new life, 
of  the 
State.  the  current  definition  taught  that  the  State  is  the 
highest  and completest  of  Communities and a  Com- 
munity  that is self-sufficing3".  It is  evident that, so 
soon as men  are taking this definition in earnest, only 
some one among the various subordinated and super- 
ordinated  Communities can be regarded as being the 
State.  For a while this logical  consequence might be 
evaded  by  a  grossly  illogical  device.  The IT~XLS  or 
civitas that the ancients had defined was discovered by 
medieval Philosophy in a medieval town, and, by virtue 
of the  ideal  of  the  organic  structure  of  the  whole 
Human  Race,  the community  of  this  IT~XLS  or civitas 
was  subordinated to a  regnzm  and to the imjeriz~m: 
that  is, to higher  and wider  communities in  which  it 
found  its  completion  and  its  limitations.  Thus,  no 
sooner has  the medieval  thinker given his  definition, 
than  he is  withdrawing it without the slightest embar- 
rassment :  hi^  superlative becomes a comparative, and 
the absolute attribute  becomes  Then,  on 
the  other  hand,  the lawyers,  with  the  Corpus  iaris 
before them, explained that the Empire is the one true 
State3"; but they defined ci71itas andpopudus and even 
regnum  in  such a  manner  that these  terms  could  be 
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applied to provinces and to rural or urban communes3s6; 
and then, as a matter of fact, they went on applying- the 
concept of ' The  State ' to communities that were much 
smaller  than  the  Empire"!  Still  the  antique  idea, 
when  once  it had  been  grasped, was sure to triumph 
over this confused thinking.  Indeed we may see that 
the Philosophic Theory of the State often sets to work 
with  the assumption that there cannot  be two States 
one above the other, and that above the State there is 
no  room  for  a  World-State,  while  below  the  State 
there  is  only  room  for  mere  communes".  Then in 
Jurisprudence,  from  the  days  of  Bartolus  onwards, 
an ever sharper distinction  was being drawn between 
comnlunities which  had  and those  which  had  not  an 
external Szgevior, and con~munities  of  the latter kind 
were  being  placed  on  a  level  with  the Imjerizm3". 
The differences between  civitas, Yegnum and imperium 
became mere differences in  size instead of being joints 
in the organic articulation  of  a  single body, and at the 
same time  the concept  of  the State became  the  ex- 
clusive  property of  a  comnlunity  which  recognizes no 
external  superior  (universitas  sajeviorem  non  recog- 
nosceszs)  339. 
Thus already in  the Middle Age the idea of  the  The State 
and other 
State arrived  at theoretical  completion, and the attri- ~o,,,ni 
bute of  External Sovereignty became the distinguish- ti". 
ing mark of  the State.  The  Imperium Mundi, which 
rose above the Sovereign States, had evaporated into 
an unsubstantial shadow, and at any rate was stripped 
of  the character of a  State, even when  its bare exist- 
ence  was  not  denied.  For States within  the  State 
there  was  thenceforth  no  room,  and  all  the  smaller 
groups had to be brought under the rubric '  Communes 
and Corporations'". 
From the concentration of  '  State Life ' at a single 
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precarious point  there by no means follows as logically necessary 
position  Communi-  of a similsr concentration of  all '  Community Life.'  The 
ties within medieval idea of  the organic articulation  of  Mankind 
the State. 
might  live  on,  though  but  in  miniature,  within  each 
separate  State.  It  might  become  the  idea  of  the 
organic  articulation  of  the  Nation.  And  up  to  a 
certain degree this actually happened.  The Romano- 
Canonical  Theory of  Corporations, although it decom- 
posed  and radically transmuted  the German notion of 
the  autonomous life  of  communities  and  fellowships, 
always insured to the non-sovereign community a cer- 
tain  independent life  of  its own,  a  sphere of  rights 
within  the  domain  of  Public  Law,  a  sphere  that 
belonged to it merely because it was a community, and 
lastly, an organic interposition  between the Individual 
and  the  Community  of  All.  Even  among  political 
theorists there were not wanting some who in the last 
centuries  of  the  Middle  Age-centuries  brimful  of 
vigorous corporate life-sought  to oppose to that cen- 
tralization which had triumphed in the Church and was 
threatening the State, a scientific statement of the idea 
of  corporative  articulation  and  a  logically  deduced 
justification of the claims that could be made on behalf 
of  the smaller  groups  as  beings  with  rights  of  their 
own and an intrinsic valuem. 
Centraliza-  For all  this, however, even  in the Middle Age the 
tion of 
commu~~al  drift of  Theory set incessantly  towards  an  exaltation 
life.  of the Sovereignty  of  the State which  ended  in  the 
exclusive representation by the State  of all the common 
interests an2 common life of  the Community.  In this 
direction  Philosophy  with  giant  strides  was  outstrip- 
ping Jurisprudence. 
Philo- 
sophic  For those  rights of  Lordship of  Germanic origin 
2;;;gd  which  subsisted  within  the  State  and  beneath  the 
Lordship.  Sovereign's  Power, Jurisprudence might long provide 
a secure place.  It had accepted the iusfeudomm,  and 
was prepared to treat offices as objects of proprietary 
rights.  But Political and Philosophical Theories could 
find no  room  whatever  in  their  abstract systems  for 
feudal and patrimonial powerssa.  On the contrary, this 
was just  the point  whence spread the thought that all 
subordinate public power  is a  mere delegation of  the 
Sovereign  P~wer''~. Also  this  was  just  the  point 
whence  spread  a  process  which  transmuted  the me- 
dieval concept of  Office, in such wise that every office 
appeared merely as a  commission  to use the Power of 
the State : to use, that is, in a certain manner, a power 
which is in substance one and untransferable.  When 
that process  is completed, every officer appears as the 
freely chosen instrument of the Sovereign 
A similar attitude was taken by the abstract theories philo- 
sophic  of  Politics and Philosophy in relation to those indepen- theory and 
dent Rights of  Fellowships which  had their source in 
the Rights 
of Fellow- 
Germanic Law.  For a  long time  Jurisprudence  was ships. 
prepared  to  give  them  a  home;  but  Philosophical 
Theory looked askance at them.  The Doctrine of the 
State that  was  reared  upon  a  classical  ground-work 
had  nothing to say  of  groups that  mediated  between 
the  State  and  the  Individual.  This  being  so,  the 
domain of Natural Law was closed to the Corporation, 
and its very existence was based upon the ground of  a 
Positive Law which  the State had made and might at 
any time alter.  And then as the sphere of the State's 
Might on the one hand, and the sphere of  the  Indivi- 
dual's  Liberty on the other, became the exclusive and 
all-sufficing  starting-points for  a  Philosophy  of  Law, 
the end was that the Corporation could find a place in 
Public  Law only as a part of  the State and a place in 
Private  Law only as an artificial  Individual, while  all 
in  actual  life  that  might  seem  to conflict  with  this 
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doctrine  was  regarded  as the  outcome  of  privileges 
which the State had bestowed and in the interest of the 
public  might at any time revoke.  While the Middle 
Age endured, it was but rarely that the consequences 
of  these  opinions were  expressly drawns".  Howbeit, 
Philosophic Doctrine was on the one hand filling itself 
full of the antique idea of  the State, and on the other 
hand  it  was  saving  therefrom  and  developing  the  , 
Christiano-Germanic idea of  Freedom  and depositing 
this in the theory of  Natural Law.  And as this work 
proceeded towards the attainment of ever more distinct 
results, the keener were the weapons which Medieval 
Doctrine was  forging for  that combat  which  fills  the 
subsequent centuries.  A  combat  it was  in  which the 
Sovereign  State and  the  Sovereign  Individual  con- 
tended over the delimitation of the provinces assigned 
to them  by Natural  Law, and in  the course  of  that 
struggle  all  intermediate groups  were  first  degraded 
into  the  position  of  the  more  or  less  arbitrarily 
fashioned creatures of  mere Positive  Law, and in the 
end were obliterated. 
NOTES. 
I.  Too little attention has hitherto been  paid  to the influence Import- 
on political  theory  of  the work  done by  the Legists and Canonists. ;'':"'"' 
Really  it is  from their great commentaries that the purely political 
writers  borrow  their  whole  equipment  of  legal  ideas.  Thus  it  is 
characteristic that nothing is said of  Bartolus  and much is made of 
Ubertus de Lampugnano and his lecture on the Empire delivered  at 
Prague in 1380 (Zeitschr. j  gesch.  Rechtswis.  11. pp. 246-256).  But 
this is a reproduction almost verbatim of Bartolus's  Commentary on 
1.  24 Dig, de capt. 49,  15.  Only a few  ornaments have been added, 
such as the jest about the Greek Emperor being still an Emperor at 
least in that sort in which the king on the chess-board is a king. 
2.  This sequence of  ideas may  best  be seen in  Dante's  work, Macro- 
m~here  it serves as a foundation for his Theory of  the State.  Comp. :;zzd 
e.g. Monarchia, I.  c.  7 (also c.  6) on the correspondence between the cosm. 
universitas humann with, on the one hand, the World-Whole, and, on 
the  other  hand,  those  smaller  communities whose  tokm this  uni- 
versitas is.  But Dante takes the core of  this thought from Aquinas : 
see especially Summa contra gentiles  III. q. 76-83,  and De regimine 
principum  I.  c.  12.  And long before  this  we  meet  the same ideas 
similarly formulated;  in particular the parallelism of  macrocosm and 
microcosm:  thus  in  Joh.  Saresb.  Polycr.  (see  below  Note  10) and 
Hugo  Floriac.  De  regia  et  sacerdot.  pot.  I.  c.  I.  Then  compare 
Alvar.  Pelag.  De planctu eccl. 1.a 37 R, and Somn. Virid. I. c. 37-48. 
The last splendid example of  the development  of  this fundamental 
thought is the 'Catholic Concordance' of  Nicolas Cusanus; especially 
I.  C.  1-4. 
3.  The  application  to the  Order  of  Human  Society  of  pro- Unity as 
positions  derived  from  Augustine  and  teaching  the  principle  of source and 
goal.  'Unity  before  Plurality'  is effected  by  -4quinas  in particular.  He 
enlploys  the maxim  Onznis muZiitudo derivatur ab uno, and sees the 102  PoZiticnZ  Theovies of  the Middle  Age. 
prototypes  of  the  State  in  the World  with  its  One  God,  in the 
Microcosm  of  Man  with  its  single soul,  in  the unifying  principle 
which prevails among the powers of the soul, and which  reva ails also 
in the natural body and in the animal kingdom.  See De reg. princ. 
I.  c.  2, 3, 12;  also Summa contra gentil. III. q. 81.  But the kernel 
of  this mode of thought is older;  e.g.  Hugo Floriac. I.  c.  I brings in 
a  with  the unity of  the World-Whole  and with  that of 
the human  body.  Similar thoughts  are developed  by  Aegid. Rom. 
De regiin. princ.  111.  2,  c. 3 : since all  mzrltitudo a6 uno procert'if,  it 
must  in unum  aliyuod redun':  since among the heavenly bodies we 
see the rule of  the primzlnz mobile,  in the body the rule of  the heart, 
in a  compound  body the rule  of  one element, among bees  the rule 
of  a  queen, so the State  needs  a  single government.  With higher 
genius,  Dante,  Mon.  I.  c.  5-16,  bases  the demand  for  a  unum 
regens in every Whole on the types of an orn'inatio ad  unum, found in 
the World-Whole (c.  7), among the heavenly bodies (c. g), and every- 
where  on earth.  Similar thoughts in Alv.  Pel. I.  a. 40;  Joh.  Paris. 
c.  I; Anton. Ros.  11.  c.  5-7  ;  Laelius  (in  Goldast  11.  p.  1595 ff.); 
Petrus de Andlo I.  c. 8.  Then a  mystical  development is given to 
the idea  by  Nicolas  Cusanus,  who  finds an  image  of  the  Trinity 
throughout the  Unity  of  the articulated  world : thus  God,  Angels, 
Men in the Church Triumphant ;  Sacrament, Priesthood, Folk in the 
Church Militant;  Spirit, Soul, Body in Man.  See Conc. Cath.;  and 
also  De auctor.  praes.  in  Diix,  I.  p.  475 ff. 
Partial  4.  See Tliom. Aq.  Comm. ad Ethic. lect. I (Op. ed. Parm.  XXI. 
p.  2) : hoc  totum, quod  est  civilis multitudo  vel  domestics familia, 
habet  solam  unitatem  ordinis,  secundum  quam  non  est  aliquid 
simpliciter unum;  et ideo pars eius totius potest  habere operationem 
quae non  est operatio  totius ;...habet  nihilominus  et ipsum  totum 
aliquam operationem, quae non est propria alicuius partium.  De reg. 
princ.  I.  c.  I :  since  the  Many  bound  together  'secundum  propria 
quidem differunt, secundum autem commune uniuntur,' there must be 
'moventia  ad proprium bonu~n  unius cuiusque,' as well as a  'movens 
ad bonum commune multorum.' 
The  5.  In high  terms  Dante, c.  15, lauds the Principle of  Unity as 
Praises  the source of all good, for the maxime ens must be the maxime unum,  of  Unity. 
and the mxime unum must be the maxime Eanum.  Similarly Thom. 
Aq. De reg.  princ.  r.  c.  3 ;  comp.  Summa  contra gentil.  IV.  c.  I & 
Nay, '  binarius  numerus  infamis.'  Papal theory  accuses  its  oppo- 
nents  of  heresy,  since  they  'ponunt  dua  principia.'  See  e.g. 
Boniface  VIII. in  the  bull  Unam  sanctam  of  1302  (c.  I  Extrav. 
comm.  I.  8), and the letter in Raynald. Ann.  1302 nr.  12;  also \,hat 
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is  said  by  the Clerk  in  Quaestio in  utramque part.  p.  105 ;  Joh. 
Andr. upon c.  13, X. 4, 17 ;  Panorm. upon c. 13, X.  2, I. 
6.  Dante,  I.  c.  3  and 4,  endeavours  to  define  the  common The 
purpose  of  Mankind.  He finds it in the continuous activity of  the g:~:::~:~ 
whole  potency of Reason, primarily  the speculative, secondarily  the hlankind. 
practical.  This is the '  operatio propria universitatis  humanae ';  the 
individual man, the household,  the civitas and the regnum partinrlare 
are insufficient for it.  For the achievement of  it only a World-Realm 
will serve, and the ~ropintpuissimzlm  medium  is  the establishment  of 
an Universal Peace.  Comp. III. c.  16. 
7.  Already in 829 the episcopal utterances  about  Church and The 
Universal 
State at the Councils  of  Worms  and Paris, afterwards  appended to church 
the  Capitulary  of  Worms,  begin  with  the  ~rinciple  (grounded  on and the 
Common- 
words  of  S.  Paul)  'universalis  sancta  ecclesia  Dei  ununc  co@zls ,,lth  of 
rnanifeste  esse  credatur  eiusque  caput  Christus.'  On this  follows Mankind. 
the doctrine, warranted by Gelasius and Fulgentius, that '  principaliter 
itaque totius sanctae Dei  ecclesiae  corpus in duas eximias personas, 
in sacerdotalem  videlicet  et regalem ...  divisum  esse  novimus';  and 
lastly  the professional duties  of  the priesthood on the one hand and 
the kingship  on the  other are particularized.  See Concil. Paris. in 
Mansi XIV.  p.  605 8.;  Const. Worm. in  Mon.  Germ.  Leg.  I.  p.  333, 
c  2-3,  p. 333 ff.,  p.  346 ff.;  also Hefele Conciliengesch.  IV. p.  57 ff. 
and 72  ff.  To the like  effect  Jonas  of  Orle'ans (ob. 843), De insti- 
tutione regia, in d'AchCry,  Spicileg., ed. nov.  Paris  1723,  I.  p.  324. 
Similar thoughts from  Agobard  of  Lyons (ob. 842) and Hinkmar of 
Reims  (ob. 882).  After  this  the picture  of  Mankind  as one body 
with  a  God-willed  spiritual  and temporal  constitution  is  common. 
Thus in Gregor. VII.,  e.g.  lib. I.  ep. 19, ann. 1073;  Ivo of  Chartres, 
e.g. ep. 106, p. 125, ep. 214, p.  217 ff.;  S. Bernard, ep. 244 ad Conr. 
Reg.  ann.  I 146, p.  440  ff.  (also  in  Goldast  11.  67-68)  ; Gerhoh 
of  Reichersberg,  De corrupt0 statu  eccl.,  praef.  p.  11 ;  Thomas  of 
Canterbury, ep.  179, p.  652 ;  Hugo Floriac.  I.  c.  I  and 11.  pp. 46, 
50; Innocent III., e.g.  Registr.  sup.  neg.  Rom.  Imp. ep.  2,  18 and 
79,  pp.  997,  1012,  1162.  Throughout  Aquinas:  see  e.g.  Summa 
Theol. 11.  I, q. 81, a.  I  (multi homines  ex  Adam  derivati  sunt  tan- 
quam multa membra unius corporis) and  111. q.  8, a.  I  and 2 (genus 
humanum consideratur quasi unum  corpus, quod vocatur mysticum, 
cuius  caput est  ipse  Christus et quantum ad animas et  quantum  ad 
corpora);  Lect. z ad Rom.  12 ;  Lect. 3 ad I  Corinth.  12.  See also 
Vincent. Bellov. Spec. doctr. lib. VII.  C.  31 (duo latera corporis unius). 
On Innumerable  occasions  Theologians  and Canonists employ  the 










temporal constitution: e.g.  August. Triumph. I.  q. I, a. 6; Joh. Andr. 
upon c.  13, X.  4,  17 ;  Panorm.  upon c.  13, X.  2,  I.  On the other 
hand, Engelbert  of  Volkersdorf, De ortu et fine c.  15, I7 and 18, is 
the first expressly  to argue  that  Mankind  is  one people with  only 
one true  law  and  one  true  consensus,  and  must therefore  be  one 
true re~ftblica. Then to the like  effect Dante,  Mon.  I.  c.  3, 5-9. 
Lupold. Bebenb.,  c.  15.  Petrarca, Ep. VII.  and VIII.  Alvar. Pelag. I. 
a. 13 F,  a.  37  Q  and R, a. 40 and 45  (nnum  corpus mysticum, una 
cornmunitas  et  unus  populus,  una  civilitas  et  politia  Christiana). 
Quaestio in utramque partem, p.  102  ff.  Ockham, Octo qu. 111.  c.  I 
(totum genus humanum est  unus populus;  universitas  mortalium est 
una com~nunitas  volentium  habere  communionem  ad invicem)  and 
c. g; also Dial. III.  tr.  2,  1.  I, c. I  (univ.  mortalium,  unus populus, 
unus grex, unum corpus, una civitas, unum collegium, unum regnum; 
connexio  inter  omnes  mortales);  ibid.  1.  3, c.  17  and  22.  Somn. 
Virid. 11.  c.  305-312  ;  Nic.  CUS.  Conc. Cath. III.  c.  I and 41. 
8.  As  is  shewn  by all  the passages  cited  in  our last  note, the 
whole  Middle  Age  is  filled  by  the  thought  which  finds  a  typical 
expression  in the Summa mag.  Stephani Tornacensis (I  I 65-1  17 7) 
praef. : in eadem civitate sub uno rege duo populi sunt, et secundum 
duos populos  duae vitae, duo principatus,  duplex  iurisdictionis ordo 
procedit : the civitas is  the  ecclesia, the king is  Christ, the two folks 
are  the  clergy and the laity, the two lives are the  spiritual and the 
temporal,  the  two princ$afus  are  sacerdotium et  regaum,  the  two 
spheres of  law the divinum et humanum.  References  to the spiritual 
and bodily sides of  humanity become  common, and the purposes of 
the two Orders are found respectively in  this world and  the next.- 
Occasionally Science, the studium, is introduced  as a third and inde- 
pendent  province  of  life.  See  Ptolom. Luc. De reg. princ. 11.  c. 16 
in fine : in qualibet monarchia ab initio saeculi tria se invicem comi- 
tata sunt : divinus cultus, sapientia scholastics et  saecularis potestas. 
Jordan.  Osnabr. c.  5, p. 71 : the  Romans received  the sacerdotium, 
the  Germans  the  imperium, the  French  the studiunc;  these  are  the 
three courses in the edifice of  the Catholic Church ;  the sacerdotium 
at Rome is the foundation, the stud~um  at Paris the roof, the imperium 
at Aachen, AiLes, Milan and Rome the four walls. 
9.  When  Boniface  VIII. [in  the famrus bull  Unam Sanctanl] 
put  the sum  and substance  of  the ecclesiastical  claims into a com- 
pendious  form  (c.  I, Extrav.  com.  I.  8), he placed  in the forefront 
an  emphatic  statement  of  the  principle  of  Unity.  But  the  same 
principle had long been the base of  the assertions of  the popes  and 
their partizans.  The argument that could be drawn from the superior 
worth of  Spiritual Power could become a proof  of  the subjection of 
Temporal Power only by virtue of the self-evident proposition that an 
ordinatio ad  unum,  in  the sense  that  we  have  explained  above,  is 
requisite  for  all  mankind.  The consequences deduced from a com- 
parison of the two Powers to body and soul, or sun and moon, would 
have lacked cogency, had any doubt been felt touching the validity of 
a comparison  of  the whole body of  mankind  to a single organism or 
to a celestial vault enlightened by  a single luminary.  Also the argu- 
ment which speaks of  the two swords is only cogent if  we  may take 
for granted that God has destined both  swords  for  the protection  of 
a one and only Church.  And so it is with  other arguments.  Then 
from  the  fourteenth  century  onwards  appeals  to  the  argumenturn 
unitatis,  coupled  with  references  to  the  decretal  of  Boniface,  are 
freely made by the ecclesiastical party.  We  even  see the downright 
statement that,  since it  would  be  heretical  to derive  the  universe 
from  two  principles,  so  also  it must  be  heretical  to  suppose  two 
co-equal  Vicars  on earth  (ponere  duos vicarios  aequales  in  terris). 
See e.g. John  Andr.  upon  c.  13,  X.  4,  I 7 ; Panorm.  upon  c. 13, 
X.  2,  1 ;  August.  Triumph.  I.  q.  I, a.  6  and q.  22, a.  3  (the tota 
machina  mundialis is  single, therefore  there  can be but  one princi- 
patus).  Petrus  de Andlo  11.  c.  9.  See also  the arguments  drawn 
from the unitasprinctpii by the Clerk in Somn. Virid. I.  c. 37, 43,45, 
47,  IOI ;  also  the  arguments  for  and against  unity  in  Quaest.  in 
utramque  partem,  p.  102  K;  in Ockham,  Octo  qu.  I.  c.  I, 5, 18; 
111.  c.  I  and g,  also  c.  8 ;  Dial.  111.  tr.  I,  1.  2,  c.  I  and  30 ;  and 
Anton.  Rosell. I.  c.  3, 4,  19, 39-55. 
10.  This absorption of the State by the Church is already clearly Absorp- 
proclaimed,  so far  as  concerns its  first  principle,  by  Gregory  VII. gy,"t,"t 
Nothing  less  than  this  lies  in  the  extension that  he  gives to the Church 
'potestas  ligandi  in coelo et in terra' committed to S.  Peter, and to 
the 'Pasce oves meas.'  He  asks (Registrum, lib. 4, ep. 2,  ann. 1076, 
p. 242-243)  : '  Quod si sancta sedes apostoiica divinitus sibi coliata 
$rinc@ali potestate spiritualia decernens diiudicat, cur non  et  saecu- 
laria?'  And  again  (lib.  8, ep.  21,  ann.  1080,  p.  279): '  Cui  ergo 
aperiendi claudendique coeli data potestas est, de terra iudicare non 
licet?'  And  again  (lib.  4,  ep.  24,  ann.  1077,  p.  455) : 'Si  enim 
coelestia  et spiritualia sedes b.  Petri solvit  et  iudicat, cluanto magis 
terrena et saecularia.'  Compare also lib. 4, ep. 23, p.  279, and lib. I, 
ep.  63, p.  82,  and  the  statement  of  papal  rights  in  the  Dictatus 
papae  11.  55",  p.  174-6.-But  the  system  is  for  the  first  time 
scientifically developed by John of  Salisbury.  For him the respublica 








ty of the 
Pope. 
Nature  and the microcosm  of  man; in it the Priesthood, being the 
soul, rules the rest and has even to govern, erect, depose the Head ; 
Polycrat.  IV.  c.  1-4  and 6,  V.  c.  2-6,  VI.  c.  21.  Similarly Thomas 
of  Canterbury,  ep.  179 ad Henr. 11.  Reg.  Angl., p.  652 :  'Ecclesia 
enim Dei in duobus constat ordinibus, clero et populo; ...  in  populo 
sunt reges, principes, duces, comites et aliae potestates, qui saecularia 
habent  tractare  negotia,  ut  totum  reducant  ad  pacem  et unitatem 
Ecclesiae.'  See also  Ivo of  Chartres, ep. 106, p.  125 ;  S.  Bernard, 
ep. 256, and De consid. lib. 4,  c.  3; S.  Anselm.  Cantuar.  Comm. in 
Rlatth. c.  26.  Then  Innocent  111.  gave  this  doctrine  the juristic 
shape in which it passed into the Canon Law.  See especially c. 34, 
X.  1,6; c.6,X.1,33;  c.13,X.2,1;  c.  13,X,4,17; alsolib.2, 
ep.  202,  ann.  1199,  in  Migne,  vol.  214,  p.  759 : Petro non  solum 
universalem  ecclesiarn, sed totum  reliquit  saeculum  gubernandum. 
Innocent  IV.  expressed  the  same  thought  in  a  yet  sharper  form. 
See the letter to Frederick 11. in v. Wessenberg, Die grossen Kirchen- 
versammlungen,  vol.  I.  (2  ed.  IConstanz,  1845),  p.  305-6.  Also 
Comm. on c.  13, X. 4, 17  In principle  Thom. Aquinas  stands on 
the same ground.  See De reg.  princ.  I.  c 14-15  ;  Summa Theol. 
11.  2,  q. 60,  a. 6, ad.  3 ;  Opusc, contra errores  Graecorum, libell. 11. 
c.  32-38  (the  Pope  head  of  the  respudlica  Christi).  Yet more 
strongly,  Aegidius  Romanus,  De pot.  eccl.  I.  c.  2-9,  11.  c.  4-5, 
10-11,  111.  c.  12.  When  Boniface VIII. has given to this doctrine 
a final form [Unam  sanctam, c.  I, Extrav.  com.  I.  81 it  is  widely 
spread abroad by the  canonists.  See in particular Aug.  Triumph. I. 
q. I, a.  6  (the  tcclesia  is  identical with  the cornmunitas totius orbis, 
which comprehends both the corporak et spirifuale) and a.  C.  Alvar. 
Pelag. I.  a.  13 and 37 :  the Church  has  the  spiritual  and temporal 
power.  Also a. 40 :  she is the truepolitia, of which the State is only  - 
part;  both powers are 'partes integrales unius potestatis';  they have 
the same jnis supranaturalis, since the temporal  is  but  a  mean  of 
the spiritual.  Also a. 59 D:  '  partes distinctae unius potestatis.' 
11.  See  especially  Thom.  Aquin.  Summa  contra  gentil.  IV. 
c. 76, P.  625-6:  a refutation of  the argument that Christ's headship 
would  suffice to secare  the requisite  unity:  His corporal  presence 
should  be  repiesented  by  a  Monarch.  Also  Alvar.  Pel. I.  a.  40 D 
(against Dante). 
12.  Among the Popes  themselves  this is  expressly proclaimed 
by Gregory VII. (see passages cited  in Note  10; also lib. I. ep. 55", 
ann.  1075,  p.  174:  quod  solus  possit  uti  imperialibus  insigniis); 
also by Innocent  111. (see Note 10; in particular,  in c.  13, X.  4,  17 
he deduces the proposition 'quod non solum in Ecclesiae patrimonio, 
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super quo plenam in temporalibus gerimus  potestatem, verum  etiam 
in aliis regionibus, certis causis inspectis, temporalem iurisdictionem 
casualiter exercemus' from  the divine mandate that he has as 'eius 
vicarius, qui est sacerdos in aeternum  secundum ordinem Melchise- 
dech,  constitutus  a  Deo  iudex  vivorum  et  mortuorum';  compare 
Reg. sup. neg. Imp.  ep.  IS, p.  1012 : 'vicarius  illius, cuius  est terra 
et plenitude  eius,  orbis  terrarum  et universi  qui habitant  in  eo'); 
Innocent  IV.  (see  Note  10);  Boniface  VIII. (c.  I, Extrav.  comm. 
I.  8:  'subesse  Romano pontifici  omni humanae creaturae declara- 
mus, dicimus, definimus et pronuntiamus omnino esse de necessitate 
salutis';  he called himself Caesar and Emperor, comp. v.  Wessenberg, 
Kirchenversammlungen, I.  p.  307).-Among  the Canonists, already 
in cent.  xii.  many  say 'Papa  ipse verus  Imperator';  comp.  Summa 
Colon. (I 160-1  I 70) and Paris.  (circ. I I 70) upon c.  3, C.  2,  q. 6, v. 
tor14m, and c.  7,  C.  2, q. 3 dict. Grat. in Schulte, Sitzungsber. [Vienna 
Acad.] vol. 64, pp.  I I I, 131.  Also Gloss. ordin. upon c.  I, Dist. 22, 
v.  coelestis.  So too Thom. Aquinas  says  'nisi  forte  potestati  spiri- 
tuali etiam saecularis potestas  coniungatur, sicut in Papa, qui  utrius- 
que potestatis  apicem  tenet,  sc.  spiritualis  et  saecularis, hoc ill0 
disponente  qui  est  sacerdos  et  rex  in  aeternum,  sec.  ordinem 
Melchisedech etc.';  in libr. 11.  Sent. dist. 44, ad. 4 (Op. VI.).  Ptolom. 
Luc., De regim.  princ. III.  c.  10: Peter and his successors have been 
appointed by Christ to be both Priests and Kings, so that the Pope 
is the caput in corpore nystico and from him all the sense and move- 
ment  of  the body  flow:  in temporals  also,  for  these  depend  upon 
spirituals,  like  body  upon  soul;  ib.  c.  13-19.  Similarly  Aegid. 
Rom. I.  c.  2-3;  Aug.  Triumph.  I.  q.  I, a.  7-9;  11.  q.  36;  Petrus 
de  Andlo  11.  c.  9.  Yet  more  definitely  Alvar.  Pelag.  I.  a.  13, 
especially c and G; a.  37,  R nr.  19 (est simpliciter praelatus omnium 
et  rnonarcha),  and  sb (papa  universalis  rnonarcha  totius  populi 
Christiani et de iure totius mundi);  a. 52; a.  59 K  (Christ and Pope 
are  in  no  wise  two  heads,  but  one  head);  but  in  particular  the 
reasoning  of  a.  40:  (I) politiae  Christianae  est  unus  principatus 
absolute:  (2) huius politiae Christ. unius unus est princeps regens et 
dirigens eam:  (3) primus  et supremus iste  princeps  politiae  Christ. 
est  Papa.  Opinions  which  in  put go  yet  further  concerning  the 
verum  doniinium fen@oralium are stated and refuted by Joh. Paris., 
proem.  and c.  15-43;  Ockl~am,  Octo qu.  I.  c. 2,  7-19;  11.  C.  7; 
Dial.r~~.tr.~,l.~,c.  2ff.;1.2,~.  1ff.;tr.2,1.1,~. 18ff.;Ant.Ros.1. 
c.  1-19,  and c.  39-55.  Comp.  also  the Clerk  in  Somn.  Virid. 
c. 6, 8, 10, 12,  77, 85, 89, 111,  117, 151, 163. 
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are unanimous in holding that, so far as the substance is concerned, 
the Temporal as well as the Spiritual Power belongs to the Chair of 
Peter, and that  the  separation which  is  commanded  by divine  law 
affects o111y  the  Administration,  not  the  Substance.  The  various 
shades  of  opinion  differ  only as to the extent of  the right  of  user 
committed  to the temporal  ruler  and of  the right  reserved  to the 
Pope, and, in particular, as  to  the definition  of  the cases  in which 
the  Pope,  notwithstanding  the  right  committed  to  the  secular 
magistrate,  may  directly  interfere  in  temporal  affairs.-Therefore 
it  is  a  mistake  to represent  the  great  Popes  as proclaiming,  and 
the  common  opinion  of  the later  Middle  Age  as accepting,  only 
that sort of  'indirect  power  in temporalities' (in  Bellarmine's  sense 
of these  terms)  which  was  claimed  for  the Apostolic  See  by  later 
theorists.  This mistake has  been  made by  Hergenrijther,  op.  cit. 
421  ff.,  Molitor,  op.  cit.  p.  166 ff.  and  others.  The  words  of 
Innocent  IV.  on which  Molitor  has  laid  special  weight, say merely 
that as a general rule the spiritual sword is not  to meddle with  the 
wielding of  the temporal,  and it is only to this normal separation in 
the use of  the swords that Innocent's  words 'directe,  secus indirecte' 
(c. 13, X.  2,  I) refer.  The statements to the effect that the Pope, by 
virtue  of  his  spiritual power, 'per  consequens'  rules  over  temporal 
affairs, because and in so far as 'temporalia ordinantur  ad spiritualia 
tanquam ad finem,' make no surrender of  the fundamental thought 
of an Universal State in which the plenitude of  all power, worldly as 
well  as  spiritual,  is  in principle  committed  to  the  Pope.  Indeed 
these  same  popes and  canonists,  as Molitor  (p.  91 ff.)  admits, ex- 
pressly assert the axiom that the Pope has both swords and commits 
one of  them  to other  hands  merely for  use.  With  this  axiom  the 
doctrine that would allow the Pope only a potestas  intIirecta  is  irre- 
concilable.  For this reason even Torquemada, despite his tendency 
towards  moderation  in  the  statement  of  papal  rights  (Summa  11. 
C.  I 13 ff.),  cannot be reckoned among the advocates  of  this  doctrine 
of 'indirect  power,'  since  in  plain  words  he  claims  for  the  Pope 
tltrumyzre gladium, and in radice the temporal power  (c.  114).  As 
a hint of  the doctrine of  cent. xvi.  we  might rather choose a passage 
in which Gerson ascribes to the Church in worldly affairs 'dominium 
quoddam  .irectivum, regulativum et ordinctivum' (De pot. ecc. c. 12 ; 
op. 11.  248). 
14.  See  Joh.  Saresb.  IV. c.  3:  the  Church  has  both  swords: 
'sed gladio sanguinis ...  utitur per manum principis, cui coercendorum 
corporum  contulit potestatem, spiritualium sibi in pontificibus aucto- 
ritate reservata:  est  ergo princeps  sacerdotii quidem minister  et qui 
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sacrorum  officiorum  illam  partem  exercet, quae sacerdotii  manibus 
videtur  indigna.'  Aegid.  Rom.  I.  c.  g;  August.  Triumph.  I.  q.  I, 
a.  4, q.  43, a.  2; Alvar. Pelag. I.  a.  13 and 37. 
15.  In some form  or another, as  might  be expected, all advo- The 
cates of the ecclesiastical power maintain, not only the separation of phu~',"  are 
the two powers, but the divine institution of the worldly Magistrature: ordained 
for this was a revealed truth [Rom. xiii  I; bfatth. xxii.  211.  So even  God. 
Gregor  VII.  lib  2,  ep.  31,  lib.  3,  ep.  7,  lib.  7,  ep.  21,  23,  25. 
Innoc. 111. 1.  7,  ep. 212  (vol.  215, p.  527);  Reg. sup. neg. Imp. ep. 
2  and 79.  Joh.  Saresb. Polycr.  rv.  c.  I, p.  208-209  and vr. c.  25, 
p.  391-395.  Thom. Aquin. in libr. 11.  Sent. dist. 44, ad. 4 (utraque 
deducitur a  potestate  divina).  Ptol. Luc.  III. c.  1-8.  Aiv.  Pel. 1. 
a. 8, 41 C-K,  56 B.  Host. Summa IV.  17.  Panorm. on c.  13, X.  2, I. 
16.  Resuming  the teaching  of  Augustine, Gregory VII.  is the sinful 
Origin of 
first to declare that the temporal  power  is  the work  of  sin  and the the state. 
devil.  See lib. 8, ep. 21,  ann.  1080, p.  456-7:  'Quis  nesciat  reges 
et duces ab iis habuisse principium, qui  Deum  ignorantes,  superbia, 
rapinis,  perfidia,  hoinicidiis,  postremo  universis  sceleribus,  mundi 
principe  diabolo  videlicet  agitante,  super  pares,  scilicet  homines, 
domlnari caeca cupiditate et intolerabili praesumtione affectaverunt?' 
And  again:  'itane  dignitas  a  saecularibus-etiam  Deum  ignoranti- 
bus-inventa,  non  subicietur  ei  dignitati,  quam  omnipotentis  Dei 
provideatia  ad  honorem  suum  invenit  mundoque  misericorditer 
tribuit?'  See also  lib.  4, ep.  2,  ann.  1076,  p.  243:  'illam  quidem 
(scilicet, regianl dignitatem) superbia humana repperit, hanc (episco- 
palem) divina pietas instituit; illa vanam  gloriam  incessanter captat, 
haec  ad  coelestem  vitam  semper  aspirat.'  Cardinal  Deusdedit 
(ob.  logg), Contra invasores etc. lib. 111.  sect. 5 et 6 §  12 (in Mai VII. 
p.  107) argues  in like  fashion:  'Nec  mirum,  sacerdotalem  auctori- 
tatem, quain Deus ipse per  se ipsum constituit, in huiusmodi causis 
regiam  praecellere  potestatem,  quam  sibi  humana  praefecit  adin- 
ventio eo quidem permittente,  non tamen volente':  then the example 
of the Jews  is cited.  John  of  Salisbury, Polycrat.  VIII.  c.  17-18, 
20, says  of  all  regna 'iniquitas  per  se aut praesumpsit aut extorsit a 
Deo';  the latter was  the case  of  the Jews according to I Reg. viii., 
since  'populus  a  Deo quem  contempserat  sibi  regem  extorsit.'- 
Hugh  of  Fleury  (Prol.  1.  c.  I, 4,  12,  11.  p.  66-68),  who  himself 
deduces  an  immediately  divine  origin  for  the royal  power  from 
'Nan est potestas  nisi  a  Deo,'  describes as a wide-spread error the 
doctrine  which  would  give  to  that  power  a  human,  and therefore 
sinful,  origin.  Innocent III.,  Reg.  sup.  neg.  Imp.  ep.  18,  argues 
for the indestructibility  of  the  Priesthood  and  the  frailty  of  the I I  fil&aG  T/zeo?ies of  the MilddZe  Age. 
petr.  ~l~~~~~i~  jun. Specul. c.  16.  Vincent. Bellovac. lib. VII.  c 33. 
Law.  Triumph.  I.  q.  I, a.  3,  and 11.  9.  44,  a.  1-8.  Alv- Pel%- 
,. ,  44.  Ockham,  Octo qu. 111.  c. 9. 
subjection  20.  See Gregor. VII., lib. I, ep. 63; lib. 4, ep. 2, ep.  23, ep. 24; 
of Tern-  lib.  8,  ep.  21  (especially  p.  464).  Cardinal  Deusdedit,  Contra 
poral 
power.  invasores,  lib.  III.  per  totum.  Honorius  Augustod.,  Summa gloria, 
p.  1265 : 'iure regnum sacerdotio subiacebit' (above Note 17).  Joh. 
Saresb. v. c.  2,  p.  252.  Thom.  Cantuar.,  epist.  I 77-184,  p.  648 ff. 
Ivo  of  Chartres, ep.  106, Henrico Anglorum  Regi, p.  r 25 : 'regnum 
terrenum  coelesti  regno,  quod  Ecclesiae  commissum  est, subditum 
esse semper cogitatis ;  sicut enim sensus animalis subditus debet esse 
rationi, ita potestas terrena subdita esse debet  ecclesiastico regimini ; 
et quantum valet  corpus nisi  regatur  ab anima, tantum valet terreria 
potestas  nisi  infornietur et regatur  ecclesiastics disciplina;  et sicut 
pacatum est regnum  corporis cum  iam  non  resistit  car0 spiritui,  sic 
in  pace  possidetur  regnum  mundi, cum  iam  resistere  non  molitur 
regno Dei':  You (King Henry) are not domi~zus,  but semus servol-unt 
Dei ; be  their  protector,  non  possessor.  Comp.  ep.  60,  p.  70  ff. 
If Ivo  here  and elsewhere  (ep. 214, p.  217 ff.,  and ep.  238, p.  245) 
expressly states that  the ecclesia  can only flourish if  Priesthood  and 
Realm be united,  while every discord between  the two powers must 
rend the church, and if he exhorts the Pope (ep.  238) to do his part 
in  the  production  of  unity,-with  a  saving  for  the majesty  of  the 
apostolic see,-still  the legal relation  of  Realm to Priesthood  is, in 
Ivo's  eyes,  a  complete  subjection.-To  the  same  effect  Alex. 
Halensis, 111.  q. 40, m.  2.  Rolandus (Alex. III.), Summa, p. 5, D.  10. 
Innocent III., in c. 6, X. I, 33.  Thom. Aquin. De reg. princ. I.  c. 14 
(Romano pontifici omnes reges populi  Christ. oportet  esse  subditos, 
sicut  ipsi  domino  Jesu  Christo) ;  Opusc.  contra impugn.  relig.  11 
C.  4, concl.  I ; Summa Theol.  11.  I,  q.  60,  a.  6,  ad.  3  (potestas 
saecularis subditur spirituali, sicut corpus animae) ;  in lib. 11.  Sent. d. 
44; Quodl.  12, q.  13, a.  19, ad.  2.  Aegid.  Rom.  De pot. eccl. I. 
C.  7 (two swords, like soul and body, quorum  unus alteri debet esse 
subiectus);  11.  c. 4, 10 and 12.  Boniface VIII., in Unam Sanctam : 
Oportet auteln  gladium  sub gladio  esse et temporalem  auctoritatem 
s~irituali  subiici potestati.  August.  Triu~n~h.  I.  q.  1, a.  1 and 3, 
11.  q.  36, :  3,  44,  a.  I  (Papa est  medius  inter  Deum  et  populum 
Christianum ;. ..medius inter Deum et imperatorem ;...a  quo impera- 
tori  respublica  commissa).  Alv.  Pel.  I.  a.  13,  37  Q-R,  56,  59. 
And. Isern. I.  Feud. 29, pr. nr.  2.  Barthol. Soc. 1x1.  cons. 99, nr.  18. 
Cardin  Alex.  c. 3,  D.  10.  The Commentary on  c.  6,  X.  I,  33. 
CO~~J.  also  Hofler,  Kaiserthum, 57 &,  80 ff.,  137  ff.-Comparisons 
Notes. 
with gold and lead, heaven and earth, sun and moon, soul and body, 
frequently recur, and the last of these, if taken in earnest,  must make 
for an  unconditional  subjection  of  the State,  as in the  above-cited 
words of  Ivo. 
21.  See John of  Salisbury in Note 14 and Thomas of  Canterbury Temporal 
in Note 10.  Summa Parisiensis (above Note 12): imperator vicarius Rulers as  Servants 
eius.  Ptol.  Luc.  III.  c.  17 : imperium  ad  exequendum  regimen of Church 
fidelium  secundum  mandatum  pontificis  ordinatur,  ut  merito  dici and ''pee 
possint  ipsorum  executores  et  cooperatores  Dei  ad  gubernandum 
.  populum Christianum.  Aegid. Rom. De pot. eccl. c.  5.  Hostiensis 
upon c.  8, X.  3, 34, nr.  26-7.  August. Triumph. I.  q. I, a.  8 (princes 
are quasi ministri et stipendiarii ipsius papae et ipsius  ecclesiae, they 
receive an office and are remunerated  de thesauro  ipsius  ecclesiae) ; 
q.  44 and  45;  11.  q.  35,  a.  1,  and  38,  a.  2-4  (the Emperor  is 
minister  ~apae);  I.  q.  22,  a.  3  (the Emperor  is  likened  to a  pro- 
consul).  Alv.  Pel.  I.  a.  40 : as  the  Church,  which  is  Cosmopolis, 
can give (by baptism) and take away the right  of  citizenship, so she 
distributes  offices among her  citizens ;  sacerdotal  consecration and 
unction  first  give  temporal  lordship  over  God's  holy  people,  and 
these  priestly acts must  be regarded  as approval  and confirmation; 
a. 56 B  and  P; also  a.  13;  a.  40 K  (sicut  aninla  utitur  corpore  ut 
instrumento, ...  sic  papa ...  utitur  officio  imperatoris  ut  instrumento); 
a. 52-54  (all worldly and ghostly  offices are  'gradus  in ecclesia'). 
The Clerk  in  Somn. Virid.  11.  c. 163.  Comp. in Joh.  Par. prooem. 
the  confutation  of  the statement that  praelati  et principes are only 
tutores, procuratores and dispensatores of the Pope's verum dominium 
temporalium. 
22.  Apparently  Goffredus abbas Vindocinensis (Migne, vol. 157, The High 
p.  320) is the first allegorically to explain the two swords mentioned EC;:ke 
in Evang. I,ucae, c. 22, v. 38, as being material and spiritual swords, ofthe~wo 
which are to be used in defence of  the Church ;  but he only uses this 
allegory  to support  a  demand  for  an amicable union  between  the 
two  powers.  Gerhoh  Reichersp.  (Migne,  vol.  I 94, p.  I I I) goes no 
further.  Bernard  of  Clairvaux  (ep.  256,  ann.  1146,  in  Migne, vol. 
182, p.  463)  seems  the  first  to explain  the allegory in  the  manner 
that  was  afterwards  adopted  by  the  Church's  champions:  Petri 
uterque  est, alter  suo  nutu, alter  sua  manu:  see also  De consider. 
Iv.  c.  3,  in  Migne,  vol.  186,  p.  776.  Then already  with  John  of 
Salisbury, Pol~crat.  IV.  c.  3, the Prince  receives  one sword from the 
hand  of  the Church; the Church  has that sword (habet  et ipsum), 
but uses it 'per principis manum.'  So S.  Anselm, Comm. in Matth. 
C.  26.  Among  the Popes, Innoc.  III.,  Gregor.  IX.,  Innoc. IV., and 
M.  8 1 1 4  PoliticaZ  Theories  of  the Middle  Age. 
Bonif. VIII. (Unam  sanctam, also  speech  in  the  Roman synod, in 
Hefele, Konciliengesch.,  VI.  § 689)  raised  this  theory to the rank of 
an official &:trine.  It  was conceded by some of the Emperors, such 
as Otto IV.,  Frederick  II.,  Albert  (1302  and  1303);  see Hofler, 
pp.  86,  134.  Thenceforward  it  was  a  self-evident  axiom  for  the 
Canonists,  and Prosdocimus de Comitibus,  nr.  55,  can reckon  the 
two  theories  of  the Two Swords as 'a difference between  the Zeges 
and the  canones.'  Comp. Glossa Ord. on c.  I, Dist.  22.  V.  coelestis: 
argumentum quod papa  habet utrumque gladium, scil. spir. et temp. 
(The text that is being glossed, from Petrus Damianus, Opusc. IV. admits 
of  various  interpretations :-beat0  aeternae vitae  clavigero  terreni 
simul et coelestis irnperii iura commisit.)  Quotation from Alanus in 
Lup. Beb. c.  g, p.  368.  Gloss. Ord. on c.  13, X.  I, 2:  verum execu- 
tionem  gladii  temporalis  imperatoribus et regibus commisit ecclesia; 
quaedam enim possumus aliis committere quae nobis  non possumus 
retinere.'  Commentaries on c.  34, X. I, 6, c.  I, X.  I, 7,  c.  13, X.  2, 
I, c.  10, X.  2,  2 by Innocentius, Zabarella,  Ant.  Butrigarius,  Felinus 
and Decius.  Thus  e.g.  Panormitanus holds  that  the imperium  is 
'non  immediate  a  Deo,  sed per  debitam  et  subalternatam  emana- 
tionem a vicario Christi Jesu, apud quem sunt iura coelestis et terreni 
irnperii':  in  this  sense  are  to  be  understood  the  words  'non  est 
potestas  nisi  a  Deo';  but  we  may  also  apply them  to mean  that 
according to the will  of  God  one Sword belongs to temporal  rulers 
'respectu  exercitii.'  See  further  Aegid.  Rom.  De  pot.  eccl.  r. 
c. 7-9.  Schwabensp. c. I.  Aug. Triumph. I. q. I, a.  I, and 11.  q. 36, 
a.  1-4.  Alv.  Pelag. I.  a.  13, 37 s (dominus legitimus.. .utilis) and z, 
40  K, 59  D  (the  Pope  is  always primum  movens,  even  when  the 
Prince  is  proximum  movens),  11.  a. 57;  Konr. Megenb.  in  Hofler, 
aus Avignon, p.  24 ff.  Petrus a Monte, in Tr. U. J.  XIII.  I, f.  152 ff. 
Fetrus de Andlo, 11.  c.  g.  Turrecremata, Summa de eccl. 11.  c.  114. 
Naturally a  few  legists  take  the same view,  e.g.  Bartolus,  1.  r, 5  I, 
Dig. 48, 17, and Paul. Cast. 1.  8, Dig. I, 3, nr.  6; and some feudists, 
e.g- Andr.  de  Isern.  11.  Feud.  55,  nr.  87.  All  the arguments pro 
and con  are collected by Ockham, who  distinguishes  with  exactitude 
various  nice shades of  the doctrine  'Imperium  a  Papa':  see Octo 
qu.  1.  c.  2,  18-19  and  on  the  other side c.  6-17  ; also see  11. 
c.  1-4,  I , 15, and on the other side c.  6-14;  VIII. c.  I; Dial. 111. 
tr.  2,  1.  I, C.  18-25. 
Emperors  23.  Comp. e.g. Innoc.  IV. upon  c.  10,  X.  2,  2,  nr.  I ;  Thom. 
Aquin. Quodl.  12,  q.  13, a.  19,  ad  2 : Reges  sunt vassalli ecclesiae. 
Rulers as  C1e  -lent V. in Clem. un.  de iureiurando,  2, g, and the commentaries 
[;::is.  -,ereon.  Aug.  Triumph.  I. q. I, a.  I ;  11.  q. 38,  a.  4;  Alv.  Pel.  I. 
Notes.  11.5 
a. I 3 B,  a. 40, a. 5  7 ;  Konr. Megenb., in Hofler, aus Avignon, p  24 ff.; 
Petr. Andl. 11.  c. z ;  Panorm.  C.  13, X.  2,  I. 
24.  According to S.  Bernard, De consider.  IV.  c. 3, the temporal The 
sword  is  to  be  wielded  'ad  nutum  sacerdotis  et  ad  iussum  im- ~G:,P?' 
peratoris.'  Gregory  IX.  (Raynald,  ann.  1233,  nr.  I) repeats  this at the 
but omits the last half  of  the phrase.  Aegid. Rom., De pot. eccl. I. 2::~~ 
c.  8-9,  says that  the Pope has  both swords, 'sed  decet  Ecclesiam Church 
habere materialem gladium  non ad usum  sed ad nutum.'  See also 
Notes zo and 21. 
25.  Innocent  111.  is  the  first  sharply  to distinguish  between Direct use 
(I) the normal use that is made of  the spiritual sword when the acts $::zh 
of  temporal  rulers  are subjected  to  ecclesiastical  jurisdiction,  and of the 
(2) the exceptional cases in which the Pope directly uses the temporal :;:q'n1 
sword.  See in particular c.  13, X.  2,  I (lib. 7,  ep.  42, ann. 1204) on 
the one side, and on the other c.  13, X. 4,17.  So also Innocent IV.: 
compare the letter of  1245  in  Hefele, v.  1001 : nec  curabimus  de 
cefevo gladio uti  materiali, sed tantum spirituali  contra  Fridericum. 
Encyclica  of  1246 : spiritualiter  de temporalibus  iudicare.  Innoc. 
Comm. upon c. 13, X. 2, I.-Hostiensis,  Summa, 4, 17 : sicut contra 
et super et praeter naturalem et humanam rationem Filius Dei incar- 
natus et natus est, sic iurisdictio spiritualis, quam Ecclesiae reliquit, 
contra et super et praeter  naturam  iurisdictionis  trahit  ad se princi- 
palem iurisdictionem temporalem, si id, quod de iurisdictione spirituali 
est, in  ea incidit.  Petrus Paludanus, De causa immediata eccl. pot. 
a  4: Papa est superior in spiritualibus et per consequens in tempora- 
libus, quantum necesse est pro bono spiritua1i.-Johan.  Andr. c. 13, 
X.  4,  17 : temporalia  per  quandam consequentiam.  Turrecremata, 
11.  c. I 13 @.-On  the other hand, in the argumentation of Gregory VII. 
lib. 4, ep. 2, and lib. 8, ep. 21,  the right that he claims of  deposing the 
Kaiser is thoroughly fused with a right to excommunicate the Kaiser. 
Similarly, those later writers, who will hardly allow any independence 
to  the  temporal  sword,  do  not  clearly  distinguish  between  the 
ordinary use  of  spiritual  power  in  the correction  of  Rulers and an 
extraordinary  use  of  temporal  power  by  the Pope.  See  e.g.  Joh. 
Saresb. Polycr.  IV.  c.  1-4;  Aegid.  Rom.  De pot.  eccl.  I.  c.  2-4, 
11.  c. 4 and esp. 1x1.  c. 4-8  ;  August. Triumph.  I.  q.  I, a.  I (institui, 
regulari  et ordinari  si  bona  sit, condemnari et iudicari  si bona  non 
sit) ;  Alv.  Pel. I.  a.  37, 56, 58 ;  Cler. in Somn. Virid. 11.  c.  18, 22, 24, 
26,  28, 32, 69, 139. 
26.  So Innocent 111. in c.  13, X.  4,  17 : there  sho~ild  be no ~h, 
invasion  into  ius  ulietium;  what  is  Caesar's  should  be  given  to k%;h 
Caesar.  And  to the same effect what  is  said  of  the separation  of respectthe 
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~i~h~~  of  the swords and their duty of  mutual aid : Reg. sup. neg. Imp. ep.  2, 
Rule-  V~I.  216,  p.  997, and ep.  179, P.  1162,  also lib. 7,  ep. 54 and 79, 
vol.  215,  p.  339 and  361,  lib.  10, ep.  141, P.  1235, lib.  11, ep.  28, 
p.  1~58. Innocent  IV. Comment on  13, X.  4, 17 : nam temporalia 
et spiritualia diversa sunt, et diversos iudices habent, nec unus iudex 
habet se intromittere de pertinentibus  ad aliun~,  licet  se ad invicem 
iuvare debeant.-Hostiensis,  Summa, 4, 17:  iurisdictiones distinctae; 
...  nec  debet  se intromittere  de subditis  Imperatoris,  nisi  forte  in 
casibus.-Gloss.  Ord. upon C.  13, X. 4, 17; and upon c.  13, X.  2,  I : 
non ergo de temporali  iurisdictione debet  intromittere  se Papa nisi 
in  subsidium.  Ant.  Butr.  on c.  13, X.  4,  17; Joh.  Andr. on c.  13, 
X.  2,  I; Panorm. on c.  13, X.  2,  I; Turrecremata, 11.  c. 113. 
Extra-  27.  S.  Bernard,  De  consider.  I.  c.  6:  ubi  necessitas  exigit ... 
ordinary 
Use of  incidenter ...  causa quidenl urgente.-Innocent  111. in c.  13, X.  4,  17: 
Temporal  the power may be used  casualiter if  causae multum arduae require it. 
Power 
by the  (AS to casualiter and the variant  carnaliter, see Molitor, p.  61  ff.)- 
Church.  Gloss.  Ord.  1.  c.:  in  subsidium.  Host.  upon  c.  13,  X.  2,  I; 
Thom. Aquin.  Sum. Theol. 11.  2, q.  60, a.  6,  ad. 3; Joh.  Andr. c.  13, 
X.  2,  I; Ant. Butr.  c.  13, X.  4,  17:  non  regulariter;  Panorm. 1.  c. : 
in a case of  necessity, if  there are ardua negotia. 
Transla-  28.  Gregory VII. lib.  8, ep.  21,  ann.  1080, p.  464:  quapropter 
~UOS  sancta Ecclesia sua sponte ad regimen  vel  imperium deliberato 
by the  consilio  advocat,  (iis) non  pro transitoria  gloria  sed  pro multorum 
"pee  salute,  humiliter  obediant.-S.  Bernard,  ep.  236;  Landulf, Col.  De 
transl.  Imp., c.  8; Ptol.  Luc. III. c.  10; Aug. Triumph. 11.  q. 37, a. 5: 
regnorum oinnium translatio auctoritate papae facta fuit vel  alicuius 
qui ipsum figurabat:  e.g.  Samuel, Daniel and so forth.  Also  q.  46, 
a. 3 :  est Dei vice omnium regnorum provisor.-Konrad  v.  Megenburg, 
in  Hofler, aus  Avignon,  p.  24 f. : the transfer  should  be made in 
accordance with  divine  law, not arbitrarily.-Panorm,  c.  13, X.  2,  I: 
hint est quad imperium transferre potest de certo genere personarum 
ad aliud genus.-Turrecremata,  11.  c.  115; Ockham, Octo qu. IV.  c. 4, 
and VIII.  c. 3; Dial. III. tr.  2,  1.  I, c.  20. 
Translati0  29.  Innocent  111.  in  c. 34, X.  I, 6, and all  the  Commentaries  Imperii.  upon  this  canon.  Ptol.  Luc.  III.  c.  18;  Land. Col, c.  3-8;  Aug. 
Triumph. 11.  q.  37,  a.  1-4.  Alv.  Pel.  I.  a.  13  F  and  41;  Andr. 
Isern.  pro  em.  Feud.  nr.  37;  Petr.  Andl.  I.  c.  13-15,  11.  C.  3; cf. 
Ockham, Octo qu. IV, c. 5. 
Papal  30.  See above Notes 17 and  21, and below  Note 34.  Already 
*ppoint-  Gregory VII. claims this right,  as appears from  c.  3, C.  15, q.  6, a 
ment of 
I<aisen  pasc ge  from  a  letter  of  his  (ann.  1080)  to  Bishop  Hermann  of 
and Kiags.  1  ~tz  : Alius  item  Romanus  Pontifex,  Zacharias  scilicet,  regem 
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Francorum non tam pro suis iniquitatibus, quam pro eo, quod tantae 
potestati erat  inutilis,  a regno deposuit, et Pipinurn, Karoli impera- 
toris  patrem,  in  eius  loco  substituit,  omnesque  Francigenas  a 
iuramento fidelitatis, quod illi  fecerant, absolvit.  In the two letters 
of  1077,  lib.  4,  ep.  23  and 24,  p.  275  ff.,  he claims  to decide  a 
disputed succession to the throne, and charges  all  men  to obey him 
whom he confirms in repa dknitate. 
31.  As  to the  supposed  institution  of  the  Prince-Electors  by The Pope 
and the 
Gregory V.  and  his  right  to institute them,  see  Land.  Col.  C.  9; G,,,,, 
Ptol. Luc. 111.  c. ro and 19;  Aug. Triumph. 11.  q.  35 ;  Alv.  Pelag.  I.  Electors. 
a.  13 F,  21,  27  z  and ~d,  40 E-F,  45 ;  Zabarell. c.  34 $ verum, X. 
I, 6, nr.  8.  Ptolemy of Lucca, Augustinus Triumphus, and Alvarius 
argue that  the Church  may  at any  time  for  good  and reasonable 
cause  change  the  mode  of  election,  give  the  right  of  election  to 
another nation,  or  itself  exercise  the  right,  institute an  hereditary 
empire etc.  Augustinus and Alvarius say straight out that the Pope 
elects the Emperor by  the agency of  the Prince-Electors  (per eos), 
for  a  principal  may  choose  instruments  and  ministers  as  he 
pleases. 
32.  Honorius Augustod. p.  1264;  Imperator Romanus debet ab Thepope's 
Part in the 
Apastolico  el@  consensu  principum  et  acclamatione plebis, in caput Election 
populi constitui, a Papa consecrari et coronari.  Innoc. 111.  in c. 34, of an 
X.  I, 6.  Innoc.  IV.  Compost.,  Joh.  And.,  Zabar.,  Panorm., Ant. 
Butr.,  Felin.,  Decius on this  canon.  Aug.  Triumph.  11.  q. 38-41. 
Alv.  Pel. I.  a. 13, 40, 43, 57 ;  Petr. de Andlo, 11.  c.  2,  4-7;  Marcus, 
I.  q.  938;  Turrecrem.  11.  c.  115. 
33.  Innoc. IV. upon  c.  10,  X.  2,  2,  nr.  1-2,  and c.  7, X.  I, The 
10, nr.  3: the Pope appoints a curator for a king incompetent to rule. 
Ilurant.  Spec.  I.  I  de legato  $  6, nr.  15  and  17.  Andr.  Isern.  11.  ship of  the 
Feud.  55, nr.  87.  Alv.  Pel.  I.  a. 13 F,  37  S, 56  N.  Petr.  Andl. 11.  ;;",","1":. 
c.  10 (but it is otherwise under the Golden  Bull).  Hier. Zanetinus, 
diff. nr. 101.  Turrecrem. 11.  c.  115.  This principle  was practically 
applied by Clement V.  See also Ficker, Forschungen, 11.  458 ff. 
34.  Gregory VII. endeavoured, not only practically to use these The 
powers, but also theoretically  to deduce them from the superiority of 
the spiritual power, since the bearer of  the keys  can be judged  by depose 
none  and himself  must  judge  the  temporal  rulers :  Nescitis  quia and free 
angelos iudicabimus?  quanto magis saecularia !  He appealed to the Subjects 
deeds of  his predecessors, more particularly Gregory I. and Zacharias. from  Oath the  of 
See lib.  I, ep.  55",  p.  175, lib.  4, ep. 2 and 24, lib. 8, ep. z I ;  c. 3, Fealty. 
C.  15, q. 6 (above  Note  30), c.  4 eod.  He is  followed  in  this  by 
Gregory  IX.,  Innocent  IV.,  John  XXII.,  Nicholas  V.  Comp. I  I 8  Political  Theories of the Middle  Age. 
Dictum  Gratiani P.  11.  C.  15,  q.  6.  Joh.  Saresb. Polycrat.  IV.  c.  3, 
p. 213 : dignitatem principis conferre et auferre, and V,  c. 6.  Landulf. 
Col. c.  4.  Thom. Aq.  Summa Theol. 11.  2, q. 10, a. 10, and q.  12,  a.  2. 
Innoc.  IV. on c.  27,  X.  2,  27,  nr.  6.  Aegid.  Rom.  De pot.  eccl. 
1. c.  2-5.  Host. c.  8, X.  3,  34, nr.  26-27.  Dur. Spec. 1.  c.  nr.  17. 
Aug.  Triumph.  I.  q.  I, a.  I  and 3; q.  6; q.  26,  a. 4; q.  46, a.  I; 
11. 4. 40, a. 1-4;  q. 45, a. 3; q.  46, a.  1-2.  Alv. Pel. I.  a. 13 B,  21, 
37  R, 40 F (eccl. Rom. cuius est regna transferre et reges de sua sede 
deponere);  56 E (duty of  protecting  nations  against the tyranny  of  , 
kings) ; 11.  a.  29  and  30.  Zabar.  c.  34  5  vencnz,  X.  I,  6,  nr.  7. 
Panorm.  eod.  c.  nr.  7-9,  and  c.  13,  X.  4,  17  (deponit  causis 
exigentibus).  Phil. Dec. c.  I, X.  2, 19, nr.  8.  Some legists took this 
side : Bartol., 1.  11, C.  I,  14, nr. 4; Baldus, ead. 1.  nr.  6. 
Thepope's  35.  See e.g. Aug. Triumph. 11.  q. 45 and 46; the Clerk in Somn. 
Powerover Virid.  11.  c.  76 ff.,  92 ff.,  163.-It  is  true  that  some special  claims 
Rulers 
other than  could be made against the Kaiser (see e.g.  Alv.  Pelag. I.  a. 42 G and 
the Em-  a.  44 E),  because he was  an elected prince,  and because  there was 
peror. 
'specialis  coniunctio  inter  imperatorem  et papam';  and  the  im- 
perialist  partizans  point  out  that  their  adversaries  would  set  the 
Emperor below other Monarchs (see e.g.  Ockham, Dial. III. tr. 2, 1.  I, 
c. 20).  Still in the main  Frederick 11.  was  quite right when  in his 
famous letter he laid  stress on the solidarity of  the interests  of  all 
temporal rulers  who  were  equally  threatened  by  the  Pope.  See 
Petr. de Vin. ep. I. c.  2,  3, 34. 
Remin-  36.  For Abp.  Reinald  of  Koln in 1162  (Watterich, Pont. Rom. 
iscences  vitae  11.  530 and 533)  there was  still  life  in the thought  that  the 
of the 
subjection Church of  Rome is the Empire's  church, and the Pope is a bishop of 
of Church  the Empire.  Then  in  cent.  xiv.  it  begins  to be  common  for  the 
to Realm.  opponents of  ecclesiastical  claims  to appeal to history and to speak 
of  the position held  by the church under the old Roman Emperors, 
the Frankish Emperors, the Ottos and Henry 111. 
37.  Ockham, Octo q. 111.  c.  3 and 8, Dial. 111.  tr. 2,l. I, c.  I, and 
1.  3, c.  17  and 22.  Comp. also Anton. Rosell.  I.  c.  61-63. 
Church  38.  This had previously been the teaching of the Church herself. 
and State  Henry IV. (ann.  1076 in  M. G. L.  11.  p. 48) is the first  to oppose it 
are co- 
ordinate.  to the growing  ecclesiastical  claims.  Pet.  Crassus,  p.  28 ff,, fully 
develops it:  God instituted two laws, two p-oples, two powers amollg 
Mankind.  SO Wenrich,  p.  214  ff.;  Wido,  De  scismate,  lib.  11.; 
Walram  Naumb.,  De  unitate  eccl.,  lib.  I.;  Sigebert  episc.  adv. 
Paschalem, ann.  1103;  Tractatus de investitura, ann. 1109.  Appeals 
to it dre  made by Frederick  I. (e.g. ann. 1152  in  Jaff6  Mon.  Corb. 
p.  500 and ann.  1157,  M.  G.  Leg.  11.  p.  105 ;  comp.  ep.  Wibaldi, 
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ann. 1152,  in Jaff6, 1.  c.  p.  502), Frederick  11.  (e.g.  Pet.  de Vin.  ep. 
I. c.  I, g, 31,  V.  C.  I) and later Emperors.  It is adopted by most of 
tile Legists;  they follow in this the glosses, especially that  on Auth. 
coll. I. 6, prooenl. v. conferens  generi.  Many of  the older Canonists 
held the same opinion, connecting it with the words of  Gelasius and 
Nicholas  I. which  appeared in  the Decretum  as c.  8,  D.  10,  c. 6, 
D.  96, c.  10, D.  ead.  Among them  are Stephanus (above Note  8) 
and Huguccio (as to whom see Lup. Beb. c. g, and against him Aug. 
Triumph.  11.  q.  36,  a.  4).  So also  some of  the older Theologians, 
such as Peter Damiani (Opusc.  IV.  in Migne, vol.  145, p.  71-72  and 
86-87,  lib.  4,  ep.  g ad Firm.  ep. and lib.  7,  ep.  3  ad Henr. Reg. 
p.  121) and Gerhoh of  Reichersberg  (Syntagma, 180-3)  Then it 
is defended by Hugo Floriac. (I. c 12,  p.  43 ff., and 11.  p.  46 ff., and 
65) ;  Otto Frising. ;  Eberh.  Barnberg. (ob. I 172, see Hofler,  Kaiser- 
thum, p.  61);  Eike v.  Repgow in the Sachsenspiegel, I.  a. I; Johann 
v.  Buch, Gloss,  on Sachsensp. I. a.  I, and 111.  a.  57,  5  I ;  Vridank, 
p. 152, V.  12-19,  and other German poets.-Then  Dante (Mon. 111. 
c.  16) endeavoured to give it a deeper philosophical foundation.  To 
biblical,  historical  and  legal,  he  added  physical  and  metaphysical 
arguments, for he endeavoured to show that to the double nature and 
double  end  of  man  there  must  correspond  a  dzlplex  diye~tivum 
ordained  by  God.  Comp.  also  Joh.  Paris.  c.  4-10:  potestates 
distinctae et una in aliam non reducitur.  Lup. Bebenb. c.  10 : pot. 
distinctae  et  divisae.  Quaestio  in  utramque  part.  p.  96-102, 
Ockham, Octo qu. I.  c. I, 3-5  and 20 (where a distinction is drawn 
between two opinions, viz. that the two powers cannot be united, and 
that, though  they could be united, an ordinance of  God forbids their 
union);  Dial.  111.  tr.  2,  1.  2,  C.  1-4.  Disput.  int.  mil.  et  cler. 
pp. 667-682.  Miles in Somn. Virid. I. c.  1-16  and 39 ff., 11.  C.  116: 
Deus duas iurisdictiones distinxit, duos populos, duas vitas, duo genera 
militum.  Petr. de Aliac.  in Gerson,  Op.  I.  678.  Gerson,  IV.  650. 
Randuf,  De mod.  un.  c.  IS.  Theod.  a  Niem, De schism. 111.  c.  7; 
Priv.  et iura imp.  p.  785.  Nic.  Cus.  111.  c.  1-2,  5, 31, 41.  Aen. 
Sylv.  c.  7.  Greg.  Heimb.  Admon.  I.  p.  557-563.  Ant.  Ros.  I. 
c.  20-38  and 41 :  Deus duos constituit  vicarios.  Almain, Expos. 
on Qu. I.  c.  6-7,  declares the second of  the two opinions discussed 
by Ockham to be the true one. 
39.  Pet.  Crassus, p.  28 ff.  Sachsensp. I.  a. 3,  § 3.  Joh.  Paris. Temporal  Law is not 
c.  18,  p.  195.  Ockham,  Octo qu.  I.  c.  15 and 111.  c 2.  Somn. dependent 
Virid. I.  c.  70 ff. and 103 ff.  Franc. Curt. sen. Cons. 43, nr. 4.  on the 
Canons. 
40.  See esp. Pet.  Crassus, p.  26 : divinitus datum.  Wenrich in 
Martene,  I.  p.  220.  Enlp.  Frederick  I.  ann.  1157  and  1159,  in I 20 POZi2Lica  Z  Theories of the Miadze Age. 
Imperium  M.  G.  L.  pp 105,  118 : a  solo  Deo imperium.  Cinus  upon  1.  I, 
non  pendet  de-  ab  C.  "re  2-3,  and Aoth. cassa  on 1.  12,  C. I, 3, nr.  2 : Imp. et 
ecclesia.  Papa aeque principaliter  sunt constituti  a Deo.  Damasus, Broc. M. 
III.  br,  19.  Dante,  Mon. lib. 111,  throughout.  Quaestio in  utr. part. 
a.  I, 2, 3, 5.  Joh.  Paris.  c.  5 : et  ambae  oriuntur ab una suprema 
potestate, scil. divina, immediate;  c.  10, 15-22.  Marsil. Pat. Def. 
pat. 11.  c.  27.  Declarations  at Lahnstein  and  Rense, in Ficker, zur 
Gesch. des Icurv. v.  R. p.  699 ff.  Miles in Somn. Vir.  I. c.  57-69, 
74-78,  88-102,  146-163.  Disput.  int.  mil.  et  cler.  p.  677. 
Baldus, 1.  I, C. I, I, nr.  1-12;  sup. pace Const. v.  'hoc quod non,' 
nr.  8-13.  Joh.  ab Imola,  1.  I.  Dig.  de V. 0. nr.  22-27'.  Joh. 
And. Nov.  s.  c.  13, X. 4, 17.  Theod. a Niem., De schism. III. c.  7; 
Priv.  aut iur.  imp.  p.  785.  Nic.  Cus.,  Conc.  cath.  111.  c.  3 and 5. 
Ant.  Ros.  I.  c.  11,  20-38,  47-49  and  56.  Declarations  of 
Frederick I. (Hofler, p.  64 ff.) and Frederick 11.  (in Pet. de Vin. ep. 
I.C.  1,p.g~;  c.g,p.122;  c.11,p.126;  c.25;  111.c.4~p.68;  V.C. 
I).  Passages from the poets in Hofler, p.  105-7.  For intermediate 
opinions, which he rejects, see Joh. Paris. c. I I ;  also  Lup. Bebenb. 
c.  g.  Ockham elaborately discusses the many possible shades of the 
doctrine  Imperium  a  Deo:  Octo  qu.  11.  c.  I, 3,  5;  IV. c.  8-9; 
VIII.  c.  5; Dial. 111. tr.  2, 1.  I, C.  25-28. 
Imperial-  41.  A feudal  relationship  between  Emperor and Pope is unani- 
ists on the 
papal  mously  denied:  the Kaiser  only  swears to defend:  Lup.  Bebenb. 
Claims.  c. g, P. 368-70,  and c.  13, p. 391-4;  Ockham, Octo qu. 11.  c.  11; 
VIII.  c.  I and 5 ;  Dial. III. tr.  2,  1.  I, C.  21 ;  the definition of rights in 
Ficker, Kurverein, p.  710;  Ant.  Ros. I.  c.  g, 47,  71.  On the  other 
hand,  but  few  men  flatly  deny the  power  of  the  Pope  to  act  as 
supreme  judge  over  the  Emperor  or  allow  only  purely  spiritual 
censures ratioione peccati:  among the few  are Frederick  11. (Petri de 
Vin. ep.  I.  c.  3) and Marsilius.  Others  admit that there is such  a 
power  to  be used  in  extraordinary  cases,  or  explain  the  acts  of 
jurisdiction  which the Popes have really performed as the outcolne of 
voluntary submission.  Of  this  more below.  There is much hesita- 
tion  over the Translati0 Imperii [from  Greeks to Germans] and its 
legal  justification:  also  over  the  part  played  by  the  Pope  in  the 
Election of an Emperor.  Marsilius (11.  26) denies to the Pope any 
right of e:  tmining the election.  Usually some right  of  deciding, for 
certain ecclesiastical purposes, who is  de facfo  Emperor is allowed to 
the  Pope-  See e.g.  Lup. Bebenb.  c.  10, p.  370-4;  Ockham, Otto 
gu. 11.  C.  ro; Dial.  111.  tr.  2, 1.  I,  c.  21;  Ant.  Ros. I.  c.  48.  Lupold 
v.  Br3enburg (c.  12) goes  further, and concedes  a  power  to  solve 
dr .ots  in cases of  double elect~on,  since the law  of  God gives the 
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Pope power to decide a'ubia iuris, and the law of necessity gives him 
power to decide dzlbia facti.  He even maintains (c.  I I, 13 and 16) 
that  the coronation  is  no bare  ceremony, for,  though  the  Election 
gives the Elect imperial power  over the lands held  by  Charles  the 
Great before the Translatio Imperii, it is the coronation which makes 
him  Emperor of  the rest  of  the  world.  This opinion  (see  against 
it  Ockham,  Oct.  q.  IV.  c.  1-3  and  7)  failed  to  obtain  supporters. 
At  any  rate  after  the  Kurverein  [meeting  and declaration  of  the 
~lectors]  at Rense, the imperialist party held  that the unction  and 
coronation were  mere  solemnities, which  played  no greater  part  in 
the case of  the elected emperor than that which they played in the 
case of  an hereditary king ;  they in no way attested a papal overlord- 
ship.  Comp. Joh.  Paris. c.  19;  Articuli  of  1338 in Bohmer, Fontes 
IV.  p.  594,  a.  2;  Documents  in  Ficker,  Kurverein  von  Rense, 
PP.  699 fX  esp.  p.  710,  a.  4; Marsil. Pat.  11.  c.  26  and De transl. 
imp.  c.  12 ;  Ockham,  Octo qu.  11.  c.  10 ;  V.  c.  1-10  ;  VI.  c.  1-2  ; 
VII.  c.  1-2  ;  VIII.  C.  I  ff. ;  and Dial.  111.  tr.  2,  1.  I, c.  21 ;  Somn. 
Virid. I.  c. 166-9  ;  Joh.  de Anan.  c.  6, X.  I, 6, nr.  7.  (At  a  later 
time the  Church Party had  recourse  to the supposition  of  a privi- 
Zegium  bestowing  on the Emperor  Elect the ius adtninistrandi ante 
coronationem.)  Ecclesiastical claims to a guardianship of  the Empire 
were  disputed by  Marsilius  and Ockham;  but  the latter admitted 
that they might  perhaps  be founded upon  an auctoritas proceeding 
from  the Empire itself:  Octo qu. 11.  c.  14; and Dial. III. tr.  2,  1.  I, 
C.  22. 
42.  The principle that Christ's kingdom is not of this world was The 
interpreted in numberless ways by the anti-clerical opposition.  The Church  a purely  is 
commonest  exposition  comes to this, that ex iure divino the Church Spiritual 
has no worldly iurisrEciio, and as regards  property can only demand 
Realm. 
SO much as is necessary for her support and divine service ;  but that 
she is capable  of  acquiring by title of  Positive Law (ex concessione 
et permissione  principum) a wider field of  lordship  and ownership, 
and also  may  in  case of  necessity  exercise worldly rights.  Comp. 
Job. de Paris.  prooem.  and c.  13-14.  Ockham,  Octo q.  I.  c.  6, 
ad. 2,  7-9,  10,  11.  C.  6,  111.  C.  1-2,  VIII.  C.  5 ;  Dial. I.  6, c. 3, 111. 
tr.  I, 1.  I, c.  g,  13,  15, 1.  2,  C.  2  a.nd  29,  tr.  2, 1.  I, c.  rg and 24. 
Michael  Cesena,  ep.  d.  a.  1333 (Goldast,  11.  1238 ff,).  Quaest, in 
utramque, a. 3.  Disput. p. 677 ff.  Somn. Virid. I. c. 1-16,  11.  c. I ff. 
and 303; Petr. de Aliac., I.  667  and 674 ff. ;  Greg. Heimb. a. 1433 
(Gold.  I.  560  ff.  and 11.  1604 ff.);  Ant.  Ros.  c.  20-38  and 50. 
These  principles  in  themselves  remained  unaffected  by  the  ever 
renewed  complaints of the growing worldliness of  the Church (e.g I 22  Political  Theoyies of the Middle  Age. 
Dante,  11.  c.  12-13),  and by  the dispute  among the  Franciscans 
touching Evangelical  Poverty.  Still hardly ever were there wanting 
extremer opinions  which  flatly denied the Church's  competence to 
wield worldly power or to hold  any-or  any unnecessary-property. 
This is the case of Marsilius, who therefore (but in this he stands nearly 
alone) denies to the Church any 'coactive jurisdiction,'  and therefore 
any coercion  of  consciences,  even  in purely  spiritual matters.  See 
also Wyclif, Supplem. Trialogi, p.  407 ff.,  and art.  I7 ;  Hus, Determ. 
de abl. temporal. a clericis. 
~~~~d~l-  43.  Comp. Sachsensp. I.  a.  I.  Dante, III. c.  16 in fine:  despite 
istscou-  the separation,  the  Kaiser  should  do reverence  to the  Pope  as a 
cede Su- 
penor  first-born  son  to  a  father:  mortalis  illa  felicitas  quodammodo  ad 
Dignity  immortalem  felicitatem  ordinatur.  Joh.  de Paris.  c.  15  and  18. 
of the 
Church.  Ockham, Octo qu.  I. c. 3 and 14.  Somn. Virid. 1.  c. 83-84.  Baldus, 
1.  I I, C. I, 14, nr. 4, and prooem. Dig. nr. I 7-19:  the Pope superior 
to the Emperor, non simpliciter, but in pz~ibusdam.  Similarly Joh. de 
An. c. 6, X.  I, 33, nr. 6.  Comp. Heinrich v. Langenstein, in Hartwig, 
I. p.  52, n.  I.  Ant.  Ros. I.  c.  63.  In this  sense it was  possible  to 
accept  the comparison with  Soul and Body: better  still,  that with 
Sun and Moon, both of  which were created by God, each having its 
own powers and duties, though the orb of  day was the higher. 
The  44.  Thus already  Hugo Floriac.  I.  c.  2,  and  11.  pp.  46,  65. 
Celestial 
Headgives Dante, III. c.  12 : true it is that  Emperor  and Pope must ad unum 
sufficient  redu&;  but while,  if  we  consider them as homines, the measure will 
Unity to 
the ,,,  be  that  of  the 'optimus homo, qui est mensura  omnium et idea,' if 
Powers.  we  consider them as office-holders, $se  Deus is the commu~zis  unitas 
which is  super-posed above their relationes and dzferential'ia.  Joh. 
Paris.  c.  18-19  : una  est  ecclesia,  unus  populus,  unum  corpus 
mysticum;  but  the  unity  rests  in  Christ,  and  under  Him  the 
Priesthood  and Realm  are two  distinct  offices:  as distinct  as the 
offices of  teacher and physicizn when held by one man.  Quaest. in 
utramque p.  103, ad. 4-5.  Ockham, Octo qu.  I.  c.  I and 18 ;  Dial. 
111%  tr.  I, 1.  2, c.  I  and  30.  Miles in Somn. Virid. I.  c. 38, 46, 48, 
102,  11. c.  102, 305-312.  Anton.  Ros.  I.  c. 42. 
Church  45.  It need  hardly  be  said  that  even  the  Popes  and  their 
and State  supporters often  teach  that  amicable  relations between  Priesthood  In co- 
operation.  and Realm are a necessary  condition  for  the weal  of  Christendom. 
Thus Gregory VII. with  great  emphasis : lib.  I, ep.  19, ann.  1073, 
p.  302.  IVO  of  Chartres  (above,  Note  20).  S.  Bernard,  ep.  244, 
p.  440  ff.;  De consid.  11.  c.  8.  Innocent  111.  (above,  Note  26). 
Inr ,cent  IV.  (above,  Note  26).  But  what  is  peculiar  to  the 
cpponents of  Church-Sovereignty is the doctrine that  in this world 
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the Unity of  the two powers goes no further than the establishment 
of these good relations.  Thus already Hugo Floriac. prol. I.  C.  3, 12, 
11.  p.  46,  50 : God  instituted,  hallowed  and  connected  the  two 
powers, by which in this  present  life the Holy Church is ruled  and 
governed, and He desired  their  inward  harmony:  they are the two 
eyes of  the corpus ecclesiae,  the two  lights  in tota  mund  fabrica,  two 
pillars, two wings.  See also Const. Frider. 11. ann. 1220, $ 7 in M. G. L. 
11.  p.  236.  Sachsensp. I, a. I, with the gloss to this art.  and to  111. 
art. 57.  Also Declaration of the Princes of the Empire, ann. 1274, in 
Raynald,  ann. nr.  11 : et ii duo gladii in domo  domini  constituti, 
intirnae  dilectionis  foedere  copulati,  exsurgant  in  reformationem 
universi populi Christiani.  Likewise Rudolf I. ;  see also citations in 
Hofler,  p.  121 &  Eng.  Volk.  De ortu,  c.  22.  Joh.  Paris.  c.  14. 
Definition  of  Rights  in  Ficker,  op.  cit.  p.  710,  art.  4,  ann.  1338. 
Quaest. in utramque partem, p.  105, ad. 11.  Ockham, Octo q.  I. c. 3 
and 14.  Miles in Somn. Virid.  I.  c.  49-54.  Ant. Ros. III.  C.  15- 
18.  Johannes in Introduction  to the Briinner  Schoffenbuch.  But 
the idea of 'harmonious concordance' between two powers which are 
two vital functions of the one mystical body attains its most splendid 
form in the hands of  Nicholas  of Cues: especially, 111. c. I, 12 and 14. 
46.  Hugh of  Fleury  teaches  on the one hand that the bishops Supe- 
are subject to the royal power, 'non natura, sed ordine, ut universitas g2zcfn 
regni ad unum redigatur principium,'  even as Christ is subject to the Spirituals 
Father  (I.  c.  3,  and  11. p.  58 and 65),  and,  on the other hand, that g:t:in 
kings are subject to the  spiritual power  (I.  c.  7,  p.  30 ff.,  c.  9-10,  Tem- 
".  pp.  53-5,  59-60).  He blames  Gregory VII.  (11.  p.  58), and porals' 
even concedes the royal appointment  of  bishops, subject however to 
the approval of  the ecclesiastical  power  and to spiritual  investiture 
(I.  C.  5, and 11. p.  57).  Joh. Par. c.  14.  Qu. in utr. a. 4.  Ock. Oct. 
qu. 111.  C.  3, 8 and Dial.  III.  tr.  2, 1.  I, c.  24.  Som.  Vir. 11.  c.  112, 
114,  124.  Theod.  a  Niem,  Priv.  p.  785.  Nic.  Cus.  111.  c.  I, 4. 
Ant.  Ros.  I.  47,  48,  56,  63,  64,  I".  c.  16,  21  and  the  summary 
in  56 : the  monarchia  diz~ina and  monarchia  temporalis  are  co- 
ordinated  by  God;  each  is  subject  to  the  other  in  that  other's 
province;  and 'mixed'  affairs should be  treated  by 'mixed' councils. 
AS to particulars:-the  subjection  of  Emperor  and Princes  to the 
Church  ratione $dei  et peccati  is  conceded  (see  Host.  de  accus. 
nr.  7 and see the admission in the  Sachsenspiegel,  III. a. 54, 8 3 and 
57, $ I, that the Kaiser  is within  the 'rightful'  ban of  the Church); 
also princes are in duty bound to lend to the Church the aid of  the 
lay arm (Dictum Gratiani before Dist.  97 and after c. 28, C. 23, q. 8 ; 
Const.  of  1220,  3  7,  M.  G.  L.  11.  236;  Sachsensp.  I.  a.  I; Gerson, 124  Political Theories of the Middle Age. 
IV.  fj06  and  61~);  but,  on the other  hand,  a  temporal jurisdiction 
over  the  in temporal  causes is  asserted  (Ockham,  Octo 
qu.  111.  c.  2 ;  and Dial.  I.  6,  c.  1-65,  91-100,  III.  tr.  2,  1.  3, c. 
16-23;  Ant. Ros. I.  c.  29, 30, 53, 63; Gloss on Sachsensp. I.  a. I). 
Occasional  47.  Job.  Paris,  c.  24  and  18  (per  accidens).  Lup.  Bebenb. 
inter-  c.  12,  p.  379,  385, 386 (necessitas facti aut iuris).  Ockham, Octo 
ference of 
Popein  qu.  I.  C.  IT,  11.  C.  4,  7-9,  12,  14,  III.  c.  2, IV.C.~,VIII.C.~,~~~ 
Temporal  Dial.  111.  tr.  I,  1.  r, c.  16 and 1.  3,  c.  4  (casualiter  in  defectum 
Affairs. 
iudicis).  Somn. Virid.  I.  c.  150-151,  164-165,  11.  c.  4-1  2, 136. 
Ant. Ros. III.  c.  22.  Gloss  on Sachsensp. I.  a.  I, 111.  a. 52  and 57. 
Klagspiegel,  I I 9. 
occasional  48.  Petrus Crassus, pp. 27 and 31 (right to summon a Council); 
inter-  p,  48  (right  to  sit  in  judgment  on  a  Pope).  Hugo  Floriac.  11. 
ference of 
~~i~~~i~  pp.  57-9  (appointment  of  Popes  and  decision  of  ecclesiastical 
spiritual  disputes).  Nilus arch. Thessal. De primatu, 1.  11.  p.  38.  Joh. Paris. 
Affairs. 
c.  14.  Mich. de Caes. ep.  Gold. 11.  pp.  1244-1261.  Petrarca,  ep. 
xv. ib. 1365.  Ockham, Octo q. I.  c.  12,  17, 11.  C.  7, 111.  c. 8, IV.  C.  6; 
Dial. 111.  tr.  2,  1.  2,  C.  2-15,  1.  3, C.  2 and 4.  Randuf, De mod. un. 
c.  15 and 20.  Nic.  Cus. III. c.  15 and 40 (the Emperor may himself 
undertake ecclesiastical  reforms).  Zabar.  c.  6,  X.  I, 6, nr.  15, and 
De schism.  p.  689 ff.  Greg.  Heimb.  in Gold.  I.  561-563.  Ant. 
Ros.  I.  c.  48, 11.  c.  24,  25,  III.  c.  3.  Decius,  Cons.  151,  nr.  13.- 
Even  the  papalists  concede  certain  rights  which  they  explain  as 
flowing  from  the  Emperor's  advocatia over  the  Church  (Gloss  on 
c. 34, X.  I, 6, v.  carebit) :  thus the right to call a Council is conceded 
by  Aug.  Triumph. I.  q.  3,  a.  2,  and q.  5, a.  6, by Petrus a Monte, 
11.  nr. 5, and others, but contested by Alv. Pel. I. a.  22.  The papalists 
help themselves over historical instances  of  the exercise of  imperial 
rights (especially in the matter  of  papal  elections) by referring  such 
instances to concessions which the Church has revoked: e.g. Landulf. 
Col.  De transl.  Imp.  c.  6; Aug.  Triumph.  I.  q.  2,  a.  7 ;  Alv.  Pel. 
I. a.  I, and 37 sb  and cc. 
Unity  49.  See esp. Thom. Aquin. Summa cont. gent.  IV.  76  (sicut  est 
within the una ecclesia, ita oportet  esse unum  populum Christianum, with one 
Church.  capuf and one regillr~n)  ;  Lect. 2 ad Ephes.  IV.  (the ecclesia  as civitas 
etc.);  C-mm.  ad Ps.  45.  Alv.  Pel.  I.  a.  7,  13, 24-8,  36-8  and 
esp. 63. 
The  50.  For this reason the power of  the Church and of  its earthly 
Church  - iead con~prises,  though to a disputable extent, all the infidels in the  and the 
Infidels.  world, nay, it covers all past and future Mankind and so reaches into 
heaven  and  hell.  See Thom.  Aquin.  Sum. Theol. 11.  2,  q.  10-12, 
and 111.  q.  8, a.  1-3;  Host.  upon  c.  8, X.  3, 34; Aegid.  Rom.  De 
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pot. eccl. 11.  c.  7 ;  Aug.  Triumph. I.  q. 18, 23-4  and 29-35  ;  Alv. 
Pel.  I.  a.  13  A,  37  F-N,  40,  57;  Somn.  Virid.  11.  35;  Ant.  Ros. 
IV  C.  I. 
51.  In the eyes  of  the papalists  this is self-evident.  Gloss on The 
c, 3, X.  I, 41, v.  minoris:  ecclesia fungitur iure imperii.  Hostiensis, 
Summa  de r.  i.  i.  nr. 4: ecclesia  respublica  est,  quia  ius publicum Polity or 
consistit  in  sacris  et in  sacerdotibus.  Thom.  Aquin.  as  above  in Common 
wealth. 
Note 49.  Alvarius Pelagius,  I.  a.  61-3,  goes furthest:  the Church 
is  a  regnum,  and  indeed  the  one  universal,  holy  and  complete 
Realm;  and to it the whole  of  the '  Aristotelic-Thomistic'  theory of 
the  State is  applied.-But  even  the  Opposition  disputes  only  the 
worldly nature of  the Church, and does not deny to it the character 
of apolitia with magistrature and coercive power;  see above Note 42. 
Gerson and other writers  of  the same group declare that the Church 
is  a  communitas,  respublica, politia  iuris,  to  which  everyone  must 
belong;  see e.g.  Gerson, Op. III. p.  27 ;  Randuf, De modis uniendi, 
c. 2  (ib.  11.  p.  163):  ecclesia  Christi  est  inter  omnes  respublicas 
aut  societates  recte  ordinatas  a  Christo  superior.-The  treatment 
of  heresy  as  chen Zaesae  maiestatis  (Innoc.  111.  and  Gerson, 
111.  pp. 33, 63) and all coercion of  conscience have their roots here. 
52.  Ockham, Octo qu. I.  c.  I and 30, and III. c.  2 and 8; Dial. The 
III.  tr.  2,  1.  I, c. 3 and 8, 1.  3, c.  17.  See also Gerson, Trilogus, Op. :yi2p 
11.  p.  88, for some similar opinions that were expressed in his day.-  ternal 
Marsilius denies to the Church coercive power even in spirituals, and y2L;ed. 
this implies the negation of the necessity of  External Unity.  Gregory 
of Heimburg, I.  p.  557 ff.  goes near to this. 
52 a.  See Lechner, Joh. v.  Wiclif, I.  p.  541,  and 11.  p.  233.  The 
53.  See above all Dante, Mon. I.  Also Engelb. Volk., De ortu, Church as 
conceived 
C.  14,  15,  17-18;  De reg.  princ.  VII.  c.  32.  Ocliham,  Dial.  111.  by Wyclif 
tr.  2,  1.  I, C.  I.  Petrarca, ep.  VII.  (et  in terra  et in coelo  optima and 'IUSs 
Univer- 
semper  fuit  unitas  principatus)  and  ep.  VIII.  p.  1355.  Ant.  Ros. ,,lit,, 
1.  C.  5-7.  Aen.  Sylv.  c.  4,  10,  12.  of  the 
Empire. 
54.  Following in  the steps of Augustine, De civit.  Dei, v. c.  15, Legiti- 
theorists  elaborately prove that  the Romans  subdued the world  de macy 
iure,  though  at  times  they  were  guilty  of  violence.  The  chief gdke,, 
argument  consists  in  the  many  miraculous  judgments'  in  which Empire. 
God  manifested  his  choice  of  the  Romans,  on  account  of  their 
political virtues, to be the wielders of  that oficium  i?n$erii  for which 
they were  the aptum organum.  Thereby  He legitimated  their  wars 
and  victories.  Also  it  is  opined  that  in  all  their  conquests  they 
unselfishly kept 'the common good ' before  their eyes, and that this 
end justified  the means.  Comp.  esp.  Dante,  11. c.  1-11;  Engelb. 1 26  PoZiticaZ  Theorz'es of fhe Middle Age. 
Volk.  De  ortu,  15,  18;  Petrarca,  ep.  VII.  p.  1355;  Baldus,  1.  I, 
C.  I, I ;  Aen. Sylv. c.  3-5  ;  Petr. de Andlo, I.  c.  4-10;  Ant.  Ros. 
v. c.  I-2,  15-24;  and so also  ecclesiastical writers (e.g.  Ptol.  Luc. 
111.  c. 4-6  ;  Alv.  Pel. I.  a. 42)  even  though they  do not  allow that 
this impeyium was verum.  Then the lawyers add references  to the 
Corpus  Iuris  (esp.  1.  g,  D.  14,  z),  to the  legitimacy  of  the titles 
(testamento and bella  iusfa) by which dominion was acquired, and to 
the retroactive validation  by  voluntary subjection.  Comp.  Engelb. 
Volk.  c.  11;  Ockham,  Dial.  111.  tr.  2,  1.  I, c.  27  andl.  2,  c.  5:  ' 
consensus maioris  partis mundi:  a  corrupt intent does not prevent 
acquisition  of  rights.  Ant.  Ros.  V.  C.  1-30  : an elaborate  demon- 
stration of  the legitimacy  of  the Empire according to ius divinum, 
naturale, gentium et civile. 
~~~~~f~~  55.  Comp.  Jord.  Osnab.  C.  I, p.  43 ff.  and c.  8.  Dante, Mon. 
of the  TI. C.  12-3.  Eng. Volk. c.  11 and zo.  Ockham,  Octo qu. 11.  c. 5, 
Empire. 
IV.  c. 3, VIII.  C.  3 and Dial.  III. tr.  2,  1.  2,  c.  5.  Aen. Sylv. c. 6-8  : 
general  utility  required,  Nature  invented,  God  granted,  His Son 
hallowed, the consent  of  men confirmed, the Roman empire.  Ant. 
Ros. v. c.  18 and 29.-The  strictly ecclesiastical  doctrine  differed a 
little  from  this :-Christ  Himself  took  over  the Empire,  allowing 
Augustus to govern  as His Vicar;  He then  substituted for Himself 
Peter and Peter's  successors, and the subsequent emperors were their 
vicars;  and finally He caused Constantine to recognize this relation- 
ship  by  the  so-called  Donation;  Ptol. Luc. 111.  c.  13-18;  Petr. de 
Andlo,  I.  c.  11 and 13; comp.  Ockham,  Octo qu.  11.  c.  15.-Men 
are unanimous  that  the existing Reich  is  identical with  that  of  the 
Caesars;  Petr.  Crassus,  p.  26;  Dante,  1.  c.;  Ockham,  Octo  q. 
11.  C.  5, IV.  C.  3,  5,  7,  VITI.  C.  3,  Dial.  111.  tr.  2,  1.  I, c.  25  and 27. 
Only  Lupold  v.  Bebenburg  brings  into  play  the  rights  that  Karl 
the Great  had  before  he  was  crowned  Emperor;  and against  this 
Ockham,  Octo qu.  IV.  3,  protests.-Also  men  are unanimous  that 
the present Greek Emperor  is no longer a true Emperor, since he is 
no longer  united  to the true  Church : Joh.  Gal.  in appar.  Tancr. 
upon  Comp.  111.  in  Schulte,  Abhand.  [Vienna  Acad.]  vol.  66, 
P.  131;  Gloss  upon  C.  34,  X.  I,  6,  v.  t~ansklit  in  Germanos; 
Bartolc , 1.  24, Dig. de capt. 49,  15 ;  Ubertus de Lampugnano,  op. 
cit.;  Joh.  de Platea, 1.  un. Cod. 11, zo; Tengler, Laiensp.  56. 
Universal  56.  S. Bernh. ep. ad Lothar. in Gold. p.  66; ad Conr. ib. p.  67. 
Extent  Otto Frising.  Gesta,  I.  c.  23,  Chron.  VII.  c.  34.  Land.  Col.  De  of the 
Empire  transl.  c.  10: super  omnes  reges  et nationes  est  dominus  niundi. 
GI. on  11.  Feud. 53 pr.  Pet. de Vin.  ep. I.  c.  I, 2;  VI.  c.  30.  Alv. 
Pel.  I. a. 37 and 57; 11. a. 29.  Lup. Bebenb. c. 11, 13, 16.  Ockham, 
Otto q.  IV. c.  5  and  VIII.  c.  3.  Gloss  on  Sachsensp.  111.  a.  57. 
Baldus, 1.  I, Cod. I, I, nr.  I ff. and 11.  Feud. 53 pr.  Theod. a Niem. 
p.  785.  Randuf, De mod. un. c.  5 and 14 (p.  167 and 180).  Alex. 
Tart.  1.  26,  Dig. 36, I, nr.  2.  Aen.  Sylv.  c.  10.  Pet.  de Andlo  11. 
c.  2.  Tengler,  1,aiensp.  56.  The Empire  comprises  de iure even 
the infidels;  Joh. Gal. and Gloss on c.  34, X.  I, 6; Eng. Volk. c.  18 
(for even they are bound to us iure naturali vel gentium);  Ockharn, 
Dial.  111.  tr.  2,  1.  2,  C.  5; Ant.  Ros.  I.  c.  56.-The  content  of  the 
imperial  rights  is  variously  defined.  Lupold  of  Bebenburg, c.  15, 
distinguished  imperial  and  mediatized  lands:  in  the  latter  the 
Emperor  has  immediate  jurisdiction  only  over  the  rulers  and  a 
mediate jurisdiction  over  the subjects in case  of  default of  justice, 
or the like.  Ockham, Octo qu.  IV.  c. 3, 8, g, VIII.  c. 4: the Emperor 
is  a  Superior  with  right  to decide  matters  that  the  king  cannot 
decide,  and  with  power  to perform  certain  'reserved'  acts;  also 
(v. c.  6) with power to make new kings  in provinces that have none. 
Aeneas  Sylvius still  asserts  a  true feudal  lordship  over  all  princes 
and peoples;  they all  have their temporalities from  the Kaiser  and 
owe him obedience (c.  lo); he has a right of  'correction,'  may issue 
commands  pro  salute  communi,  impose  taxes,  demand  auxiliary 
troops,  right  of  transit,  provisions  (c.  14);  he may decide disputes 
among sovereigns.  Petr. de Andlo (11.  c.  8): legislation,  protective 
lordship,  taxation,  suzerain  power.  Nich.  of  Cues  (111.  c.  6-7) 
pares  down the imperium  mundi until  it  is  a  general  care  for  the 
common weal of  Christianity  especially in matters of  faith. 
57.  Jordan.  Osnabr.  c.  I, p.  43 ff.  and c.  10, p.  go.  Engelb. The 
Volk. c.  20-4.  Aug. Triumph. 11.  p. 42.  Baldus  sup. pace Const. ~~$"~'~ 
v.  imp. clem.  nr. 8.  Joh.  de Platea, 1. 2, C.  11, g, nr.  2.  Aen.  Sylv. tible dc 
c  8.  Ant. Ros.  I.  c.  67.  Petr. de Andlo, 11, c.  20.  facto. 
58.  The most  important  employment  of  this  principle  is  the The 
invalidation  of  the  Donation  of  Constantine.  Dante  III.  c.  10 
(scissa  esset  tunica  inconsutilis:  superius  dominium,  cuius  unitas tible de 
divisionem non patitur);  Quaestio in utramque p.  106, ad. 14; Ant.  iUye. 
ROS.  I.  c.  64-6,  70.  See below,  Note  283.  But  the principle  is 
also turned against kings and republics.  Lup. Bebenb. c. 11 and IS: 
true, that  by  privilege  or  prescription  hereditary  kingships  may  be 
founded and kings may acquire imperial rights in their realms and so 
far as concerns (puoad) their  subjects;  but  this is  only prescription 
quoad quid, and the Kaiser's  suzerainty is always reserved.  Ockham, 
Otto q.  111.  c.  7,  IV.  c.  3-5,  VIII.  3-4;  Dial.  III. tr.  2,  1.  I, c.  18, 
1.  2,  c.  5-9,  23.  Alv.  Pel.  11.  a.  29.  Baldus,  1.  I, Cod. I.  I, nr. 
13-22  and 11.  Feud. 53 pr.  Alex. Tart. 1.  26, Dig. 36, I, nr. 4.  Aen 128  POldicaG Theotyies  of the Middle Age. 
Sylvius, c.  11-13  :  it would  be against the ius nakrae, the common 
weal, the  of  Christ.  Petr. de Andl.  11.  c.  8 :  both swords 
are equally indivisible.  Bertach.  V.  imjerium. 
Exemp- 
tion from  59.  Land. Col.  De transl. c.  10.  Quaestio  in  utramque  p.  98, 
the Em-  Ioz,  art, 5,  106, ad.  14.  Andr.  de Is.  prooem.  Feud. nr.  29-35. 
pire by 
privilege  Nicol. Neap. 1.  6, § I, Dig.  27, I, nr.  z.  Hier. Zanetinus,  Diff. nr.  102. 
or Pre-  60.  Comp.  Eng.  Volk.  c.  18.  Baldus,  11.  Feud.  53 pr.:  the 
scription. 
Exemp- 
Empire would still remain universale, for universale and intepum are 
tions  not all one.  Comp.  prooem.  Dig. nr.  22-35.  Nic.  CUS.  Conc. 111. 
would not  c. I, 6, 7 :  it is 'imperium  mundi a maiori parte mundi,' and because 
destroy 
theoretical the imperial rights still remain, at least so far as concerns the protec- 
Univer- 
sality  tion of  the Christian faith. 
Necessity  61.  John of Paris, c. 3 :  whereas in the Church unity is required 
of an  by divine law, the faithful laity, moved by a natural instinct, which is 
Universal 
~~~l~  of  God, should live in different States ;  this difference is justified by 
denied.  the  differences  between  soul  and  body,  word  and  hand,  unity  of 
church-property and  division  of  lay  folk's  property,  unity  of  faith 
and diversity of  laws;  also appeal is made to Augustine;  comp.  c. 
16, 22, p.  210-2.  TO  the same effect, but with a 'perhaps,'Gerson, 
11.  238.  Disputatio,  p.  686-7.  Somn. Virid. I. c.  36:  only within 
each particular realm  need there be unity.-So  Marsilius, though he 
leaves  the question  open, remarks  that the unity of  the world  does 
not  prove the necessity of  an unicus princ$atus,  since a pluralitas 
can  constitute  a  unity (Def.  Pac.  I. c.  I 7;  in Transl. Imp. c.  12  he 
omits  Landulf's  mention  of  the  imjeriur~z mundz).-On  the other 
side,  see  Eng. Volk. c.  16  and 18; Ant. Ros.  11.  c. 4 and 7.  And, 
in  particular, Ockham,  Dial.  III.  tr.  2,  1.  I, c.  1-10.  Of  the five 
possible  views  that Ockham mentions  he  seems to prefer the fifth, 
viz.  that,  according  to circumstances,  sometimes unity,  sometimes 
severance will be desirable.  Comp. 1.  2,  c.  6-9. 
Wider and  62.  See Aegid.  Rom.  De reg. princ.  11.  I, c.  2.  Engelb.  Volk. 
narrower 
G~~~~~.  De ortu, c.  15, 17, 18:  as the example of Universal  Nature  shows a 
building-up towards  Unity,  so the ordo totius conzmunitatis publicae 
shows  an  ever-recurring  'subalternation'  until  a  single  point  is 
reached:  above  every  common  weal  stands  a  commoner:  every 
lower  nd  is  means to  a  higher  end: the sum total  of  thi~-~~rldly 
ends is means to an other-wordly end :  the 'felicityp  of every narrower 
depends  on  that  of  some wider  community,  and thus in  the last 
resort on the felicity of  the Empire.  Dante, I. c.  3 and 5.  See also 
A%.  Triumph.  I. q.  I, a.  6.  As  to the structure  of  the Chuch,  see 
Gierke, D. G.  1<. vol.  111.  § 8. 
63.  [The  difficulty  of  finding  an  exact  equivalent  for  the 
Notes.  129 
--- 
German Zweck has hampered the translator.  Our author means that 
in the medieval  scheme each  Partial Whole, e.g.  a village commune, 
has a Sonderzweck, an aim, object, purpose or end peculiar to it, and 
distinct  from  the  Zweck  of  any  larger  whole,  e.g.  the  kingdom.] 
Dante  (I.  c.  3  and 5),  in  particular,  makes  this  plain.  For him, 
every composite Being (plura ordinata  ad unum) has its Sonderzweck 
which makes it a unit.  This is the case with the homo singularis, the 
cornmunitas domestics,  the vicus,  the civitas, the regnunz.  No  one, 
however, more beautifully expresses the idea of  an organic articula- 
tion in unity and a relative independence of members in a 'harn~onious 
concord' of  the whole  body  than  does  Nicholas  of  Cues, e.g.  11. c 
27-28.  Comp. also Ant. Ros. I.  c. 6. 
64.  See  Aegid.  Col.  11.  I, c.  2  and Dante  1.  c.  (they  throw The 
provincia and regnum into one);  Ockham, Dial.  III. tr. I, 1.  2, c.  3-5.  ~,":,","1',"',"~ 
[Elsewhere, D.  G.  R. III. 356, Dr Gierke has stated the doctrine  of  tion of 
the  legists.  They  incline  towards  a  triple  gradation  of  local :,":munib 
universitates,  (I) vicus,  villa,  castrum,  ojpidum,  (2)  civitas,  a  city- 
territory, such as may be found in Italy, (3) provincia  or regnunz.]- 
Thom.  Aquin.  De reg.  princ.  I.  c.  I, distinguishes famiha,  civitas, 
provincia (regnum).  Engelb.  Volk.  in one of  his  writings  (De reg. 
prin.  11.  c.  2-3)  stops  at  the  civitas,  which  also  embraces  the 
regnum;  in  another  (De ortu,  c.  7  and  12) he  says  that  Aristotle 
distinguished  five  communities  (domus,  vicus,  civitas,  provincia, 
regnum, to which  imperium  must  be added,) while Augustine  made 
only  three  (domus,  urbs,  orbis).-Aug.  Triun~ph.  1.  c.,  makes five 
communitatts in the  mystical  body  of  the  Church:  the vicus  with 
a  parson,  the  civitas  with  a  bishop,  provincia  with  archbishop, 
regnum with patriarch, conzmunitas totius orbis with pope.-Ant.  Ros. 
I.  C.  6, distinguishes as standing above the individual and the house- 
hold, five '  corpora mystica universitatum':  (I) cornmunitas urzius ziti, 
castri, oppidi, underparochus and magister;  (2) civitatis under bishop 
and d@ensor;  (3) provinciae under archbishop and praeses;  (4) regni 
under primas and rex ;  (5) universi orbis under Pope and Kaiser. 
65.  This rich development of  thought  has been  overlooked  by 
van  Krieken,  Die  sog.  organische  Staatstheorie,  pp.  26-39;  also 
Held,  Staat u.  Gesellschaft, p.  575 is incorrect. 
66.  In what follows we  shall only pay heed  to those sides of  the 'The 
Organic Comparison [i.e.  the comparison of  the body politic  to the :A!: 
body  natural]  which  become  of  importance  in  legal  theory.  We parison.' 
may,  however,  notice  in  passing  its  connexion  with  some  of  the 
pictorial  concepts of  ecclesiastical  law (e.g. the spiritual marriage of 
the prelate  with  his  church,  the  family relationship  of  a  daughter- 
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to a  mother-church)  and with  some  poetical  allegories:  as 
e.g. the statue of Nebuchadnezzar's  dream (cf. Gerson, IV.  662) or the 
installation  of  the  Empire  (Lup.  Beb.  ritmat.  querul.  in  Boehmer, 
Fontes, I.  479).  The application  to the Church of  sthe Six Ages' 
(Gold. I.  p.  25 ff.  c.  3-7)  and the remarks as to the Ages and Faults 
of  the Empire in Eng. Volk. De ortu et fine, c.  21  and 23, show the 
same tendency. 
The  67.  See e.g. B. Gregor. in c. I, Dist. 89.  Concil. Paris. ann. 829 
Mystica1  (above, Note 7).  Jonas  of  OrlCans (above, Note 7).  Gregory VII.  ,  Body and 
the Pope  (abose, Note 45).  IVO  of  Chartres (above, Note 20).  S.  Bern. Ep. 
as its  of  1146  (above,  Note  7).  Gerhoh  of  Reichersp.  (above,  Note  7). 
Head. 
Thom. Aquin. (above,  Note  7).  Ptol. Luc. De reg. princ. 111.  c.  10 
(above, Note  12).  Gl. on c.  14, X.  5,  31,  v.  unum corpus.  Innoc. 
c.  4, X.  2,  12,  nr.  3.  Alv.  Pel.  I.  a.  13.  Joh.Andr.c.4,X.  1,6, 
nr.  13.  Domin. Gem. c.  17 in Sex~o  I, 6, nr. 4-16. 
Bicephal-  68.  Alv.  Pel. I. a. 13 F and a.  37 R-Q.  Somn. Virid. 11.  c. 6 ff. 
ism would  Ockham,  Dial. 111.  tr.  I, 1.  2,  c.  I.  Aug. Triumph. 1.  q.  5,  a.  I  and 
be mon- 
strous.  q.  19, a.  2 : the Pope is 'caput  universalis  ecclesiae ...  et capitis est 
influere vitam omnibus membris.'  Elsewhere (I. q.  I, a. I and 6) he 
makes  the  Pope the vitalizing  heart,  and then (I.  q.  rg, a. 2)  says 
that he is not  contradicting himself, since in metaphorical discourse 
comparisons may  be  varied  so as to bring  out  various  likenesses. 
Johannes Andreae, Nov.  s.  c.  13, X. 4,  17.  Card. Alex.  D.  15, and 
c. 3, D.  21.  Ludov.  Rom.  Cons. 345, nr. 3 ff.  Petrus a Monte, De 
prim. pap. I.  nr.  16 (Tr. U.  J.  XIII.  I, p.  144). 
Need for a  69.  Engelb.  Volk.  De ortu, c 15,  I 7, 18.  Petrarca, Ep. VII. . 
Tempora1  the orbis universus,  l~eing  a  magnum  covpus,  can  only  have unum  Head. 
caput temporale, for,  if  an animal biceps  would  be a  monster,  how 
much  more a many-headed beast.  Similarly in Ep. VIII.  Nic.  Cus. 
111.  c.  I and 41.  Ant. Ros. I.  c. 67.  Petr. de Andlo, 11.  c.  2. 
70.  The Knight in Solnn. Virid. 11.  c.  305-12. 
Possibility  71.  Lup. Bebenb. C.  15, pp. 399, 401 : not duo capita in solidurn, 
Many-  but a caput mediatum below a caput immedmtum, like kings below the  headed. 
ness.  Emperor, and bishops below an  archbishop.  Quaestio in utramque 
partem, p.  103.  Ockham, Dial. III. tr.  I, 1.  2,  c.  I and 30:  quamvis 
corpus  naturale  esset  monstruosum  si haberet  duo  capita ...  tamen 
corpus lnysticum potest habere plura capita spiritualia, quorum unum 
sit sub alio : so priests and king, whose i~ead  is God. 
The  72.  [Elsewhere,  D.  G.  R.  III.  112,  our  author  has  traced  this 
comparison  far  back  to the  Apostolic  Constitutions,  Chrysostom, 
as Soul 0 
the ~~d,  Gregory of  Nazianzus  and Isidore  cf  Pelusium.]  Ivo of  Chartres, 
Ep.  106 (above,  Note  20).  Joh.  Saresb. V.  c.  2, 3-5  Alex. Hal. 
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111.  q.  40,  m.  2.  Hugo de S.  Vict.  De sacram.  1.  11.  p.  2,  c.  4. 
Honor. Augustod. Summa gloria de  praecel. sacerd. in Migne, vol. 17 z. 
Innocent 111. in c.  6, X.  I, 33; Reg. sup. neg. imp. Ep.  18.  Thom. 
Aquin. Summa, 11.  2,  q. 60, art. 6,  ad 3 (potestas saecularis subditur 
spirituali,  sicut  corpus  animae).  Ptol.  Luc.  nr.  c.  10.  Alv.  Pel. 
1.  a.  37 R.  Cler. in Somn. Virid.  I.  c.  37, 43, 45, 47, 101. 
73.  The knight  in  Somn.  Virid.  (I.  c.  38,  44,  46,  48,  102, The 
Represent  - 
11.  102) asserts that Christ alone is the Soul, while  the spiritual and  of 
temporal  powers  are the two  principal  members,  head  and heart, Soulby  the Priest- 
equally directed by the Soul, but endowed with separate powers and hood ques- 
activities.-On  the other hand, Marsilius  sees the priesthood  as no tioned. 
more than one among many members. 
74.  Nic.  Cus.  I.  c. 1-6,  III.  c.  I, 10, 41.  [The main  part  of   he 
this note has been  taken  into our text.  Cusanus proceeds to show :,"%::- 
the  parallelism  between  spiritual  and  temporal  assemblies : e.g. ance of 
between  the Cardinals and the prince-Electors.] 
Nicholas 
v.  Cues. 
75.  Joh. Saresb. v.  c.  2 :  est  respublica  corpus  quoddam, quod ~h,  ~~d~ 
divini muneris  beneficio  animatur et summae aequitatis agitur nutu Mystical9  Moral 
et regitur  quodam  nloderamine  rationis.  Vincent  Bellovac.  Spec. 
doctr,  VII.  c.  8 : to the like effect : de corpore reipublicae mystico. 
Hugo Floriac. I. c.  2 :  corpus regni :  also c.  I, 3, 4.  Thom. Aquin. 
De reg.  princ.  I.  c.  I, 12-14  ;  Summa Theol. 11.  I, q.  81, a.  I : in 
civilibus omnes  homines  qui  sunt  unius  communitatis  reputantur 
quasi unum corpus et tota communitas quasi unus homo.  Ptol. Luc. 
11. c.  7 : quodlibet regnum sive civitas sive castrum sive quodcunque 
aliud collegium assimilatur humano corpori ;  IV.  C.  23.  Eng. Voll<. 
De  reg.  princ.  111.  c.  16 : civitas  vel  regnum  est  quasi  quoddam 
unum  corpus animatum ;  c.  19 : corpus naturale ;  corpus morale  et 
politicum.  Mars.  Pat.  I.  c.  15.  Ockham, Octo q. VIII.  c.  5,  p.  385 ; 
1  I  tr.  I, 1  2,  c.  I; tr.  2,  1 I, c.  I.  Gerson,  IV.  598,  600, 601. 
Zabar.  c.  4,  X.  3,  10, nr.  2-3  : ad similitudinem corporis humani. 
Aen.  Sylv.  c.  18 : mysticum  reipublicae  corpus.  Ant. Ros. I.  c.  6 : 
five-fold corpus mysticum (above, Note 64).  Martinus Laudens. De 
repress.  (Tr.  U.  J.  XII.  279)  nr.  5  and  6 : universitas  est  corpus 
mysticum  quod  continet  partes  suas,  i.e.  singulos  de universitate. 
Bertach. v.  capituZum, f.  150, nr. 4. 
76.  Joh.  Saresb.  v.  c.  I ff.  The servants  of  Religion  are the Anthropo 
Soul of the Body and therefore have principatum  totius corporis, the r':",:?,"," 
prince is the head, the senate the heart, the court the sides, officers 
and judges are the eyes, ears and tongue, the executive officials are 
the unarmed and the army is  the armed  hand, the financial depart- 
ment is belly and intestines,  landfolk,  handicraftsmen  and the like 
9-  2 132  PoZiticnZ  Theories of  the Middle Age. 
-  - 
are  the  feet,  so that  the State exceeds the centipede  numerositate 
pedum;  the  protection  of  the folk  is  the shoeing;  the  distress of 
these  feet  is  the  State's  gout  (vi.  C.  20). 
The be-  77.  Joh.  Saresb.  v.  c.  1.  Compare  Wyttenbach,  Plutarchi 
ginnings of  Anthropo- Moralia,  Oxonii  1795,  I.  p.  Ixviii &;  Schaarschmidt, Joh.  Sares- 
morphism.  beriensis,  Leipzig  1862, p.  123.-The  incitement  to comparison  of 
particular pieces  of  the State with particular members of  the human 
body  is  due  in  part  to  the  words  of  St Paul  (see  esp.  in c.  1, 
Dist.  89,  the application  of  the idea of  nzembra  in cotpore to  the 
divers o@cia  of  the Church, where the Apostle is vouchetl);  and is 
also due to a continuous tradition of the pictorial phrases of classical 
writers.  This may  be seen already in Lex Wisigoth. 11.  I, § 4; also 
in the ancient Introduction  to the Institutes  in  Fitting,  Juristische 
Schriften  des  friiheren  Mittelalters  (Halle  1876),  p.  148,  $  20: 
Princeps  quasi  primum  caput.. .illustres  quasi  oculi..  .spectabiles 
manus ...  clarissimi  thorax ...p edanei  pedes : and so in  the  Church. 
Anthropo-  78.  Thus Vincent.  Bellovac.  Spec.  doct.  VII.  c.  8-14;  close 
mOrphism  agreement  with  John of  Salisbury.  Ptol. Luc. 11.  c.  7,  IV.  c.  I I and  continued. 
25 ;  vouching  the  Policraticus.  Engelb.  Volk.  De reg.  princ.  III. 
c.  16 : the  rulers  are the soul, the citizens the various limbs : 'cui 
deputatur  a  natura  unumquodque  simile  membrum  in  corpore! 
Aen.  Sylv.  c.  18.-Marsilius  is  freer  from  these  vagaries,  notwith- 
standing the use that he makes of his knowledge of medicine. 
The  79.  Nic.  Cus. I.  C.  10, 14-17,  and III. c.  41.  In the 'Spiritual 
Anthypo-  Life,' which  in  its totality represents  the soul, Christ Himself  is the 
morphism 
and state-  single heart,  whence  in the guise of  arteries  the canones  branch  in 
Medicine  every direction, so that even  the Pope does not  stand above them 
of  Cu- 
but  must fill himself  with  them.  In the 'Corporal Life' the offices 
from the Kaiser's  downwards are the several limbs, the leges are the 
nerves,  and the leges  impel-ides are the brain,  so that by them  the 
head,  that  is,  the  Emperor,  must  be  bound.  The patria  is  the 
skeleton  and  the flesh  is  represented  by  changing  and  perishing 
honzines.  The health of the State consists in the harmony of the four 
temperaments.  Diseases of the body politic should be treated by the 
Emperor in accordallce with the counsel of  books and of experienced 
state-phycicians.  He should  himself  test  the  medicine  by  taste, 
smell and sight that it may suit time and place, and then  bring  it  to 
the teeth  (privy council), stomach (grand council) and liver (judicial 
tr'junal) for  digestion  and  distribution.  If  preservative  measures 
'  .il, then  in the last resort he must proceed to amputation, but this 
will be cum dolore compassionis. 
80.  Joh.  Saresb. vr.  c. 20-5. 
Notes.  I33 
81.  Thom.  Aquin.  Summa Theol.  III.  q.  8 : a  demonstration Some 
Theories 
that '  tota ecclesia  dicitur  unum corpus mysticum per similitudinem of 
ad naturale corpus humanum':  Christ the head, all rational creatures Aquinas. 
the members of  this body.  Aquinas  remarks, however, that this is 
similitude, not identity.  As points of  difference he notices that past 
and future men are members of  the mystical body, and that parts of 
it  are in their turn independent  bodies, so that there may be divers 
heads and heads of  heads (caput capitis) corresponding to its mani- 
fold articulation.  Then the various Conditions of Grace are pictured 
as  internal  degrees  of  membership  (art.  3).  Then  he  explains 
Original  Sin by saying that all born  of  Adam  may be considered ui 
unw homo, and also tanpuarn  multa  rnembra zcnius corporis, but that 
the act of  one member of  the natural  body, e.g.  the hand,  'non est 
voluntarius voluntate ipsius manus, sed voluntate animae quae primo 
movet  membrum':  Summa Theol.  I.  q.  81,  a.  I.  With  the same 
idea  of  the  Body  hiiystical  he connects the doctrine  of  the seven 
sacraments;  whereof  two  operate for the spiritual and bodily main- 
tenance  and  increase  of  the  Whole,  and five  for  the  placing  of 
Individuals in the way of grace :  Summa Theol. 1x1, q. 65 ff. ;  Summa 
cont. gentil. IV.  q.  58 ff. ;  Lect.  2 ad Rom.  12.  Also  the differences 
of  ecclesiastical  office  and  calling  he deduces from  the necessary 
existence  of  divers  members  in the one body  with  the one soul; 
Lect.  2  ad Rom.  12;  Lect.  3 ad I.  Corinth.  12.  Comp. Alv.  Pel. 
I.  a. 63.  Also Catechism. Rom. P.  11.  c.  7, q.  6. 
82.  Ptol. Luc.  IV.  c.  23 :  therefore Augustine compares the State Harmony 
to  a  melodious  song,  while  Aristotle  likens  it  to  a  naturale  et $,zit 
organicurn corpus. 
83.  Aegid.  Rom.  De reg.  princ.  I.  2, c.  12 ;  comp. I.  I, c.  13 ;  Co-ordina- 
tion of 
1x1.  I, c.  5  and 8 ;  III.  2,  C.  34;  III.  3,  C.  I  and c.  23  (wars the Limbs. 
medicine  of  human  society). 
84.  Eng.  Volk.  De  reg.  princ.  c.  I 6.  In  c.  I 8-3  I  the Goods of 
State and 
parallelism  is  displzyed  in  the  matter  of  the  five  internal  borza  Goods of 
(sanitas,  pulchritudo,  magnitudo,  robur,  potentia  agonistica  regni) vidual.  Indi- 
2nd the six external bona  (nobilitas,  amicitia, divitiae, honorabilitas, 
potentia,  bona fortuna regni). 
85.  Mars. Pat. 1.  c.  z, and for the details c.  15.  Comp. c. 8, 17, 
and 11.  c.  24. 
86.  Ockham,  Octo qu.  I.  c.  11, and vr~r.  c.  5, p.  385.  Thus, Mutually  Suppletive 
e g. the lame try to walk with their hands and those who are handless power 
must take to biting:  sic in corpore mystico et in collegio seu univer- among  Organs. 
sitate,  uno dehciente,  alius,  si  habet  potestatem,  supplet  defectum 
eius.  Comp. Dial. 111.  tr.  2,  1.  3, c.  2 and 4, where the common and 134 Political  Theories of the Middle Age.  Notes.  I35 
-  - 
specific functions of clergy and laity as divers members of the Church 
are distinguished, and  at the  same time it is remarked  that in the 
mystical body  there  is  a  much  greater  call  than  there  is  in  the 
natural body for one member to discharge in cases of  necessity the 
functions assigned to another by positive law. 
The Idea  87.  Joh.  Saresb.;  see above,  Note  75.  Thom.  Aq.  De reg. 
of Mem- 
bership.  princ. I.  c.  12;  Summa Theol. 11.  2,  q.  58, a.  5,  111.  q. 8, a.  I,  and 
above, Note  81.  Aegid.  Rom.;  above Note  83.  Eng. Volk.  III.  c. 
16.  Alv.  Pel. I.  a. 63 : ecclesia est...unum  totum ex multis partibus 
constitutun~  et sicut unuln corpus ex multis membris compactum :  in 
details he follows the learning of S.  Thomas.  Baldus, prooem. Feud. 
nr.  32 : imperium  est  in  similitudine  corporis  humani,  a  quo,  si 
abscinderetur auricula, non esset corpus perfectum sed monstruosum. 
Nic.  Cus.;  above,  Note  79.  Aen.  Sylv.  c.  18.  Ant.  Ros.  I.  c.  67 
and 69. 
Likeness  88.  Comp.  the  definition  of  ora'o  (obtained  from  Aug.  De 
and Un-  civ. Dei, 1.  19, c.  13) in Hug.  Floriac. I.  c.  I and 12,  p.  45 and Ptol.  likeness 
among  Luc.  IV.  g : parium  et disparium  rerum  sua  cuique  loca  tribuens 
Members.  dispositio.  Then Thom. Aq.  (Summa Theol. I.  q.  96,  a.  3) starting 
from  this,  concludes  that,  even  had  there  been  no Fall  of  Man, 
inequality among men mould have developed itself 'ex natura absque 
defectu naturae';  for 'quae a  Deo sunt, ordinata  sunt'  and 'ordo 
autem maxime videtur  in  disparitate  consistere.'  See also Summa 
adversus gentiles,  1x1.  c.  81.-Then  all  Estates, groups, professional 
gilds  and the like  appear  as parfes civifatis to writers who rely on 
Aristotle : especially to Marsilius (11.  c.  s),  who  distinguishes  three 
partes  vet  oflcia  civitatis  (in  a  strict  sense),  namely,  the military, 
priestly and judicial  orders, and three parfes vel  o@cia  civitatis (in a 
wider  sense)  namely,  agriculture,  handicraft  and trade.  A  similar 
idea is applied to the Church;  e.g. by Aquinas : see above Note 81. 
Alv.  Pel. I.  a.  63 G : the triple distinction  in  the Church (despite its 
unity)  according  to status,  oflcia  et graa'us  is likened to the triple 
distinction  among carnal members according to their natures, their 
*asks  and  their  beauties.  See  also  Randuf,  De  mod.  un.  c.  2 
(membra inaequaliter composita),  7 and I 7. 
Mediate  89.  k 'v.  Pel.  I.  a.  36 c :  there are indivisible  members, whose 
Articuh-  Parts would  not  be members;  e.g.  in the Church  the faithful man ;  tion. 
and there are divisible members, whose parts in their turn are mem- 
be  j,  as  e.g.  the  'particular  churches'  and  ecclesiastical  colleges. 
ltonius  de Butrio,  c.  4,  X.  I, 6, nr.  14-5  : membra de membro. 
hfarsil. Patav.  11.  24 : in the regimen  ciuile, as well as in the reghen 
eccZesiasficum, the  analogy  of  the  animal requires  a  manifold  and 
graduated articulation ;  otherwise there would be monstrosity ;  finger 
must  be  directly  joined,  not to head  but  to hand;  then  hand  to 
arm, arm to shoulder, shoulder to neck, neck to head.  Nic. Cus. 11. 
c.  27.  [Elsewhere, D.  G.  R. 111.  251,  our  author gives other illus- 
trations from Innocent IV., Johannes Andreae and others.] 
go.  Already S. Bernard (De consid. III. p.  82) exhorts the Pope Papal  Absolu- 
to pay regard  to the potestates  mediocres et  inferiores; otherwise  he tism and 
will be putting the thumb above the hand and alongside the arm and the  Mediate 
so  will  create  a  monster : '  tale  est  si in Christi  corpore membra Articula- 
aliter locas quam  disposuit  ipse.'  Marsilius  (11.  c.  24) employs the tion of the 
same picture  when  complaining  that  the Popes  have  impaired  the Church' 
form  of Christ's  mystical  body by disturbing its organic articulation, 
while that  body's  substance is  impaired  by  the corruption  of  the 
clergy.  The champions  of  the conciliar  party have recourse to the 
same analogy for proof that the mystical body will perish if all power 
be concentrated  in its highest  member.  See Randuf,  c.  17  (183); 
Greg. Heimb. De pot.  eccl. 11.  p.  1615 & 
91.  Ptol.  Luc.  11.  26,  where,  besides  the  organization  of  the Organiza- 
natural body, that of the heavenly spheres is add~~ced.  Marsil. Pat. ~~~$~ 
I.  c.  2  and  5 :  see above, p.  26.  Also Thom. Aquin. Summa cont. pendence. 
gentil. III. c. 76-83.  Alv.  Pelag. I.  a.  63 c (ordinatia).  Eng. Volk. 
1x1.  c.  21 : in ordinatione debita et proportione ad invicem ...p artium. 
Nicol.  Cus.  111.  c.  I :  omnia quae a  Deo sunt,  ordinata necessario 
sunt.  Petr.  de Andlo,  I.  c. 3. 
92.  Joh.  Saresb.  1.  c.  Thom. Aq.  Summa Theol. I. q. 81, a.  I;  The 
Lect.  2  ad Rom.  12 : in corpore  humano  quaedam  sunt  actiones Idea  Function.  of 
quae solum principalibus membris conveniunt, et quaedam etiam soli 
capiti; sed in ecclesia vicem capitis tenet papa et vicem principalium 
membrorum praelati maiores ut episcopi ;  ergo etc.-Ptol.  Luc. 11.  c. 
23 :  debet ...q uilibet  in suo gradu  debitam  habere  dispositionem  et 
operationem.  Marsil.  Pat.  I.  c.  2 (above, p.  26) and c 8: upon the 
formation  and separation of the parts of  the State, there must follow 
the  allotment  and  regulation  of  their  oficia,  'ad  instar  naturae 
animalis!  Alv. Pel. I.  a.  63 G :  diversi actus.  Ockham ;  above, Note 
86. 
93.  The difference between  an organ and a  mere limb is  sug- The Idea  of Organ. 
gested by Eng. Volk.  III. c. 16 :  pars civitatis andpars regni.  Comp. 
also Marsil.  Patav. I.  c.  5 ;  above, Note 8s. 
94.  Thom.  Aq.  Summa  Theol.  I.  q.  96,  a.  4 : quandoque The 
Governing 
multa ordinantur ad unum, semper invenitur  unum  ut  principale  et part. 
dirigens;  Summa cont. gentil.  IV.  q.  76.  Ptol.  Luc.  IV.  c. 23 : there 
must be a summum nzovens  controlling all  movements of  the limbs; I 36  Political Theories of the Middle Age. 
with this is compatible  'in  qualibet parte corporis  operatio propria 
primis  rnotibus  correspondens  et  in  alterutrum  subministrans.' 
Similarly Dante.  Comp.  Aegid.  Col.  111.  2,  C.  34: the king as soul 
of the body.  Marsil.  Pat.  I.  c.  r7 : in  the  State, as in  the animal 
bent  composiizlm,  there  must  be  a primum princtpium  et  movens ; 
otherwise  the organism  must  needs '  aut in contraria ferri aut omni- 
nlodo  quiescere '  :-this  is  the pars princ2pan.r.  Joh.  Par.  c.  I : 
quemadmodum  corpus  hominis  et  cuiuslibet  animalis  deflueret, 
nisi  esset  aliqua vis  regitiva  communis in corpore ad omnium mem- 
brorum commune bonum intendens, so every multitude of men needs 
a  unifying and governing  force.  In closely similar  words, Petr. de 
Andlo,  I.  c.  3, who  then adds that among the summi moventes there 
must  be unw supenius (the  Kaiser),  in relation to whom the mem- 
bers that are moved by the other moventes are membra de membro. 
95.  See above, Notes 67 ff. 
Connexion  96.  This argument  is  often  adduced on the papal side to show 
with a  that the Church cannot exist without the Pope, and that no one who  Rightful 
Head.  is not connected with  the Pope can belong to the Church.  Comp. 
e.g.  Alv.  Pel. I. a. 7,  13, 24, 28, 36, 38; Card. Alex. D.  15 summa. 
Need for  97.  It is urged that there may be unity although there are many 
a single 
Head  rulers; that theprincz$afus as an institution is distinguishable from its 
denied.  occupant for the time being; that the mystical body may be headless 
for a time :  in particular the Church, which always retains its celestial 
Head.  Thus, Ockham, Dial. I.  5, c.  13 and 24, maintains the possi- 
bility of the continued existence of  the  Church  after  severance from 
the  ecclesia  Romana;  for,  he  expressly  says,  though  the similitude 
between  the mystical  body of  Christ  and the natural  body of  man 
holds  good  at many  points, still  there  are points  at which  it  fails. 
To the same effect Petr.  Alliac. in Gerson, Opera, I.  692 and 11.  112; 
Gerson, De aufer. pap.  11. zog ff.;  Randuf, De mod. un. c.  2, ib. 163; 
Nic. Cus.  I.  c.  14 and 17. 
The State  98.  Camp. Thorn. Aq.  Comment. ad  Polit. p.  366 (ratio ...  con- 
stituens civitatem).  He  teaches that the constitution  of  the Church 
Reason.  is the work  of  God (Summa  adv.  gentil.  rv.  c.  76), but  regards  the 
creation  of  the State as  a  task  for  the  kingly  office, which  here 
imitates '  ie  creation of the World  by God  and of  the Body by the 
Sou1 (De reg.  prince  1.  c.  13).  Ptol.  LUC IV.  C.  23.  Aegid.  Rom. 
De reg.  ~rinc.  111.  1, C.  I, and  111.  2,  c.  32.  Eng. Volk. De Ortu, 
C.  r  (ratio imitata naturam).  Aen.  Sylv. c.  I, 2,  ,+.-More  of  this 
f .low  in Note  303. 
Marsilius  99.  Mars.  Pat.  I.  c.  15.  In the  natural  organism  Nature,  the 
on the 
causa movens, first makes the heart which is the first and indispensable 
Notes.  I37 
portion,  and  bestows  on  it  heat  as its  proper  force,  whereby  the Origin 
heart then, as the proper  organ for  this  purpose,  constitutes, sepa- 2;:: 
rates, differentiates  and connects all the other parts, and afterwards 
maintains,  protects  and  repairs  them.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
creative principle  of  the State is the rational '  anima universitatis vel 
eius  valentioris  partis.'  This, following  the  model set by  Nature, 
generates a pars  prima, perfecttior  et nobilior, answering to the heart, 
and  being  the  Princeship  (princtpaks).  On  this  the  said  animz 
bestows  an  active  power,  analogous  to  vital  heat,  namely,  the 
auctoritas iudicandi, praec2piendi et  exepuendi.  Thus the Princeship 
is empowered and authorized to institute the other parts of  the State. 
But,  just  as the heart  can  only  work  in  the form  and power  that 
Nature has given  to it,  so the Princeship  has  received  in the Law 
(Zex) a regulator of its proceedings.  In accordance with the measure 
set by the Law, the Princeship must establish the different parts of 
the  State,  equip  them  with  their  oficia,  reward  and  punish  them, 
conserve them, promote  their  co-operation, and prevent  disturbance 
among them.  Even when the State's life is started, the Ruling power, 
like the heart,  can  never  stand  still  for  an instant  without  peril. 
100.  Thom.  Aq.  Summa Theol.  11.  I, q.  91,  a.  I : tota  com- The 
munitas universi  gubernatur  ratione  divina;  and therefore  the ip5.1 ~~~~y. 
ratio  gubernationis  rerum,  which  exists  in  God  sicut  in  princz$e 
universifatis,  has  the nature of  a  lex,  and indeed  of  a  lex aeterna. 
Comp.  ib.  I.  q.  103  (although  according  to a.  6  'Deus  gubernat 
quaedam  mediantibus  aliis ')  and  11.  I, q. 93,  a.  3; Summa  cont 
gentil. 111. q.  76-7.  Dante,  I.  c.  7, and 111.  c.  16.  And  see above, 
Notes 7, 8, 11, 44, 67, 71. 
101.  See above,  Note  15.  John of  Salisbury (Policr.  IV.  c.  I, Divine 
pp.  208-9,  and VI.  c.  25,  pp.  391-5)  is especially  earnest in the g:'$:ayL. 
maintenance  of  the  divine  origin  of  temporal  power.  Ptol.  Luc. 
(1x1.  c.  1-8)  gives  elaborate  proof  of  the  proposition  'Omne 
dominium est a Deo':  it is so ratione  enfis (for  the ens primum is 
the principiunz);  and it is so ratione jnis (for  all  the purposes  of 
government  must  culminate  in  God,  who  is  ultimus $nis).  Even 
dominium fyrannicum  is of  God, who suffers it to exist as a method 
of  chastisement,  but  Himself  will  not  leave  tyrants  unpunished. 
Then Alv.  Pel. (I. a. 8 and 41 c-K)  repeats this, but  expressly says 
that it does not disprove the sinful origin of the State.  He  (I. a. 56 FJ) 
distinguishes : materialiter et inchoafive the temporal power proceeds 
from natural instinct and therefore from God :  perfecfe  et formaliter it 
derives its esse  from  the  spiritual power '  quae a Deo speciali modo 
derivatur.' Political  Theories of  the Midde Age. 
Imme-  Ioz.  See  above,  Notes  38,  40,  44,  and,  as  to  the  Roman 
diately  Empire,  Notes  53-55. 
Divine  Origin of  103.  ~lv.  Pel.  I. a.  12,  a3 u  and x, 18.  Aug. Triumph.  I.  q.  I, 
the State.  a,  I ;  a.  5 : the papal  power  comes  from  God specialius than any 
The Pope  other power,  God being immediately active in election, government 
as Christ's 
Vicar.  and protection;  still  He does not  immediately  generate  each  par- 
ticular  pope  (as  He generated  Adam,  Eve  and  Christ),  but  this 
happens  mediante homine,  as  in  the generation  of  other  men;  but 
the elec~oral  college only has the destgnatio personae, for aucton'tas et ' 
ojicium, being quid formale  in papatu, come from Christ (q.  4, a. 3) 
Petr. de Andlo,  I.  C.  2. 
The  104.  See  above,  Note  40.  The  doctrine  of  the  Karolingian 
Emperor  time makes the Emperor vicarius Dei.  Then during the Strife over  as Christ's 
Vicar.  the Investitures this is for the first time attacked ;  and then defended, 
e.g.  by P. Crassus, p.  44, by Wenrich (Martene,  Thes.  Nov.  Anecd. 
I.  p.  zzo),  and  by  the  Kaisers  and  writers  of  the  Hohenstaufen 
age.  Comp.  Dante,  III.  c.  16 : solus  eligit  Deus,  solus  ipse  con- 
firmat;  the  Electors  are merely  denuntiatores  divinae jrovidentiae 
(though sometimes, being  blinded  by  cupidity, they fail to perceive 
the will  of  God);  sic  ergo patet quod  auctoritas  temporalis  mon- 
archiae  sine  ullo  medio  in ipsum  de fonte universalis  auctoritatis 
descendit;  qui  quidein  fons  in  arce  suae  simplicitatis  unitus  in 
multi~lices  alveos  influit  ex abundantia  bonitatis.  Bartol.  prooem. 
D.  nr.  14: Deus ...  causa  efficiens.  Ant.  Ros.  I.  c.  47-8  and 56 : 
the Electors, the Pope (in so far as he acts at all) and the Folk, are 
only  organa  Dei;  so the  Empire  is  it~zmediate  a  Deo.  Gerson, 
IV.  p.  586.-Comp.  Ockham,  Octo q.  11.  c.  1-5,  and  IV.  c.  8-9, 
and  Dial.  III.  tr.  2,  1.  I,  C.  18  ff.,  where  three  shades  of  this 
doctrine are distinguished,  for we  may  suppose (I) a direct gift  by 
God,  or  (2)  a  gift  ministerio  creakrue,  i.e.  by  the  agency  of  the 
Electors  (whose  action  may  be  likened  to  that  of  the  priest  in 
baptism,  or that  of a  patron  in  the transfer  of  an office), or (3)  a 
difference  between  the  purely  human  heathen  Empire  and  the 
modern  Empire legitimated  by  Christ. 
Mediation  105.  Joh. Saresb. V.  c.  6 :  mediante sacerdotio.  Aug. Triumph. 
of the 
church  1.  q. I, a. ,,  11.  q.  35, a.  I, q.  36, a.  4 (mediante  papa),  q.  45,  a.  I. 
between  Alv.  Pel.  I.  a.  37  D  and ~d,  41,  56,  59  E  (a  Deo ...  mediante in-  the State 
and ~~d.  stitutione  humana).  Petr. de Andlo,  11.  c.  g :  imperium a Deo  ...p er 
sul  dlternam  emanationem.  So in  the  Quaestio in utramque (a. 5) 
a  d  the  Somnium  Virid.  (I.  c.  88,  180-1)  the  only  dispute  is 
whether  kings are immediately  or but  mediately  ministri Dei.  See 
ab-ve,  Note  22. 
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106.  See Dante, 1.  c.  Pet.  de Andlo,  I. c.  2 : regimen mundi a Delega- 
tion by 
summo rerum  principe  Deo eiusque divina dependet voluntate ;  He  ~,d  of all 
institutes the pope as Vicar;  from  the pope proceeds  the imperialis Human  Power. 
allctoritas;  and from it again 'cetera  regna,  ducatus,  principatus  et 
dominia  mundi  subalterna quadam  emanatione  defluxerunt.'  Also 
11. c.  g,  Tengler, Laienspiegel,  p.  14,  17, 56. 
107.  Thom.  Aq.  De reg.  princ.  I.  c 2 : manifesturn  est quod Monarchy  and Unity. 
unitatem  magis efficere potest  quod  est per  se unum quam plures; 
and c.  5; Summa  Theol.  11.  I,  q.  105,  a.  I; 11.  2,  q.  10, a.  11; 
Summa  cont.  gentil.  IV.  76 : optimum  autem  regimen  multitudinis 
est ut regatur per unum; quod patet ex  fine regiminis, qui est pax: 
pax  enim  et  unitas  subditorum  est  finis  regentis;  unitatis  autem 
congruentior causa est unus quam multi;  Comm, ad Polit. p. 489 and 
507 ;  Aegid.  Rom.  De reg.  princ. III.  2, c.  3 ;  Dante,  I.  c. 5-9  and 
the practical  arguments  in c.  10-14;  Joh.  Paris. c.  I ;  Alv. Pel. I. 
a. 40 D and 62 C;  Ockham, Octo qu.  111. c.  I and 3 ;  Dial.  III. tr. I, 
1.  2,  c.  I, 6, 8, 9-11  ;  Somn.  Virid.  I.  c.  187 ;  Gerson,  IV.  585 (ad 
totius gubernationis exemplum, quae fit per unum Deum supremum); 
Nicol. Cus.  111.  praef. ;  Laelius in Gold.  11. p.  1595 ff. ;  Anton.  Ros. 
11.  c.  5-7  ;  Petrus de Andlo, I.  c.  8 ;  Patric. Sen. De regno, I.  I and 
13,  p.  59  (unitas  per  imitationem  ficta).  With  some  divergence 
and  greater  independence,  Eng.  Volk.  I.  c.  11-12  : now-a-days 
only  a  monarchy  is able to unite wide  territories and great masses 
of  men. 
108.  Dante,  I.  c.  15.  Similarly Pet.  de Andlo, I.  c.  3 :  social Singleness 
of Will in a 
order depends on a sub-et-super-ordination of wills, as natural order 
upon a sub-et-super-ordination of natural forces. 
109.  Thom.  Aq.  Summa cont.  gentil.  IV.  q.  76 : the regimen The 
rcclesiae,  being of  divine institution,  must  be optintic  ordirrotum, and &k,"ciY. 
therefore  must  be such ut unus toti  ecclesiae praesit.  Alv.  Pel.  I. 
a.  40 D  and 54.  Joh.  Par. c.  2.  Ockham, Dial.  III. tr.  I, I.  2,  c.  I, 
3-11,  18-19,  29; also I.  5, c.  20-21.  Soinn.  Virid.  11.  c.  168- 
179.  Ant. Ros.  11.  c. 1-7. 
110.  Above  all,  Dante,  lib.  I.;  in  c.  6,  it is argued. that the Divine 
ordo totalis must be preferable to any ordopartialis.  Eng. Volk.  De  institution  of Tem- 
ortu,  C.  14-15.  Ockham,  Octo q.  111.  c.  I  and 3 ;  Dial. 111.  tr.  2,  poral 
1.  I, c.  I and g.  Aen. Sylv. c.  8.  Ant.  Ros. 11.  c. 6.  Petr.  de Andlo, 
I. c.  8. 
11 I.  Above, Note 107.  Thom. Aq. 1.  c.;  it is so in everypopulus Monarchy 
the Nor-  unius ecclesiae.  Compare his statements (in lib. IV.  Sent. d.  I 7,  q.  3, mal Form 
a.  3, sol. 5, ad 5) as to the relation  of  pope, bishop,  and parson  as of Govem- 
the God-willed monarchical heads  super eandem plebem immediate 140  Political  Theories of  the Mzddle Age- - 
constituti.,  Dante, I. c  6.  Petr.  de Andlo,  I.  c.  8.  In particular, 
~~t.  R~~.  11. c.  6 (above, Note 64) as to the monarchical structure of 
the five corpora mystica. 
References  112.  Thom.  Aq.  De reg.  princ.  I.  C.  4.  Eng.  Volk.  De reg. 
to Re- 
publics.  princ.  I.  c.  12-16.  Petr. de Andlo, I.  c.  8.  Ant.  Ros.  11.  c.  4 (on 
the other hand, c.  7,  pp.  314-9). 
corn-  113.  Ptol. Luc.  11.  c. 8, and IV. c.  8, goes so far as to hold  that 
parison  in the status integer of  human nature the regimen $oliticum would be 
Forms of 
G~~~~~-  preferable;  and  even  in  the  corrupt  state  of  human  nature  the 
men'.  disposih'o gentis may decide ;  thus e.g.  the courage of the Italian race 
leaves  no  choice  but  republic  or  tyranny.  Eng.  Volk.  I.  c.  16. 
Ockham, Octo q. 111. c.  3 and 7 (variances in accord with congrzdentia 
fenzporum);  also Dial. III. tr.  2, 1.  I, c.  5. 
A,,  Aris-  114.  Ockham,  Octo q.  III.  c.  3,  6,  8,  and Dial.  III.  tr.  2,  1.  I, 
tocratic  c  I, 4, g, 13: it is possible that the form of government best suited to  World- 
State.  a part may not be the same as that best suited to the whole. 
Necessity  115.  Ockham,  Dial.  111.  tr.  I, 1.  2,  c.  2,  12-4,  16-7,  25, 30. 
Even with  an aristocratic constitution,  unity  is  possible :  pluralitas 
in the  pontificum  non scindit unitatem  ecclesiae :  what  is good  for a pars  2z:td.  andpamum may not be always good for a totum and magnum.  The 
divine institution  of  the primacy is expressly disputed  by Marsilius, 
11.  c.  15-22,  111.  concl.  32  and  41,  and,  among  the  Conciliar 
pamphleteers,  by  Randuf  (De mod. un. eccl.  c.  5) and others, who 
are opposed by d'Ailly, Gerson, and Breviscoxa (Gers.  Op. I.  p.  662, 
11.  p.  88, and I. p.  872). 
Preference  116.  Patricius  of  Sienna in  one place  (De inst.  reip.  I.  I) ex-  $bk$- pressly declares for a  Republic;  elsewhere (De regno I.  I) he giver 
Form.  a preference to Monarchy, but would pay heed to differences between 
various nations. 
'Unitas  I 17.  Mars.  Pat.  I.  c.  17  and  III. concl.  r I (even for composite 
princi-  States).  Ockham, Dial.  111.  tr.  2,  1.  3, c.  17  and 22.  patus' in a 
Republic.  I 18.  Aegid.  Rom.  111.  2,  c.  3 : plures  homines  principantes 
Repub-  quasi constituunt  unum  hominem  multorum  oculorum  et multarum  lican 
Assembly  manuurn:  but  the good  Monarch  might  become  such a  collective 
a  man  by  the association  of wise  councillors;  and at any rate he is 
Collective 
Man.  more unz  than the Many can be 'in quantum tenent locum unius. 
-Mars.  Pat.  1.  c.  17 : '  quoad officium principatus '  the $lures  must 
form a  unit, so that every act of government  appears as 'una actio 
ex  ~mmuni  decreto  atque  consensu  eorum  a~t  valentioris  partis 
sc  dndum statutas leges in his.'-So  Ockham, Dial.  111.  tr.  2,  1.  3, c 
17,  with  the  addition  that  'plures  gerunt  vicem  unius  et locum 
unius tenent.'-Patric.  Sen.  De inst. reip. I.  I  and  III.  3 : the ruling 
Notes.  141 
assembly constitutes 'quasi unum hominem ' or '  quasi unum corpus ' 
with  manifold  members  and faculties ;  I.  5 : 'multitudo  universa 
potestatem  habet  collecta  in unum  ubi  de republica  sit  agendum, 
dimissi autem singuli rem suanl agunt! 
I 19.  Thus Dante, Mon. I. c. 6, sees in the Ruler '  aliquod unum The  Monarch 
quod non est pars.'  So again Torquemada seeks to refute the whole ,hove and 
Conciliar Theory by asserting that the very idea of a Monarch neces- outside  the 
sarily places him  above the Community, like  God above  the world G~~~~. 
and the shepherd above the sheep:  Summa de pot.  pap.  c. 26, 48, 
83, 84;  De conc. c.  29, 30, 44. 
I 20.  Joh.  Saresb.  Policr.  IV.  c.  I : est. ..princeps  potestas The  Monarch 
publica  et  in  terris  quaedanl  divinae  maiestatis  imago ;  v.  c.  25, represents 
p.  391-5.  Thom. Aq. De  reg. I. c.  12-14:  the erection of the State, Divinity. 
being like unto God's creation  of the world, and the government of 
the State, being like unto God's  government  of  the world,  are the 
affairs of  the Ruler. 
121.  G1.  on c.  17 in Sexto I, 6, v. homini:  in hac parte non est Apotheo-  sis of  the 
homo sed Dei vicarius.  G1.  on prooem.  C1.  v.  papa: nec Deus nec Pope. 
homo.  Petr.  Blesensis,  ep.  141.  Aug.  Triumph.  I.  q.  6,  a.  1-3 
(identity of the Pope's  sentence with God's, and therefore no appeal 
from the one to  the other); q. 8, a. 1-3,  9.  9, 9.  18.  Alv.  Pel. I. a.  13 
(non  homo  simpliciter,  sed  Deus,  i.e.  Dei  vicarius),  37  y  (Deus 
quodammodo, quia vicarius),  12  (unum  est consistorium et tribunal 
Christi et Papae in terris).  Bald.  on 1.  ult. C. 7,  50.  Ludov. Ron?. 
cons. 345, nr. 6-8.  Zenzelinus on c.  4,  Extrav. Joh.  XXII. nr.  14. 
Bertach. v. papa. 
122.  Already under the Hohenstaufen a formal apotheosis of  the Apotheo-  sis of the 
Emperor may be often found.  See, e.g.  Pet.  de Vin.  Ep.  11.  c.  7,  E~~~~~~. 
and  111.  c.  44.  Bald.  I.  cons.  228,  nr.  7 : imperator est  dominus 
totius mundi  et Deus in  terra;  cons. 373, nr.  2:  princeps est Deus 
in terris.  Joh.  de Platea, 1.  2,  C.  11,  g,  nr.  I : sicut Deus adoratur 
in coelis, ita princeps adoratur in terris;  but only impr@rie.  Theod. 
a Niem, p.  786 : to the Emperor is due 'devotio tanquam praesenti 
et corporali Deo.'  Aen.  Sylv, c.  23 : dominus mundi, Dei vicem in 
temporalibus gerens.  Jason,  11.  cons.  177, nr.  I I :  princeps mundi 
et corporalis mundi Deus. 
123.  Thus already in  the Councils of Paris and Worms of  825, Kingship 
(M. G. L.  I.  p.  346 ff.)  we find an exposition of  the doctrine that the is  Oftice. 
kingship  is  a  'ministerium  a  Deo  commissum,'  that the  Rex is so 
called  a  vecte  agendo,  that,  ceasing  to  rule  well,  he  becomes  a 
tyrant.  Similarly in Concil.  Aquisgran.  11.  ann.  836 and  Concil. 












Hefele  IV.  p.  gr  and  546.  Hincmar,  Op.  I.  693.  Manegold  v. 
Lautenbach,  l.c.,  expressly uses  the phrase  vocabul'um  oficii.  John 
of Salisbury, IV.  c.  1-3  and 5, says '  minister populi '  a:~d '  publicae 
utilitatis  minister.'  Hugh  of  Fleury,  I.  c.  4,  6,  7,  'ministerium, 
~fficium  regis.'  Thom. Aq. De reg. prin. I.  c.  14.  Alv. Pel.  I. a. 62, I. 
ptol.  Luc.  11. 5-16.  Dante,  I.  c.  12 : princes  are  'respectu  viae 
domini,  respectu  termini  ministri  aliorum,'  and in this  respect  the 
Emperor is 'minister omnium.'  Eng. Volk. tr.  11.-VII.  Gerson,  IV. 
p. 597.  Ant.  Ros.  I.  c.  64:  officium  publicum;  like a tutor.  Pet. 
de Andl.  I. c. 3, 11. C.  16-18. 
124.  In particular,  Joh.  Saresb.  IV.  c.  1-3,  and  5.  Thom. 
Aquin. De reg. Iud. q.  6 :  Principes  terrarum  sunt a Deo instituti, 
non  quidem ut propria lucra quaerant, sed ut  communem  utilitatem 
procurent;  Comm. ad Polit.  p.  586.  Ptol. Luc.,  111. c.  11:  regnum 
non est propter regem, sed rex propter regnum.  Eng. Volk. De reg. 
princ.  v. c.  g : sicut  tutela pupillorum,  ita et procuratio  reipublicae 
inventa est ad utilitatem eorum qui commissi sunt, et non eorum qui 
cornmissionem susceperunt ;  11.  c.  18, IV.  c.  33-4.  Dante, I.  c.  12: 
non  enim  cives propter consules nec gens propter regem, sed e con- 
verso consules  plopter cives et rex propter gentem.  Ockham, Octo 
q.  III.  c.  4,  and I.  c. 6.  Paris  de Puteo,  De synd.  p.  40,  nr.  21. 
Petrus de Andlo,  I.  c. 3. 
125.  Councils  of  Paris and Worms,  an.  829 : to rule  the Folk 
with  righteousness  and equity,  to preserve  peace  and unity.  Petr. 
Bles.  Epist.  184, p.  476 :  ut recte definiant et decidant examine quod 
ad eos pervenerit quaestionum.  Dante,  Mon.  I.  c.  12.  Thom. Aq. 
Comm.  ad Polit.,  p.  592, 595 ff.  Eng. Volk. I.  c.  10.  Gerson,  III. 
p.  1474.  Ockham,  Octo q.  111.  C.  5,  declares a plenitzcn'o potestatis 
incompatible  with  the  best  Form  of  Government,  which  should 
promote  the  liberty  and  exclude the slavery  of  the subjects;  and 
(VIII.  c.  4) he opines that  the Kaiser has smaller  rights  than other 
princes  just  because  it behoves  the  Empire  to have  the  best  of 
constitutions. 
126.  Councils of  Paris and Worms, an. 829.  Council of Mainz, 
an.  888,  c.  2.  Nicolaus  I.  Epist.  4  ad  Advent.  Metens.:  si  iure 
princip-ntur;  alioquin  potius  tyranni  credendi  sunt  quam  reges 
habendi.  Petr.  Bles.  1.  c.:  Principatus nomen  amittere  promeretur 
qui a iusto iudicii declinat tramite.  Hugo Flor.  I.  c. 7-8.  Joh.  Sar 
VIII.  c.  17-24.  Thom. Aq.  De reg.  princ.  I.  c.  3-11.  Ptol. Luc. 
III.  C.  11.  Vinc.  Bellov.  VII.  c.  8.  Eng.  Volk.  I.  c.  6  and  18. 
1.  Pel.  I. a. 62 D-H.  Ockham, Dial. 111.  tr.  I,  1.  2, c. 6 ff.;  Octo 
q. 1x1.  c.  14.  Gerson, 1.c.  Paris de Puteo, 1.  c  pp. 8-51. 
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127.  This principle was never doubted.  See e.g.  Pet. Bles. ep. God 
131, p. 388.  Thom. Aq. Summa Theol. 11.  I, q. 96, a.  4 (quia ad hoc 
rather than 
Man is to 
ordo potestatis divinitus concessus se non extendit) and 11.  2, q.  104, be obeyed. 
a.  5.  To the  same  effect  the  '  Summists'  [i.e.  the  compilers  of 
Summae Confessorum,  manuals for  the use  of  confessors],  e.g.  Joh. 
Friburgensis, Sum. Conf. lib.  2,  tit.  5, q.  204. 
128.  Thus Hugh of Fleury, who therefore prescribes that tyrants Passive 
be tolerated  and prayed  for, but  that  commands which  contravene ,",",":- 
the law  of God be  disobeyed,  and that  punishment and death  be 
borne in the martyr's spirit; I. c.  4, p.  17-22,  C.  7, p. 31, C.  12,  p. 44, 
11.  p.  66.-Baldus  also  on 1.  5, Dig.  I, I, nr. 6-7,  declares against 
any invasion into the rights of Rulers. 
129.  Hug. de S. Victore,  Quaest.  in epist. Paul. q.  300 (Migne, Nullity of 
vol.  175,  p.  505):  Reges  et  principes,  quibus  obediendum  est  in ::is  that 
omnibus  quae ad potestatem  pertinent.  Thom.  Aq.  Sum.  Theol. are ultra 
11.  2, q. 104, a.  5 : only in special circumstances or for the avoidance ~~~~entis. 
of  scandal and danger,  need  a  Christian obey  the command  of  an 
usurper  or even  the unrighteous  command  of  the legitimate ruler. 
So also Vincent  Bellov.  x.  c 87 and Joh.  Friburg 1.  c. (Note 127). 
Ockham,  Dial.  111.  tr.  2,  1.  2,  c.  20 : all  men  owe  to the Emperor 
immediate but conditional obedience :  to wit, 'in licitis ' and 'in his 
quae  spectant  ad  regimen  populi  temporalis,'  so  that,  e.g.  a  pro- 
hibition of wine-drinking would not be binding.  And compare c.  26 
and 28.  Nic.  Cus. 111.  c.  5.  Decius, Cons.  72, nr.  2 : superiori non 
est obediendum quando egreditur fines sui officii. 
130.  Already Manegold of Lautenbach (see Sitzungsber. d. bair. Active 
Akad.  an.  1868,  11.  325)  teaches  that  the king  who  has  become a gp$ce 
tyrant  should  be  expelled  like  an  unfaithful  shepherd.  Similar rannicide. 
revolutionary doctrines were frequently maintained  by the papalistic 
party  against  the  wielders  of  State-power.  John  of  Salisbury 
emphatically  recommends  the  slaughter  of  a  tyrant  'qui  violenta 
dominatione  populum  oppremit,'  for a tyranny is nothing  else than 
an abuse of power granted by God to man.  He  vouches biblical and 
classical  examples,  and  rejects  only  the  use  of  poison,  breach  of 
trust, and breach of oath.  See Policr. 111. c.  15, IV. c. I, VI.  c. 24-8, 
VIII.  c.  17-20.  Thomas of  Aquino  is against  tyrannicide,  but in 
favour of  an active  resistance against a regimen tyrannicum, for such 
a regimen is non iusfum, and to abolish  it is no seditio, unless indeed 
the  measures  that  are taken be  such that they  will  do more harm 
than would  be  done by  tolerating  the tyranny:  Sum. Theol.  11.  2, 
q.  42,  a.  2,  ad 3,  q.  69, a.  4 ;  De  reg.  princ.  I.  c.  6 ;  Comm.  ad 
Polit. p. 553.  TO  the same effect, Aegid. Rom.  De reg. princ. I. c. 6. r 44  Political  Theories of the Mddle Age. 
There is an elaborated doctrine of active resistance in Ockham, Dial. 
111.  tr.  2, 1.  2,  C.  26 and 28 (it is iusgentium).  Somn. Virid. I. c.  141. 
Henr. de Langenstein, Cons. pacis,  C.  15.  Gerson,  IV.  600 and 624. 
Decius,  Cons.  690,  nr.  13.  Bened.  Capra,  Reg.  10,  nr.  42 : the 
execution of  a tyrannical measure is an act of violence which may be 
violently  resisted.  Henricus  de  Pyro,  Inst.  I.  2,  3  I : iudici  et 
rninistris  principum  licet  resistere  de facto  quando  ipsi  sine  iure 
procedunt.-As  to the thesis  in which Jean Petit on 8 March, 1408 
defended tyrannicide (Gerson, Op. v. pp.  15-42),  the opposition  of 
Gerson  (Op.  IV.  657-80)  and the qualified  condemnation  of  the 
thesis  by  the Council  of  Constance (sess.  xv. of  6 July,  I~I~),  see 
Schwab, Gerson, pp.  609-46.  Wyclif  (art.  damn.  15 and 17) and 
Hus (art. 30) held that a Ruler who is in mortal sin is no true ruler. 
Thepope's  131.  The first to elaborate  in idea and in phrase a 'plenitudo 
Plenitude  ofpower.  ecclesiasticae  potestatis'  vested  by  God  in  the  Pope,  whence  all 
other  ecclesiastical power  has flowed and in which all other ecclesi- 
astical  power  is  still  comprised,  was  Innocent  III.,  although 
substantially  the same doctrine had  been  taught  by  Gregory VII., 
lib. I.,  ep. 55",  ann.  1075.  For Innocent  111.  see c.  13, X.  4,  17; 
c.23,X. 5,33; lib. 1,ep. 127,~.  116,lib.  7,ep.1a11d405,pp.279 
and 405, lib. g, ep.  82, 83 and 130, pp. 898, go1 and 947.  Compare 
1nnocentIV.onc.  I,X. 1,7; c.~o,X.z,z;  c.1g,X.z,z7,nr.6. 
Durantis, Spec. I.  I  de legato 3 6,  nr.  1-58.  Thorn. Aquin.  lib. 4, 
Sent.  d.  20,  q.  4,  a.  3,  ad  3,  quaestiunc.  4,  sol.  3 : Papa  habet 
plenitudinem potestatis pontificalis quasi  rex in regno, episcopi vero 
assumuntur in partem  sollicitudinis  quasi iudices singulis civitatibus 
praepositi.  See also  lib.  2, dist. et quest. ult.;  Summa Theol. 11.  2, 
q. I,  a.  10;  Opusc.  cont.  error.  Graec.  11.  c.  34 and 38.  Aegid. 
Rom. De pot.  eccl.  III.  c.  9-12  :  tanta  potestatis plenitudo,  quod 
eius posse  est  sine pondere,  numero  et mensura.  Petr.  Palud.  in 
Raynald, a.  1328, nr.  30.  The doctrine  reaches  the  utmost  exalta- 
tion in Augustinus Triumphus, I.  q. I,  8,  10-34,  11.  q.  48-75,  but 
goes yet further  in  Alvarius  Pelagius,  I.  a.  5-7,  11-12,  52-58: 
potestas  sine  numero,  pondere  et  mensura;  it  is  exceptionless, 
all-embracing,  the  basis  of  all  power,  sovereign,  boundless  and 
always immediate.  Durantis, De mod0 eccl. conc. P.  111.  Turrecre- 
mata, Summa de eccl. 11.  c.  54, 65.  Petrus a  Monte, De primatu, 
f.  I44 ff. 
Limits to  132.  'Lex divina et lex naturalis, articuli fidei et sacrarnenta novae 
!  legis' were always recognized as limits.  See Alex. 111. in c. 4, X. 5, rg 
reignty.  9--'  Innocent  111.  in  c.  13, X.  2,  13.  Joh.  Sar.  Ep.  198, p. 218. 
Thorn.  Aq. Summa Theol. 11. I, q. 97, a.  4, ad 3;  Quodlib. rv. a 13. 
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Aug.  Triumph.  I.  q.  22,  a.  I ;  Ah. Pel.  I.  a.  7  and  46.  Cornp. 
Ockham, Dial. III.  tr.  I, 1.  I, C.  I, and tr.  2,  1.  I, c.  23. 
133.  Ockham makes an elaborate attack on the doctrine which Limited 
teaches that, at any rate in spiritual affairs, the Pope has a plenitude z:iyh~ 
of  power in the sight of  God and man.  This (he argues) would be Pope. 
incompatible  with  'evangelical  liberty'  for  it  would  establish  an 
'intolerable  servitude.'  In all,  or at any rate all normal,  cases the 
Pope's  power  is  potestas  Zimitata.  Ockham,  Octo q.  I.  c.  6,  III. 
C.  4-5,  Dial.  III.  tr.  I, 1.  I, c.  2-1  5,  tr.  2, 1.  r, c.  23.  Compare 
Joh.  Paris.  c.  3  and 6; Marsil.  Patav.  11.  c.  22-30;  Somn. Virid. 
I. c.  156-161  ;  Randuf, De mod. un. c.  5, 10, 23, 28;  Greg.  Heimb. 
11.  p.  1604. 
134.  Ockham, Octo q.  I. c.  I 5 and III. c.  g :  obedience  is due Condi- 
only  'in  his  quae  necessaria  sunt  congregationi  fidelium,  salvis gb","iience 
iuribus et libertatibus aliorum';  if  the Pope transcends his sphere of due to the 
competence,  every  one,  be  he  prelate,  emperor,  king,  prince  or 
simple layman, is  entitled and bound to resist, regard  being had to Necessity. 
time, place and opportunity.-During  the Great Schism the doctrine 
of  a  right  of  resistance  and  rejection  given  by  Necessity  became 
always commoner.  See Matth.  de  Cracovia,  Pierre  du  Mont  de 
St Michel  and other  Gallicans in  Hiibler,  pp.  366,  370-2,  377; 
also ib. p.  121,  note 8 ;  also ib. 373 ;  Gerson, Trilogus, 11.  p.  83 ff.; 
Theod.  a  Niem,  De  schism.  111.  c.  20  (resistance,  as  against  a 
bestia); Randuf, De mod. un. c.  9-10;  Ant. Ros. 11. c.  23,  27-30, 
III.  c.  4-6.  Nicholas  of  Cues (Op.  11.  pp.  825-9)  held  to this 
doctrine even after he had fallen away from the Conciliar party. 
135.  See the following sections. 
136.  Ockham refutes at large the opinion that the Zex  divinn vel Limited 
Monarchy 
naturalis  is  the  only  limit  to  imperial  power:  on  the  contrary, in the 
'limitata  est  imperatoris potestas, ut quoad  liberos sibi subiectos et Empire. 
res  eorum  solummodo  illa  potest  quae  prosunt  ad  communem 
utilitatem.'  Dial.  III.  tr.  2,  1.  2,  C.  26-8:  in relation  to persons, 
c.  20;  in  relation  to  things,  c.  21-5.  Gerson,  IV.  pp.  598,  601. 
Nic.  Cus.  III. c. 5.  See above, Notes 126-30. 
137.  See above, Note  16.  Placentinus  de var.  actionum, I.  4.  The State 
of Nature. 
Summa Rolandi, C.  23, q.  7, p.  96.  Addition  to the Gloss on § 5, 
Inst.  2,  I,  v. publicus  [which  addition  teaches  that  communia  are 
those  things  which  by  virtue  of  the  ius  nakrale jrimaevum  still 
remain  in  their  original condition  as common  to all].  Joh.  Nider, 
Tract.  de  Contr. (Tr. U.  J. VI.  p.  27g), tr. v.  K.  Summenhard,  De 
contr. tr.  I, q.  8-11  [a  German  jurist,  ob.  1502].-But  Aquinas, 
Summa Theol.  I.  q.  96, a.  4 and Ptolemy  of  Lucca,  De reg. pr.  111. 
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c.  g,  and IV. c.  2-3,  teach that dominilrmpoZiticum would have come 
into existence even in the State of  Innocence, though not cEomi7tium 
sef-,yiZe.  [Elsewhere (D. G.  R. 111.  125) our author nas spoken of the 
patristic doctrine that lordship and property are consequences of  the 
Fall.  He there refers to various works  of  Augustine and sends us 
for  other patristic  utterances  to  Hergenrother,  Katholische  Kirche 
und christlicher Staat, Freib.  1872, p. 461.1 
Begin-  138.  Already in the course of the Investiture Quarrel, Manegold 
ning~  of  Lautenbach  (above, Note 130) asked : Nonne clarum  est, merito 
of the 
original  illum a concessa dignitate cadere, populum ab eius dominio  liberum 
Contract.  existere,  cum pactlcm  pro  quo  constitutus  est  constat  illum  prius 
irrupisse?  On  the  anti-papal  side  the  only  answer  was  that  the 
People's  Will  when  once  uttered  became  a  necessitas,  and  that 
therefore the grant  of  lordship was irrevocable.  See the pronounce- 
ment of the Anti-Gregorian cardinals in Sudendorf, Registr.  11.  p.  41. 
Engelbert of  Volkersdorf  is the first to declare in a general way that 
all  regna  et princ@atus originated  in  a  pacturn  subiectionis which 
sltisfied  a  natural  want  and  instinct:  De ortu,  c.  2.  Marsil.  Pat. 
I.  c.  8,  12,  15.  Ockham, Dial.  III. tr. 2,l.  2,  c.  24:  the ius humanum 
which introduced lordship and ownership in place of  the community 
of  goods  existent  under divine and natural law,  was a iuspopuli and 
was  t~ansferred by  the pojulus  to  the  Emperor,  along  with  the 
impenkm.  Nic.  Cus.  111.  c.  4.  Aen. Sylv. c.  2. 
~i~h~~f~  139.  Eng.Volk.,Deortu,c.  10.  Lup.Bebenb.c.5and15. 
People to  Ockham,  Octo q.  11.  c.  4-5,  V.  c.  6,  VIII.  c.  3.  Baldus, 1.  5, Dig.  choose a 
superior.  I, I, nr.  5 and 8; 1.  2,  Cod. 6,  3, nr.  3.  Paul.  Castr. 1.  5, Dig. I, I, 
lect. I, nr. 5,  and lect.  2,  nr.  17-18. 
The  140.  Joh.  Paris.  c.  11  and  16:  populo  faciente  et  Deo  in- 
Peopleas  spirante.  Mars.  Pat.  I.  c.  g : where  men  institute a  king,  God is 
Instru- 
ments of  causa remota.  Ockham, Dial.  III. tr.  2,  1.  I, c.  27 :  imperiunl a Deo, 
God.  et tamen per homines, scil. Romanos.  Ant.  Ros. I.  c.  56 :  imperium 
immediate a Deo,  per  medium  tamen  populi Romani, qui tanquam 
Dei minister et instrumentum  eius iurisdictionem  omneln  in ipsum 
transtu1it.-somewhat  divergently Almain, De auct. eccl. c.  I (Gers. 
OP- 11.  PP.  978 and  1014) : God  gives the power  to the communitas 
in oder that this power may be transferred to the Ruler. 
God and  141.  Nicol.  C~S.  11.  19,  111.  praef.  and  c.  4,  argues  that  all 
the  power in Church and State comes both from God and from Man, for  as the 
Source of  the voluntary  subjection of  men gives the material  power and God 
grants the spiritual force.  Is it  not divine, and not merely human, 
-.'  -n  an assembled  multitude  decides as though  it were one heart 
and one soul (11.  c  5 and 15) ? 
Notes.  -  I47 
142.  [The  famous text  in  question is  1.  I, Dig. I, 4  and  Inst. The Lex 
r, 2,  6 : Quod principi placuit legis habet  vigorem :  utpote cum lege Regis. 
regia, quae de imperio eius lata est, populus ei et in eum omne suum 
imperium et potestatem conferat.]  Gloss on 1.  9, Dig.  I, 3 ;  1.  I, Dig. 
r, 4; 1.  un.  Dig.  I, 11; 1.  2,  Cod.  8, 53; 1.  11, Cod. I, 17 v. solus 
ivperator;  and on I. Feud. 26.  Jac. Aren. Inst. de act. nr. 5, p.  277. 
Cinus, 1.  4, Cod.  2,  54.  Baldus,  1.  I, Cod. I, I, nr.  1-12.  Innoc. 
c.  I, X.  I,  7,  nr.  1-2  :  papa  habet  imperium a  Deo,  imperator a 
populo.  Dante,  III.  c.  13-4.  Lup.  Bebenb.  c.  5,  p.  355 : olim 
tenuit monarchiarn imperii populus urbis Romanae;  postea transtulit 
in ipsum imperatorem.  Ockham, Octo q. 11. c.  4-5  ;  Dial.  III. tr. 2, 
1.  I, c.  27-28.  Aen. Sylv. c.  8.  Ant.  Ros. I. c.  32 and 36. 
143.  Thus Engelbert,  Marsilius,  Ockham  and Bneas Sylvius, Voluntary 
as in Note 138.  In particular,  Nic.  Cus. 11. c.  12 : the binding force ft,"'ection 
of  all  laws  rests  upon  'concordantia  subiectionalis  eorum  qui Groundof 
ligantur';  11.  c.  13:  all  power  flows  from  the  free  'subiectio 
inferiorum '  ;  III. c.  4 :  it  arises 'per  viam voluntarie subiectionis et 
consensus';  11.  c.  8 and 10. 
144.  See above, Note 54. 
145.  Ockham, Dial.  III.  tr.  2,  1.  I, c.  27, vouching Gloss on c.  6, 
X.  I, 2.  Ant. Ros.  v.  c.  2  (true  even  for  the  Babylonian  empire: 
with voucher of  Dig. 3, 4, Innocentius and Bartolus). 
146.  See the letter of the Senatus Populusque Romanus to Icing Rights 
Conrad  in  Jaff6, Monum.  Corbeiens.  p.  332  (also Otto Fris Gesta $:the, 
Frid.  I.  c.  28) : the  Kaiser  has  the '  imperium  a  Deo,'  but '  vigore of Rome 
senatus et populi  Romani':  he ought  to  dwell 'in urbe quae caput gt$,!:;s 
nlundi  est.'  Also  Otto Fris.  1.  c.  11.  c.  21 ;  letter  of  Wezel,  ann. vacant. 
1152, in  Jaff6,  1.  c.  p.  542 : set  cum imperium et omnis reipublicae 
dignitas  sit  Romanorum  et  dum  imperator  sit  Romanorum  non 
Romani  imperatoris, ..  .quae  lex,  quae  ratio  senatum  populumque 
prohibet  creare  imperatorem?-Even  the  Hohenstaufen,  however 
decisively they may assert  their  divine right  as against  such  claims 
as these (cf. ep. an. 1152 in Jaff6, 1.  c.  p. 449, and Otto Fris. 111.  c.  16, 
and  IV. c.  3),  treat Rome as the capital town of the Empire and the 
Roman townsfolk as in a special sense the imperial  folk (cf. Petr.  de 
Vineis, ep. I. c.  7,  111. c  I, 18, 72). 
147.  Lup.  Rebenb.  c.  12  and 17.  Similarly Ockham, Dial.  111. The 
tr.  z,  1.  I, c.  30 : '  imperium  Rom.'  and '  dominiurn temporalium.. .  ~,P~~~ 
principalissime spectat  ad totam communitatem universalium morta- the  People.  Roman 
lium.'  See also Dante, III.  c.  16. 
148.  Joh.  Paris. c.  16 :  acclamante populo, cuius est se subicere The 
cui vult sine alterius praeiudicio.  Marsil.  Pat. Def. pac.  11. c.  30: the 
10-2 148  Politicad  Theo?yies of the Middle  Age. 
Part in the Pope acted, if  at all, as the delegate of  the legislator Xonzanus [i.e. 
Transla- 
tion of 
Roman  people].  See  also  the  changes  made  by  ~arsilius  in 
Empire.  IIandulf's  De transl. imp.  C.  8, 9,  10,  12.  Ockharn, Octo q.  11.  C.  g, 
JV.  c, 5 "nd 8 : auctoritate populi Romani, with the Pope as a part or 
mandatory or counsellor;  Dial.  III. tr.  2, 1.  I, c.  zo : the Pope acted 
auctoritate et vice Romanorum ...  transferentibus consensit.  Theod. a 
Niem, pp.  788-792.  Aen. Sylv. c. g : concurrente summi pontificis 
consensu. 
The  144.  Lup. Bebenb. c.  12, p.  385; comp. c.  1-4  and 8.  Ockham, 
Roman  Dial.  111.  tr.  2,  1.  I, c.  29-30,  raises other doubts.  Could the then  Citizens 
and the  populus Ronzanus surrender  the  imperium  to  the  prejudice  of  the 
Transla- 
tion.  populus sepuens?  Could  the whole universitas mortalium  make the 
transfer invitis Romanzs?  To the last  question  the answer  is Yes, 
if  there were cu&a  on  the part of  the Romans, or other reasonable 
cause. 
Right of  150.  Lup. Bebenb. c. 5.  Ockham,  Octo q.  11.  C.  14, and Dial. 
the  TII.  tr.  2,  1.  I, c.  22 : only by  authorization  of  the Romani or  the 
during a 
Vacancy  Electors can the Pope claim  any right  in this matter.  Ant. Ros.  I. 
Ofthe  c. 64:  the  flopulus  Rotnanus  demises  the  imperial  power  as  an  Empire. 
oficium publicum ;  on the Kaiser's  death this reverts to the populus. 
The Right  151.  See the citations in Note 138.  Mars. Pat. I.  c.  g and IS. 
to choose 
a Ruler.  Idup. Bebenb.  c.  5 :  secundum ius gentium ...q uilibet populus potest 
sibi regem  eligere;  c.  15 : election  or appointment by  the  Kaiser 
is, according to the common law, the only title whereby aprincz$atzls 
or vegnum can be acquired.  Ockham, Dial.  III.  tr.  z,  1.  3, c.  5-6  : 
if once a departure has been made from the Onznia comnzunia of  pure 
Natural law, we have as a principle of  the now modified Natural Law 
'quod  omnes  quibus  est praeficiendus  aliquis habeant  ius  eligendi 
praeficiendum, nisi  cedant iuri  suo  vel  superior  eis  ordinet  contra- 
rium.'  Nic.  Cus.  III.  c.  4:  populus  Romanus  habet  potestatem 
eligendi inperatorem per ipsum ius divinum et naturale;  for, accord- 
ing  to God's  very own  will,  all  lordship,  and in particular  that  of 
Kings and Kaisers, arises  'per  viam voluntariae subiectionis et con- 
sensus.'  Ant. Ros. I.  c. 69. 
Consen- 
sual Origin  152.  Mars.  Pat.  1.  c.  9.  Eng.  Volk.  De  ortu,  c.  ro.  Lup. 
or,ere-  Bebenb. :-  15, P.  398.  Ockham, Octo q. v. c.  6.  K. Summenhard, 
dltary  De contr. tr. I.  q. 11 :  an hereditary kingship arises if those who first  Kingship. 
consented gave consent pro se et silis, an elective kingship if they only 
consented pro se,  so that  'eo sublato, libere possunt  se alteri  sub- 
mittere quern elegerint.'  Custom, ordinance proceeding from a higher 
I--  ..-r,  and ccnquest are mentioned as other titles to hereditary rule. 
153.  Thom. Aq. Comm. ad Polit. pp.  495 and 501.  Aegid.  Col. 
Notes.  I49 
III.  2,  C.  5.  Mars.  Pat.  I.  c.  16.  Bart.  De reg. civ.  nr.  23.  Nic. Elective  Rulersh~p 
Cus. III.  praef.  See also Miles in Somn. Virid. I. C.  187.  is prefer- 
154.  Otto Fris. Gesta, 11.  c.  I.  Lup.  Bebenb.  c.  s.  Ockham, able.  The 
Octo q.  IV.  c.  5 and 9, VIII.  c. 3.  Baldus, 1.  5, Dig. I.  I, nr.  11-15.  Empire 
Nic.  Cus.  III.  c.  4.  According  to  Lupold,  the  exercitus,  which Elective. 
'  repraesentabat  totum  populum  Romanorum  imperio  subiectum,' 
used to make  the election;  afterwards  it was  made  by the People 
itself;  then by the  Emperor  who  chose a  successor;  finally by the 
Prince Electors. 
155.  Mars.  Pat.  11.  26  (concessio  populi is the basis)  and III. Theory  and the 
concl. g and 10.  Lup.  Bebenb.  c.  5  and  12 :  when  the Karolings prince 
had died out, the princes and nobles  of the Franks, Alamans, Bava- Electors. 
rians  and Saxons  'who  represented  the  whole  Folk  of  Germany' 
made the choice;  then Otto 111.  'by the express or at any rate the 
tacit  consent'  of  the princes  and people established the Kurfrsten 
(Prince  Electors);  and this  was  legitimate,  for  by  the ius gentiuvz 
every  universitns  may  choose  a king,  and,  in  accordance with  a 
general custom, may also confer upon him imperial rights, and more- 
over may delegate for ever to committees the right  to make equally 
valid elections.  Ockham, Octo q.  VIII, c. 3.  Nic. Cus. III. c. 4 :  the 
Electors  were instituted in the  time of  Henry 11.  by the common 
consent of  all the Germans and of  all others who were subject to the 
Empire, and therefore '  radicalem vim  habent ab ipso omnium con- 
sensu qui sibi naturali iure imperatorem constituere  poterant.'  Ant. 
Ros.  I.  c.  48:  the  'collegium  universale  fidelium,  et  sic  populus 
Romanus,'  instituted the Electors. 
156.  Ockham,  Dial.  111.  tr.  2,  1.  I, c 30 :  what the People has The Pope 
de facto  conveyed to the Pope is knowable only by one who has seen F0oapular 
all  the papal  charters,  registers  and authentic  documents;  but  in Delegate. 
principle the People might  have  transferred to the Pope power  to 
constitute the Electoral College or even directly to make the election. 
Nic.  Cus.  III.  c.  4  holds  that  it  was  merely  as a  subject  of  the 
Empire (for in  temporals the Church is subject) that the Pope gave 
his consent, whereas the virtue  (vkor) of  the act flowed not '  ex suo 
sed  ex  communi  omnium  et ipsius  et aliorum  consensu.'-On  the 
other hand, according to Lupold v.  Bebenburg, c.  12,  an authoriza- 
tion by the Church was  requisite in order that the choice made by 
the Prince Electors might give a claim to iniperial coronation and to 
imperial rights outside the realm of  Charles the Great. 
157.  Mars.  Pat.  11.  c.  26.  Ockham, Octo q. VIII.  C.  1-8,  and Election, 
IV.  c. 8-9;  Dial.  111.  tr.  2, 1.  2, c.  29.  Nic.  Cus. 111.  c. 4.-So  also nation, 
Bebenburg, c. 5-6,  but  once more with  an exception  of  imperial  the 150 Politicnd  Theoyies of the Middle Age. 
imperial  beyond the limits of  the 'immediate'  Reich.  Ockham justly 
Rights.  urges  that  Bebenburg's  own  argument  requires  that  the  Electing 
Princes should represent  the World-Folk,  and not  merely  the folk 
of Charles the Great's  lands. 
I,ex~egia:  158.  Accursius  in  G1.  upon  1.  g,  Dig.  I, 3, v.  non  amb%ihr, 
an irre-  decides in favour  of  this view, while the GI.  upon 1.  11, Cod.  I, 14, 
vocable 
convey-  v.  solus imjemto~  mentions it but does not decide.  So also G1.  upon 
ance. 
1.  Feud.  26, v.  an impe~atorem  (imperator maior populo).  Hostiensis, 
De const.  Bartolus,  1.  11, Cod.  I, 14, nr.  3-4:  omnis potestas  est 
abdicata ab eis.  Baldus, 1.  8, Dig.  I, 3, nr. 5-11,  says that thepoju- 
lus Romanus cannot depose the Emperor and is not ivz$eratorisimil'is; 
the fyanslatio was an alienatiopleno iztre; otherwise the Kaiser would 
be, not dominus, but commissan'zlspojul'i.  So Baldus in I.  Feud.  26, 
nr.  15 and 11.  Feud. 53 $ I (princeps maior populo); 1.  8, Dig.  I, 14, 
nr.  1-3,  and 1.  11,  eod.  nr. 6: the populus  can  no longer make 
laws.  Angel.  Aret.  $  6, I.  I, 2,  nr.  5-6.  Joh.  de Platea, Inst.  I, 
2, nr.  51.  Marcus, Dec. I.  q.  187. 
LexRegia:  159.  See  the  counter opinions  in the Glosses cited in the last 
a revo- 
cableDele- note.  G1.  on 1.  2,  Dig.  de R.  D.  v.  Zittora :  the protectia of the res 
gation.  communes ornniz~itn  is ascribed  to the Roman people : Baldus substi- 
tutes Caesaris for pop.  Xom.  Also Cinus,  1.  12,  Cod.  I,  14 :  but he 
confesses that at the present day statutes made by the Roman people 
would  find little observance outside the walls  of  Rome.  Ockham, 
Octo q.  IV.  c. 8.  Christof. Parcus $ 6, Inst. I, 2,  nr. 4 (with elaborate 
proof).  Zabar.  c.  34 $ verum, X.  I, 6, nr. 8.  Paul. Castr. 1.  8, Dig. 
I, 3, nr. 4-6,  and 1.  I, Dig.  I, 4, nr. 4: he holds that there was a 
concessio  of  the zcsus,  not  a  translati0  of  the  substantia,  but  since 
Christ's advent the Church has taken the place of the People. 
Absolute  160.  See e.g. the speech of the Abp of Milan to Frederick I. in Ott.  Monarchy 
and the  Fris. Iv. C.  4, and the letter of Frederick 11. in Pet. de Vin. ep. v. c, 135. 
Will of the  161.  Oldradus  and, following  him, Baldus, Prooem.  Feud.  nr.  People. 
~~lli~~  of  32, and 11.  Feud. 26  $  4  in  generali,  nr. 34.  Picus a  Monte Pico, 
Monarch's  1-  Feud- 7,  nr.  7.  Decius,  Cons.  564, nr.  9-10.  Franc. Curt. jun.  $,$;tnd  Cons. 174, Dr.  17.-Therefore  to support the Donation  of Constan- 
to impair  tine,  an approval  by  Senate  and  People  was  supposed.  Baldus,  his Funda- 
mental  PrOOen1- I'ig.  nr.  44-45?  and 11.  Feud.  26  5 4,  nr. 3 ;  Aug. Triun;- 
Rights.  ~hus,  11.  q. 43, a.  3 ;  Ant. Rosellus, I.  C.  69;  Curtius, 1.  c.  nr.  18, 
Nullity 
of Acts  162.  Lup. Bebenb. c. 8, p. 367, and c. 12, p. 381, but esp. c. 14, 
subjecting  PP. 395-7  :  since these concessions and confessions were made without 
theE~lplre  the consent of  the Prince Electors and the People of the realm and 
to the 
Church.  empire, the said Princes and other representatives  of the People can 
conrlau~ct  them,  and  this  contradiction  is to  be  received;  so the 
Notes.  151 
subdifi may always raise objection if a &minus would subject himself 
and his land to another dominus;  for according to the iusgentium, 
civile et cnnonicum whatever  would prejudice a community 'debet ab 
omnibus approbari.'  Similarly, Ockham, Dial. 111.  tr.  2,  1.  I, c.  30: 
a division or diminution  of  the Empire would be valid 'non absque 
consensu express0 vel tacito totius universitatis  mortalium.' 
163.  See the Commentaries on 1.  8,  Cod.  I, 14; also  Baldus, 
11.  Feud. 26  § I, nr.  13. 
164.  See e.g.  Pet.  de Vin.  ep.  I.  c.  3, p.  105.  Lup. Bebenb. The Right 
c.  17, p.  406-7  : even  were rex maiorjopuio, the people must have 
a right  to depose him  in  a  case  of  necessity ; '  necessitas  enim a case of 
legem non habet.'  Ockham, Octo q. 11.  c.  7, VI.  c.  2,  111.  c.  3 ;  the Nec"sit~. 
Kaiser, albeit ius a fojulo  habet, stands above the People, the King 
above the Realm, the General of  an Order above all  the friars:  still 
in case of  necessity  the community may  depose him.  Anton.  Ros. 
111.  c.  16 :  although the Kaiser stands as caput above the Assembly of 
the Keich  and is  judge  in  his  own  cause,  an  exception  must  be 
admitted  if  he  is  accused  before  that  Assembly  as '  tyrannus  et 
. 
scandalizans universale bonum imperii saecularis.'  Comp.  ib.  c.  2 I 
and  22, and above, Note  130.-On  the other hand, already in the 
time  of  Henry IV. the Anti-Gregorian cardinals  opine that, though 
the people can make a king, the will  of  the people, when once it is 
uttered,  becomes  a  necessitas : see  Sudendorf,  Registr.  11.  41.  SO 
also Baldus (Note 158);  but comp. his Cons. V. c.  325-6. 
165.  Thomas  of  Aquino  attributes sovereignty  sometimes  to TheMixed 
the People, sometimes to the Prince, regard being had to the different ::::- 
constitutions of  different  States.  Summa Theol.  11.  I, q.  go, a.  3 : 
ordinare aliquid in bonlim  commune est  vel  totius multitudinis vel 
alicuius  gerentis  vicem  totius multitudinis;  et ideo  condere legem 
vel pertinet  ad totam multitudinem, vel pertinet ad personam publi- 
cam, quae totius multitudinis curam habet.  SO  also, q. 97, a. 3.  In 
this matter later writers follow him : e.g. Joh. Friburg.  11.  t. 5, q. 209, 
and K.  Summenhard,  q.  I I :  potestas politica  exists '  duplici modo, 
uno mod0 in uno rege, alio in una communitate!  But as to the best 
constitution,  Aquinas  declares in favour  of  the  mixed  constitution 
which (so it is imagined) prevailed among the Jews.  Summa Theol. 
11  I, q. 95, a. 4,  and q.  105, a.  I : 'Unde  optima ordinatio princi- 
pum est in aliqua civitate vel regno in quo unus praeficitur secundum 
virtutem qui  omnibus  praesit;  et sub ipso sunt aliqui participantes 
secundum  virtutem;  et tamen  talis  principatus  ad omnes  pertinet, 
tum  quia  ex  omnibus  eligi  possunt,  tum  quia  etiam  ab omnibus 
eliguntur :  talis  enim  est  omnls  politia  bene  com7nixta  ex  regno  in I 52  POZiticaZ  Theories of the Middle  Age.  Notes. 
quantum unus praeest,  ex arzstocratia in quantum multi principantur 
secundum  virtutem,  et  ex  denzocratia,  id  est,  potestate  ~o~uli,  in 
quantum  ex  popularibus  possunt  eligi  principes  et  ad  populum 
pertinet  electio principum.'  In all cases he demands that Monarchy 
be  subjected  to  limitations  so  that  it  may  not  degenerate  into 
Tyranny: De reg. princ.  I. c.  6.  John of Paris, c.  20,  p.  202, prefers 
to a  pure  Monarchy  one  mixed  with  Aristocracy  and Democracy. 
So d'Ailly,  De pot. eccl. 11. c.  I, and Gerson, De pot. eccl. cons. 13. 
Eng.  of  Volkersdorf  also  (I.  c.  14-16)  portrays the advantages  of 
mixed  constitutions.  Jason,  1.  5,  Cod.  I,  2,  lect.  2,  nr.  10-13, 
declares  it to be a general maxim in Church and State, that, if there 
be ardzca negotia concerned, the Head is bound to obtain the consent 
of a conciliar assembly.  Almain,  Comm.  ad Occam, q. I, c.  5 and 
15, holds it to be  compatible with the nature of  a Monarchy that in 
State and Church respectively the congregatio nobilium or the Council 
is entitled to impose limits on the regal or papal power and to judge 
and depose the king or, as the case may be, the pope ;  but then it is 
true  that  he elsewhere  (Tract.  de auct.  eccl.  c I, Gerson,  Op.  11. 
p.  977 K)  declares  that the Prince is above all individuals, but not 
above  the  conlmunity.  John  Mair,  Disput.  a.  1518  (Gerson,  11. 
p.  I 131 ff.) supposes two  highest  powers, that of the folk being the 
more unlimited. 
166.  See  above,  Note  159.  Lup.  Bebenb.  c.  12  and  17. 
Ockham,  Octo  q.  IV.  8. 
ustice to  167.  Mars.  Pat.  I.  c.  15  and  18;  11.  c.  26  and  30.  Lup. 
Bebenb.  c.  17, p.  406.  Ockham, Octo q. 11. c.  8 (correctio impera-  upon the 
Ruler.  toris spectat ad Romanos).  Miles in Somn. Virid. I.  141 :  if a King 
imposes unjust  taxes, denies justice, fails to defend  the country, or 
otherwise  neglects  his duty, the People may depose him and choose 
another Ruler, and so the People of a part of the realm, if this part 
0111~  has  suffered  neglect,  may  appoint  a  separate  Ruler.  Joh. 
Wiclif,  art.  17:  populares  possunt  ad  suum  arbitrium  dominos 
delinquentes corrigere.  Nicol. Cus. III.  c. 4.Already in the course 
of the  Investiture  Quarrel,  Manegold  of  Lautenbach  deduced  the 
right  of deposition  in  case  of  breach  of  contract by  the  Ruler.- 
Innoc. c.  1, X.  I, 10, nr.  1-2  concedes a right of deposition only it1 
the case of elective kings. 
TheDepo-  168.  Especially in relation to the deposition of  the last hferovings  sition of 
Kings.  and the exaltation of Pipin, it is asserted at length that '  non deposuit 
papa,  sed  deponendum  consuluit  et  depositioni  consensit,'  'non 
substituit  sed substituendum  consuluit et substituentibus  consensit,' 
'-  --.--nento  al-.solvit, i.e.,  absolutos  declaravit';  and  reference is 
made to Huguccio and Glos. ord. on C. alius, C.  15, q. 6. Joh.  Paris. 
c.  15.  Mars.  Pat. De transl. c. 6.  Lup. Bebenb. c.  12, pp.  386-9  : 
the Pope merely  declared  a dubium iuris,  the Franks deposed and 
instituted.  Ockham, Octo q, 11. c. 8;  VIII. c.  I and 5; Dial. 111.  tr. 2, 
I.  I, c 18: so too Innocents  111.  and IV.  acted auctoritak Boman- 
orum,  unless  indeed  their  doings  were  usurpatory.  Somn.  Virid. 
I. c. 72-73.  Quaestio in utramque p. 106, ad 15-16.  Nic. Cus. III. 
c. 4 :  the Pope acted as a member of  the universifas. 
169.  Lup. Bebenb.  c.  12,  p.  385, and c. 17, p.  406. 
170.  Marsil. Pat. I. c. 7-8,  12-13,  15, 18, 11. C.  30, 111. concl. 6. 
171.  Nicol.  Cus.  III.  c.  4 and 41,  and 11.  c. 12-13.  The pro- The 
posals  made  by  Cusanus  for  the  reformation  of  the  Empire  are kc:",0r 
connected with these theories, and in a very remarkable fashion blend of Cues. 
the forms of  the medieval Land-Peace-Associations with the ideas of 
Nature  Right,  III.  c.  25-40.  The Emperor  continues to be  the 
monarchical Head of  the Empire and is to take the initiative (c. 32). 
A very complicated method is proposed for his  election (c. 36-37). 
The power of making laws for the Empire is wielded by an annually 
assembled Imperial Diet (Reichstag) which consists of Prince-Electors, 
Judges,  Councillors  and  Deputies  of  Towns,  and  represents  the 
whole  People  (c.  35).  Then  below  this  stand  annual  Provincial 
Assemblies  of  the three  Estates (Clergy, Nobles and People) which 
regulate  the special  affairs  of  the  provinces,  and  depute  standing 
committees (provincial courts) with a strong executive power (c. 33). 
Further  and  detailed  reforms  of  the imperial  army  (c.  39),  of  the 
finance and justice  of  the Empire, of  the laws concerning the Land 
Peace  (c.  34),  of  ecclesiastical  privileges  (c.  40)  and so forth  are 
proposed.  As in the Empire, so generally in all territories the kings 
and princes are to have by their sides an aristocratic consilium puoti- 
dianum and an electing, legislating  and deciding  consilizrm generale 
(c. IZ).-Analogous  reforms in the Church are proposed;  11. c. 22-33. 
172.  See in particular the transactions of the French Estates of  Popular 
1484, and on them Bezold, Hist. Zeitschr. vol. 36 (1876) 361 B., and :ysY  in 
Baudrillart,  Bodin et son temps, p.  10 ;  the remarks of  Philippe de Prance. 
Comynes in Baudrillart,  p.  11 ff. ;  the doctrine of  Jacob.  Almain, 
Expos.  ad Occam,  q.  I.  c.  5  and  15 ;  Tract.  de auctor.  eccl.  c. I 
(Gerson, Op.  11.  p.  977 ff.);  De dominio naturali etc.  (ib. 964). 
173.  See the passages from the Canonists collected by v.  Schulte, Theory  Papal  of 
Die Stellung der Koncilien, p.  253 K  Thorn.  Aq.  Opusc. cont. err.  ~,,,,,1 
Graec. 11.  c. 32-38.  Innoc. c.  23,  X.  de V.  S.  nr.  3.  Dur. Spec. Councils. 
I.  I  de leg.  8  5,  nr.  10.  Aegid.  Rom.  De pot. eccl. I.  c. 2.  Aug. 
Triumph. I.  q. 6, a. 6.  Alv.  Pel.  I.  a.  6  (printed in Hiibler,  Konst. 154  Political  Theories of tkte  hfiddde Age. 
--- 
Ref. p.  36~)  and 17.  Brief of  Pius 11. and Reply of Laelius in Gold. 
11.  p.  1591 and 1595.  Turrecremata, Summa de eccl.  11.  c.  54 and 
65;  111.  C.  28,  32,  44,  47,  51,  55.  Petrus de Monte in Tr. U.  J. 
XIII.  I, p.  I44 ff. 
Papa!  174.  If Aug.  Triumphus, I. q. 3,  a.  7-9,  says that the electing 
Elections:  college is not maius papa, since it is merely God's instrument for the 
Repre- 
sentative  dest;pnatio personae,  makes  the  election papae auctoritate,  and can 
Character  confer no authority upon  the pope, still in default of the college he 
of  the 
cardinals.  attributes  the right of  election to the Concilium Generaze,  and con- 
nects  this  attribution with  the doctrine that, during the vacancy of 
the see, the coZZe~ium universalis ecclesiae  represents the Church, may 
assemble  of  its  own  motion  or  at the  emperor's  call, and, to this 
extent, possesses a 'potential  superiority (maioritaspotentialis)' which 
may be contrasted  with  the 'actual  superiority (maioritas actualis)' 
of  the pope.  See I.  q.  3, a.  2, q. 4, a.  1-8,  q. 6, a. 6.  However, 
during  the vacancy  the  properly  monarchical  power,  so fw as  its 
substance is concerned, lives on merely in Christ, and, so far as its 
use is concerned, lies dormant, for  the Cardinals-here  a  departure 
from older theory-can  at the most exercise the papal jurisdiction  'in 
minimis et quibusdam.'  See also Alv. Pel. I. a. 20, G1.  on C1.  2 de el. 
I, 3, v.  non consonam; Hinschius, Kirchenrecht, § 39. 
175.  See  v.  Schulte,  Die  Stellung der  Koncilien,  pp.  192-4 
and p.  253 ff. 
Deposition  176.  See C.  13, C.  2,  q.  7,  and c.  6, D. 40 ;  also in v.  Schulte, 
of  heretical  an  op.  cit.,  the opinions  of  Gratian,  Rufinus,  Stephanus  Tornacensis, 
Pope.  Simon  de Bisignano, Joh.  Faventinus, Summa Coloniensis, Summa 
Parisiensis, Summa Lipsiensis, Huguccio, Bern. Papiensis,  Joh.  Teu- 
tonicus,  Archidiaconus,  Turrecremata,  Goffr.  Tranensis, Hostiensis, 
Joh.  Andreae, Joh. de Imola, Joh.  de Anania.  Moreover,  G1.  ord. 
on C.  9, C.  24, q.  I, v.  novitatibus;  Innoc.  IV. on c. 23, X.  de verb. 
sig.  5,  40,  nr.  2-3;  Host.  de accus.  nr.  7; Joh.  de Anan.  c 29, 
X.  3, 5, nr.  g ff.; Petrus a Monte, f.  148 ff. 
The  17 7.  This is suggested  already by Joh.Teutonicus  (1.  c.  nr. 3 10, 
hereti?'  p.  265).  and is urged in particular by  Aug. Triumphus, I.  q. 5. a. I,  Pope is 
deposed  2,  6 and q. 6,  a. 6 (see also q.  I, a.  I, 3, q.  5, a. 3-4,  q.  7,  a. 1-4, 
'pS0 
q. 6, 11.  q. 6 and 11.  45-46),  and Alvarius Pelagius, I. a. 4-6  and 34, 
11.  a.  10.  Also  by  the  Clerk  in  the Somnium  Virid.  11.  c.  161 
Ockham  discusses  the matter  at length:  Octo q.  111.  c.  8,  VIII.  c 
5-6,  Dial. I.  6, c. 66-82. 
m  Matters  178.  Already Huguccio (v.  Schulte, p.  261)  is  of  opinion that 
O*  Faith  the heretical pope is '  mirror  quolibet catholica.'  See the statement  the Pope 
is below  of tlll~  view in Ockham,  Dial.  I.  5, c.  27, and I.  6, c  12-13,  57, 64: 
Notes.  I55 
in matters  of  faith  the Council is  'maius  papa'  because  it 'tenet the 
vicem  ecclesiae  universalis.'  Michael  de  Cesena,  ep.  a.  1331 
(Goldast,  11.  p.  1237):  in  his  quae ad fidem  catholicam pertinent 
papa  subest concilio.  Henr.  de Langenstein,  Cons.  pac.  a.  1381, 
c.  13 and 15 in Gerson, 11.  p.  824, 832. 
I 79.  Thus already  Huguccio  and others ;  for  crinzina  notoria of  Deposition  a 
comp.  Ockham,  Octo q.  I.  c.  17,  11.  c.  7,  111.  c.  8,  VIII.  c.  5-8; 
Dial.  I.  6,  c.  86.  Letter  of  the  University  of  Paris,  an.  1394 matical or 
criminous 
(Schwab,  pp.  131-2,  Hiibler,  p.  362);  for  schism,  Matth.  de pope. 
Cracovia  (Hiibler,  p.  366-7).  Pierre  Plaoul,  a.  1398  (Schwab, 
p. 147).  Zabar.,  De schism. p.  697. 
180.  See above, Note 134.  Henr.  de Langenstein, 1.  c., c.  IS.  Rejection 
of a Pope 
Simon Cramaud, Pierre Plaoul and other Gallicans in Schwab, 146 ff.  in  of 
and Hiibler, 368 ff.  Opinion of the University of Bologna in 1409, Necessity. 
in  Martene,  Ampl.  Coll.  VIII.  894.  A practical application of  this 
doctrine in the French Subtraction of  Obedience (Schwab, p.  146 E) 
and Declaration of Neutrality (ib. 2 I I). 
181.  Joh.  Paris.  c.  6,  pp.  155-8,  c.  14, p.  182, c.  21, p.  208, 
C.  25,  P.  215-224. 
182.  Mars.  Pat.  11.  c.  15-22,  and 111.  concl. 32 and 41.  All Marsilius  on Pope 
other powers wielded by the popes have been usurped.  The Council and 
has authority, not only in matter of faith (11.  c.  18, 20,  111.  c.  I and Council- 
2), but also in matters  of  excommunication, punishment, legislation, 
raising  tithes,  licensing  schools,  canonization,  establishment  of 
festivals  etc.  (11.  c.  7,  21,  III.  C.  5,  34-6). 
183.  See in Ockham, Dial. I. c.  5, c.  14-19,  and HI. tr.  I, 1.  4, Divine  Right of 
the opinion that the papacy rests upon human ordinance; III. tr. I, 1.  2, the Papal 
c.  2,  12-14,  16-17  and 25, the reasons which can be urged against Primacy 
there  being any single, human, monarchical head of the Church; 111. 
tr.  I, 1.  I, c.  I, the question how wide a power God has committed 
to the  Pope.  See  also  the references  to such  opinions  in  Petr. 
Alliac. (Gerson, Op. I.  p.  662  ff.),  Gerson  (ib.  11.  p.  88, where it is 
said to be a common opinion  that the pope is not iure n'ivino Head 
of  the  Church)  and Joh.  Breviscoxa, Tract. de fide (ib.  I.  p.  808, 
esp. 878 ff.).  The divinity of the primacy is decisively disputed by 
Nilus,  arch.  Thessalon.,  De primatu (Gold. I.  pp.  30-3g),  Randuf, 
De mod. un., Wyclif, Hus, and so forth.-The  aucto~itas  conciliorum 
is often mentioned by the older  canonists as one of  the forces which 
had constituted the primacy : e.g.  Huguccio, 1.  c. p.  266.  So d'Ailly 
(Gers.  Op.  11.  p.  905)  seems to favour  the  middle  opinion : licet 
principaliter Rom. eccl. principatum habuerit a Domino, tamen secun- 
dario a concilio.  In the same spirit, Gerson  (11.  p.  239  ff.)  distin- I 56  Political  Theovies of the Middle Age. 
-  -  Notes. 
guishes those powers of the papacy that were divinely bestowed from 
those that have been acquired under human law. 
A~~~~~~~~  184.  Ockham, Dial.  III. tr.  I, 1.  2, c. 20-27,  treats the questions 
of Papal  whether  the  Community  of  the Faithful  possesses  and  might  ex- 
Primacy 
sugpsted,  pediently use  a  power  of  changing  the regal form  of  ecclesiastical 
government into an aristocratical, and vice versa.  Also (c. 28) from the 
principle of autonomy (quaelibet ecclesia  et quilibet populus Christi- 
anus propria  autoritate ius proprium statuere pro sua utilitate potest) 
he deduces the right  of every people  to give itself a separate eccle- 
siastical head, in case the Pope be heretical,  the papal see be long 
vacant, or access to Rome be impossible. 
185.  Ockham,  Dial.  111.  tr.  2, I.  3, c.  4-13.  And then to the 
like effect Henr. de Langenstein, Cons. pac.  C.  14 and 15. 
186.  Ockham, Octo q.  I. c.  15, III.  c.  g; Dial.  III. tr. I, 1.  I, c.  I 
(where the fifth of  the suggested opinions seems to be his own).  - 
The  187.  Ockham, Octo q.  I.  c.  17,  III. c.  8; Dial. I.  5,  c.  27 ;  I.  6, 
Council 
may judge  C.  12-13,  57,  64, 69-72,  86.  See Nilus, as in Note 183.  Anony- 
the Pope.  mus De aetat. eccl. c. 6, p.  28 :  nemo primam sedem iudicare debet, 
sed  hoc  pertinet  ad  dominam  et reginam  sponsam  Christi,  cuius 
servus et dispensator est papa, quam uiiiversales synodi repraesentant. 
Somn. Virid.  r.  c.  161.  Henr.  de Langenstein, Cons. pac. c.  15. 
Right  188.  Ockham,  Dial.  I.  6, c. 84 :  this is but one instance of  the 
the  general right  of every autonomous popuZus,  of  every communites, of  Church to 
assemble  every  corpus,  to assemble  itself,  or  to constitute  an  assembly  of 
and to  deputies :  potest  aliquos  eligere  qui vicein  gerant totius  communi-  constitute 
a council.  tatis aut corporis absque alterius autoritate.  So the Universal Church, 
when  the holy  see  is  vacant,  might per se  convenire were  her  size 
small  enough,  and,  as  it  is,  may  assemble  'per  aliquos  electos  a 
diversis  partibus  ecclesiae.'  The  impulse  to  such  an assemblage 
may come from the temporal powers or from all the laity, in case the 
organs which  in  the first instance are entitled to give it, the prelates 
and divines, make default.  Comp. Langenstein, 1.  c.  c.  15 : Conrad 
de Gelnhausen, Tr. de cong. concil. (Martene, Tliesaur.  11. p.  1200). 
Theory  189.  Zabarella,  De schism.  p.  703, and upon  c.  6, X.  I, 6, nr. 
of the  16 : id quod  dicitur  quod papa habet plenitudinem potestatis, debet  Conciliar 
party.  intelligi  ?on  solus  sed  tanquam  capilt  universitatis:  ita  quod  ipsa 
potestas  est  in  ipsa universitate tanquam in fundamento, sed in ips0 
tanquam ministro, per  quem haec potestas explicatur.  Petr. Alliac. 
de pot. eccl. (Gerson,  Op.  11.  p.  949 ff.):  the plenitude of  ecclesias- 
tical  power  is  'in  papa  tanquam  in  subiecto  ipsam  recipiente  et 
ministerialiter  exercente, ...  in universali  ecclesia tanquam in obiecto 
ipsam causaliter et finaliter continente, ...  in generali concilio tanquam 
- 
in exemplo ipsam repraesentante et regulariter dirigente.'  For Gerson 
see the next  note.  Theod.  a  Niem,  De schismate.  Randuf,  De 
mod.  un.  especially  c.  2, goes  furthest:  the Universal  Church  has 
the power of the keys from God, the Roman Church has the exercise 
thereof  only  in  so far  as this  has  been  conceded  to  her  by  the 
Universal Church. 
190.  See last  Note.  The whereabouts of  ecclesiastical  power Gerson's 
Theory. 
is  more  thoroughly discussed  by  Gerson  than  by  others : Gers.  11. 
225 ff.;  Gold.  11.  1384 ff.  This power bestowed by Christ's mandate 
must in all its elements be regarded  from three points of view (c.  6). 
'In se formaliter et absolute' (i.e.  regarded abstractedly and according 
to its  simple essence)  it is  unchangeably and indestructibly in  the 
Church, thereby  being  meant  the complete  system  of  all  essential 
offices, among which offices the primacy is only one, so that it is a 
part within the whole (c.  7).  '  Respective  et  quodammodo materia- 
liter'  (i.e.  regard  being  had  to the  'subject'  in  which  this  power 
resides) it is in the office-holders for the time being and to this extent 
also  in  the  Pope, but,  if  need  be,  can  be changed  or  taken  away 
(c.  8).  '  Quoad exercitium et usum ' it is, in a yet more changeable 
and more limited fashion, allotted among the various  organs accord- 
ing to the Church's  constitution  (c.  9).  In the first of these three 
senses the power comes directly from Christ ;  in the second and third 
senses '  mediante homine.'-Then  as to the division of power among 
ecclesiastical  organs, the  'plenitudo'  is both  in  the  Pope and the 
'ecclesia synodaliter congregata.'  It  is in the latter more aboriginally 
and more fully in four respects (ratione  indeviabilitatis, extensionis, 
regulationis, generalis extensionis).  Indeed it is in the Pope '  forma- 
liter  et monarchice' ;  but  it is in the Church as in its final cause (in 
ecclesia  ut  in  fine) and as  in  its ordaining,  regulating and supple- 
menting  wielder  (ordinative, regulative  et suppletive).  It therefore 
is exercised by the Pope, while the Council '  usum  et applicationem 
regulat,'  and 'mortuo vel eiecto papa  supplet' (c.  10-11  ;  also 'con- 
cordia quod plenitudo eccl. pot. sit in summo pontifice et in ecclesia,' 
Op. 11.  p.  259 and Goldast, 11.  p.  1405).  In its Zatitudo, on the other 
hand, the ecclesiastical power is bestowed on all offices and therefore 
in the highest degree on the Pope, but belongs to him only in so far 
as respect is paid to the subordinate but independent power of  other 
offices and to the all-embracing  power  of  the  Council.  (Hiibler's 
account of Gerson's trichotomy (p. 385 ff.)  is not quite accurate.) 
191.  Zabarella, De schism. pp.  703, 709, and  C.  6,  X.  I, 6,  nr. Practical 
15-20  : '  ipsa universitas  totius ecclesiae ' is to cooperate in arduous z;z: 
matters,  to  decide  on  good  or  bad  administration,  to  accuse,  to Council. Political  T'eowies of the MMe  Age. 
depose,  and can  never  validly  alienate these  rights  to  the  Pope. 
Gerson, De auferibilitate papae (Op. 11.  p.  209 and Gold. 11. p.  I~II) 
cons.  10 and 12-19,  De unitate eccl.  (Op.  11.  II~),  De pot.  eccl. 
c. 11 (cornp. also Op. 11. p.  275):  the Church or the General council 
representing the Church can  repress abuses of  power, can direct and 
moderate; can depose the Pope 'auctoritative,  iudicialiter et iuridice,' 
not merely  'conciliative  aut  dictative  vel  denuntiative';  nay,  can 
imprison  him  and put  him  to death:  Aristotle  teaches  that  every 
communifas libera  has  a  like  inalienable  right  against  its prince&. 
See also Randuf, c.  5 and g; Pierre du Mont de St Michel in Hiibler, 
p. 380, and the doings at Constance, ib.  101-2  and 262. 
Power  192.  Petr. Alliac. Propos. util. (Gerson, Op.  11. p.  112) :  a  right 
ofthe  of the Council to assemble of  its own accord is deduced both from 
Council to 
assemble.  the power  given  by  Christ  and (after  Ockham's  fashion)  from  the 
natural  right  of  every  corpzcs civile seu nvilis communitas vel polilia 
rite  ordritafa  to  assemble  itself  for  the  preservation  of  its  unity. 
(Somewhat otherwise at an earlier date, ib. I.  pp. 661-2.)  Randuf, 
c.  3 (p.  164).  Less unconditionally,  Gerson, Propos. (Op. 11.  p.  123j, 
De un.  eccl.  (ib.  I IS),  De aufer.  pap.  (c.  I I. ib. 211)  and De pot. 
eccl. (ib. 249).  Zabarella,  De schism.  pp.  689-694,  attributes  the 
right of summons to the Cardinals, and, failing them, to the Emperor 
'loco ipsorum  populorum,'  since he represents  the whole  Christian 
people,  'cum  in  eum  translata  sit  iurisdictio  et potestas  universi 
orbis':  in the last resort, however, the Council may  assemble itself 
according to the rules  of  Corporation  Law. 
Power  193.  Gerson, De pot. eccl. c.  11.  Zabar. De schism. pp. 688-9: 
of the 
council  with application to the case of a schism, for then the holy see is quasi 
a  zlacans.  Domin. Gem. Cons.  65, nr.  7. 
Vacancy 
of the  194.  Octo  conclusiones  per  plures  doctores  in  Italiae  part. 
Holy See.  approb. ann.  I409 (Gers. Op.  11. p.  110): veri cardinales in electione  z,","dinals  papae vices gerunt universalis ecclesiae  Christianae.  Zabarella, c. 6, 
are Repre- X.  I, 6,  nr.  9,  and Panorm.  eod.  c.  nr.  IS.  According  to Gerson 
sentatives 
of the  (Op.  11. pp.  123,  293)  the Council might  institute  another mode of 
Whole  election :  according to Randuf (c.  g) it might itself elect. 
Church. 
An inde-  195.  Octo concl. 1.  c.  Gerson, De pot.  eccl. c.  7 and 11.  Petr. 
pendent  Allia-.  De pot. eccl. 11. C.  I.  Hiibler, p.  74, and the Reform Decrees, 
position  ib.  129 and 218.  assigned 
to the  196.  Gerson,  De pot.  eccl.  c.  13 :  the organization  of  ecclesi- 
astical  power  should  share  in  the  harmony  and  'pulchra  ordinis 
Mixed 
Govern-  varietas'  of ~uY@,  leges, iurisdictiones and dominia : therefore itspolitia 
ment  --..-+ 
in the 
, be compounded  of  the three good polities  of  Aristotle:  the 
Church.  three degenerate forms also are possible in the Church.  Pet. Alliac 
Notes. 
- 
De pot. eccl. 11.  c. I (11.  p.  946) :  the Church must  have the best of 
constitutions, and therefore 'regimen regium, non purum, sed mixturn 
cum aristocratia et democratia.' 
197.  Zabar.  De  schism.  pp.  703,  709.  Octo  concl.  1.  c. :  The 
Council  delegated nature of all other powers.  Pierre du Mont de St Michel, above the 
ann.  1406, in Hiibler,  p.  380.  Gerson,  De unit.  eccl. (11.  p.  113); Pope. 
Tract.  quomodo et an liceat etc (ib.  303 and Gold.  11.  1515);  De 
pot.  eccl.  7 and 11 : the  Pope  is  only  a  membru7n  of  the  corpus 
ecclesiae,  and is as little  above the Church as a  part  is above  the 
whole;  much rather, if  the General Council represents the Universal 
Church sufficiently and entirely, then of necessity it must include the 
papal  power,  whether  there  be  a  Pope,  or whether  he has died a 
natural  or a  civil  death; but it  will  also  include  the power  of  the 
cardinals, bishops and priests.  Randuf  will  allow to the Pope not a 
whit more power  than is conceded to him by the Universal Church,' 
and only a power which is 'quasi instrumentalis et operativa seu execu- 
tiva' (c.  2);  the concilium is thoroughly  'supra  papam,'  and to it he 
owes obedience (c. 9) ;  the Sovereignty of  the Council is inalienable 
and all  Canon Law to the contrary is invalid (c.  17;  comp. c.  23). 
Add the famous decree of Session V.  of the Synod of Constance, and 
Gerson,  11. p.  275 thereon. 
198.  Gerson,  De pot.  eccl. : the 'congregatio  totius  universi- Gerson on 
Divine  tatis hominum' could, it is true, establish the Empire, but could not, Right 
without  Christ, have laid  the foundation  of  the Church (c.  9); the of the 
Church  is  a  system  of  offices,  including  the  papacy,  which  were Papacy' 
instituted  by Christ and are indestructible (c. 7 and g);  the papacy, 
though as a function it is subject to alteration and may be temporarily 
dispensed with (c. 8), is as an institution indestructible (c. I I).  Comp. 
De auferib.  pap.  c.  8 and  20,  where  this  is  made  the  distinctive 
difference between  the  constitution  of  the  Church  and  civil  con- 
stitutions.  See also Op. 11.  pp.  130, 146, 529-30,  and IV.  p.  694 
199.  See Randuf, 1.  c., c. 5. 
200.  In the Concordantia Catholics  See also his  De auctor. 
praes. in Diix, I. p. 475 ff. 
201.  Gregory  of  Heimburg  in his  polemical  writings  touching Popular 
the strife about the bishopric of  Brixen :  as to which see Brockhaus, ::&& 
Gregor v.  Heimburg,  pp.  149-259.  [For this quarrel the English in the 
reader should refer to Creighton, Papacy,  Irr.  237 :  Nicholas of  Cusa Churck 
and Gregory  of  Heimburg were concerned in it and Aeneas Sylvius 
was  the then Pope, Pius 11.1  According to Heimburg the Council 
and  only  the  Council  represents  the  eternal,  constant,  infallible 
Church,  realizes  the  Church's  unity  in a  democratic  form,  and is 160  Political  Theories of the Middle Age. 
greater  than  the  monarchical  Head  (Gold.  11.  1604 ff., 1615  ff., 
1626 ff.).  Immediately from  Christ  it has power  over  the Pope in 
matters  of  faith,  unity  and reform,  and is his  sujerior.  From  the 
Pope lies an appeal to the Council, as in Rome an appeal lay from 
Senate to People (ib.  1583,  1589, 1591, 1595, 1627); and a  papal 
prohibition  of  such an appeal is invalid (ib.  1591 and 1628).  If  no 
Council be sitting, the appeal  is to a  future  Council, since once in 
every ten years the authority of  the Church scattered throughout the 
world-an  authority which lies dormant during the intervals-should 
become visible (ib. 1580-g~).-Compare  Almain, Expos. ad octo q. 
1.  c.  15,  and Tract.  de auctor.  eccl.  et conc.  gen.  (Gers.  Op.  11.  p. 
977 f.)  : the Church is a  Limited Monarchy,  in which  the  Council 
vatione indeviabilitatis stands above the Pope, sits in judgment on him, 
receives appeals from  him,  restrains him  by  laws,  can depose him, 
and  so  forth.-Aeneas  Sylvius, Comment.  de gestis  Basil.  concilii 
libr.  11.  : the  comparison  to  the  relationship  between  King  and 
People  is  consistently pursued. 
Canonis&  202.  Comp.  Ludov.  Rom., Panormitanus (e.g.  upon  c.  2, X I, 
and the 
Council,  6, nr.  2: potestas ecclesiastics est in papa et in tota ecclesia, in papa 
ut in capite, in ecclesia ut in corpore ;  c. 3, eod. nr.  2 -4  ; c.  6,  eod. 
nr.  15; C.  17, X.  I, 33, nr.  z),  Decius (e.g. c. 4, X.  I, 6, nr.  1-22; 
c. 5, eod.  nr.  3; Cons.  I~I),  Henr. de Bouhic (e.g. c.  6, X.  I, 6), 
Marcus (e.g. Dec. I. q. 935), and so forth. 
The  203.  The Pope stands as Monarch (caput) above the Council: 
System of 
htonius  ut SO soon as he prescribes anything against the Faith or the weal of 
de Rosel-  the Church  or beyond  his  official  competence, the Council  stands 
lis.  above him, judges him, and receives appeals from him (11.  c.  13-22, 
and III. c.  16-17).  Although  therefore  he normally has the pleni- 
tude  of  power  and  his  opinion  has precedence  over  that  of  'the 
whole body mystical,' still the judgment  of  the whole  Council takes 
precedence 'in a matter of  faith, or schism, or where the good of the 
universal Church is in question' (111.  c. 26-27),  even if this good be 
but some secondary good;  for example, if  there be question as to the 
appointment  of  officers.  When  there  is no pope or there are more 
popes  than one or  the pope  is  heretical,  then  the Council  has  all 
powe1 (11.  c.  24).  The  election  of  popes  belongs  to the  Church 
universal  which  has  committed  it  to the cardinals (I.  c. 48).  Nor- 
mally  it  is  for  the  Pope  to  summon  and  authorize  the  Council 
(111.  C.  I  and 3): but he is  bound  to summon  it  for every  arduous 
affair of the whole Church or if  he himself is to be called to judgment 
(ih. c.  2).  If he makes default, then the Cardinals, the Emperor, or 
indeed  any  clerk  or  lay~rlan  may  call  a  Council,  which  then  con- 
Notes.  161 
stitutes itself  of its own authority (11.  c.  4 and 24, 111.  c.  3).  Against 
a  pope  who  has been  condemned  or who  impedes  or  dissolves  a 
Council  which might  depose him, there is a general right  of  resist- 
ance and renunciation (11. c.  23, 26-30,  III. c. 4-6).  To  deal with 
'mixed ' affairs '  mixed' councils, to which the Church should submit, 
are to be summoned by the joint action of the spiritual and temporal 
powers (111.  c.  15-18  and 21-22). 
204.  Turrecremata,  De pot.  pap.  c.  38.  So also  Nicholas  of Popular 
Cues (Op. 825-9)  in his  later days:  for  Plurality is  evolved out  of cz$,"ld" 
Unity, and the Body out of the Head.-After  as well as before the 
reaction in  favour of  the Papacy, the papalists admit the superiority 
of the Council in 'a cause of  faith or of  schism ' (contentio de  pnpatlr 
and causa contra papam), but regard this as an exception.  See, e.g., 
Card.  Alexandr.  c.  3, D.  21,  c.  I, D.  23, summa, and c.  I, D.  15; 
Domin. Jacobatius Card. De consiliis, esp. IV.  a. 7, nr. 29-31  and VI. 
a. 3, nr.  41  and 58-60,  comp. with  VI.  a.  3, nr.  61 ;  also  Petrus de 
Monte and Turrecremata, in Schulte, Geschichte, 11.  p.  319 and 327. 
205.  As to the part assigned to delegates of  Princes, Towns and Lay 
Universities, see Hiibler, p.  119, note 3,  120,  note 5 ;  Voigt,  Enea Repre- 
sentatives 
Syivio, 1.  p.  102 K  Gerson,  De pot.  eccl.  (11.  p.  250),  allows the in the 
laity only consultative voices.  Even  Nic. Cus. would  allow them  a COunciL- 
real voice only under certain conditions, but lets all parishioners take 
part  in the parochial  synods,  and the laity  are to cooperate  In  the 
election of parsons and bishops (11. c.  16, 111.  c.  8-24). 
206.  Gerson, P~o~os.  coram Anglicis, ann. 1409 (Op. 11.  pp. 128 The 
-130)~  De aufer. pap.  (ib. 209 ff.),  De pot. eccl. c.  7  and g,  Sermo in  an 
Institute 
Op. 11.  p. 436 ff.  So also Petr. Alliac. (ib. I. p.  666 ff. and 690) and rather 
Nic.  Cus.  (I.  c.  7-10  and 11.  c.  19)  regard  the Priesthood  as the $%;- 
essential and distinctive  mark  of  the Church.  AS to Heinrich v.  ship. 
Langenstein,  see his  biography  by 0. Hartwig, I.  pp.  56-57.  [Dr 
Gierke here contrasts an idea of  the Church which is anstaltlich with 
one which is genossenschaftich.  Some learning of  a technically legal 
kind  is implied by the employment of  these words, and it cannot be 
briefly explained  in  English.  But  we  shall  not go far wrong  if  we 
contrast the idea of  the Church as 'a corporation aggregate,' congre- 
gatio $deliurn,  with  that  of  the  Church  as  a  system  (Inbegrzf)  of 
personified  offices,  or  (as  we  say  in  England)  of  'corporations 
sole.'] 
207.  SO e.g.  in  Randuf,  De  mod.  un.  in  Gerson,  Op.  11. 
p.  161 ff. 
208.  Ockham,  Dial.  I.  5, c.  1-35.  So almost verbatim  Petr. Fallibility 
Alliac.  (Gers.  Op.  I.  p.  661 fi:)  who,  however, does not draw  infer- ofevev 
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,,  nr.  4: fiscalis  res  et Caesaris  res  est  eadem,  quia  omnia  iura 
fiscalia  transferuntur  in  eum  tanquam  imperatorem  non  tanquam 
Titiurn :  but with the 'patrimonium  Caesaris' it is otherwise, for this 
he has 'tanquam  Titius.'  Marcus, Dec. I.  q.  338, nr.  1-7.  [Refer- 
ence is made by Dr Gierke to other parts of  his book where the dual 
personality  of  bishops  and the like  is  discussed:  a bishop,  it was 
said, had two persons;  one 'in  quantum  est  episcopus';  the other 
'in quantum est Petrus vel Martinus.'] 
219.  See last note.  Also  Ockham,  Octo q.  11.  c.  2: what  the 
ICaiser  had before he was  Kaiser  or afterwards  acquired  'per se et 
non dignitati,'  is his private property.  On the other hand, the 'bona 
et iura imperii'  exist '  propter bonum  commune subditorum et non 
propter bonum proprium principatus.'  Of these last he can dispose 
'non  nisi  propter  bonum  commune seu  utilitatem  omniu\m  subdit- 
orum,'  and if  he do otherwise he is bound to make restitution like 
anyone else who misapplies goods that have been entrusted to him. 
220.  Baldus,  Cons.  I.  271,  326,  327;  "1.  C.  159,  371.  The 
question is whether and in what case a Prince, elective or hereditary, 
is bound by the acts of  his  predecessor, and Baldus always acutely 
reduces this to the question in what  cases  the State, or the Fisc, is 
bound by the acts of its highest  organ.  When  it  comes  to particu- 
lars, he applies the ordinary rules of  Corporation Law  touching the 
liability of corporations for the contracts and torts of their governors; 
but in the case of  Kings and more  especially  of  hereditary  Kings 
he supposes an unusually wide power  of  representation.  A  king is 
no mere  legitimus administrator,'  but  stands '  loco  domini ' (nam 
regnum  magis assimilatur  dominio quam  simplici regimini);  and in 
particular his  power  to bind  by contract extends to unusual as well 
as  to  usual  affairs.  In the  same  sense,  Jason,  Cons.  III.  c.  10, 
distinguishes the Ruler's  'pacta personalia,'  and 'pacta realia nomine 
suae gentis inita' (c.  8), extends the principle to judicial acts (nr. IO), 
appeals to ecclesiastical  analogies  (nr.  15-19),  and then  declares 
that the successor is bound as successor  'si princeps faciat ea quae 
sunt de natura vel consuetudine sui officii' (nr. ZI),  or if  the conven- 
tion  was made '  in utilitatem  status ' (nr.  14).  Comp.  Bologninus, 
Cons. 6.  '_!n  the other hand Picus a Monte Pico, I.  Feud. 3, nr.  1-3, 
and I.  Feud. 7,  nr.  1-17,  once more throws the whole question into 
confusion. 
221.  Nic.  Gus., above in Notes 171 and 209;  Gerson, De pot. 
eccl. c. 10, and Concordia, p.  259.  ---  See, e.g.  Eng. Volk. De reg. princ.  IV.  c. 21-29  ;  alongside 
the duties arising  between individuals as men, as fellow countrymen, 
Notes.  16.5 
as fellow burgesses, as kinsmen, as  members of  social groups, stand Indivi- 
their  duties  to the Whole  which  arise  out  of  'illa  coniunctio  qua duals and  Duties to 
unusquisque privatus universitati sive reipublicae tanquam membrum the Com- 
munity.  corpori et tanquam pars toti consociatur.'  Comp. VII.  c.  8-12  as to 
the different '  status personae.' 
223.  Mars.  Pat.  I.  c.  12 : the populus is sovereign ;  thepopulus Rights of 
is  the  universiios  civium;  a  &is  is  one  who  'secundurn  suum ::z~~- 
gradum'  takes  part  in  public  affairs;  excluded  are  'pueri,  servi, exercised 
advenae ac mulieres.'  So Thom.  Aq.  Comm.  ad Polit.  p.  452 and zi::e 
460 (comp.  also Summa Theol.  11.  I, q.  105, a.  I) and Patric. Sen. Members. 
De inst. reip. I.  3, p.  22 define civis in the Aristotelian  way, so as to 
equate it with 'active citizen.' 
224.  Lup. Bebenb. c.  17, p.  406 : et intelligo  populum Romani Repre- 
imperii  connumeratis  principibus  electoribus  ac etiam  aliis  prin- 
cipibus, comitibus et baronibus  regni  et imperii  Romanorum :  nam  People as 
appellatione populi continentur etiam patricii et senatores.  And so a 'yStem 
of Estates. 
other writers.-Even  the Radical Marsilius  admits to the legislative 
assembly  everyone  'secundum  suum  gradum';  tries  to  secure the 
influence  of  the docti et sapientes  in  the discovery and redaction  of 
laws, and apparently would give no unconditional support to a system 
of  equal  votes,  for the valentior pars  which  decides  seems  to be 
measured  'secundurn  politiarum  consuetudinem  honestam.'  See 
Def.  pac.  I.  12-13  and  15;  also  De transl.  imp.  c.  6. 
225.  Mars. Pat. Def. I. pac. c.  12-13  : the volufitas of  the mi-  will of 
versitas civium  becomes  law  by  being  expressly  declared  in  the the People 
expressed  congregatio generalis;  I.  c  I 7 : the act is a single act though done by  by Assem- 
many in common;  111.  c.  6.  So also Aegid. Col.  11.  I, c.  3.  blies. 
226.  From  Corporation  Law  are deduced the exclusive right of  The Rules 
the Pope to summon  the Council (e.g.  Card. Alex. c.  2,  D.  17), and $::in 
by others a  right  of  summons normally to be exercised by the Pope Law are 
applied to  (Jacobat.  De Conc.  IV.  a.  7,  nr.  24;  Ant.  Ros.  III.  c.  I-3),  but Political 
supplemented by a right of the Cardinals or such part  of  their  body Assem- 
as does not  make default (Zabar. De schism. p.  689;  Ros. 111.  c.  3; blies' 
Decius, Cons.  151, nr.  13-22)  and of  the Kaiser (above, Note 48); 
and the right of the Council  to assemble itself is similarly deduced 
(above, Notes 188, 192, 203).  It is opined that if  all the members, 
though  unsummoned,  were  present,  then,  as  in  the  case  of  other 
corporations,  they might proceed  to business  (Ros.  11.  c.  4).  If all 
are not  present,  then  Zabarella  (comp.  De schismate,  pp.  693-4) 
vouching  Innocent  [IV.]  would  require  the  presence  of  two-thirds, 
who  would  then have  to summon  the others  and  wait  until  they 
either appeared  or could be declared  guilty of contumacy.  On the 166  Political  Theories of the Middle Age. 
other hand, Rosellus (111.  c. 4)  and Jacobatius  (IV. a.  7,  nr.  25-8) 
argue  that  in  the  case  of  the  Council  an  imminens pericuhrn  vel 
nPcessitas  may always be presupposed, and that, when this is so, even 
a minority can summon the others and preclude them, since, accord- 
ing  to  Corporation  Law,  the pars in  casu  periculi non  conturnax 
is  in truth  the maior et saniorpars.  [In an earlier part of  his book 
Dr Gierke  has  explored  the formation of a law and theory of  corpo. 
rate assemblies.  The legists, relying on certain texts which concerned 
the Roman decuriones, were inclined strictly to require the presence 
of  two-thirds  of  the  members.  This  requirement  the  canonists 
mitigated in divers fashions.  They also  held  that if  no meeting had 
been summoned, but two-thirds of  the members were present, those 
present  might  proceed  to business, but ought to suhmon the others 
unless  there were danger (periculurn) in delay.  Then, according to 
the canonists, it was not a mere maiorpars but a maior et saniorpars 
that could validly outvote a minority.] 
Corpora-  227.  See especially  Jacobat.  IV.  a.  7.  He elaborately  argues 
~~~~~w  that 1.  3 et 4,  Dig. 3, 4 are not to be applied, and that, according to 
General  the canonical principle  Vocati non venientes constituunt se alienos,' 
even  a  minority  can  act  (nr.  1-16);  also  that  the  right  of  the 
contempti to re-open a question has no existence in this case, since a 
citatio generalis is sufficient (nr.  16-23);  and so forth.  Also  Ros. 
111.  c.  7-14  (in  c.  14 the  requirement  of  two-thirds  is  set aside). 
Card.  Alex.  c.  2,  D.  17.  [The Canonists  had practically  circum- 
vented  the  requirement  that  two-thirds  of  the members  should  be 
present,  by  holding  that  those  who  failed  to  appear  when  duly 
summoned were in contempt, had 'made thetnselves  alien '  and were 
not to be counted.] 
Majorities  228.  Zabar. De schism. p. 689.  Panorm. c. 26, X. 2, 27, nr. 13. 
;,","kcned.  Even in the Council  the voice  that  prevailed was  to be  that of  the 
greater 'and souqder' part (Card. Alex. c.  I, D.  15 in fine;  Jacobat. 
~v.  a.  3, nr.  I-4~) ;  and with  this was  connected  the principle  that 
matters  of  faith were not to be decided by mere majorities (Jacobat. 
1.  c. nr.  7-12  and 25 ;  Nic.  Cus.  I.  c.  4).  The words of  Cusanus 
(11. c.  15) carry us back to old  Germanic thoughts:  quia quisque ad 
synodurn  ,ergens  iudicio  maioris  partis  se  submittere  tenetur... 
synodus finaliter  ex  concordia  omnium definit.  [The old Germanic 
thought  is  that  unanimity  is  requisite, but that  a  minority ought  to 
and can be compelled to give way.]  Also we may see that the iura 
singulorum  are  to  be  protected  against  the  vote  of  the  majority 
(Jarohat. 1.  c. nr.  27-32)  During  the strife over the adjournment 
of  the  Council  of  Easel,  an  odd  inference  was  drawn  from  this 
Notes. 
principle, namely, that the minority or even  any one member  could 
resist  an adjournment  to another  place  on the ground  of  'vested 
right '  (ius puaesitz~m)  :  see  Ludov.  Rorn. Cons. 35 2,  nr.  10-24,  and 
Cons.  522;  Jacobat.  1.  c.  nr.  36-39,  and ib.  a.  7,  nr.  35.  [Under 
the rubric iura singulorum, medieval law withdraws  from  the power 
of  the majority  rights  of  individual  corporators  which  are more  or 
less closely implicated in the property  and affairs of  the corporation. 
A modern example would be the shareholder's '  share ': this does not 
lie  at the  mercy  of  a  majority;  a  medieval  example  would  be  a 
canon's '  prebend.'] 
229.  The plan  of  voting  by  Nations  was justified  by  the rules Majorities 
that dealt with the conjoint action of  divers covpora (Panorm. c.  40, 
X.  I, 6, nr.  6, Jacobat.  IV.  a.  3,  nr.  52-57),  while the opponents of in the 
that plan made much of  the unity of  the whole  body of  the Church 
(Card.  Alex.  c.  I, D.  15  in  fine).  See Hiibler,  p.  279,  n.  60 and 
316  ff.  [The federalistic character  of  medieval  groups gave rise  to 
many elaborate schemes for  securing a  certain  amount of  unity and 
independence to those  smaller  bodies  that were  components  of  a 
larger body, e.g. the faculties and nations within an university.] 
230.  See e.g.  Mars. Pat.  Def.  pac.  I.  c.  12,  13, 15,  I7 :  what the The 
valentior pars does is  'pro  eodem  accipiendum' as that  which  the MajoritY 
as a Repre. 
tota  uniz)ersitas does,  for  the  'valentior  pars  totam  universitatem  sentation 
repraesentat.'  Eng.  Volk.  De reg.  pr.  I.  c.  5,  7,  lo,  14.  Lup. !$L2e, 
Bebenb.  c.  6  and  12.  Ockham  and  Ant.  Ros.  as  above,  in 
Note  145. 
231.  Ockham,  Dial.  111.  tr.  2,  1.  I,  c.  29-30  : quaecunque corporate 
universitas seu communitas particularis  propter culpam suam potest 
of the 
privari quocunque honore et iure speciali; and therefore for culpa the R,,,, 
Romans may  be  deprived of  their  lordship in the Empire;  and so People. 
with other nations;  and so for their culpa whole portions of mankind 
can be  deprived of  their  active rights in the World-State, and many 
think that this has happened to the Jews and Heathen, their share in 
the Empire having  'devolved'  to the Christians.  But, according to 
1.  2,  c.  5,  there  ought  to  be  a  formal  sententia  of  the universitas 
mortalium  or  its  representatives.  Whether  the papal '  translatio  a 
Graecis  in  Germanos'  was  founded  on  this  principle  and whether 
that act was rightful or wrongful could, says Ockham (Octo q. 11.  c. 9), 
be known only to one who possessed all the documents of that age. 
232.  See  the  definition given  by  Konrad  v.  Gelnhausen,  De Itepre: 
congreg.  conc.  temp.  schism.  an.  1391  (in  Martene  11.  p.  1200) :  sentat~ve  Character 
concilium  generale  est  multarum  vel  plurium  personarum rite con- of the 
vocatarum repraesenrantium vel gerentium vicem diversorum statuum, 163  Political  Theo9.ie.s  of the Middle Age. - 
ordinurn  et  personarum  totius  Christianitatis  venire  aut  mittere 
volentium  aut  potentium  ad  tractandum  de bono  communi  uni- 
versalis  ecclesiae in unum  locum communem congregatio.  Gerson, 
De aufer. c.  10; De pot. eccl. c. 7 ff.  Nic.  Cus.  De auctor.  praes. 
(in Diix, I.  p. 475 ff.) :  the Pope is the remotest, the General Council 
the  directest  and  surest  representative  of  the  Universal  Church. 
Decius,  c.  4,  X.  I, 6,  nr.  21. 
The  233.  See Ockham,  Dial.  I.  5, c. 25-28  : even the representative 
Council  Council  is  only  pars ecclesiae;  it  stands  below  the  'communitas 
a mere 
Repre-  fidelium  si posset  convenire';  is summoned by  human agency  and 
sentative.  can be dissolved;  and it can err, so that resistance to, appeal from, 
and accusation against it are not inconceivable.  Similarly at some 
points,  Petr.  Alliac.  in  Gers.  Op.  I.  p.  688 ff.,  >nd  again  at  the 
Synod of Constance (Sess. I. in Mansi, xxvrr. p.  547).-S0  Breviscoxa 
(Gers.  Op.  I.  p.  898)  speaks  with  hesitation  about  the Council's 
infallibility.-On  the other hand, Gerson and Cusanus (11.  c.  15-16) 
maintain  its  infallibility,  its  representation  of  the  Church  being 
absorptive. 
Election  234.  Nic.  Cus.  I.  c.  15  and  11.  c.  18: it  is  on the ground of 
g:t%,"F  election  that 'praesidentes  figurant suam subiectam ecclesiam'  and 
that  Councils  of  such  prelates  represent  the larger  circles  of  the 
Church ;  and so on up to a representation  of  the Church Universal. 
Ant. Butr. c.  17, X.  I, 33, nr.  27-28  : at the Provincial Councils the 
Prelates and '  Rectores'  do not appear as individuals, but  'quilibet 
praelatus vel  rector  tenet  vicem  universitatis.'  Zabar.  c.  ult.,  X.  3, 
10, nr.  1-3.  Panorm. c.  17, X.  I, 33, nr. 2 :  in the General Council 
'  praelati totius orbis conveniunt et faciunt unum  corpus, repraesent- 
antes  ecclesiam  universalem ';  so  the praeati et  maiores  of  the 
province  represent  their  universitates,  and  so  in  their  Provincial 
Assembly they represent the uniz~ersitates  ecclesiarum of the province ; 
and again 'in  una dioecesi.. .praelati et capitula repraesentant totum 
clerum';  and so also is it in the constitution of Universities. 
Election  235.  Ockham, Dial. I. 6, c. 84 (above, Note 209) :  he appeals to 
of Lay  the general right  of  every people,  every commune.  every corpus,  to  Iiepre- 
sentatives. assemble, not only in proper  pelson  but also 'per aliquos electos  a 
diversis  partibus,'  for  every  body  'potest  aliquos  eligere  qui vicem 
gerant  totius  communitatis  aut corporis.' 
Repre-  236.  See  above,  Notes  161-3,  168,  172.  Marsil.  Pat.  I.  c. 
sentation 
in T~~-  12-13  :  vicem et auctoritatem universitatis civiurn repraesentant.  Nic. 
poral  Cus. III. c.  12  and 25.  Men thought that certain texts in the Corpus 
Assem- 
blies.  ,  - -:..  -issigned s  similar position to the Roman Senate.  [Our author 
is referring  in  particular  to certain  words  of  Pomponius  (1.  2,  3  g, 
Notes. 
-  169 
Dig.  I, 2) which, he says, exercised  a  marked influence  on Political 
Theory; deinde quia difficile plebs  convenire coepit, populus  certe 
multo  difficilius  in  tanta  turba  hominum,  necessitas  ipsa  curam 
reipublicae  ad senatum deduxit.  He here  remarks  that already in 
the Brachylogus-a  manual of  Roman law  which he is  inclined  to 
ascribe to OrIkans and the twelfth century-these  words of  Pomponius 
are supposed to record a formal transfer of  power  by the p~p~lus  to 
the senate.] 
237.  See  the formulation  of  the  general  principle  in Ockha~ll 
(above,  Note  235)  and  Mars.  Pat.  1.  c. 
238.  Nic.  Cus.  111.  c.  12  and  25 : elected  governors  are  to The 
represent  communities;  assemblies  of  such governors  are to repre- kfi:;ve 
sent the lands and provinces;  and an universaZe concilium imperiale Parlia- 
is  to represent  the Reicd:  in this  council  'praesides  provinciarum Ftarism 
suas  provincias  repraesentantes  ac etiam  universitatum  magnarum Nicholas 
rectores ac magistri'  and also  men  of  senatorial rank are to meet ; 
they will  compose  the 'corpus  imperiale cuius caput est  Caesar, et 
dum  simul conveniunt  in  uno  compendia  repraesentativo,  totum  im- 
periufn colZectum  est.' 
239.  Mars.  Pat.  I.  c.  12-13  ;  he says in c.  12 :  sive id fecerit The 
universitas  praedicta  civium  aut  eius  pars  valentior  per  se ipsam E:d:;l- 
immediate,  sive  id  alicui  vel  aliquibus  commiserit faciendum,  qui Marsilius. 
legislator simpliciter non sunt nec esse possunt, sed solum ad aliquid 
et quandoque ac secundum primi legislatoris auctoritatem. 
240.  Lup. Bebenb. c.  5,  p.  352-3  and C.  6,  p.  357-8:  the Theprince 
Prince  Electors make the  election  'repraesentantes  in hoc  omnes E1:Ee- 
principes et populum Germaniae, Italiae et aliarum  provinciarum et sentatives. 
terrarum regni et imperii, quasi vice omnium eligendo.'  Were it not 
for their institution, the 'universitas  ipsa'  would  have  to make the 
choice;  but, as it is, the  Electors choose 'vice et auctoritate univer- 
sitatis.'  When therefore they have made the choice, 'proinde  est ac 
si tota  universitas  principum  et  populi ...  fecisset' ;  to prove  which 
voucher  is  made of  1.  6 $  I,  Dig.  3,  4,  and c.  ult. in Sexto deprae- 
bendis.  See also  the participation  of the  Electors in the deposition 
of  an  Emperor, c.  12, p.  386-7,  and in the alienation of  rights  of 
sovereignty,  c.  14,  p.  396.-Coinp.  Ockham,  Octo  q.  VIII.  c.  3: 
'repraesentantes universitatem.'  Zabar. c.  34  verum X.  I, 6,  nr. 8. 
Nic.  Cus.  III.  c.  4: 'qui  vice  omnium eligerent.'  Gregor. Heimb. 
in Gold.  I.  p.  561.  Ant. Ros. I.  c. 48. 
241.  See above,  Notes  174 and 194.  Ockham, Dial. I.  5, c.  6 The 
and 8.  Nic.  Cus.  I.  c.  14,  17,  11.  c.  14 (repraesentant); Ant.  Ros. as Repre- 
' I.  c.  48 : ab universali  ecclesia, quam cardinales et electores in hoc senbtlves. 70  political  Theovies of the Mule  .Age. 
ipsalll  totam repraesentant.-Ni~.  Cus. 11.  C.  14-15  desires therefore 
to extend to the Cardinals the elective principle,  which is in his eyes 
the  only conceivable  foundation  for  a  mandate in ~olitical  affairs. 
The cardinals ought  to  be elected  provincial  deputies  forming  an 
Estate and constituting in some sort the aristocratic Upper House of 
a parlian~entarily  organized Spiritual Polity. 
Corpora-  242.  Hostiensis, Johannes  Andreae  (c.  34, X.  I, 6, nr.  25) and 
9:;  Law  others  opined that  the Prince  Electors  made  the choice as indivi- 
Ilnperial  duals,  ut singuli.'  Lup. Bebenb. c.  6, pp. 356-8,  and c.  I z, pp. 379 
Elections.  -80,  argues that much  rather  they are representatives of an univer- 
sitas, and must themselves meet '  tanquam collegium seu universitas' 
and make  the choice  commuv~iter.  Therefore he would  here apply 
the principle of the 'ius gentium, civile et canonicum'  which teaches 
that an election  made by an absolute majority is '  electio iuris inter- 
pretatione concors '  and exactly equivalent to an unanimous election. 
So too Zabarella (c.  34 8  verum, X.  I, 6, nr.  8) who cites Leopold :  in 
all  respects  the  same  procedure  should  be  observed  as  'in  aliis 
actibus  universitatum' : thus,  e.g.,  the requirement  of  the presence 
of  two-thirds  of  the members,  the preclusion of  those  who  do not 
attend, and so forth.  Comp.  also  Cons.  154, nr.  6.  Felinus,  c.  6, 
X.  I,  2,  nr.  29.  Bertach.  Rep.  v.  maiorpavs,  nr.  27.  Petrus de 
Andlo, 11.  c.  1-4,  treats the Election of  an Emperor at great length, 
and  in  detail  subjects  it  to Roman  and  canonical  rules  for  the 
election of  prelates which are stated by Johannes Andreae,  Antonius 
de Butrio,  Johannes  de Anania,  Baldus  and Panormitanus.  Thus 
it  is  in  the matter  of  summons  and presidency,  form  of  scrutiny, 
decision  with  absolute majority, accessio, self-election; so also in the 
matter of the demand for and grant of  examination and approbation 
on the part  of  the Pope, and the devolution or lapse of the election 
to the Pope;  and so again as to the requirement of an actus cornmu- 
nis, the right of objection of unus contemptus, the privation of scienter 
el'kentes  indignum.  For  he opines  that  'these  Electors  have  suc- 
ceeded to the place of the Roman People, who ut universitas elected 
an Empero-  and so the  Electors  must  be  conceived  to  act  in  the 
Corpora-  same  right  [i.e.  ut unive~sitas], since  a  surrogate  savours  of  the  tion Law 
and Papal  nature of him whose surrogate he is.' 
243.  See  Innoc.,  Host.,  Ant.  Butr.,  Zabar., Panorm.,  Dee.  on  The 
Universal  C.  6,  X- 1, 6 ;  Aug- Triumph. I.  q.  3 ;  Alv.  Pel. I.  a.  I; Ludov. Ram. 
Church  Cons. 498, nr.  1-22  (applying the whole  of  the law  about  decu- 
and the 
Particular  rions);  Ant. Rosa  11.  c.  8-10;  Bertach.  V.  gesta a maioriparte. 
Churches  244.  [Dr Gierke here refers to other parts of his work  where he  as Cor- 
-orations,  has dealt with the Canonists' conception of  every church as a corpus.] 
Notes. 
245.  Baldus  s.  pac.  Const.  v.  imp.  clem.  nr.  4: the Emperor, The 
Empire 
Baldus explains, is speaking '  de ista magna universitate, quae omnes  state 
fideles imperii in se complectitur tam praesentis aetatis quam succes- ass Car 
poration. 
sivae  posteritatis.'  Prooem.  Feud.  nr.  32 : non  potest  rex  facere 
deteriorem conditionem  universitatis, i.e.  regni.  Rubr. C.  10,  I, nr. 
I I :  Respublica  as an '  Object '  means  publica  res,  as a '  Subject ' 
ipsa universitas gentium quae rempublicam facit.  Zabar. c.  13, X.  5, 
31, nr.  1-7  brings in the learning of  Corporations, defines coqus or 
coll'egium  as '  collectio  corporum  rationabilium  constituens  unurn 
corpus repraesentativum,'  distinguishes 'collegia surgentia naturaliter,' 
which  so soon as they have  come into  being  are also  'necessaria,' 
and 'collegia  mere  voluntaria';  in the former class he reckons com- 
munes, provinces and realms, and therefore brings in at this point the 
learning of  the six Aristotelian forms of government, and the doctrine 
of the World-Monarchies and their relation to the Church. 
246.  Baldus, Cons. III. c.  159.  Comp. ib.  c.  371, and 1.  c.  326 Peqetuitv 
of the  -327  and c.  271  (respublica  et fiscus sunt  quid aeternum et per- State, 
petuum  quantum  ad  essentiam,  licet  disponens  saepe  mutetur). 
Comp.  also Jason,  Cons.  III. c.  10, where in nr.  14 we  already meet 
the phrase '  conventio facta in utilitatem Status.' 
247.  Baldus, Rubr. C.  10, I, nr.  15-16. 
248.  See above, Notes 2 I 2 and 2 18-20;  also rgo and 206. 
249.  See above, Notes 213-7. 
250.  See above, Note I 18. 
251.  See above, Notes 221-231. 
252.  Expressly  d'Ailly,  Gerson  (De  pot.  eccl.  c.  10)  and Mere Col- 
Nicholas  of  Cues (11.  34)  vest  all  the rights  of  the Church in  the ~F:F:~ 
'omnes  collective  sumpti.'  But  also  Marsilius, Randuf and others Concept 
of the  leave no room for doubt that for them the Church, considered as the Church. 
Congregation  of  the  Faithful,  is  coincident  with  the  sum  of  indi- 
viduals.  And if  Ockham in one passage  (Octo q.  I.  c.  11) names 
as the receiver of the divine mandate the 'persona  communitatis fide- 
lium,'  still his whole system, as set forth above, and most  unambigu- 
ously his discussion of  the whereabouts  of  the Church's  infallibility, 
prove that he is not  thinking of  a  single personality which comes to 
light in organization,  but of  a personified collective unit.  See above, 
Notes 188 and 208. 
253.  Turrecrem.  De pot. pap. c. 7  1-7  2:  where the power of the ~h, 
keys is ascribed to 'the Church,' this means in  truth that  she has it ::,"rch 
in some of her members and the whole of it only in her head.  '  Subject ' 
254,  See in particular  Nic.  Cus. as above in Note 171, also III.  Rights. 
The  c.  4 (vice  omnium),  12 and  25 ; Mars.  Pat.  I.  c.  12-13  ;  Lup.  People a I 72 Political  Theories of the MMid  Age. 
Cfleetive  Eebenb.  c.  5-6;  Ockham, Dial.  I.  6,  c  84; Patric.  Sen. De inst. 
Unit'  reip. 1.  I, 5  (multitudo universa potestatem habet collecta in unum,.. 
dimissi autem singuli rem suam agunt). 
255.  See above, Notes  215-8,  228,  230,  232-42. 
~h~ LRw  256.  That there was a Law of Nature was not doubted, nor that 
of Nature  it flon-ed from a  source  superior  to the human  lawgiver and so was 
and the 
Essence  absolutely binding  upon  him.  Such was  the case whatever solution 
Law.  might be found for that deep-reaching question of  scholastic  contro- 
versy which asks whether the essence of  Law is Will or Reason.  In 
any  case  God  Himself  appeared  as being  the  ultimate  cause  of 
Natural Law.  This  was  so,  if,  with  Ockham,  Gerson  and  dlAilly, 
men  saw in  Natural  Law a Command proceeding  from  the Will  of 
God, which Command therefore was righteous  and binding.  It was 
so, if, with  Hugh de St Victor, Gabriel Biel and Almain, they placed 
the constitutive moment of  the Law of  Nature in the Being of  God, 
but  discovered  dictates  of  Eternal Reason  declaring  what  is  right, 
which dictates were unalterable even by God himself.  Lastly, it was 
so, if, with Aquinas and his followers, they (on the one hand) derived 
the content of  the Law of  Nature from the Reason that is immanent 
in  the  Being  of  God  and  is  directly  determined by  that Natzrrn 
Reryzm  which is comprised in God Himself, but (on  the other hand) 
traced  the  binding  force  of  this  Law  to  God's  Will.  Aquinas 
(Summa Theol. 11. I, q.  go-gz),  when  he has discussed  the nature, 
kinds and operations  of  a Lex in  general, and has defined it (q. go, 
a.  4) as 'quaedam  rationis  ordinatio ad bonum commune, et ab eo, 
qui curaln  communitatis habet, promulgata,'  proceeds  to put  at the 
head of  his Philosophy of  Law the idea  of  Lex Aeterna.  And this, 
he  says,  as  being  'ipsa  ratio  gubernationis rerum  in  Deo  sicut  in 
Principe universitatis existens,' and 'summa ratio in Deo existens,' is 
identical with  the Being  of  God  (non aliud a Deo), but at the same 
time is a true fix, absolutely binding, and the source of  every other 
Lex (omnis lex a lege aeterna derivatur); 1.  c. q. 91, a. I, q. 93, a. 1-6. 
Immediately from this he derives the Lex Naturalis isvhich is grounded 
in  the participation  by  Man,  as a  reasonable  being,  in  the  moral 
order  of  the  world  (participatio  legis aeternae in rationali creatura) 
and is  perceived  by  the  light  of  Natural  Reason  (lumen  rationis 
naturalis) entrusted to US by  God  (q.  91,  a.  2,  q.  94).  ~t is  a leX 
Iromu&ata,  for  'Dew  eam  mentibus  hominum  inseruit  naturaliter 
cognoscendam'  (q.  go,  a.  4);  it  exists  in actu  and not  merely  in 
habitu (q. 94, a.  I); it is in its principles a true, everywhere identical, 
unalterable and indestructible rule for all actions (q. 94, a.  3-6). 
[Dr  Gierke here cites a note in his  tract on Johannes Althusius 
Notes. 
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(p.  73) in which  he has dealt with  the same matter and from which 
we  take  the  following  sentences,  though  they  reach  beyond  the 
Middle Age.] 
The older  view,  which  is  more  especially that of  the Realists, 
explained  the Lex Nntu~alis  as an intellectual act  independent  of 
Will-as  a mere Zex  indicativa, in which God was  not lawgiver but a 
teacher  working  by  means  of  Reason-in  short,  as the  dictate  of 
Reason  as  to  what  is  right,  grounded  in  the  Being  of  God  but 
unalterable even by him.  (To this effect already Hugo de S.  Victore 
Saxo, in the days of  Calixtus 11.  and Henry V.,  Opera omnia, Mog. 
1617, Irr. p.  385, de sacramentis  I.  p.  6,  c.  6-7;  later  Gabriel  Biel, 
Almain  and  others.)  The opposite  opinion,  proceeding  from  pure 
Nominalism,  saw  in the  Law  of  Nature a  mere  divine  Command, 
which was  right  and binding  merely because God was the law-giver. 
So  Ockham,  Gerson,  d'Ailly.  The  prevailing  opinion  was  of  a 
mediating  kind, though  it inclined  to the principle  of  Realism.  It 
regarded the substance of  Natural Law as a judgment touching what 
was right, a judgment necessarily flowing from the Divine Being and 
unalterably determined by that Nature of  Things which is comprised 
in God ;  howbeit, the binding force of  this Law, but only its binding 
force,  was  traced  to God's  Will.  Thus  Aquinas,  Caietanus, Soto, 
Suarez.  In like  fashions  was  decided  the  question,  What  is  the 
constitutive  element  of  Law  [or  Right]  in  general?  Most  of  the 
Schoolmen  therefore  held  that  what  makes  Law  to  be  Law  is 
'iudicium  rationis  quod  sit aliquid  iustum.'  So with  even  greater 
sharpness Soto, De iustitia et iure, Venet. 1602 (first in 1556), I. q. I, 
a.  I, and  Molina,  Tract.  v.  disp.  46,  §§  10-12.  Compare  also 
Bolognetus (1534-85),  De lege, iure et aequitate,  Tr. U. J. I.  289 ff. 
c.  3 ;  Gregorius de Valentia,  Commentarii theologici, Ingoldst. 1592, 
11.  disp.  I,  q.  I,  punct.  2.  The opposite  party  taught  that  Law 
becomes Law merely through the Will that this or that shall pass for 
Law  and  be  binding;  or  they  laid  all the stress  on a  Command 
(imperium) given to subjects.  Others, again, declared that intellectus 
and voluntas  were  equally  essential.  Only  Suarez,  who  reviews  at 
length  all  the  older  opinions,  distinguished  at this  point  between 
Positive  Law and Natural  Law, and in the case of  the former sees 
the legislative  Will  (not  however  the  law-giver's  command)  as  the 
constitutive, while Reason  is only a normative,  moment (I.  c.  4-5 
and  1x1.  c.  20).  In the later Philosophy of Law the derivation of  all 
Law  from  Will  and the  explanation  of  both  Natural  and Positive 
Law  as  mere  Commai~d  was  well-nigh  universal.  Only  Leibnitz 
(1646-1716),  who  in  so  many  directions  went  deeper  than  h~s I 74  Political Theories  of  the  Middle  Age. 
-  -- 
contemporaries,  and who,  perhaps  for  this reason,  so often  turned 
his eyes backwards towards  medieval ways of  thought, disputed this 
6 ~vill-Theory'  with  powerful  words  directed  against  Pufendorf  and 
Cocceji.  He  denied the essentialness of  the idea of  Compulsion in 
the idea of  Law, and argued  that  Recht was  prior  to Gesetz.  '  Das 
Recht  is nicht  Recht weil  Gott  es  gewollt  hat,  sondern weil  Gott 
gere~ht  ist.'  See Opera, ed. Dutens, Genev.  1768, IV.  3, pp. 275-83, 
also p.  270 ff. § 7 ff.  and 5  13. 
[In  another  note  Dr  Gierke  (Joh.  Althusius,  p.  74)  cites  the 
following passage from the German, Gabriel Biel (ob. 1495).  In his 
Collectorium  Sententiarum,  Tubing.  1501,  lib.  11.  dist.  35,  q.  un., 
art.  I, he says:  Nam si per impossibile Dens non esset, qui est ratio 
divina, aut ratio  illa  divina  esset errans, adhuc si quis ageret contra 
rectam rationem  angelicam vel  humanam  aut aliam  aliquam si qua 
esset, peccaret.  Et si  nulla  penitus  esset recta ratio, adhuc si quis 
ageret contra id quod agendum  dictaret ratio  recta  si  aliqua esset, 
peccaret.  '  Already ' Dr  Gierke  adds,  '  medieval  Schoolmen  had 
hazarded the saying, usually referred to Grotius, that there would be 
a  Law  of  Nature,  discoverable  by  human  reason  and  absolutely 
binding, even  if  there  were no God, or the Deity were unreasonable 
or unrighteous.'] 
Nullity  257.  Thom.  Aquin.  Sum. Theol.  11.  I, q. gr,  art. 2, q. 94, a. 1-6, 
of Laws 
contra-  q.  97,  a.  I  (the whole  people  bound);  11.  2,  q.  57,  a.  2.  Aegid. 
vening the Rom.  De reg.  princ.  III.  2,  c.  29:  the  rex  stands  below  the  Zex 
Law of 
Nature.  naturalis.  Vincent. Bellovac. VII.  c.  41  ff.  and X.  c.  87 : ipso iure 
non valent  leges  quia nulla  lex  potest  valere  contra  Deum.  Joh. 
Friburg.  11.  t. 5, q.  204-6,  t.  7,  q.  43  ('leges  permittentes usuras' 
are null).  Ockham,  Dial.  111.  tr.  I, 1.  2, c.  6, and tr.  2,l. 2, c.  26-8 
(as to Kaiser and Pope), ib.  c.  29 (as to the universitaspopuZi),  and 
tr.  2,  1.  I, c  30  (even  an  unanimous  decision  of  the  universitas 
mortalium  could  not  wholly abolish  the  Roman  Empire).  Baldus, 
I.  Feud. I § 3, nr.  2 (potentius est ius naturale quam principatus), and 
1.  I, Cod.  I,  I, nr.  24 ff.  (therefore Kaiser and Pope could not, e.g., 
make  usury  lawful).  Gloss  on  the  Sachsensp.  I.  a.  25  and 55. 
Bened.  Capra,  Regula  10,  nr.  20-43  and 53 (as toprinceps,papn, 
imperator, $o$~Zus  seu  universitas  with  iurisdiciio  and  imperiz~m). 
Felinus Sand. c.  7,  X.  I, 2,  nr.  19-25  (as to Pope) and nr.  26 ff.  (as 
to imperator, princeps, populus  Ziber).  Petr.  Alliac.  in  Gers.  Op.  I. 
p. 652 ff.  Nic. Cus. III. c. 5.  Ant. Ros. IV.  c. 2-14.  As to the Pope, 
see above, Note 132, and as to the Council, see Gerson in Note 198. 
Revealed  258.  So in particular  Thom. Aquin.  Sum.  Theol.  11.  I, q.  91, 
Law  art.  1-2  and 4-5  ;  he thereafter  (q.  98-105)  treats at length  of 
Notes.  I75 
the Zex  vetus, and (q. 106 ff.)  of  the Zex  nova.  Comp. Aegid. Rom. Natural 
De reg.  princ.  III.  2,  c.  24-9  (Ztx naturalis) and c.  30 (Zex  divina). 
Gerson, IV.  p.  652-4.  See also the passages  cited in the last Note, 
in which the force of  the Zex  divina is placed on a level with that of 
the Zex  naturalis, this principle being applied, e.g.,  when statutes that 
permit usury are pronounced void. 
259.  See e.g.  Thom.  Aquin.  1.  c.  q.  95,  a.  2  and  4: the Zex  Nature of 
the Ius  humana  carries into detail the principia  Zegis  nakralis, partly as ius Gentium 
gentium  by  way  of  mere  concZusiones,  partly  as ius civile  by  way  of 
determinutiones.  See also ib. 11.  2,  q.  57, a. 3.  Aegid.  Rom.  III.  c.  2, 
c.  25  and  c.  29 : si  dicitur  legem  aliquam  positivam  esse  supra 
principantem,  hoc non est ut positiva,  sed ut in ea reservatur virtus 
iuris naturalis.  Lup.  Bebenb.  c.  15, p. 401.  Ockham, Dial. 111.  tr. 
2,  1.  2,  c.  28 : the ius gentium, in accordance with which the highest 
power  is  subject  to  the common  weal,  'non  est  imperatorum  vel 
regum  per institutionem, sed  solum per approbationem  et observa- 
tionem.'  Baldus, I.  Feud. I $ 3, nr.  2.  Hieronymus de Tortis, Con- 
silium  for Florence, nr.  25 : Papa et imperator  non sunt supra ius 
gentium; therefore (nr.  20-32)  a papal sentence, if not preceded by 
citation, is null. 
260  Thus Thom. Aquin.  1.  c.  q.  94,  a.  4-6,  distinguishes the Principles 
prima principra  of  the Zex  nniuralis, which are everywhere identical, gtondav 
immutable,  ineradicable,  and the praec@ta secundaria of  the same Rules of 
Zex  which  are  mutable  and,  in  consequence  of  the  depravity  of the Law of 
Nature. 
human  reason,  'in aliquo'  destructible.  Generally  it  is  said  that 
the ius nakrale is immutable and can never be abrogated (tolli) by 
the ius civil8 ;  but  that  derogation  from  it '  quoad quid ' is possible, 
and that 'ex causa' additions to and detractions from it can be made. 
See Lup. Bebenb.  c.  15, p.  401.  Ockham, Dial.  III. tr.  2, 1.  2, c.  24. 
Gloss  on  Sachsensp.  I.  a.  55.  Anton.  Rosell.  rv.  c.  7 : the  'ius 
naturale  divinum'  is  wholly  unalterable;  on  the  other hand,  the 
'ius naturale homini commune cum  animalibus'  cannot  indeed be 
abrogated  by the law-giver, but can 'ex causa' be interpreted  and 
confined.-This  limitation  was  unavoidable,  for,  according  to 
general opinion, the very existence of lordship and ownership implied 
a  breach  of  the  pure  Law of  Nature,  and even  Thomas Aquinas, 
Sum. Theol. 11.  2, q. 66, a.  2,  was of  opinion that '  proprietas possessi- 
onum non est  contra  ius naturale, sed iuri naturali superadditur per 
adinventionem rationis humanae.'  Compare I.  q.  96,  a.  1-4;  and 
K. Summenhard, Tr. I.  q. 8-11,  who speaks at length. 
261.  Anton. Ros. IV.  c. 2-6  says that, though John de Lignano Positive 
Modifica-  denies this, the legists  are all agreed  that  though  the ius divinum  . 
tions of 176  Political  Theories of the Midde Age. 
the Law  cannot  be  abrogated  (toZZi)  it  can  be  distinguished,  limited  and 
of God  restrained  in  proper  cases, and  that additions can  be made  to it ; 
but this holds good only of  such ius a'ivinum  as is not de necessifnte. 
Camp. Ockham, Dial.  III.  tr.  2, 1.  2,  c.  24.  Such limitations become 
all the more  necessary  when  men are beginning to regard Positive 
Canon Law as ius dizlinum. 
primeval  262.  Very  usual  is  a  distinction  between  the  'ius  gentium 
and  Secondary primaevum'  which has existed ever  since men were in their original 
Ius  condition  and  the  'ius  gentium  secundarium'  which  is  of  later 
Gentium.  growth.  According  to Anton.  Rosell.  IV.  c 7, the law giver can not 
abrogate,  though  he  may  interpret,  the former, while  the latter he 
may abrogate '  ex causa.' 
Mutability  263.  Thom.  Aquin.  Sum.  Theol.  11.  I, q.  go, a.  2 and 3, q. 91, 
of Positive a. 3, q.  95, a. 2,  q. 96, a.  5 :  but he maintains that a law has a  vis 
directiva for the legislator who made it.  Also q. 97, a.  1-4.  Aegid. 
Rom.  De reg.  princ.  III.  2,  c.  24,  26-28,  31 : already we see here 
a  comparison  between  law  and  language;  like  language,  the  Zex 
positiva  varies  according  to  'consuetudo,  tempus,  patria  et mores 
illius gentis.'  Mars. Pat. I.  c. 12-13  : a quite modern definition  of 
a law as the expressly declared will of a sovereign community.  Patric 
Sen. De inst. reip. I.  5. 
The  264.  Thom. Aquin. 1.  c. q. go, a. 3, q.  97, a. 3; also Comm. ad 
Prince and 
Positive  Polit. p.  477, 491, 499, 518.  Aeg.  Rom.  111.  2,  c.  29 : '  positiva lex 
Law.  est infra principantem sicut lex naturalis est supra';  the Prince stands 
in the middle between Natural Law and Positive ;  the latter receives 
its auctoritas from him  and he must  adapt it to the particular case. 
Ptol.  Luc.  11.  c.  8,  III.  c.  8 and IV. c.  I :  the essential  difference 
between  the princ$atus  regalis  and the princz2atus politiczls lies  in 
this, that the latter is a responsible government according to the laws, 
while in the former  the lex is 'in pectore regentis,'  wherefore he can 
at any time produce  as law  from  this  living  fount whatever  seems 
expedient  to  him.  Engelb.  Volk.  I.  c.  10-11  : the  vex  as  Zex 
animata ;  and such a Zex,  since it can suit itself to the concrete case, 
is  better  than  a  Zex  inanimnta.  Joh.  Saresb.  IV.  c.  2.  Ockham, 
Dial.  III. tr.  I, 1.  2,  c.  6.  Petr.  de Andlo, I.  c.  8. 
Potestas  265.  AS to the Pope, see  Boniface  VIII. in c.  I in Sexto I, 2 
legibus 
(qui iura omnia in scrinio pectoris  censetur habere);  Aug. Triumph.  soluta. 
I.  q.  22,  a.  I;  Alv.  Pel.  I.  a.  58; Laelius  in  Gold.  11.  p.  1595 R.; 
lien. Sylv.  a.  1457 (Voigt, 11.  p.  240 ff.); Nic.  Cus. after his change 
of  opinion (Op. 825 ff.).  Then as to the Emperor, see the doctrine 
of  all  civilians;  the theories  of  the Hohenstaufen;  Frederick I.  in 
Otto Fris.  III.  16 and  IV. 4; Wezel, 1.  c.; Ep.  Freder. 11.  in ann. 
Notes. 
-  - 
1244 and 1245 in Huillard, Hist.  dipl. Frid. 11. vol. VI. pp.  217,  258, 
and Pet.  de Vin.  Ep.  11.  c.  8 (quamquam enim Serenitati nostrae... 
subiaceat  omne  quod  volumus  etc.);  III.  c.  g,  V.  c.  I  ff.;  Hofler, 
p.  70  ff.;  Ficker, 11. pp.  495, 539 ff.,  554 ff.;  Gloss on Sachsensp.  I. 
a.  I, 111. a.  52-54,  64,  Lehnrecht,  a.  4; the summary in Ockham, 
Dial.  111,  tr.  2,  1.  2,  c.  26 and tr.  I, 1.  2, c. 6; Aen. Sylv.  praef. and 
c. 19-21  ;  Petr. de Andlo,  11. c.  8 (but how does this agree with the 
doctrine,  11. c.  10, that the Emperor can be tried by the Palsgrave?). 
266.  Comp.  Thom.  Aq.,  Ptol.  Luc.,  Engelb.  Volk.,  Ockham, Only in a 
Republic  Petr.  de Andlo, as above in Note 264.  Aegid. Rom.  111.  2,  c.  2 :  it is the 
is so in  the Italian  towns,  where  despite the existence of  a  Lord Ruler 
below the  (dominus)  or  Podesta  (potestas),  '  totus  populus  magis  dominatur,'  Laws, 
since the People makes statutes 'quae non licet dominum transgredi.' 
Pat  Sen.  De inst.  reip.  I.  5  (lex tantum  dominatur)  and 111.  I (the 
Magistrates rule over the People and the Laws over the Magistrates). 
267.  See above Notes  159, 166, 169-71,  186-7,  200.  Most The Ruler 
decisively Mars.  Patav.  I.  c.  7-11,  14-15  and  18; with  him  the k2Llge 
'legislator' is in all cases the People, and the 'principans'  is bound by  Laws. 
the '  forma  sibi tradita  a  legislatore.'  Nicol.  Cus.  11. c. 9-10  and 
20,  III.  praef.  and c.  41 :  all the binding  fo~ce  of the laws rests on 
the  will  of  the  whole  community;  the  Pope  is  bound  by  the 
'canones,'  the Emperor by  the 'leges  imperiales,'  and the laws are 
to allow  for  governmental  and judicial  acts  a  no  wider  field  of 
activity than is absolutely necessary.  Gregor.  Heimb.  11. p.  1604 ff. 
Comp. Ockham, Dial.  111.  tr.  I, 1.  2,  c.  6 :  he remarks that perhaps 
in the whole world there is no instance of  a regal form of government 
in the sense of  a lordship unrestrained by laws, and that such a form 
would  not  deserve  approbation except  in the case,  never  found  in 
practice, of an absolutely virtuous ruler.  With this Aquinas agrees in 
so far  that he prefers  a monarchy  limited by law.-Naturally  those 
who  advocated  the supremacy of  the laws  appealed at this point to 
the 'lex d&a.'  In that text their opponents saw no more than that 
a purely voluntary observance of the laws on the part of  the Princeps 
was promised  by him a6  a praiseworthy practice.  [This famous text 
(1.  4,  Cod.  I,  14) runs thus : Digna vox maiestate regnantis legibus 
alligatum se principem profiteri.] 
268.  In particular Mars.  Pat.  I.  c.  11,  14,  15  and 18 and Nic. The 
'  Rechts-  Cus.  develop modern  thoughts  at this point.  It is  to be observed, staatsidm, 
however,  that all the writers mentioned in Note 266 suppose that in 
a  Republic there  will  be a  separation  of  legislative  from  executive 
power, such  as they do not allow  in a  Monarchy, and thereby they 
make  this  separation  the distinguishing  trait  of  a  Republic.  [T~lc 
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translator of  these  pages  believes  that in  German  controversy  the 
common  contrast  to  the  Rechtsstaat  has  been  the  Beamtenstaat. 
Perhaps the nearest English equivalent for the former term would be 
the Reign of  Law.  But not all theorists would  allow that the Reign 
of 1,aw exists in England  where  the State or Crown cannot be made 
to answer in Court for its wrongful acts.] 
Popular  269.  In relation  to the Assembly of the People, this comes out 
Assem-  most plainly in the doctrine of  Marsilius.  In relation to the General 
blies above 
the L,~~~.  Council of  the  Church the freedom  from  the restraints  of  Positive 
(canon)  Law  comes  out  in  the  doctrine  of  Epieikia  which  finds 
its  clearest  expression  in  Henr.  de Langenstein,  Cons.  pac.  c.  15, 
Randuf, De mod. un.  c.  5 (Gerson, Op.  11.  p.  166) and in particular 
Gerson, De unit. eccl. (ib. p.  115, also p.  241 and 276). 
Omnia  270.  See the statement and refutation of this doctrine in Georg 
Principis  Meyer, Das Recht der Expropriation, Leipz.  1868, p.  86 ff. 
esseintelli- 
guntur.  271.  See Accursius in GI.  on 1.  3, Cod. 7,  37, v.  omniaprinc$is 
Eminent  and 1.  2,  Dig.  de rer.  div.  v.  Zittora (the Princeps has iurisdictio veC 
protectio not proprietas).  Jac.  Aren.  Dig.  prooem, nr.  1-7.  And. 
Is. 11.  Feud. 40, nr. 27-29.  Bart. Const.  I. Dig. pr.  nr. 3; 1.  4, Dig. 
50, 9,  nr.  12; 1.  6,  Dig. 50,  12 : throughout a distinction is maintained 
between 'dominium mundi ratione iurisdictionis et gubernationis'  and 
'dominium ratione proprietatis.'  Baldus, 1.  2, Dig. de rer. div., Const. 
I. Dig. pr.  nr.  10-11  : a  double '  dominium ' in '  singulae res,'  but 
'  diversa ratione' :  ius publicum Caesaris, privatum privatarum perso- 
narum.  Baldus,  11.  Feud.  51,  pr.  nr.  1-4:  territorial lordship and 
ownership distinguished in the case of a city that has been given away 
or has subjected itself.  See also  Alv.  Pel.  11.  a.  15  (administraiio 
contrasted with dominium) and a.  57 and 63 (Christ had no dominium 
particuZare, but he had domznium generaze).  Ockham, Dial.  III. tr.  2, 
1.  2, c.  21-25,  discusses  a11  opinions  at some length.  Me  rejects 
both that which  asserts and that  which  denies that the Emperor is 
'dominus omnium temporalium,'  and teaches the mediating doctrine 
of a '  dominium  quodammodo ' vested  in  him  by conveyance  from 
the People.  This is evidently the '  dominium eminens '  of later times, 
for, on the one hand, it is a '  dominium,'  though 'minus pingue,'  and 
yet is compatible with the ownership of the 'res privatorum'  by private 
individuals and with the ownership of  the 'rks nullius' by  the 'totun1 
genus humanum.'  Somn. Virid.  11.  c.  23-30  and 366 : 'dominium 
universale'  of  Emperor and Pope contrasted with '  dominium appro- 
priatius  et specialius'  of  individuals.  Ant.  Ros.  1.  c.  70.  Petr, de 
Andlo, 11.  c.  8.  Almain, Expos. ad q. I.  c. 6, and 11.  c.  2.  Dec~us, 
Cons.  538, nr.  8-11  : in  the  case  of every City, as well  as in the 
case of  the Emperor, we  must  distinguish 'iurisdictio  et imperium' 
Notes.  I79 
-- 
over  the  'districtus  et  territorium,'  which  is  a '  superioritas  coerci- 
tionis,'  from '  proprietas et  dominium ' ;  for '  proprietas et imperium 
nulla societate coniunguntur.' 
272.  See the  work  of  Georg  Meyer,  as above  in  Note  270. The Right 
of Expro- 
[Dr  Gierke  remarks  that  his  own  notes  on  this subject, which had priation. 
already appealed  in his  tract on Althusius, are supplemental to the 
learning collected by Meyer.] 
273.  Accursius  in  G1,  on 1.  3,  Dig.  I,  14, v.  multo magis  and NoExpro- 
priation 
other passages in G.  Meyer  p.  88; Gloss.  Ord.  on c.  I, D.  22,  v.  ,ithout 
kiustitiam;  Jac.  Arena,  Dig.  prooem.  nr.  1-7;  And.  Isern.  11. Just  Cause : an 
Feud. 40, nr.  27-29;  Host. Summa de rescript.  nr.  I I ff.;  Oldradus, 
Cons.  224  and  257 ;  Bart.  1.  4,  Dig.  50,  g, 1.  6,  Dig.  50,  12, 1.  6, Rule of 
Cod.  I, zz  and Const.  I.  Dig.  pr.  nr.  4-6  (neither restribendo nor law' 
yet  Zegem  condendo); Raphael Fulgosius,  Cons.  6, nr.  46-47,  Cons. 
21,  nr.  12  and 28;  Paul.  Castr.  1.  23,  Dig.  41,  2, 1.  6, Cod.  I, 22, 
Const.  I. c.  229;  Jason,  1.  3, Dig.  I,  14, nr.  24-34  and Const.  1x1. 
c. 86, nr.  14; Anton. Butr. c. 6, X.  I, 2,  nr.  20-zz  ; Panorm. eod. 
c.  nr.  6; Bologninus,  Cons.  58; Alex.  Tart.  Cons.  11.  c.  190  (esp. 
nr.  13) and c.  226, nr.  18; Franc. Curtius sen. Cons.  20,  49, 50, 60; 
Christof.  de Castellione,  Cons.  8, nr.  16-18  ;  Joh.  Crottus,  Cons. 
11.  c.  156, nr.  28-44;  Ant.  Ros.  IV.  c.  8 and 10.  Ockham, Dial. 
111.  tr.  2,  1.  2,  c.  23-5  mentions  as  an  outcome  of  the  'domi- 
nium  quodammodo'  which  he allows  to  the  Emperor,  a  right  to 
quash or appropriate to himself or transfer private ownership, and to 
forbid the occupation of  'res nullius' ;  but such acts as these are not 
to be done lad libitum' but only 'ex causa et pro communi utilitate' 
in so far  as  general  utility  is to be  preferred  to  'privata  utilitas.' 
And  at the same time  it is Ockham who most emphatically teaches 
(ib.  c.  27)  that  this  is  not  merely a  limit  set  to  the power  of  the 
Monarch but a limit set to the power of  the State itself;  for, accord- 
ing to him, the limitation of  impe~ial  rights by the rights of individuals 
rests upon  the fact  that  the  Populus, which  transferred its power to 
the Princeps, had itself no unbounded power, but (in accordance with 
c. 6, X. I, 2) was entitled to invade the sphere of private rights by the 
resolutions of  a majority only at the call of  necessity (de necessitate). 
274  TO this  effect,  despite  a  strong  tendency  towards  abso- NoExP~*  priation 
lutism, Jacob. Buttrig. 1.  2, Cod. I, 19; Alber.  Rosc. Const. I.  Dig. v.  withont 
omnis, nr.  5 ff.;  1.  15,  Dig.  6,  I; 1.  2,  Cod.  I, 19; Baldus, Const. I. Just  Cause : 
Dig. pr. nr.  11; 1.  7,  Cod.  I,  19; 1.  6, cod. I, 22; 1.  3, cod. 7,  37. agood 
For some intermediate opinions see Felinus Sandaeus c.  7,  X.  I, 2,  general  Rule. 
nr.  26-45  j  Decius eod. c. nr.  19-24  and Cons. 191, 198, 269, nr. 
4-5,  271, nr. 3, 352, nr.  I, 357, nr.  3, 361, nr. 7, 250, nr.  5-6,  588, 
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bob,  nr.  8,  699,  nr.  8; Riminald.  Cons.  I.  c.  73.  Ludov.  Rom. 
Cons. 310 (a just cause necessary in case of a 'lex specialis'  but not 
in case of  a  lex universalis');  Bened. Capra, Reg.  10, nr. 30 & 
Cornpen-  275.  AS to the fluctuations of  the Glossa  Ordinaria,  see Meyer, 
sation  the Expro  for  ~p.  cit. p.  92-94  Decidedly in favour of compensation are Baldus, 
priated.  1.  2,  Cod.  7,  13;  Decius,  1.  I I, Dig.  de Reg.  Iur. and Cons. 520 
(recompensatio); Jason, 1.3, Dig.  I, 14 and Cons. 1x1.  c. 92, nr. 11 (si 
causa cessat debet res illa restitui si potest);  Paul. Castr. 1.  5 9 I I, Dig. 
39,  I, nr.  4,  1.  10, Cod.  I, 2, nr.  3; Lud.  Rom.  Cons.  310,  nr.  4; 
Bertach. Rep. v.  civitas, nr. 88 and 96 ;  Fel. Sand. c. 6, X.  I, 2, nr.  2 
and c.  7, eod. nr. 28-29.  Aeneas Sylvius, c.  18 (if  practicable,  'ex 
public0 compensandum est');  Crottus, Cons. 11. c. 156, nr. 27 (princeps 
propter favorem publicum si auferat dominium alicui, debet pretium 
solvere) nr. 28-29  (expropriatory acts of towns), nr. 31 (the Pope).- 
On the other side, Alber. Rosc. 1.  14 fj I, Dig. 8.  6. 
No Cam-  276.  Decius,  Cons.  520: a law  may take away rights  'genera- 
pensation 
in case of  liter' even 'sine compensatione privatorum';  on the other hand, if the 
General  law  does this '  particulariter  alicui  subdito'  then  it must  be  'cum 
Expro- 
priatory  recompensatione.'  Jason, 1.  3, Dig.  I,  14,  nr.  44;  Paris de Puteo, 
Law.  De synd. p.  41,  nr.  24 and Ant. Ros.  IV.  c.  8 and 10. 
NO  Corn-  277.  SO,  e.g.,  Aen. Sylv. c.  17-18  : in case 'reipublicae neces- 
pensation  in aCase of sitas  id  expostulat,'  though '  aliquibus fortasse  durum  videbitur  et 
Necessity.  absurdum.' 
Proprie-  278.  Thus already the Glos.  Ord. on 1.  2,  Cod.  I, 19, and 1.  6 
tary Rights c 
proceed  od.  I,  22 ;  also  Hostiensis,  Jac.  de Arena,  Oldradus,  Fulgosius, 
from the  Iserna, Bartolus, Paul. Castrensis, Jason? Ockham,  as in  Note  273 ; 
Ius Gen- 
,  also, but with less protection  for  property,  Rosciate,  Baldus,  Decius 
and Bened. Capra, as in Note 274.  See also Joh. Paris. c.  7, where 
private ownership  is  placed  outside the sphere of  the Public Power, 
temporal and spiritual, by the more specific argument that such owner- 
ship originates in the labour of  an individual and thus is a right that 
arises  without  any relation  to the conriexion between men or to the 
existence of  a society with a common head (commune caput).  Paris 
de Puteo, De synd. p.  41, nr.  22-24;  Somn. Virid.  I.  c.  156-161  ; 
Bertach.  v.  pLenitudo potestatis;  Pet.  de Andlo, 11.  c.  8; Gerson, rv. 
p.  598; Ant. Ros. rv. c.  8 and 10 (the source of private property is ills 
gentium, but  ius gentium  secundarium,  and so it  is  destructible).- 
When  the  objection  was  raised  that  it  was  only  Property  as  an 
institution that existed ex  iuregentium, and that this was not infringed 
if  particular  owners  were robbed,  the reply  was  that  the  distincfio 
dominorum and the permanent  establishment  of  certain  modes  of 
acquisition were attributable to the ius gentium. 
Notes.  181  - 
279.  Baldus I.  Feud.  7 (God subjected the laws,  but not con- sacred. 
ness of  tracts,  to  the  Emperor) ; Ludov.  Rom.  Cons.  352,  nr.  15-25  ;  Contracts 
Christof. Castell.  Cons. 8, nr.  25 ;  Jason, Cons. I.  C.  I and c. 56,11. c. made by 
223, nr.  16 fX  and 226 ;  Decius, Cons. 184 nr.  2,  286 nr. 5,  292 nr. 8, the State. 
404 nr.  8  (for  Deus ipse ex promissione  obligatur '1,  528 nr. 6, 6g9 
nr.  7-27.  But,  once more,  'ex  iusta  causa' breach  of  contract is 
permissible:  Jason,  Cons.  I.  c.  I, nr.  12 and 29 ff.,  11.  226, nr. 43, 
1.  3 Dig.  I, 14, nr. 34; Bened.  Capra, Reg.  10, nr. 43 ff. ;  Ant. Ros. 
IV.  c.  14.  Therefore  the  old  moot  question,  whether a city can 
revoke the freedom from  taxation which it has promised to a settler, 
is generally answered in the negative, on the ground that such an act 
would be a breach of contract ;  but exceptions are allowed '  ex causa,' 
e.g.,  when there is the punishment of  a delict, or if  the city's existence 
is at stake;  Jason,  Cons.  I.  c.  I, nr.  21-30;  Ant. Ros.  IV.  c.  IS. 
280.  Thus the Gloss.  Ord.  on 1.  2  Cod.  I, rg and 1.  I Cod.  I, Rights 
founded 
22 holds that private rights are suspended if the ius civile comes into  positive 
collision with them, and that they are abolished by a simple rescript, Law are at  the mercy 
if  the intent  to abolish  them  be  clearly expressed;  but many, it is ofthe 
added, hold that in the case last mentioned the rescript to be effectual State. 
must contain the clause '  non obstante lege.'  Then the last of  these 
opinions  is  developed  by  Hostiensis, Paulus  Castrensis, Jason  and 
others.  Bartolus allows that  private  rights  arising ex  iure civili can 
be abolished 'without  cause,' but only by legislation, and not (unless 
the damage  be  inconsiderable)  by  way  of  rescript.  On the  other 
hand, Baldus, Decius  and others hold that  such rights can be with- 
drawn unconditionally and in  every form.  Innocent IV.,  Alb. Ros- 
ciate and others think  that the State cannot  take  away the right of 
ownership  (domi~zium  $sum),  but  can  make  it  illusory  by  taking 
away  the rights  of  action  which  flow  merely  from  Positive  Law. 
Anton.  Ros. III. c.  14 and Bened. Capra, Reg. 10, nr.  43-52  discuss 
at length the withdrawal of  'iura mere positiva.' 
281.  Jason,  Cons.  I.  c.  I, nr.  20,  c.  56,  nr.  I, 2,  7,  8,  21,  11.  Revoca-  tion of 
c.  226, nr. 43-49  : '  privileges '  granted gratuitously may be revoked  privi- 
'sine causa' ;  those granted for value '  ex causa.'  Felinus Sand. C.  7 leges.' 
X.  I.  2, nr. 48-52  : for the princejs can 'ius auferre, cuius ipse fuit 
causa ut acquireretur.'  Bened. Capra, 1.  c., excepts the case of 'non 
subiecti.'  Aen.  Sylv.  c.  15 : privileges  may  be revoked if they  be 
veipudl'icae damnosa.-In  the Disput. inter mil.  et cler.  p.  686, and 
the Somnium Viridarii  I.  c.  33-34  the knight  already applies this 
doctrine in such wise that the State 'pro ardua necessitate reipublicae 
vel  utilitate  manifests'  can  withdraw  all  ecclesiastical  privileges, 
since  every pr~vile~e  must  be  deemed  to comprise a clause  to  the 
effect that it is not to impair the 'salus publics.' 182  Political  Theo~ies  of the Middle Age. 
282.  See above  Notes  2,  87,  125-30;  Dante,  Mon.  I.  c.  3; 
Ockham,  Dial. 111.  tr.  2, 1.  2,  C.  28. 
Nullity  283.  Already in the Gloss. on Auth.  Coll.  I.  tit.  6,  prooem.  v. 
of the  canferens,  there  is  a  suggestion  of  the arguments  which  the  legists 
1 Donation 
of con-  developed by way  of  proof that the Donation  of  Constan- 
stantine.'  tine  was  void,  because  the  imperial  power  is  inalienable  and no 
'  expropriatio territorii, dignitatis vel  iurisdictionis ' is possible.  For 
full discussions of this matter, see Bartol. on prooem. Dig. nr.  13-14 
and Baldus eod.  nr. 36-57,  and prooem. Feud. nr.  32-33.  Com- 
pare Dante, Mon. III. c.  10 : '  nemini licet ea facere per officium sibi 
deputatum  quae sunt  contra  illud  officium';  the  Emperor  cannot 
destroy  the Empire, which  exists  before  he exists,  and whence  he 
draws his imperial rights (ab eo recipiat esse quod est) ;  the seamless 
garment would be rent; in every grant or infeudation by the Emperor 
there is a reservation of 'superius illud dominium cuius unitas divisio- 
nem non patitur.'  Lup. Beb. c.  13, p.  391-3.  Quaestio in utram- 
que, p.  106, ad 14.  Ockham,  Octo q.  I.  C.  12,  111.  c.  g,  vIrI. c.  I, 
Dial. 111.  tr.  2,  1.  I, c.  27.  Gloss on Sachsensp. 111.  a. 63.  Damasus, 
Broc. M. 111.  br.  19.  Greg.  Heimb. I.  p.  560.  Anton.  Ros. I.  c. 64 
-70  (' officium  publicum' ;  'imperium  indivisibile  et inalienabile' ; 
'corpus  mysticum' ; '  ecclesia  non  capax' ; '  populus  Romanus 
liber, non  in  commercio').-These  arguments  are not attacked  by 
the other party.  The defenders of the Donation  are for making an 
exceptional case of it.  The gift  was  really made to God and there- 
fore  was  not  subject  to  the  ordinary  restrictions.  So  Bartolus, 
1.  c.,  whose chief reason, however, is that  he is teaching in the papal 
territory:  so also  Baldus  and others.  In particular,  however,  the 
papal party develop the doctrine  that  the Pope was already 'verus 
dominus  iure  divino,'  and  that  therefore  the  donation  bore  the 
character of a 'restitutio.'  So Innocent  IV.,  Ptol.  Luc.  III.  c.  16; 
Alv.  Pel.  1.  a.  13 E,  43  D-El  24  S,  56 MI  59 HI  11.  a.  29;  Aug. 
Triumph.  I.  q.  I, a.  I, 11.  q.  36,  a.  3,  38, a.  I, 43, a.  I-;  camp. 
And.  Isern. I.  Feud.  I, nr.  10 and Petr.  de Andlo  I. c.  XI,  and 11. 
C. 9.-The  opinion that  the whole  donation  was  a  fable had  never 
quite died  out in  the  days before the forgery was  exposed by Nice 
Cusanus (111.  c.  2) and Laur. Valla (ann. 1439 in Schard, p.  734-g0). 
This is shewn by the bold words of Wezel, ann. I 152, in Jaffd, Mona 
Corb.  P.  542,  and  the  mention  of  this  opinion  by  Lup.  Bebenb. 
c.  13. 
halien-  284.  See above, Note 58.  In particular  Lupold von Bebenburg 
(c.  15, pp. 398-401)  in this context  sharply formulates the general 
Power.  proposition  that  the  'imperium,'  since  it  is  'ob  publicum  usum 
Notes.  183 
assignatum,'  stands  'extra  commercium'  like  any  other  '  res  in 
public0  usu.' 
285.  Among  the jurists  and publicists  we  may  see an  always Nullity 
of Acts 
more  definite  apprehension  of  the  rule  that  every  contract  which tending to 
purports to sacrifice an essential right  of  the State is void, and that diminish  the State's 
no title can  give protection  against that  claim  to submission  which power. 
flows  from  the very  idea  of  State-Power.  (Compare the passages 
cited  in Note  283.)  Therefore contracts made by the Princeps  are 
not  binding  on his  successor if  thereby '  monarchia regni et honor 
coronae  diminui  possit,'  or  'magna  diminutio  iurisdictionis'  would 
ensue,  or 'regalia  status '  would  be abandoned.  See Bart. 1.  3,  $ 2, 
Dig.  43,  23,  nr.  5; Bald.  I.  Cons.  271,  nr.  3; Joh.  Paris.  c.  22; 
Somn.  Virid.  rr.  c.  293;  Picus a  Monte Pico,  I.  Feud.  7,  nr.  10; 
Jason,  Cons.  III.  c. 10,  nr.  6-9,  16,  24-25;  Crottus,  Cons.  11. 
c 223,  nr.  11  and  21-22  ; Bertach.  v.  successor  in regno.  SO a 
contract  by a  city purporting  to exempt a man from  taxation might 
be valid  if  entered into with  a new  settler,  but would  be invalid  if 
made with  one who  was 'civis  iam subditus':  Bart. 1.  2, Dig.  50, 6, 
nr.  2 and 6 ;  to the contrary, Gal. Marg. c.  30, nr. I I and Dur. Spec. 
IV.  3, de cens. $ 2, nr.  12. 
286.  See  Notes  283-5.  Dante,  111.  c. 7 :  Emperor  or  Pope, Inalien- 
ability of 
like  God,  is  powerless  in  one point,  namely,  'quod  sibi  similem Sovereign- 
creare  non  potest:  auctoritas  principalis  non  est  principis  nisi  ad ty. 
usum,  quia  nullus  princeps seipsum  autorizare  potest.'  Aen.  Sylv. 
C.  11-12. 
287.  Most  definitely  Nicol.  Cus.  (above,  Note  171);  but  also structible  Aninde- 
Mars. Pat.  I.  c.  12  (in the words  'nec esse possunt').  As regards save- 
the Church, see above, Notes 189 and 200.  According to Ockham, reignty  of the 
Dial.  111.  tr.  I,  1.  I,  c.  29,  there  were  some  who  held  that  a People. 
renunciation of the lordship of  the world by the '  Populus Romanus' 
was impossible and would  not bind  the '  populus sequens ';  but this 
opinion  is  refuted,  reference  being  made to the merely  'positive' 
character  of  the  Romans'  right  to preeminence,  and  also  to  the 
doctrine  about  the binding  force  of  resolutions  passed  by  a  cor- 
poration. 
288.  Bart.  Rubr.  C.  10,  I, nr.  3-5  and 9-10.  The idea of Essential 
Rights  the  Fiscus  includes  only  'quicquid  ad  commodum  pecuniarium 
imperii  pertinet:  alia  vero,  quae ad iurisdictionem  et honores  im- State  casually  and 
perii pertinent et non commodum pecuniarium et bursale, continentur acquired 
nomine rez$ubZicae  et non fisci.'  Baldus,  11.  Feud.  51,  pr. nr.  4 : a the  Rights  Fisc.  of 
city which  subjects itself  to lordship thereby conveys the iurisdicti0 
over  the  town  mills,  for  this  the  city  had  possessed  'sicut  ipsa I 84  Political Theories of the Midde Age. 
civitas,'  but it does not convey the ownership of  the mills, for this it 
had  'iure  privato.'  Compare  Bald.  Rubr.  C.  10,  nr.  11,  Cons. 
1.  c.  271,  nr.  2,  but especially 1.  I, Cod. 4, 39, nr. 4,  and above all 
1.  5,  Cod.  7,  53, nr.  13 : a  distinction  between  'res  universitatis  in 
cOmmerci~  ' and '  extra commercium ' : in things of the latter class- 
and to this class belong  all public rights-'  tenuta capi non potest ' 
[a  tenure cannot  be created];  therefore,  e.g.,  the right to impose a 
tax 'cum  sit publicum auctoritate et utilitate  et sit meri imperii' is 
inalienable,  and can  never  'privato  concedi  vel  in  tenutam  dari'; 
only the cornmoditas [profit]  of  this  right  can  be  sold, given,  let to 
farm, in such wise  that the '  civitas ipsa' will  still  'impose ' the tax, 
though  the buyer  or lessee '  exacts '  it ;  also the city can appoint for 
itself  a  cajitaneus  or conservator,  who,  as its  proctor,  will  impose 
taxes  and  exercise  other  rights  of  ownership;  '  et sub hoc  colore 
perdunt civitates suas libertates, quae de decreto vendi  non possunt.' 
See further the separation of  the sovereign rights and fiscal rights of 
the  Empire  in  Ockham,  Dial.  111.  tr.  2,  1.  2,  c.  23 : also the dis- 
tinction  between  the commodum $ecuniarium,  which  is  involved  in 
the idea of  the jiscus, and the regalia which are involved in the idea 
of the reqz~blica,  in Vocab. Iuris, v. jiscus, in Paul. Castr. 1.  4,  Cod. 
2,  54, Marcus, Dec. I.  q. 338, nr. 8-10  and 17, Martinus Laudensis, 
De fisco, q.  141. 
Gradual  289.  See the passages cited above in Notes 284, 285 and 288.- 
apprehen-  A certain, but a very distant, influence was exercised  at this point by 
sion of the 
Distinc-  the distinctions drawn by the Philosophers between the various  sorts 
tion be-  of  izcstitia.  So,  in  particular,  the  Thomistic  distinction  between  tween Ius 
Publicurn  (I) the iustitia $articuZaris,  which is (a) commutative, regulating the 
and IUs  relationships  of  man  to man,  or  (6)  distributiveJ dividing  among  Privatum. 
individuals what  is common, and (2) the izcstitia generalis s.  legalis, 
which limits the rights of individuals in accordance with the demands 
of  the  bonum  commune  See  Thorn.  Aquin.  Sum.  Theol.  XI.  2, 
q.  58 ff.;  also  11.  I,  q.  105,  a.  2.  Also  Aegid.  Rom.  above, 










290.  SO,  to some extent, all the writers mentioned in Note 257. 
And  so in  connexion  with  attacks  on vested  rights  made  without 
iusta causa, all the authors named in Note 273 : see especially Gloss. 
Ord.  on 1.  2,  Cod.  I, 19  and 1.  6, Cod.  I,  22,  Host.  1.  c.,  Jacob. 
Aren. 1.  C.  (for the Emperor,  if  he orders anything contrary  to law, 
'quasi  non  facit ut imperator'), Raphael Fulgosius 1.  c. (the opinion 
that the Emperor,  though  he does unright,  does a valid  act, would 
practically  subject  everything  to arbitrary  power).  Comp.  Bened. 
Capra,  Reg.  10, nr.  35-42.-Then  Bartolus  draws,  and  others 
Notes.  18.5 
accept,  the  distinction  between  invasions  of  right  (I) legem  con- 
dendo,  (2)  iudicando,  (3)  rescribendo,  and he is inclined  to allow 
greater  force  to an act  of  legislation  than  to acts of  other  kinds; 
still it is just he who expressly declares  that in conflict with  Natural 
Right,  strictly  so-called,  even  laws  are void.-See  also above, Note 
259 injne. 
291.  See above, Notes 129-130  and 134. 
292.  This is the core  of  the doctrine  that  the lack  of  a iusta Tribunals 
causa  for  any  invasion  of  vested  rights  by  the  Sovereign  can  be :&$: 
supplied  by  the  deliberateness  (ex  certa  scientia)  with  which  he ~ctsofthe 
exercises his plenitude jutestatis :  deliberateness which can be mani- isf"{,"giz- 
fested by such a clause as '  lege non obstante.'  This doctrine, which liberately. 
first appears in a rough form in Durantis, Speculum, I. tit. interd. leg. 
et sedi Apost. reserv.  nr.  89 (cf.  G. Meyer, op. cit. p.  IOI), is attacked 
by the jurists cited in our Note 273 (though Jason in Cons. 11.  c. 233, 
c.  236, n.  12-13  and rv.  c.  107, nr. 4, makes large concessions) and 
is defended, though  to a  varying  degree,  by  the jurists  mentioned 
in  our  Note  274.  See in particular  Alber.  Rosc.  1.  c.  where prac- 
tically all difference between  Positive and Natural Right disappears 
and the same formal omnipotence  is claimed both  for rescripts and 
for acts of  legislation.  Baldus,  1.  c.;  Felin.  Sand.  1.  c.  nr.  60-66 
(despite  nr.  45-52)  ; Riminald.  Cons.  I.  c.  73;  Capra,  Reg.  10, 
nr.  48-52,  56-59;  Decius,  c.  7,  X.  I, 2,  nr.  27-28,  Cons. 198, 
nr.  7,  269, nr. 4-5,  271,  nr.  3, 640, nr.  6-7,  and esp. 588, nr.  I- 
14; also Aen. Sylv.  c.  16-17.-The  rejection of  the right  of  active 
resistance is a logical consequence ;  see above, Note I 2 7. 
293.  This is made externally visible by the treatment as two dif- Natural  Law is not 
ferent subjects of (I) the '  lex naturalis et divina,'  which is binding on reduced to 
rulers  as  on  others,  but  like  all  other  'leges'  is  concerned  with the level 
of mere 
'actus exteriores,' and (2) that Instruction for the Virtuous Prince, in  hi^^. 
the development of  which  medieval publicists expend much of  their 
pains. 
294.  Already John  of  Salisbury,  IV.  c.  I, 2  and 4,  speaks of  a Coercive 
and  '  lex iustitiae,' to which the Ruler remains subject, since the 'aequitas ~i~~~~i~~ 
et iustitia,'  of  which  the  'lex'  is  the 'interpres,'  should govern  his Force of 
will.  Then in Aquinas there comes to the front the formula that the Law' 
Prince,  in so far  as the rules  of  law have no 'vis  coactivaJ against 
him,  is still  bound  by  them  'quantum  ad vim  directivam';  comp. 
Sum. Theol. 11.  I, q. 96, a.  5, also q.  93, a.  3.  With Thomas himself 
it is only  the  'lex  humana'  which  is  reduced  to the exercise  of  a 
merely directive force over the Prince;  in this province unrighteous 
laws  (e.g.  those  which  proceed  'ultra  sibi  commissam  potestatem,' I 86  Political  Theories of the MWe  Age. 
which impose unjust taxes and unjust divisions  of  burdens, or which 
are  'contra  commune  bonum ')  have  formally  the  force  of  laws, 
though they are not  binding '  in for0 conscientiae ': comp. ib. q. go, 
a. 2, and q.  96, a.  1-4.  Similarly Joh.  Friburg.  c.  11.  t.  5,  q. 204. 
On the other hand, those who unconditionally  maintain the formal 
sovereignty of  the legislator  and in so doing refuse even to Natural 
Law any '  coactive force '  against him, are unanimous in allowing to 
it at least a 'directive  force.'  See also  Ptol.  Luc. De reg. princ.  IV. 
c.  I.  Ockham,  Dial.  III.  tr.  2,  1.  2,  c  28.  Gerson,  IV.  p.  593 K 
esp.  601. 
Legal  295.  See  above,  Notes  127-8.  The  limit  to  the  duty  of 
Limit to  Obedience is steadily represented as a  matter for Jurisprudence, and 
the Duty 
Obe-  is deduced from the nature of r'ex  or ius. 
dience.  296.  See, e.g.,  Gloss. Ord.  on 1.  2,  Cod.  I, 19, and 1.  I, Cod.  I, 
Unjust 
Acts of  22;  Baldus, as cited in Note 274;  Jason,  Cons. 11.  c. 233, nr.  9, "1. 
Sovereign-  C.  24, nr.  21,  IV.  C.  166, nr. g; Franc.  Aret.  Cons.  15, nr.  g; Franc. 
ty to be 
inter-  Curt.  sen.  Cons.  20,  49,  50;  Domin.  Gem.  Cons.  99,  nr.  7-8, 
pretedinto  C.  104, nr. 4; Decius, Cons.  292, nr.  3 and g, 373 nr. 10, 606 nr. 17. 
Rightful- 
,,,,.  In case of need men were ready to feign that the Sovereign's act had 
been induced by subreptio, circumventio, etc. 
Discharge  297.  For the benefit of the omnipotent Council, Randuf teaches 
of the  that, if the weal of  the Church requires it, the Council may disregard 
Sovereign 
from the  the Moral  Law:  De mod.  un.  c.  6,  16,  20  and 22 (Gerson, Op. 11. 
pp.  170, 182, 188,  190).  Gerson (IV. p.  671)  protests against this : 
Law. 
the Law of  Morality  must not  be transgressed  even for the sake of 
the common weal;  perjury  should  not  be committed  even  to save 
the whole people. 
298.  In  my  book '  Joh.  Althusius  und  die  Entwicklung  der 
naturrechtlichen Staatstheorien' I have submitted just this side of the 
medieval  doctrine  to  closer  inspection,  and  have  traced  the later 
development of those germs that were planted in the Middle Age. 
299.  See above, Notes 16,  137 and 260 in$ne. 
300.  See above, Notes 16, 138-9,  142-5. 
301.  See above, Notes 140-1. 
Natural  302.  Aegid.  Rom.  De reg.  princ.  III.  I, c.  6,  supposes  three 
Growth  possible origins of  a State: the first  is the purely  natural  way  of  a  of the 
State.  gradual growth  from out  the Family;  the setond is the 'concordia 
constituentium  civitatem  vel  regnum'  and this  is partially  natural, 
owing to a '  naturalis impetus ' which  impels to this  concord ; the 
third is the way of mere violence, compulsion and conquest.  Marsil. 
Pat.  I.  c. 3 combines the thought  of  natural increase and differentia- 
tion with the notion of a creative act of human activity. 
Notes.  187 
303.  Already Aquinas, however great may be the stress that he Rational 
Origin 
lays on man's  nature as 'animal  politicuin  et sociale in multitudine ofthe 
vivens'  (De reg.  princ. I.  c.  I  and Sum. Theol. I.  q_.  96, a.  4), makes stat& 
mention  of  the  'ratio  constituens  civitatem'  (above,  Note  98). 
Comp.  Ptol.  Luc.  III.  c.  g,  and  IV.  c.  2-3.  Aegid.  Rom.  111.  2, 
c.  32  says  expressly:  'sciendum  est  quod  civitas  sit  aliquo  mod0 
quid naturale,  eo quod  naturalem  habemus  impetum  ad civitatem 
constituendam ;  non tamen efficitur nec perficitur civitas nisi ex opera 
et  industria  horninurn.'  Comp.  III.  I, c.  I  (opus  humanum)  with 
c. 3-5  (homo est naturaliter animal civile et civitas aliquid secundum 
naturam).  Engelb.  Volk.  De  ortu,  c.  I : ratio  imitata  naturam. 
Joh.  Paris.  c.  I.  Gerson,  IV.  p.  648.  Nic.  Cus.  III.  praef.  Aen. 
Sylv.  c.  I,  2  and 4: human reason,  'sive  docente natura sive  Deo 
volente,  totius naturae  magistro,'  invented  and instituted the State, 
Lordship,  Empire.  Already  Patric.  Sen.  De reip.  inst.  I.  3  speaks 
of  all  the manifestations  of  social  life-living  in  company, making 
strongholds,  language,  the arts,  the laws, the State-as  'inventions' 
to which mankind 'duce naturae' came by giving  thought to general 
utility (de communi utilitate cogitare).  According to III.  5, the State 
may be so erected that it cannot perish. 
304.  The ecclesiastical  theory that the constitutive principle  of  The State 
the State was violence and compulsion (see above, Note 16) was still FE:,",:Y 
maintained by Ptolemy of Lucca, IV.  c. 3, and such an origin seemed 
at least  possible  to Aegidius  Romanus  (above, Note  302).  On the 
other hand, Aquinas traces the founding of  the State to the office of 
the King (above, Note 98). 
305.  See Mars.  Pat. I.  c 15  as to the 'anima  universitatis  vel The State 
eius  valentioris  partis'  as the  'principium  factivum'  of  the  State ?:&::? 
(above, Note 98).  And so in relation to the World Empire (above, tion. 
Note 145). 
306.  Of  special  importance  was  the  acceptance  of  Cicero's  Thesocial 
definitions  of  the State as a societas.  See,  e.g.  Thom. Aquin. Sum. Contract' 
Theol.  11.  I, q.  105,  a.  1, 11.  2,  q.  42,  a.  2 ; Vincent  Bellov.  VII. 
c. 6-7  ;  Dom. Gem.  c.  I 7 in Sexto,  I, 6, nr.  7 ;  Randuf, De mod. 
un. c.  7,  p.  171 ;  Theod. a Niem, Nemus Unionis, tr.  v.  p.  261.  So 
also the acceptance, in c.  2  5  2 D.  8, of  the words  of  St Augustine: 
'generale  quippe pacturn  est  societatis  humanae  obedire  regibus.' 
The separation  of  the  Social  Contract  from  the  Contract  which 
institutes  the  ruler  is  suggested  by  John  of  Paris,  c.  I,  and  is 
effected in clear outline by Aeneas Sylvius, who treats (De ortu, c.  I) 
of  the grounding  of a  societas civilis by  men  who theretofore wan- 
dered  wild  in the woods,  and then (c  2)  of  the establishment of  a I 88  Political  Theories of the Middle Age.  Notes. 
l@  patestas  in  consequence  of  the  transgressions  of  the  Social 
Contract  that  men  were  beginning  to  commit.  See also  Aegid. 
Ram.  above  in  Note  302 ;  Patric.  Sen.  I.  3.  [The  passages  in 
Cicero's  works  referred  to  in  this  note  are given  by  Dr Gierke 
elsewhere  (D.  G.  R.  111.  p.  23).  De  off.  I.  17,  where  the  State 
appears among the son'etates.  De republ.  I.  25, 39 : 'populus autem 
non  omnis  hominum  coetus quoquo  mod0 congregatus,  sed coetus 
rnultitudinis iuris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus '; ib. 26, 
41 ;  ib.  32,  49 : 'lex  civilis  societatis  vinculum,  ius  autem  legis 
aequale ;  quid  enim  est  civitas  nisi  iuris  societas  ?' ; ib.  III.  3 I : 
'neque  esset unum vinculum  iuris nec consensus ac societas coetus, 
quod est  populus';  ib.  33; ib.  35, 50; ib.  IV.  3: 'civium  beate et 
honeste vivendi societas ' ;  ib.  VI.  13 (Somn. Scip.) :  'concilia  coetus- 
que hominum  iure  sociati,  quae  civitates appellantur.'  In another 
place Dr Gierke (D. G. R. III. p.  124), discussing the influence of the 
patristic writings, remarks that certain pregnant sentences of  Cicero's 
long-lost  De r@ubZica  were  known  in  the  Middle  Age  through 
Lactantius and  Augustine  and exercised  a  powerful  influence.  In 
yet another place  (D.  G.  R.  III. p.  125) the words 'generale  quippe 
pactum  est  societatis  humanae  obedire  regibus'  are  cited  from 
August.  Confess. 111. 8; but  it is  there  remarked  that  Augustine is 
wont to give to the State a sinful origin in violence.] 
Voluntary  307.  See the derivation of  the binding force of  laws from a self- 
Subkc-  binding of individuals, in Mars. Pat. I. c.  12 (lex illa melius observatur  tion the 
Ground of  a quocumque civium, quam  sibi quilibet  imposuisse  videtur; ...  hanc 
Obedi-  quilibet  sibi  statuisse  videtur  ideoque  contra illam  reclamare  non 
ence. 
habet) ;  in Ockham,  Dial.  III. tr.  2,  1.  2,  c.  26-28  ;  in Nic.  Cus.  11. 
8, 10,  12  (concordantia subiectionalis eorum qui ligantur),  13 (sub- 
iectio  inferiorum),  III.  c.  14 (per  viam  voluntariae  subiectionis  et 
consensus).  Add to this the supposition that the isolated individual is 
historically prior to the community: Aen. Sylv. 1.  c., and Patric. Sen. 1.  c. 
The terms  308.  Already Ockham, Dial.  III. tr.  2,  1.  2, c.  26, says that many 
the  derive the Emperor's '  plenitudo potestatis ' from  Original  Contracts,  Contract 
of Subjec-  since '  humana  societas servare  tenetur ad quod se obligavit ' :  'sed 
societas  humana  obligat  se  ad obediendum  generaliter  regibus  et 
multo  magis  imperatori';  this appears from the words of  Augustine 
[above, Note 3061.  Ockham himself, however, opines (c.  28 in fie) 
that  this Padurn secured  obedience  only 'in his quae ad utilitatem 
comrnunem proficiunt.'  Comp. Aen. Sylv. 1.  c. 
309.  See Dante, I.  c.  3; Ockham, Dial.  III.  tr.  2,  1.  2,  c.  28. 
Limitation  310.  So when  Dante (above,  Note  6) makes  the institution  of 
of the 
work  of  an 'universalis  pax'  the aim  and object  of  the Empire.  So when 
Engelbert of  Volkersdorf  (De ortu, c.  7-13)  finds the object of  the the State 
State in the '  felicitas regni,' and, having  mentioned  its components, $:Zen- 
finally  (c.  14) sums them  all up in the one idea of  'pax,'  and else- ance of 
Peace and  where (c.  19) simply identifies the 'ordinatio  et conservatio pacis  et La,a 
iustitiae'  with  the  object  of  the State.  So also  when  Gerson,  IV. 
p.  649,  does the like.  And  so,  again,  when  Petrus  de Andlo,  11. 
c.  16-18,  mentions the 'cura totius reipublicae' as the State's object, 
but, when  it comes to particulars,  mentions  only the administration 
of  justice,  the  preservation  of  the  peace  and  the  protection  of 
religion. 
311.  See, e.g.,  Thom. Aquin. De reg. princ.  I. c.  14 : the object Final 
of  the State is life according to virtue ;  but  the '  virtus  humana ' of Causes of  State and 
tbe '  multitudo,' which is to be realized  by the '  regimen humanurn,' church. 
is  itself  but  means to that other-worldly purpose which  the Church 
has to promote by  realizing  the  'virtus  divina.'  See also c.  7-15, 
and  Sum.  Theol.  11.  I, q.  90,  a.  2.  On  the  other  hand,  in  his 
Commentary on the Politics he simply follows Aristotle : see Op. xxr. 
pp.  307 E,  400,  402, 424, 469,  634 ff., 678 ff.  Compare  Ptol.  Luc. 
1x1.  c.  3, and  IV.  c.  23; Aegid. Rom. III.  I, c.  1-2,  III.  2,  c.  8  and 
32;  Eng.  Volk.  De reg.  princ.  11.  c.  2-4;  Anton.  Ros.  I.  c.  46 
and  56. 
312.  Joh. Paris. c.  18 : since  the virtuous  life (vivere secundum Extension 
virtutem) is the object of  the State, it is untrue 'quod potestas regalis $:ZS 
sit  corporalis  et non  spiritualis et habeat  curam  corporum  et non Province 
animarum.'  Somn. Virid. I.  c.  154-5.  Gerson, in Schwab, p. 85 K-  &fl,itual 
For  the  rest,  even  Alvarius  Pelagius,  I.  a.  56,  confesses  that  the Direction. 
temporal  power,  since its object is the 'vita  virtuosa,' has to work 
upon  the  'anima,'  and  to  that  extent  is  'spiritualis':  it  works, 
' however, only 'secundum  naturam,' while the spiritual power  works 
'  secundum gratiam '  and therefore is '  spiritualis ' by  preeminence. 
313.  Mars.  Pat. I.  c.  4-6  ascribes  to the State a solicitude for Spiritual 
the  'bene  vivereJ both  on  earth  and  in heaven,  and  therefore  a Aims Of  the State. 
widely extended  care  for  morals  and general  welfare.  Patric. Sen. 
De inst. reip.  claims  for the government  the whole  'vita  familiaris ' 
(allotment  of  land  and  settlement  of  families,  lib.  IV.), the  'vita 
civilis' of  every citizen  (lib. v.),  the ordering of  the Estates of  men 
(lib. VI.),  nay, even the duty of  seeing  that the citizens receive none 
but  beautiful  (of  course  they would  be classical) names (lib.  VI.  7, 
PP.  298-304). 
314.  See Thom.  Aquin.  De reg.  princ I.  c.  I ; Engelb.  Volk 
De reg.  princ.  I.  c.  1-4;  Dante,  I.  c.  5; Alv.  Pelag.  I.  a.  62 B; 
Joh.  Paris. c. I. 190  PoZiticnZ  Theories of the Mia'dZe  Age. 
Lessons in  315.  Such  lessons  are  given  ex  o@cio  by  John  of  Salisbury, 
the Art of 
Govern-  Aquinas,  Vincent  of  Beauvais,  Engelbert  of  Volkersdorf,  Aegidius 
merit.  Romanus, Patricius of Siena. 
The  316.  See the doctrine, deriving from Aristotle,  of  the Forms of 
Forms of  G  overnment  in  Aquin.  1.  c.  I.  c.  1-3  ;  Aegid.  Rom.  III.  2,  c.  2 ; 
ment.  itIars. Patav.  I.  c.  8-9  (with five sub-forms of  Monarchy) ;  Ockham, 
Dial. 111.  tr.  I, 1.  2,  C.  6-8  ;  Patric. Sen. De inst. reip. I. 4; Almain, 
Expos. ad q.  I, c. 5 and 15.  See also Engelb. Volk. 1.  c.  I.  c.  5-18 
who  supposes  four fundamental  forms : democratia, an'stocratia,  oli- 
crntia  (sic !) and monarchia, each with  specific jrincipium  and Jnis, 
and four degenerate forms, Qrannis, olimatia (degenerate arisfocratia), 
cZerotis  and  barbaries.  See  also  above,  Notes  131,  135,  264-5, 
283-6. 
317.  See above, Notes 269 and 287. 
318.  See above, Notes 293-6. 
Possible  319.  See  above,  Notes  136,  161  and  165.  At  this  point  we 
2%:~  may also mention the theory that a '  consilium principis ' is necessary 
archy.  and that  the law-courts should be independent:  see Eng. Volk. 111. 
c.  1-45  ;  Aegid.  Rom.  111.  c.  2,  c.  I ff.  (the pnkceps to maintain, 
the consilium to contrive, the iudices to apply, thepo$uZus  to observe, 
the laws). 
Mixed  320.  See above, Note 165.  Engelbert of  Volkersdorf (I. c. 7-8 
Constitu  and 14-16)  is the most independent teacher of this doctrine ;  out of 
tions 
his  four  fundamental  forms  he constructs  six that  are doubly, four 
that are triply, and one that is  simply compounded, and then  of  his 
fifteen forms he gives highly interesting examples from  the political 
life  of  his  time. 
321.  See above, Note 268. 
322.  See above, pp.  65 ff. 
Growth  323.  A  characteristic example  is given  by  the  doctrine  or the 
the  right  to  tax.  At  first  this  is  viewed  as  a  power  of  Expropriation  Modern 
State. The founded on and limited by  the good of the public.  [In another part 
Taxing  of  his work  (D. G.  R.  III. 389)  our  author has  spoken  of  the view  Power. 
taken by the legists :  taxation is  a  form  of  expropriation, and there- 
fore there should be a iusta causa for a tax.]  Thom. Aquin. De reg. 
Iud. q. 6-7  : the State may impose taxes for the 'communis populi 
utilitas '; but,  beyond  the  '  soliti  redditus ' (accustomed revenues), 
only  'collectae'  which  are  moderate  or  are  necessitated  by  such 
emergencies as hostile attacks should be levied:  if  these bounds are 
exceeded, there is unrighteous extortion.  Vincent. Bellov. x. c. 66-69. 
Ptol. Luc. III.  c.  11 : the king, because  of  his  duty of  caring for the 
common  weal, has a right  of  taxation, which  however is limited  by 
Notes. 
-- 
the purpose  for which  it exists:  always therefore  'de iure naturae' 
he  may  demand  'omnia  necessaria  ad  conservationem  societatis 
humanae';  but never any more.  Joh. Paris. c.  7  deduces the right 
of taxation from the fact that private property needs the protection of 
the State and its tribunals,  and therefore  should contribute; but  it 
may  be  taxed  only  'in  casu  necessitatis'  and  proportionately. 
Similarly  Somn.  Virid.  I.  140-1  : taxes  which  exceed  traditional 
practice can only be imposed in those cases  (they are specified) in 
which  the  '  necessitas  reipublicae ' requires  them ;  they  must  be 
moderate and can  only be demanded if  the Ruler's  own means are 
insufficient;  and they must  be  rightly applied; all other taxation is 
sin;  the  Church  should  punish  it  'in  for0  conscientiae'  and,  if 
psssible,  secure redress;  and it gives  the people a  right  to refuse 
payment and even to depose the ruler.  Gerson, IV.  p.  199 and 616 : 
taxes  should  be  imposed  only for  the  purposes  of  the State and 
should  be  equal for all.  See Decius, Cons. 649, nr. 4: the prohibi- 
tion  of  the imposition  of  new  taxes  does  not  extend  to  sovereign 
cities. 
324.  In quite  modern fashion  Patric.  Sen.  I.  6  proclaims  the Equality 
equality of  all before  the law (aequalitas iuris inter cives), nay, their "L",?  the 
equal capacity for all offices and their equal civic duties. 
325.  See the statements of  civic duty, to sacrifice life and goods State and 
for the 'salus  pub1ica'-statements  influenced  by classical antiquity Citizen. 
Influence 
-in  Aen.  Sylv.  c.  18,  and  Patric.  Sen.  V.  1-10.  Also  Thom. of An- 
Aquin. Summa Theol.  11.  I, q. go, a.  2 : 'unus autem homo  est  pars tiquity' 
communitatis perfectae,'  therefore all private good is to be regulated 
only  'secundum  ordinenl  ad  bonum  commune,'  for '  omnis  pars 
ordinatur ad totum ' ;  ib. a. 3, so in relation  to the domus;  ib. 11.  2, 
q. 58, a.  5 : '  omnes qui  sub communitate  aliqua continentur,  com- 
parantur  ad communitatem  sicut  partes  ad  totum;  pars  autem  id 
quod est totius est ;  unde et quodlibet bonum partis est ordinabile in 
bonum  totius.'  Joh.  Friburg.  11.  t.  5, q.  204:  duty of  paying  taxes 
incumbent  on  every one as 'pars multitudinis'  and therefore  'pars 
totius' 
326.  Marsilius in his  Defensor  Pacis expressly declares that the The 
Church  is  a State  Institution and that  the sacerdotium is  'pars et Ft2jE 
officium  civitatis'  (I. c.  5-6).  Sovereign in things  ecclesiastical is tion of 
the '  universitas  fidelium,'  which, however, coincides with  the '  uni- gz~~  in 
versitas  civium'  and  in  this  respect,  as  in  all  other  matters,  is 
represented by thejrinc$ans  whom it has instituted, so that the line 
between Spiritual and Temporal is always a line between two classes 
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14, 17, 18, 21).  The State Power imposes conditions  for admission 
to the sacerdolium, regulates the functions of the piesthood, fixes the 
number of  churches and spiritual offices (11.  c.  8; III.  concl.  I 2 and 
21).  It authorizes  ecclesiastical  foundations  and corporations  (11. 
c. 17).  It appoints the individual clergyman, pays him, obliges him 
to a performance of  duties, removes him, nay, its consent is necessary 
to every ordination  (11.  c.  17, 24;  III.  21, 40, 41).  It watches  over 
the exercise of  every spiritual office, to see that it is strictly confined 
to purely  spiritual  affairs  (I.  19;  11.  1-10),  All  iurisdiclio  and 
potestas  coactiva  are  exercised  immediately  and  exclusively by  the 
wielder of  temporal power, even if  clerical persons are concerned, or 
matrimonial causes, dispensations, legitimations or  matters  of  heresy 
(11.  c.  8; III. c.  12  and 22).  Interdicts, excommunications,  canoni- 
zations,  appointments  of  fasts and feasts, require, at the very  least, 
authorization  by the State (11.  c.  7,  21 ;  111.  C.  16, 34, 35).  Only on 
the ground  of  express  commission from the State is it conceivable 
that  the churches should have any worldly  powers or the decretals 
any worldly force (I. c.  12 ; 11.  c.  28;  III.  C.  7,  13).  Education  is 
exclusively the  State's  affair  (I.  c.  21 ;  111.  c.  25).  Appeals  and 
complaints  to  the  State Power  are always permissible  (111.  c.  37). 
A11  Councils, general and particular, must be summoned and directed 
by the State (11.  c.  8, 21 ;  III. c.  33).  Church property is in part the 
State's property, and in part it is  yes  nulZius (11. c.  14).  In any case 
it is at the disposal of  the State, which thereout should provide what 
is necessary for the support  of  the clergy and for the maintenance of 
worship, and should collect and apply the residue for the relief of the 
poor  and other public purposes (11.  c.  14;  111. c.  27,  38, 39).  The 
State thelefore may freely tax it, may divert the tithes to itself, may 
give and take benefices at pleasure, and for good cause may secularize 
and sell them, 'quoniam  sua sunt et in ipsius  semper potestate  de 
iure'  (11.  c.  I 7,  2 I ;  111.  c.  27).  Only  what has  come from private 
foundations  should,  under  State  control,  'conservari,  custodiri  et 
distribui  secundum  donantis  vel  legantis  intentionem ' (11.  c.  14, 
17 ;  III.  c.  28). 
327-  Joh.  Paris.  c.  21,  pp.  203-5  : lest enim  licitum  principi 
abusum  gladii  spiritualis  repellere  eo  mod?  quo  potest,  etiam  per 
gladium  materialem : praecipue ubi  abusus gladii spiritualis vergit in 
malum reipublicae, cuius cura regi incumbit.' 
328.  Thus in  Disput.  inter  mil. et cler. pp.  682-6  and S~mn. 
Virid. c. 21-22,  where the confiscation of  church property is justified 
(with a strong premonitory suggestion of the 'proprietb de la nation'), 
since the weal and peace  of  Christian folk certainly are 'pious uses.' 
Notes. 
Cornp. Joh. Wiclif, Trial p. 407 ff. art. I 7, and Joh. Hus, Determinatio 
de ablatione temporalium a clericis, in Gold. I.  pp. 232-42,  where the 
right to  secularize church  property, at all  events in case of  abuse, is 
deduced  from  the  nature of  government  and the subjection of  the 
clergy.  Joh.  Paris.  c.  20,  p.  203 ;  Nic.  Cus.  III.  c.  39  and others 
argue  in  the same manner for  the State's  right  to tax ecclesiastical 
property.  So too Quaest. in utramque  part. p.  106, ad 17, touching 
statutes  of  mortmain. 
329.  Comp.  Nic.  Cus.  111.  c.  8-24,  33 and 40: the temporal The 
power  is  to  take  in hand ecclesiastical  affairs  and to demand and 
control their reformation, for (11.  c.  40) to the State belongs  the care reform the 
of  all things pertaining 'ad bonum  publicum,' and this is so 'etiam Church. 
in  ecclesiasticis  negotiis.'  Gregor.  Heimb.  in Gold. I. pp.  559-60. 
Peter Bertrand ib.  11.  pp.  1261-83.  Patric. Sen. III. 4.  As  to the 
practical treatment of  the Reform of  the Church as an affair of  the 
State, see Hiibler, op. cit. pp.  281-8  and 318-22. 
330.  The maxim  'ius  publicum  est  in sacris,  sacerdotibus  et IUS 
magistratibus' was  applied  by  the prevailing doctrine  as  a  proof  of ~~~~~~I~S 
the state-like  nature of  the Church;  see Thom. Aquin. Sum. Theol. Publicurn. 
11.  I, q.  95, a.  4.  But already Ockham,  Octo q.  IV.  c.  6, says that 
many infer from this text that the Emperor '  possit ordinare apostoli- 
cam  sedem  et  archiepiscopos  et  episcopos,'  and  also  that  no 
renunciation  of  such  a  'ius  publicum'  can  have  been  valid. 
331.  See above, Notes 62-64. 
332.  Thom. Aquin.  De reg. princ. I.  c. I in fine, Summa Theol. Definition 
11.  I, q.  go,  a.  2-3  (civitas  est  commiulitas  perfecta),  Comm.  ad  the 
State. 
Polit.  p.  366 f. ; Aegid.  Rom.  III.  I,  C.  I  (principalissima  com- 
munitas), c.  4,  III.  2,  c.  32 ;  Joh.  Paris.  c.  I ;  Eng.  Volk.  De reg. 
princ.  11.  c.  2-3  ;  Mars.  Pat.  I.  c.  4  (perfecta  communitas omnem 
habens terminurn  per  se sufficientiae);  Ockham, Dial. III. tr. I, 1.  2, 
c. 3-5. 
333.  Thus Thom.  Aquin.  De reg.  pr.  I.  c.  I  sees civitas, pro- State, 
vincia,  regnum,  in  an  ascending  scale  of  self-sufficiency (per  se 
Empire, 
sufficiens esse).  Ptol.  LUC.  III.  C.  10-22  and IV.  C.  1-28  places Civitas. 
the priest-kingly, the kingly  (including  the imperial),  the  'political,' 
and the domestic as four grades of  Lordship, and in so doing applies 
the name politia  to the civitates which have  been  expressly defined 
(IV. c.  I) as cities that in some points are subject to the Emperor or 
King;  but he then proceeds  to use  civitas now in this and now in a 
more general sense.  The procedure of Aegidius Romanus is clearer: 
for him the civitas is the '  principalissima communitas' only <respectu 
don~us  et vici ' ;  the '  cornmunitas  regni ' is yet '  prin~i~alior,'  being 
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related  to civitns as civitas to vicus and domus (111.  I, c.  I); also he 
declares it highly necessary that, to secure their internal and external 
(finis  et  complementum),  various  cizlitates  should  be 
united in  the body of  one regnun1 or  in a  co?$oedeyatio  sub uno rege 
(111.  I, C.  4-5  ;  compare 11.  I,  c.  2  and  III.  2,  c.  32).  Similarly 
Ockham,  Dial.  III.  tr.  I, 1.  2,  c.  5 : the '  civitas ' is '  principalissima 
olnnium con~munitatum,' but  only  of  those  'simul  in  eodem  loco 
habitantes';  for  the rest, it  is  subordinated to some ducuks or some 
rVLum, which in its turn may be subordinate.  In the passages cited 
in Note 64 Dante, Engelbert  of  Volkersdorf, Augustinus Triumphus 
and Antonius Rosellus presuppose as matter of  course that the civifas 
will be completed by some regnufn and this by the imperium. 
334.  See above,  Notes  ~gg  lf.  Lupold  of  Bebenburg  at  this 
point  adheres  closely  to  the  legists;  for  him  (c.  15)  kings  are 
magistratus  maiores '  who  differ from '  praesides  provinciae ' merely 
by  being  hereditary,  and who  in  strictness owe  their  places  to an 
imperial  appointment made  by  way  of  'tacit  consent':  so also  all 
lower  '  magistratus ' and  the  governors  of  '  universitates,  castra, 
villae.' 
335.  See the definition of civitas along with urh, oflidurn,  villa, 
castrum, etc. in Joh. And. c.  17  in Sexto 5, I I and c.  I 7 in  Sexto  I, 
6,  nr.  7;  Dom.  Gem. c.  17 in  Sexto, 5,  11, nr.  3-4;  Phil.  Franch. 
eod. c.  nr.  4-5  ;  Archid.  c.  56, C.  12,  q.  z ;  Barth. Caep. 1.  2,  pr. 
Dig.  de V.  S.  nr.  1-28;  Vocab.  Iuris v.  civitas;  Baldus, 1.  5,  Dig. 
I,  I ;  Barthol.  1.  I, §  12,  Dig.  39,  I ;  Ludov.  Rom.  1.  I, § 12,  Dig. 
39, I, nr.  12-17;  Jason, 1.  73, § I, de leg. I.  nr.  1-9;  Marcus, Dec. 
I.  q.  365  and  366.  The favourite  definitions  of  civitas leave  quite 
open  the  question  whether  the  State or  a  commune is  intended: 
thus, e.g.,  '  civium unitas '  or '  hominum  multitudo societatis vinculo 
adunata ad simul iure vivendum ' or '  humanae  multitudinis  coetus 
iuris consensu et concordi communione sociatus,' and so forth. 
336.  Baldus, Const. I. Dig. pr.  nr. 8 : the respublica is sometimes 
Rome, sometimes '  totum  imperium,'  sometimes  'quaelibet  civitasY  ; 
Cons. v c. 336; Jason, 1.  71,  $ 5, Dig. de leg. I.  nr. 29;  Barth. Salic. 
1.  4, Cod.  2,  54; Decius,  Cons.  360,  403,  468,  564,  638;  Joh.  de 
Platea, 1.  un.  Cod.  11,  21, nr.  5; Bertach. v.  respublica.  Men  help 
themselves  out  of  difficulties by  the  confession that  they are using 
words '  improprie.'  [Dr  Gierke refers to earlier pages in his book in 
which he has dealt with the usage of  the glossators (D. G. R. III. 201) 
and later  legists  (ib. 358).  Of  the glossators he  says that they en- 
deavour  to regard  the  Empire  as the  only  true  uespubLica  and  to 
maintain that all smaller communities stand 'loco privatorum '; but, 
under  the  shelter  of  a  use  of  words  which  they  admit  to  be 
Notes.  I95 
'improper,'  they  practically  concede  political  rights  to civic  com- 
munities.] 
337.  This  is the  procedure  of  John  of  Paris,  C.  r,  and other The State 
Frenchmen, who  treat  'the  Realm'  (regnum) as the abstract State ::$!'foose 
and  utterly  deny  the  imperiunz  mundi  (above,  Note  61).  So also from the 
Mars. Pat. and Patric. Sen. (I.  3 ff.) without further definition.  Empire. 
338.  [At this point Dr Gierke refers to earlier parts  of  his  book Communi- 
t~es  which  in which  he has illustrated the slow emergence in legal theory of  a do and 
line  similar  to that  which  moderns  draw  between  State and  Com- Commnni- 
mune.  The process takes the form of a division of corporations into ~~~~h 
two classes : namely, those that  do and those that do not 'recognize  recognize 
a Supe- 
a superior.'  He cites (D.  G.  R.  III.  p.  382) the following passage rior. 
from  Bartolus, 1.  7,  Dig. 48,  I, nr.  14: cum  quaelibet  civitas  Italiae 
hodie,  praecipue  in  Tuscia,  dominum  non  recognoscit,  in  seipsa 
habet  liberum  populum  et  habet  merum  imperium  in  seipsa  et 
tantam potestatem  habet  in populo  quantum Imperator in universo. 
Then  the  'universitas  superiorem  non  recognoscens'  began  to be 
regarded  as  being  de faclo,  if  not  de  iure,  the  respublica  and the 
civitas (or, in modern terms, the State) of  the Roman texts.  But the 
process  was  gradual.  The  universitas  which  does  'recognize  a 
superior'  will  have  iurisdictio,  and  imperium  can  be  acquired  by 
privilege  or  prescription.  After  the  days  of  Bartolus,  says  our 
author,  we  are often  given  to  understand  that  little  importance is 
attached to the old  dispute as to whether  communities can acquire 
sovereignty de iure as well as de facto.  He  cites Panormitanus (c. 7, 
X. I, 2,  nr.  6) for  the admission that sovereign kings and cities have 
imperial rights in their territories.] 
339.  Paul. Castr. on 1.  I, $5  1-3,  Dig. 3, 4, nr. I, 1.  5, Dig. I, I, No Com- 
lect.  2,  1.  86,  Dig.  29,  2,  nr.  3,  expressly  says  that,  according to 
modern law, every 'populus  superiorem non recognoscens'  has a real State and 
and  true  respubli~a of  its  own,  and  other  communes  have  'largo Only  munes 
mod0 rempublicam,'  while other collegia are only '  pal tes reipublicae,'  below The 
though  they have  a  certain  llkeness  (similitude) to republics.  Simi- 
larly  Jason,  1.  19,  Cod.  I,  2,  nr.  15,  and 1.  I,  Dig.  2,  I,  nr.  18. 
Therefore the  notion  of  a $sczcs  is  claimed  for  every  community 
which  does  not  recognize  a  Superior  and denied to other  groups. 
Baldus, 1.  I, Dig.  I, 8, nr.  19, 1.  I, Cod. 4, 39, nr.  22 ;  Hippol.  Mars. 
1.  ult. Cod. 3,  13, nr. 189 ;  Lud.  Rom. Cons.  I I I ;  Bertach. v.  &us 
dicitur and v. civitas, nr.  23, 46, 133, 135-7  ;  Marcus, Dec. I.  q. 234 
and 339. 
340.  AS  to the lack  that  there  is  in  medieval  theory  of  any Federal 
concept  of  a  Federal  State  (Bundessfaatsbegrzf),  see  S.  Brie,  der States. Political  Theories of the MiddGe  Age. 
Bundesstaat, I.  Leipz.  1874, p.  12  ff.  If,  besides  alliances,  mention 
is made of  permanent '  ligae et confoederationes '  between '  corpora' 
and 'universitates'  (Bartol.  on 1.  4, Dig. 47,  22, nr.  6-11  ;  Baldus, 
s.  pac.  Const.  v.  ego,  nr.  I; Angel.  Cons.  269,  nr.  1-2)  these  are 
considered  to have no political quality but to belong to the domain 
of Corporation Law. 
Resistance  341.  In the Church the writers of  the Conciliar Party resist the 
the  trend which is to be seen in the doctrine of  the Pope's 
Central- 
izing Idea  Universal  Episcopate  (as set forth,  e.g.,  by  Augustinus  Triumphus, 
The  I.  q.  19, Alvarius  Pelagius  and Turrecremata,  De pot.  pap.  c. 65), 
State. 
and in  the derivation  of  the rights  of  all  other  Churches from the 
right  of  the Roman Church (Dom. Gem. Cons. 14, nr.  2-4  and 74, 
nr.  3-6),  and in  the assertion  of  the Pope's  power  of  disposition 
over the rights of all particular Churches (Decius, Cons. 341, nr. 8-9: 
papa  potest  dominium  et ius  quaesitum  alicui  ecclesiae  etiam  sine 
causa auferre), and so forth.  See Joh.  Paris. c.  6; Petr. de Alliac. in 
Gers. Op. I.  pp.  666 ff.  and 692 and De eccl. pot. 11.  c. I ;  Gerson, 
11.  p.  256, for the defence on principle  of  the rights of  the particular 
Churches;  and,  for  profounder  treatment,  see  Nic.  Cus.  11.  c.  13, 
22-28;  also  above,  Notes  89,  go.  In the State,  besides  Dante, 
Cusanus and Ant. Rosellus (above, Notes 62-64),  who hold fast the 
medieval  thought  of  a  Community  comprising  All  Mankind,  even 
Marsilius, 11.  c.  24, upholds both in State and Church the principle 
of  mediate  organic  articulation  (above,  Note  89).  According  to 
Ockham,  Dial.  III.  tr.  2,  1.  I.  c.  30,  even  'ipsa  tota  communitas 
Romanorum'  ought  not  to invade  the 'iura  partialia  Romanorum 
personarum  vel congregationum  seu collegiorum aut communitatum 
particularium.'  Comp.  ib.  I,  2,  c.  28 : '  quaelibet  privata  persona 
et  quodlibet  particulare  collegium  est  pars  totius  communitatis, 
et  ideo  bonum  cuiuslibet  privatae  personae  et  cuiuslibet  par- 
ticularis  collegii  est  bonum  totius  communitatis.'  See  also  Paris 
de Puteo,  Tr.  de  Synd.  p.  40,  nr.  20:  Princeps  sine causa  non 
tollit  universitati  publicum  vel  commune  sicut  nec  rem  privati:  it 
would be rapifla.  Also we  often hear, as part of Aristotle's  teaching, 
that the suppression  of  'sodalitates  et congregationes' is a  mark  of 
Tyranny,  whereas  the  'verus  rex'  would  have  his  subjects  'con- 
foederatos  et coniunctos ':  Aegid. Rom. 111.'  2, c.  10 ;  Thom. Aquin. 
De reg. princ. I.  c.  3; Somn. Virid. c. 134;  Gerson,  IV.  p.  600. 
Political  342.  Of  the writers of  this group Ptolemy of  Lucca is the only 
Theory 
and Feu-  One  who  comes to close quarters with  Feudalism:  he develops  the 
ddim.  thought that while salaried offices are best adapted to a Republic, in- 
feudated offices suit a Monarchy:  11.  c. 10; and compare 111. c. 2 1-2  2. 
Notes.  I97 
343.  Towards  this  result  both  the  doctrine  of  the  Prince's  AI~  other 
'plenitude of  power' and the doctrine  of  Popular  Sovereignty were derived  Power is  by 
tending.  Aeneas Sylvius, c.  14-23,  gives to it its sharpest form  for Delega- 
the  Kaiser's  benefit.  He goes  so  far  as to declare that an appeal ~~~~~~n 
from  Emperor  to  Emperor  and  Princes  is  impossible,  and  the Power. 
attempt is laesa  maiestas;  for the 'imperator  cum  principibus'  can 
do no  more  than  the '  imperator  solus '  :-'  amat  enim  unitatem 
suprema potestas.' 
344.  See  the  notion  of  office  entertained  by  the  Emperor Early 
Frederick 11.  as formulated in Petr.  de Vin. III. 68 : For the fulfil- 2,":ia1- 
ment  of  our  divine  mission  we  must  appoint  officers,  'quia  non 
possumus  per  universas  mundi  partes  personaliter  interesse,  licet 
simus potentialiter  ubique  nos';  the officers  are rightly  'ad  actum 
deducere.. .quod  in potenfia gerimus  per  eos  velut  ministros.'  See 
also ib. v. c. I ff.,  100-2,  VI.  C.  19, 21-23.  AS to the transformation 
by  the  Hohenstaufen  of  the infeudated  offices  in  Italy see Ficker, 
Forschungen,  11.  pp.  277,  472 ff.,  477 ff.  See  also  the  notion  of 
08cizmz in Thom. Aquin.  De reg.  princ.  I.  C.  15 ;  Mars. Pat. I.  c. 5, 
7, 15 (the institution of offices and the definition of spheres of  official 
competence  are  matters for  the legislature;  the appointment,  cor- 
rection,  payment  of  officers  are matters  for  the  executive  power). 
Patric. Sen. III.  1-1  2. 
345.  Thus, e.g.,  Petr. de Andlo,  I.  c.  12,  relying  on  the maxim proceeds  All Power 
'contra  absolutam  potestatem  principis  non  potest  praescribi,'  ex- fro,  and 
pressly says that the Emperor can  withdraw all  public powers from is  cable  revo-  by 
any  commune  or corporation,  no  matter  the  longest  usage.  He  the State. 
recommends  that  this  be  done in  the case  of  jurisdictional  rights, 
more  especially in  matters of  life and linib,  vested  in 'plures  com- 
munitates, imo castella et exiguae villae  terrarum, ubi per  simplicis- 
simos rusticos  ius  reddi  consuevit.'-Compare  also the rejection of 
'autonomy'  in Aegid.  Rom.  III.  2,  c.  27,  and indirectly  in  Thom. 
Aquin. Summa Theol. 11.  I, q.  go, a. 3 ;  also the power that Marsilius 
accords to the State over ecclesiastical collegia (11. c.  21 and III. c. 29) 
and  foundations  (11.  c.  17,  21,  and  111.  c.  28).  And  see  above, 
Note  324. 